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Edition 14

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Editors' Note

Edition 14 of Interesting Journal is made up of 18 pieces of work from the University of Auckland Faculty of Arts. This collection consists of independent academic works that have been written by students during Semesters One and Two 2022, Summer School 2023, or Semester One 2023. All works have been peer-reviewed by our editorial team, and reviewed by a University of Auckland staff member who taught or marked the course that produced each work and are experts in each respective field.

As the world slowly returns into something resembling normalcy, or at least, a kind of 'new normal', we have continued the slow, meticulous process of reading and reviewing numerous essays—thankfully, no longer constrained by the pandemic for the first time in years. Writing this year's Editor's Note reminds me how grateful I am for the return of our in-person annual editorial selection meetings, even if we have to skip the potluck meals of previous years and settle for a hybrid zoom meeting. Our team this year is also smaller than previous years, though no less passionate about the essays we have received. Continuing our recent tradition of acknowledging the people at the centre of this journal, I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to our team: my fellow Editor-in-Chief Katie, and our 2023 editorial and graphic design team: Amir, Catriona, Midori, and Rayna.

Interesting Journal has always strived to highlight only the most outstanding and interesting student work. It's difficult to explain precisely what makes an essay 'interesting'; often, it's a mere instinctual feeling or recognition upon reading something for the first time. The closest I can muster to an explanation is that the works we gravitate towards are fundamentally driven by a sense of both creativity and curiosity. Whether deliberately or unconsciously, these works grapple with the most rudimentary, urgent question that seems to underpin the broad spectrum of all Arts disciplines which is: who are we, as individuals, a society, a culture, and collectively as humanity? The essays featured in this year's edition remain as broad as ever, yet all interrogate this essential question in some way. This year, we've also veered away from our usual emphasis on purely undergraduate work to include a handful of arts scholars' capstone projects and a postgraduate essay that capture this same feeling.

This edition opens with a chapter comprising a beautifully diverse range of essays and creative works that muses on the essence of human experience and artistic expression. Our next chapter explores the double-edged sword of cultural messaging, while touching on issues of perception, perspective, and individual expression. We then turn to a chapter on politics and rebellion that ruminates upon various ideological, political, and historical threads and tensions— in particular, highlighting the intertwinement of different axes of oppression. Our fourth chapter counters this discussion of oppression and difference, as it explores themes of connection even amidst crisis, across housing, justice, and the climate. Finally, in a fitting contrast to our opening chapter on human thought and creativity, we close this edition with a chapter on ethics and AI, with a collection of brilliant essays that explore ethical issues surrounding psychological research, and AI's capacity to simultaneously reflect our flaws and exciting possibilities for the future.

As always, we hope that this year's edition can offer you something of value— whether it is a brief escape into the world of art and literature, or an illuminating window into another worldview or perspective. Above all, we hope that the thoughts, research, and knowledge shared within these pages provoke and inspire you to continue moving through the world with both creativity and curiosity.

The IJ team would like to thank everyone at the Faculty of Arts Student Development and Engagement Team for their support. We also thank the Dean of Arts, Professor Robert Greenberg, for his continued support of the journal, and all the members of staff who agreed to review and provide feedback on all the publications in Edition 14, as part of our peer review process.

Jacca Chang, Co-Editor-in-Chief

NAVIGATING THE HEART OF ARTISTIC EXPRESSION AND HUMAN EXPERIENCE: ART AND CREATIVITY

If the past few years have reminded us of anything, it is that art remains a defining and necessary facet of human experience and identity. Whether as a form of escape, a channel for personal expression, or a commemoration of shared values and history, art touches all of our lives. These essays remind us that irrespective of its medium or perspective, it is art alone that can simultaneously bridge impossible divides, like past and present, while illuminating universal truths and our hidden, innermost thoughts, dreams, and desires.

The chapter opens with Mokaraka's beautiful, dual-layered creative work, consisting of an essay and pseudo-silent film screenplay reimagining an excerpt of Frederick E. Maning's semi-autobiographical work. The screenplay, centred around the interactions between an old Pakeha man and a rangatira, muses upon issues of history and identity— in particular, one's 'fallibility to the passing of time'. A series of hauntingly beautiful, black and white watercolours accompany the screenplay and amplify the gothic-like atmosphere of Mokaraka's writing. Mokaraka's work ultimately underscores the destructive, yet inevitable, steady march of time, and illuminates the intense internal and external conflict that can emerge from this realisation.

Leaning further into the visual arts, Jimenez Hambuch's stunning hand-drawn comic and corresponding analytical essay, offers a different perspective on cyclical narratives bound by time, as he explores the debilitating cycle of addiction. Through careful attention to detail, Jimenez Hambuch depicts a young man's relapse and attempts to break free from his smoking addiction. Jimenez Hambuch examines how the cycle of addiction can be both fragile— broken or perpetuated at any moment by a single decision— yet incredibly difficult to escape. Crucially, Jimenez Hambuch's work offers nuanced, valuable insights into the artistic process, as his analysis of the comic highlights the painstaking detail behind every stylistic choice, lifting the veil to remind us of the artist that sits behind the artwork we see.

Our third essay takes a detour away from the visual medium of film and comics into the world of music. Rowe presents a comprehensive and thought-provoking essay on the Suzuki method, a music philosophy that places heavy emphasis on immersion to learn music. Rowe examines how the Suzuki method likens learning music to learning a new language, encouraging students to learn by ear and spend time thoroughly immersed in the 'language of music'. Like Jimenez Hambuch, Rowe directs our attention to the more technical aspects of art and the artistic process, reaffirming the centrality of the artist to any art piece.

The chapter's final essay and attached trio of poems returns us to the realm of literature and writing. Lindeman's sophisticated and elegantly written essay emphasises that works from classical antiquity are far from rigid, historical artefacts, but are valuable and interesting *because* our interpretations of them can reveal startling connections between the past and present. Lindeman's poetry exemplifies this, as she reimagines the stories of three mythological women who have developed god-like legacies in the modern era. Through her work, Lindeman ruminates upon the essence of creativity as being 'enraptured by the beauty of the world', suggesting that art is fundamentally a human expression of what is beautiful about the world.

Above all, the essays and creative works in this section not only interrogate, but exemplify the essence of creativity. With the rise of AI art, the interrogation of artistic expression, and issues of authenticity and creativity have only become more relevant. The works in this section do not necessarily provide answers to these tangled, complex issues, but we hope that if anything, they offer a balm or reprieve of sorts, and a reminder of the power and value of the arts.

Jacca Chang

English 221

New Zealand Literature

Kowhai Mokaraka

EXT. MANING'S HOUSE. DUSK.

The sky is darkening. The windows of Maning's house glow over the dry grass. Behind the house, in silhouette, gangly Pohutukawa sway and claw at one another. Lightning flashes, throwing the scene into relief. A pūkeko scampers across the front of the house, then disappears underneath the porch.

INT. MANING'S STUDY. NIGHT.

A single candle is lit in otherwise complete darkness. There is one desk in the centre of the small room. A white-haired man hunches over it, piles of paper around his bobbing head, the singular illumination of a flame at his elbow. His hand moves at a fluttering, furious pace across the page, occasionally pausing to dip into an ink well.

His forehead has lived at a scowl for many years. The steel rim of his glasses glints in the candlelight. He pauses to dip his pen and briefly lifts his head to glare out the window. We catch glimpses of treetops being tossed violently about in high weather through the small, white-framed window.

He bends to resume his writing. The window panes shake in their frames. The man only stoops further to the page, flicking his pen deftly along a line. The small, white framed window is blown open.

In a gust of wind, his piles of paper disperse. They fly madly around the study. The man grasps desperately at them. They begin to fly out of the open window. The man is horrified. He yells.

TITLE CARD: Help! Help! Damn and blast!

We cut to…

EXT. THE SIDE OF THE HOUSE. AT THE SAME MOMENT.

The rain begins. Heavy and unavoidable. The Rangatira is sitting on a fallen puriri tree. He is unaffected by the rain. Unaffected by time, he is as old as he was when Maning knew him. He watches from several metres as Maning's papers fly out of the window. We see Maning reaching out of his window. With a mixture of bemusement and sympathy, he calls out to Maning.

TITLE CARD: Aue! Aue! Were they important?

Maning looks across the grass to him. In the half-light, the Rangatira bears a resemblance to the Pohutukawa trees swaying behind him.

He is holding his taiaha loosely in one hand, in the other he makes darting swipes at passing papers, still being whisked through the air.

Maning takes a beat, still half out of the window. Maning calls.

TITLE CARD: Come in, friend. You'll get sick.

The Rangatira peers at Maning sternly and exclaims, to no one in particular.

TITLE CARD: My Pākehā. He is looking through the window again. Come out. Let me speak with you.

Another bout of lightning flashes. Maning flinches. His hair is blown by the wind. His glasses harbour silver droplets of rain. He grips the sill. He says.

TITLE CARD: A good many things have changed since last we spoke.

Cut to…

INT. MANING'S STUDY. THE SAME MOMENT.

A gust of wind sweeps through Maning's study, upending the candle that sat at his elbow. It falls to the floor, rolling back and forth onto fallen paper. It catches alight. The edges begin to blacken and curl. Flames begin to race up the unpasted, curled edges of wallpaper.

Cut back to…

EXT. THE SIDE OF THE HOUSE.

The Rangatira stills. He solemnly declares across the lawn.

TITLE CARD: Yes, of course. But not for me.

In his stillness, the image of the Rangatira grows thin. Opaque. He begins to flicker in and out of vision. Maning leans out of the window, straining to keep him in sight. The Rangatira quickly starts forth in motion, his image growing vibrant again. He becomes many. Several versions of him appear in flashes across the grass. Moving in and out of tandem.

TITLE CARD: Why acknowledge it at all? Why give it the satisfaction.

The weatherboards of the house begin to smoulder. The rain pours down; the flames leap up and up and up. Black smoke begins to billow behind Maning. The Rangatira's eyes reflect the blaze.

TITLE CARD: E hoa. Your house is aflame.

Maning squints, confused. He replies.

TITLE CARD: Pardon me, good fellow? No, it isn't.

Abruptly, the window blows shut. Maning, hands pressed against the glass, disappears from view.

TITLE CARD: That's the spirit.

Lightning flashes once more, illuminating the black window of a house filled with smoke. A beam breaks. A part of the roof crumples in on itself.

INT. MANING'S STUDY.

Smoke covers our vision. Memories drift in silver strands through a haze of smoke. The skull in the bank. Bone glinting. A multitude of faces— his old friends, varying in expression. Figures dance in and

INT. MANING'S STUDY.

Smoke covers our vision. Memories drift in silver strands through a haze of smoke. The skull in the bank. Bone glinting. A multitude of faces— his old friends, varying in expression. Figures dance in and out of view, all unrecognisable silhouettes. The Rangatira bursts forth, poking and prodding, twirling his taiaha at the figures. But smoke covers them all. A silver lane forms over a smoky hill. A little silver boy runs over it. He is running to a little silver Maning.

TITLE CARD: My tupuna is dying.

INT. MANING'S STUDY. EARLY MORNING.

The sun has not risen yet. We see through the firmly closed window how the treetops have stilled. The trees shiver with the morning air. Maning is asleep on his desk. He is bent at an odd angle, head on the page. The candle is upright and extinguished. His papers are in order. Ink has split across the desk. Some of it is in his white hair.



TITLE CARD: And so the world goes round.

Frederick E. Maning was an early New Zealand settler in the Hokianga and later a judge in the New Zealand land court. His semi-autobiographical book "Old New Zealand" was published in 1863 under the pseudonym "A Pakeha Maori". This pseudo-silent film screenplay was prompted by a chapter of Maning's work to explore the confrontation between the author and his own fallibility to the passing of time.

Maning's work holds a conflict within it which lays the foundation for his appeal, style and the cultural implications of his work. His final sentence as the narrator in Chapter Fourteen after the Rangatira has died "and so the world goes round" captures conflict in a small, but profound way (Maning, 1863, p.222). Is it a sincere expression of resignation? Or a knowing look to the reader? Maning is cheeky and offhanded in this moment, seemingly glancing at his audience and veering on condemning the actions of the Māori as insane, but never quite giving in.

The manuscript above highlights a key aspect of Maning's style: his irreverence for human life. Maning seems to recognise that no one wants to read the moanings and groanings of an old man holding onto the past, so Maning cuts himself emotionally from his autobiography, or at least, appears to. This leads to short descriptions of ritualistic suicide as "the shrivelled old creatures were quite dead" (Maning, 1863, p.220). Such a description is how one might speak of dead mice or salad greens, not people. In this example, Meaning demonstrates how his irreverent style undercuts seemingly ridiculous situations with wry descriptions.

Maning's conflict between times is striking as he writes from a 'new' New Zealand in the 1860's, looking back to the 'old' New Zealand pre-treaty. His story of the old Rangatira is indicative of this conflict as the old man relives his 'glory days'' with his spear in Maning's garden, while Maning wistfully recalls his own. Maning's narrator farewells the old man with a measure of irreverence, being a product of his time and thus full of the follies of those who cannot catch up with the modern era. Similarly, Maning highlights the Rangatira's refusal to accept the change in combat from handheld weapons to rifles as another example of disparity between the old and the modern. The cultural implications of the 'modern' in Maning's view equates to European progress— the process of civilisation he purports to be so wary of yet is inextricably intertwined with his place in society as a settler. We cannot help but read Maning's memoir as a farewell to those 'good/bad/wild old times' and a farewell to the Māori of his time (as he writes disparagingly of their behaviours now). The attitudes of Maning's time are reflected in Dr Isaac Featherstone's sinister remark to, "smooth down…[the] dying pillow," of the Māori (Pool and Kuktai, 2011). From Maning's colonial perspective, empire and European imperialism are a steady, inevitable march in step with time itself. Although Maning is conflicted about this, he accepts it as an indisputable fact.

From where we stand today, Maning himself has been subject to the destructive force of time. Maning has become the dying Rangatira that he depicted as so passionate and vigorous in his time, but which we now view with amusement and pity for possessing such follies as empire. Now it is us, with the perspective of our modernity, that echo Maning's (1863, p. 222) final line, "and so the world goes round"— no doubt, waiting for the people of tomorrow to pay us the same regard.

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Media 222

Comics and Visual Narrative

Amir Jimenez Hambuch


Relapse
Amir Hambuch


N-NEVER AGAIN
10 PACK
JUST ONE MORE...
*SHOVE
1


DON'T DO IT!
ONE WON'T HURT...
DON'T DO IT!
DON'T GIVE IN
DON'T G
JUST THE ONE...
SNAP
2


3


WHAT
ARE
YOU
DOING?
4


YOU CAN DO THIS...
IT WON'T BE EASY...
BUT...
10 PACK
IT WILL BE WORTH IT!
5


10 PACK
NEVER LOOK BACK.
TAKE THIS ONE DAY AT A TIME
AND DON'T GIVE IN
NEVER AGAIN
6

This comic, titled *Relapse*, illustrates the cyclical nature of addiction, by following an unnamed protagonist's struggle with a smoking addiction. The comic is not concerned with the effects of smoking specifically but is more concerned with how addicts in general become overwhelmed by urges and inevitably fall into a relapse. Smoking is the focus of this narrative because it is such a common addiction often not treated as a problem until it becomes one. Using smoking as the habit in the narrative also allowed for several stylistic choices, which will be discussed in the treatment.

The story opens with the protagonist leaving his room after a relapse and taking his pack of cigarettes along. Even when outside, the urge to smoke another cigarette persists. The protagonist becomes distant from the world, as he starts succumbing to this urge. Eventually, he gives in, lighting another cigarette, now completely lost in the dark. However, as he smokes, he reflects upon what he is doing and drops the cigarette. He proceeds to throw away the pack, with one cigarette left in it, and vows to never smoke again. The ending is presented in such a way that the reader can interpret it either optimistically or see it as another empty promise echoing the same declaration at the beginning of the story. In other words, depending on reader interpretation, the cycle of the protagonist's addiction either perpetuates or breaks.

Page 1. The comic begins after the protagonist has relapsed. The first panel depicts a speech bubble reading "n-never again," uttered by the protagonist. The final panel of the comic is also a speech bubble containing a less hesitant reiteration of this promise. This is where the cycle of addiction starts and ends – not in any particular location or scene, but with the will to give in or quit. The hesitance in the protagonist's first promise foreshadows the fragility of his willpower, which inevitably results in another relapse. However, on this page he experiences a moment of clarity. This is reinforced from the third panel with the sequence of "aspect-to-aspect" transitions, which call attention to "different aspects of a place, idea, or mood" (McCloud, 1993, p.72). The first aspect focused on is a mirror, which brings forth the protagonist's moment of self-reflection. The remaining sequence of transitions emphasises aspects of the character's environment. For instance, various details signal the protagonist's smoking problem: the pack of cigarettes in his hand (with two cigarettes left), a cluttered ashtray, and a paper marked with hashes, implicitly counting the number of relapses, another being added in the following panel. The final panel of the page is taller than the rest, largely filled by a thought bubble styled as a cloud of smoke. While bubbles are typically "of oval or cloud-like shape," Saracini (2003, p.9) adds that "variations are possible and sometimes significant." In the early pages of *Relapse*, several smoke-styled thought bubbles indicate that the thoughts depicted within them are addictive, since they are styled to symbolise the substance of the addiction. In this first instance, the addictive thought occupies a great portion of the panel, even crossing over the panel's border, reflecting the overwhelming presence of the addiction in the protagonist's world. The gutter begins shifting in shade on the right side of the page, and continues to darken throughout the story's progression, which will be discussed more in depth on the treatment of Page 3.

Page 2. As the protagonist walks past an establishment and through a park, he begins to succumb to his urge to smoke. The top panel sequence mimics a cigarette icon, alluded to through a sign depicting the icon in the first panel. This particular choice of frames seeks to "connote or index the image that it encloses" (Groensteen, 2007, p.47). Illustrating this sequence in the cigarette icon emphasises how the protagonist is trapped in this addiction. As he proceeds to nurse this craving, the world begins fading around him. This starts when the people sitting outside the establishment become faceless strangers and continues with the following sequence when the park's definition becomes lighter in each panel, eventually fading

away entirely. During this sequence, the protagonist passes between panel frames and walks within the gutter. While the gutter is the "space containing all that happens between the panels" in the sequential narrative, the protagonist entering the gutter here signals that he is losing touch with the world as he passes through, reinforced by the fading definition of the content within the panels (Saracini, 2003, p. 9). Furthermore, the thought bubble merging with the gutter at the bottom of the page signals that the addiction is enveloping the protagonist. The final image of the page is not enclosed within a frame, instead showing the character lighting his cigarette, entirely lost within the dark gutter.

Page 3. The protagonist falls into a definitive relapse, lighting and smoking a cigarette. Most of this page is occupied by a dark gutter, with the exception of two panels depicting the protagonist lighting his cigarette. The most crucial detail on this page is the shade of the gutter. Saracini (2003, p.8) explains that modifying panel borders can imply the events occurring within them are doing so within dreams or memories, but this can also apply to the gutter, where explicit alterations can convey an idea or reinforce tone. The transition in the gutter's shade reflects a shift in tone, akin to Emily Carroll's work, *Through the Woods* (2014), where she uses a dark gutter to establish an ominous and unnerving atmosphere. On this page, the dark shade and vastness of the gutter evokes a hopeless atmosphere, reflecting how lost the protagonist is.

Page 4. After taking a moment to reflect upon his actions, the protagonist drops his cigarette. The page starts in the same dark gutter as on the previous page, but transitions into two panels, indicating an escape from this dark space. The notable feature of this page is that its panel layout is a 180-degree rotation of the previous page's. This is a "Leit-motif," typically recognised in cinema as the repetition of an image to stress a film's theme, used here through the repeated panel layout to reinforce the theme of cycles (Duncan, 1995, p.150).

Page 5. The protagonist starts walking toward a bin to dispose of the cigarette pack, trying to motivate himself to keep fighting this habit by assuring himself that overcoming it will be worth the struggle. The panel layout of this page is a 180-degree rotation of Page 2, with one key difference: the protagonist now walks within the panels instead of between them, and the world illustrated within them begins regaining its definition throughout the sequence. While the slant of the sequence on Page 2 reflected the world becoming distant as it faded behind the protagonist, the slant here narrows, reflecting the protagonist's clarity and focus on ridding himself of any final trigger to another relapse. While the final sequence on this page still mimics the icon for a cigarette – again alluded to through its presence in one of the sequence's panels – the protagonist's actions within the panels do not suggest he will remain trapped in the cycle of his addiction much longer.

Page 6. The protagonist throws away his remaining cigarette and walks away as it starts raining. This page is a rotation of the first page, with three panels playing significant roles as they did in their initial appearance. While the tall panel featured the addiction's overwhelming power over the protagonist on the first page, the dynamic has flipped. Now, he has control over his addiction. The first panel in the bottom sequence depicts the protagonist's reflection in a puddle of water; this is the rotated site of the panel on Page 1 in which the protagonist gazes at the mirror, illustrating another moment of self-reflection. The last panel on this page is another speech bubble, reading, as on Page 1 but with more confidence, "never again." The manipulation of panel layouts to create a cycle was inspired by John Cei Douglas's "Tick Tock," which illustrates the cycle of life, mirroring the panel layout of the first page onto the second page (Douglas). In his comic, Douglas illustrates how all life undergoes perpetual change until eventually reaching a natural conclusion, then the next generation repeats the same

cycle – a theme reinforced by the changing of seasons throughout his panels, where his first panel depicts summer and his final panel, of the same style as the first, depicts winter (Douglas). In *Relapse*, the cycle begins and ends with the protagonist promising to himself never to smoke again. However, because there is the implication of a cycle, the reader must decide whether the cycle perpetuates after this promise, or whether it has successfully been broken.

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Arts Scholars 300 A & B

Arts Scholars 3

Midori Lindeman

Transgendered Writing: Ovid and his *Heroides*

The idea of a master narrative within antiquity has guided the scholarship on classical literature for centuries. There are works which adhere to and sustain the master narrative, and then there are those which question and even oppose it. Ovid's *Heroides* sits in the latter category, with each of the female voices he adopts manipulating their literary past to serve a new and culturally subversive function (Fulkerson, 2005). This paper will engage with both scholarly and creative elements to illuminate how Ovid engages with the female voice, and how this compares to the writing of Sappho, a true female poet in antiquity.

The necessarily intertextual nature of the *Heroides* means two things: first, that Ovid's audience would benefit from a fairly strong grasp of the original myths, and second, that the stories he writes are bound by a certain extent to their literary precedents (Fulkerson, 2005). Ovid succeeded in communicating the messages he wished to without straying too far from the original narratives by using historically silent voices to question the values often idealised in classical epics (Bolton, 2009). Although Ovid, by most accounts, would be considered a 'man' writing from a 'female' perspective, it would be historically irresponsible to take any of these terms at face value. The element which ties all fifteen *heroides* together, even more significantly than their gender, is the sense of yearning, heartbreak, and powerlessness that they convey.[1] The emotions expressed by the women are not ambiguous; they are frustrated and ravenous and desperate, and it is in these moments that we must remember, each of these letters has both a male and female writer who must have been able to empathise with these emotions in some analogous way (Fulkerson, 2009).

Sappho's Poetry and Style

In the grand pantheon of classical authors, the reception of the poetess Sappho has perhaps been the most unusual, from ancient times until today (Most, 1996). The six hundred or so lines of poetry attributed to a Sappho of Lesbos are the only true window we have into the historical figure. It is my aim to return the focus to her poetry, rather than a posthumous reception, including Ovid's *Heroides* 15. When it comes to the fifteenth letter in the *Heroides*, Ovid composes in a style halfway between his usual elegy and Sappho's lyric. Lindheim (2003) phrases it as Ovid being in "artistic competition" with the poetess (p. 141).

In Sappho's own writing, she does not present men and women as two opposite identities; instead, she looks at the world in terms of what is beautiful, and what is not. In line with Platonic philosophy, Sappho's poetry is fuelled by the beautiful, which then translates into "*genesis*", or creativity (Richardson, 1943, p. 174). Her poetry is peppered with imagery of roses, perfumes, garlands, moonlight, and gold, almost like she is trying to turn the human existence that she knows into a beautiful painting. Cyril Richardson (1943) wrote that for him, the ancient Greek concept of *eros* was about creativity— being so enraptured by the beauty of the world that everything else falls away. This is precisely what Sappho communicates, and what I have attempted to emulate in my rewritings of Ovid's *Heroides*.

Breaking Through Barriers: My Aims for this Project and a Peek into Classical Reception

[1] I have limited this statement to the fifteen 'single' *Heroides*, as the themes of the 'double' *Heroides* vary too much to be included as a part of this generalisation.

In classical scholarship, both Ovid's *Heroides* and Sappho's poetry are constantly tailed by discussions of gender and sexuality. Imposing labels of twenty-first century Western culture onto the writings of Ovid and Sappho forces them into moulds that they were never meant to be in. Sappho's prolific, intense poetry touches on universal features of love that we do not have the full vocabulary for, yet translators and scholars have still historically received her poetry on the grounds of a psychology that is familiar to them (Segal, 1996; Most, 1996). Taking this into consideration, it seems that the most successful reception of her poetry arises out of an awareness of the complexities of navigating between the culture of 6th century BCE Greece, and the twenty-first century West.

According to Lorna Hardwick (2003), the purpose of classical reception is to "yield insights into the texts and contexts of ancient works…and their situation in the modern context of reception" (pp. 1-2). Classical texts should be studied as "culturally active" entities, in which being completely faithful to the source text is not as important as exploring the relationship between ancient and modern (Hardwick, 2003, p. 112). Sappho's poetry reveals a Helen, and a Hermione, and a Penelope, simply by being female-voiced. In my retellings, inspired equally by both Sappho and Ovid, it is my hope that readers will be able to experience a reception which traverses across three distinct time periods and literary styles. This is my attempt at drawing out three mythological women from Sappho's words and allowing them to express themselves via a new genre, just in the way that Ovid did, all those years ago.

Helen

Helen is one of the most well-known women from Greek mythology. Her story was popular in both Greece and Rome, though Ovid's version bears the closest resemblance to Homer's account of the Trojan War. Historically, whether as Helen of Sparta or Helen of Troy, her identity has been attached to the man in charge of her future. She was—and still is—famous for being the most beautiful woman in the world. Not much else is told about her character in the Greek epics. *Heroides XVII* is part of the double Heroides, and is written in response to a letter by Paris. Chronologically, it is part of a correspondence of letters between the two when Paris is a guest in Menelaus' palace, a few days before he will steal Helen away and spark a ten-year war (Kennedy, 1984).

1.

Aphrodite, giver of blessings,
in leading him here
you have cursed me.[2]

2.

You laid eyes on me that day
and Eros pierced you
like the sunlight pierces through the clouds.

[2] It is essentially Aphrodite's fault that Paris has set his mind on Helen, when she promised her to him.

3.

My imperishable fame,
she blinds you,
but I have known her
all my life.

4.

You seemed to me a graceless child
not a thought
for my daughter
nor Atreides[3]
nor my dear parents.

5.

I fear to be a stranger
in Ilion[4]; your people will whisper
all night long
of the affair between their Paris
and the famed adulteress.

6.

You have promised me
bracelets of gold,
sweet wine,
and chambers stained with perfumes.
But what of my home?
What of the house
of Menelaus?

7.

Your face is beautiful
to be sure
but the beauty of a good man
is hard to beat.

The wealth that you offer

[3] Menelaus; means 'Son of Atreus'.
[4] Troy.

is corroded with dishonour.[5]
I have found,
with my history,
that wealth without virtue
is but a poisonous gift.

8.

You burn me
with this letter,
your sweet-worded desires.
You dream of a fantasy that cannot last;
the winds that brought you here
will just as surely take you away.

9.

It is not easy for lady Kypris[6]
to have honoured me so exceedingly;[7]
I am the bride of Menelaus
and rightfully so.
At times like this
I wish
that was all I was.

❧ ❧ ❧

Hermione

In the aftermath of the Trojan War, Hermione, daughter of Helen and Menelaus, was married off to Pyrrhus, the cold-hearted son of Achilles. As a child, Hermione lost both her mother and her father to the antics of the Trojan prince, and, in their absence, was betrothed to her cousin, Orestes. This engagement, which Hermione characterises in *Heroides VIII* as a legitimate marriage, led to the two falling in love. Now in this letter, Hermione begs Orestes to take her back and free her from Pyrrhus.

1.

O beautiful, o graceful one,
against my will

[5] Paris has broken the sacred Greek practice of xenia, or guest-hospitality. Menelaus has invited him to his palace, and he is trying to steal his wife.
[6] Aphrodite.
[7] Naming her 'the most beautiful woman in the world'.

I have been separated
from you.[8] To my mother,
that yellow-haired Helen, you likened me;
so why do you not now
fight for my return
as my father[9] did
for his bride?

2.

You will remember
in our youth, we did these things—
many beautiful things
gathering flowers, I was
so very delicate a girl.[10]

3.

You took her from me, Kypris,[11]
she who overcame everyone in beauty
and left me, lonely child,
with one companion, that cousin.

4.

I longed for my mother, her voice
far more sweet-sounding
than a lyre;
her hair
golder than gold.

5.

Then to you, Orestes, I was given
and when we married
you put the heart
in my chest
on wings.

[8] Orestes.
[9] Menelaus, who went to Troy to fight for the return of Helen.
[10] Hermione and Orestes were betrothed to each other from when they were children.
[11] Another name for Aphrodite, who allowed Paris to take Helen from her home after the judgement of Paris.

6.

Gold-crowned Aphrodite
do not allow me
to carry on the curse of the daughters
of Tantalus.[12]

7.

Now I long and seek after
my nights and days
with you.
As long as there is breath in me
I will search.

8.

In the black sleep of night
across soft pillows,
Pyrrhus[13] reaches for me,
but I do not allow him
my sweet nectar.

That swift-footed hero[14],
a man of honour,
would surely curse his son
for taking
that which did not belong to him.[15]

9.

My darling one,
from every care
you could release me.
I have been a strong lover;
show me your strength now
and return me
to you,
my home.

[12] Helen's father, Menelaus, is descended from the titan Tantalus. The women of this bloodline (e.g. Helen, Clytemnestra) are famous for being separated from and unfaithful to their husbands, whether willingly or not.
[13] Pyrrhus was the son of Achilles who Hermione was married off to in the aftermath of the Trojan War.
[14] Achilles' most common epithet in the Iliad.
[15] Achilles was dishonored by Agamemnon during the Trojan War when the latter took his war prize, Briseis, from him unlawfully.

❧ ❧ ❧

Penelope

The Trojan War has ended, and the rest of the Greeks have made their way home. Penelope is in Ithaca with her now twenty-year-old son, her dying father-in-law, and not a clue where her husband is.[16] Suitors have come from far and wide to take her hand and the throne, and are trashing the house while Penelope weaves, day and night, to keep them at bay. Penelope has written *Heroides I* to give to the traveller who has just arrived in Ithaca, for hopes that it will reach Ulysses (Kennedy, 1984). Ovid's audience would know, of course, that she will be handing the letter directly to Ulysses himself.

1.

My darling Odysseus[17]
in my dripping pain
I yearn
for the deep sound of your voice.

2.

How I rejoiced
when I heard the news
of the other kings' return.[18]
With good luck
your sailors would gain harbour
before long.

3.

Now I wonder
for your tardiness
if I should blame the winds
or the fickleness of man[19]
or indeed some ruinous god.[20]

4.

[16] I will switch between calling him Odysseus and Ulysses depending on whether I am discussing him within a Greek or Roman text.
[17] Here I will refer to him as Odysseus, not Ulysses, because Sappho would have called him so.
[18] Penelope has heard from the travels of her son, Telemachus, of the return of the other Greek kings from the Trojan War.
[19] Infidelity.
[20] It is mainly because of a curse from Poseidon that Odysseus has not yet been able to return home, but he has also been sleeping around with other women.

Perhaps you have stumbled
upon a younger bed;
some apple-scented beauty
whose thighs melt like cream.

But shall I remind you,
o crafty Odysseus,
that I am the woman
with wisdom to match you.[21]
Not one girl I think
who looks on the light of the sun
will ever have wisdom like this.

5.

Each day I weave away
and unweave[22]
my sorrows
and the dying months.
With each passing of the loom
my heart grows colder
with the fear
you have forgotten me.

6.

Like the hyacinth
in the mountain
that the shepherd men
trample down,
so too do your stores
and kingship
wilt.[23]

7.

Return to your bride,
Laërtiades[24], now not so young;
and your son,

[21] The equal cunning of Odysseus and Penelope is a big factor for their compatibility as a couple that is mentioned time and time again in the Odyssey.
[22] Penelope has told the suitors asking for her hand in marriage that she will choose one of them when she has finished weaving the funeral-shroud for Odysseus' father. In order to delay this happening, every night she unweaves the work that she has done that day.
[23] Odysseus' palace and stores are being raided every day by the suitors.
[24] Another name for Odysseus; means 'Son of Laërtes.

now nearly a man,[25]
who searches for his father in every ship
that touches our shores.

8.

My delicate woven cloths
protect your kingdom now[26]
but they cannot last forever
against the glutton of these suitors.

9.

I pray,
Lady Hera,
let his gracious form appear
and cool my mind
which burns
with longing.

[25] Odysseus has been gone for nearly 20 years, his son only an infant when he left.
[26] see 19.

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Music 262

Music Psychology and Development

Troye Lowe

The Suzuki method is a popular music philosophy used to teach children all over the world. It was created by Shinichi Suzuki in the mid-twentieth century. Suzuki was a Japanese violinist and pedagogue, so his method was originally developed for violin, before being expanded to many other instruments. His inspiration for developing this method came from his experiences trying to learn German; he noticed that children could learn their native language far easier than he could. The Suzuki method is based on the idea that learning music is similar to learning languages. One key feature of the Suzuki method is that it delays note reading, and encourages playing by ear through imitation. After all, humans learn to speak by imitating their world before they learn to read. The Suzuki method can be split into two key areas: the teaching style, and the child's community or environment. In terms of teaching style, the method teaches playing by ear and not by note reading. In order to learn musical pieces, the student listens, imitates and memorises their teacher's playing. As for community, the method calls for a high degree of parental involvement, musical peer exposure, and listening to music at home (Suzuki Association of the Americas, 2023). This essay explores how modern music psychology and development agrees and disagrees with the Suzuki method, and any potential improvements that can be gleaned from recent research.

Musicians who learn through the Suzuki method develop excellent listening skills. These skills stem from how children are taught early on; they only play by ear and memorise the pieces. This method forces the child to rely on their ears instead of eyes, and subsequently delays the teaching of note reading. Until then, the note reading is done by the teacher who facilitates aural learning. Suzuki is not alone in this approach to music learning. Dr. Edwin Gordon, an expert of music education with his own learning theory, also recommends delaying note reading until the student develops an extensive aural vocabulary of tonal and rhythmic patterns. Gordon's music-learning theory is based on *audiation*. The term, coined by Gordon, refers to comprehending and hearing music within your thoughts. Gordon's learning model shares inspiration with Suzuki's, as he argues that "audiation is to music what thought is to language" (Azzara, 1991). When learning a new piece (under Suzuki), the teacher will scaffold the part that their student cannot do yet (note reading). This builds the student's motor skills and playing ability quickly, because their physical skills are constantly kept in the zone of proximal development (ZPD). Vygotsky, a prominent early 20th century psychologist, created the concept of ZPD, where the learner can only do things within the ZPD with the help of a mentor (Duchesne and McMaugh, 2016). A long-term consequence of delaying note reading is that students may become frustrated with the disconnect between their playing and note reading ability. Even upon learning to note read, they may still opt to use their ears instead, since there will be significantly less mental friction.

Suzuki believed that one reason why children can learn languages so naturally (eg. by ear) is because they are surrounded and immersed in the language they are learning. To replicate this immersivity with music, Suzuki's method requires the parent(s) to attend music lessons with the child, and also teach and support them at home. He also encourages group lessons and musical peer learning. Finally, Suzuki suggests that the child should expand their listening experiences by listening to classical music and Suzuki repertoire pieces at home (Suzuki Association of the Americas, 2023). In a vacuum or ideal setting, these suggestions would be good for a child's learning, but nuances in the real world would make this approach infeasible for some families due to time or money constraints. The method calls for regular home practices with heavy parental involvement. There is frequent reinforcement of skills, and a lot of music exposure. Research on the allocation of practice time also suggests that shorter, more frequent practice sessions are far more effective than one large practice (Oxendine, 1984). One

reason is because of sleep. There is strong evidence that sleep contributes significantly to the creation and maintenance of new memories (Maquet et al, 2003).

Although frequent practice is crucial for short-term improvement, there are significant long-term drawbacks. One drawback of this structured and supported practicing style is that the child may develop no sense of agency or self-discipline in their practice. The Suzuki method provides no incentive for the child to develop the self-discipline to push themselves to practice. Their music practice may lack self-strategy and planning, as the child does not need to plan out how they practice, since this is their parents' role. This is an issue because the development of strong metacognitive and monitoring skills is a critical benefit to becoming a musician. Professional musicians have more refined metacognition regarding the planning, monitoring, and evaluation of their practice (Hallam, 2001). Music learning is also known to facilitate metacognitive improvement in other academic subjects. Successful students actively plan their study and create more advanced strategies to improve in class (Weinstein and Mayer, 1986). This is an essential skill for any musician to have, but may never come to fruition if their practising method is heavily supported and overly scaffolded.

Another way the Suzuki method seeks to immerse the child in music is encouraging interactions with peers. Ideally, there are group practices with other budding musicians, allowing the children to become friends with other musical peers. When examining a child's musical development under an ecological systems model (like Bronfenbrenner), the Suzuki method represents an attempt to mould their micro- and meso-system. Bronfenbrenner's model comprises five ecological systems, ordered by their impact on the child: the micro-, meso-, exo-, macro-, and chrono-system. The microsystem contains the immediate relations of the child, like the parent(s), or close friends. The mesosystem refers to the interrelations between each microsystem aspect. Going further out, the exosystem encompasses social structures like friends of friends. Finally, the macrosystem covers larger ideas like culture and politics. Notably, the Suzuki method takes into account the most important systems that impact on the child: the micro- and meso- systems. Realistically, it would be impossible for any teaching methodology to truly affect the macrosystem, as it is not possible for it to affect social norms and political systems (Bronfenbrenner, 1977).

As mentioned above, listening to classical pieces and other Suzuki repertoire pieces is another key part of the Suzuki method. Aside from the obvious benefit of increased exposure to classical pieces and instruments, a potential, unintended consequence regards the attitude of the student. Not all students are in love with classical music, in fact, some may dislike the genre as a whole. Rentfrow and Gosling (2003) found that there was a correlation between personality traits and the music genres that people liked. In this study, classical music fell under the reflective and complex category of genre (joined by jazz, blues and folk). They found that there was a statistically significant negative correlation between social dominance orientation and liking reflective and complex music. Although this proposition is a mere generalisation that cannot apply perfectly to every individual, it nonetheless, does indicate that a child who scores higher in social dominance orientation is less likely to enjoy classical music. Why does enjoyment matter? Research has shown that for music lessons, there is a clear difference in motivation between pieces chosen by the student, versus by the teacher (Parncutt et al, 2002). These studies imply that there may be a relationship between music practice motivation and genre preference. On the macro level, the Suzuki Association could implement different Suzuki repertoires for different genres, though this would be time-consuming and expensive. A more feasible method is for the teacher to substitute the Suzuki repertoire with equivalent alternate pieces. However, this requires the teacher to be a skilled enough pedagogue to know which alternative pieces would be appropriate for a particular student. A hallmark of the Suzuki

method is that the repertoire is graded and chosen carefully, so this fix could perhaps alter the method's intrinsic character.

Although the Suzuki method has its flaws, it has excellent potential for teaching music to young children. The parallels between language learning and music learning has been supported by many other educational theorists (like Kodaly and Orff). The community aspect of the Suzuki method is excellent and there is abundant evidence that supports frequent practicing, parental and peer emphasis, and listening at home. Nonetheless, there are issues that teachers and parents should consider on a case-by-case basis. The teacher should be aware of the pitfalls of structured practice for extended periods of time, and thus encourage the child to exercise agency in how they practice. Moreover, the degree of parent and peer interactions can be time consuming and expensive which can place unnecessary strain on a family that cannot afford the time or money. The parents should keep this in mind when deciding on a music methodology for their child. The teacher should also be aware of the child's musical preferences and the extent to which their child truly enjoys the music that they play. Above all, the Suzuki method is an effective form of teaching music, and its potential issues can be easily remedied if the teacher keeps a keen eye on their progress and is prepared to implement small changes.

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We live in a time where information is disseminated on a vast scale. Yet much of what we consume, whether we are conscious of it or not, has been carefully curated to shape our views of the world in which we live. Cultural conditioning is nothing new but increasingly the reality we are presented with on our screens – the social media feeds we subscribe to, the television shows we watch or advertising we see – is manipulated to guide our response. The first two essays in this section sound a warning by highlighting how our perceptions have been moulded by the social and economic interests of the few while stigmatising any who threaten the *status quo*. A more optimistic note is offered by the final two essays in this section where fluidity of individual expression is celebrated firstly, in the online world of fangaming and lastly, in notions of masculinity in twentieth century Aotearoa.

Holly Cawdron's thought-provoking essay offers us a reminder of how much social media shapes our world, even our perceptions of mental health. Drawing on Baudrillard's study of the unreality of Disneyland lending a 'realness' to life beyond its walls, she explores how social media has colonised mental illness symptoms as a way to lend truth to the idealised images they present. The result is a blurring of the real and the unreal. Through careful and attentive analysis, Holly shows how observing these often-idealised simulations has changed how many perceive mental illness. She lauds the positive effect these posts have had on destigmatising many mental health issues but cautions that normalising these medical conditions could have the even more debilitating effect of people not addressing their cause.

Like Holly's exposé of how the normalisation of mental illness stifles interrogation into its symptoms, Briar Engel's analysis of how popular media normalises dominant social norms to ensure the *status quo* is disturbing. Briar takes as her starting point the culture industry and its ability to manipulate our perceptions of reality. She employs as her lens the popular reality television show, *The Apprentice*, and Trump's role as its host, to reveal that while it was based on a desire of social progression, it was actually carefully curated to standardise the power of the elites by presenting their ideals as the only ones worth striving for. Even more disturbingly, she shows how Trump's effective commodification of these elitist ideals through *The Apprentice* enabled him to validify his claim to actual power in 2016.

Xavier Smith's take on popular culture is an intriguing dive into the world of fangaming. This medium sits outside the culture industry explored by Holly and Briar for fangames are not made with any commercial incentive only with a wish to share experiences. Yet, by showing how the possibility of emergent narratives as a form of individualised player interpretation of video games provides gamers with a way of empathising, Xavier offers a far more optimistic portrayal of people's relationship with popular media. Taking as their subject Bagenzo's 2021 autobiographical fangame Madotsuki's Closet, they shine a light on how user generated content in the video game community has opened up a new means of queer expression and the exploration of transgender spaces.

Anna McCardle's elegant deconstruction of male stereotypes that dominated twentieth century Aotearoa offers a similar optimistic take on the power of popular culture. Taking as her starting point historian Stephanie Gibson's statement that New Zealand culture is *saturated with interest in the nature of masculinity*, Anna challenges readers to reevaluate their understanding of historical masculinity and the colonial stereotypes that were forged

through imperial ideas of race, civilisation and virility. Her essay acts as a warning against uncritical acceptance of essentialist categories. Interrogating popular culture descriptions and images of men in activities ranging from sport and manual labour to dance, she finds that the innate traits of New Zealand men were far more fluid and diverse than the tough, rugby-playing stereotypes would have one believe.

All these essays emphasise the need to look critically at information we are fed through popular media and to question our own perspectives. It is only then that we can know how much we are being played.

Catriona McCallum

Sociology 211

Sociology of Popular Culture

Holly Cawdron

The hyperreal is a fiction which seems more real than reality. This has become a clear marker of our current society. Everything from the news media's presentations of the truth to reality television which presents a "perfect" vision of our lives, to the amusement parks we visit is marked by this phenomenon of the hyperreal. But what happens when the hyperreal colonises our minds to the extent that even our mental health - what is going on in our own brains - seems even more real on screen than in our lived daily routines? Depictions of mental illness in film and television present difficulties for how we consider mental illness. Already a contentious topic even before now, social media has exacerbated the issue. Ironically it could have represented a way of disrupting the unrealistic narratives forced upon us by popular culture but instead it has taken the form of another popular culture, one on an even larger scale that transforms into the hyperreal. In this essay I will show that in acting as a way of portraying solely images and no substance, social media has enabled us to present an idealised portrayal of our lives - one seemingly indistinguishable from the truth. It stands as a pop culture form of the ethnology described by Baudrillard (1981) as a mass, self-preserving historicisation of our lives (1981). This idealised portrayal extends further than just the minutiae of our day-to-day life, however. Now we present idealised, distorted portrayals not just of what we've had for dinner, but of our experiences with mental illness.

Baudrillard (1981) identified four stages of hyperreality whereby an image firstly reflects a basic reality, then masks or perverts that basic reality, before masking the absence of a basic reality until finally bearing no resemblance to reality whatsoever. Consider the early stages of Instagram where the primary focus of the platform consisted of sharing images of one's life, such as food or travel pictures. These images, taken and posted in the infancy of social media represented the first stage of hyperreality. The second state appeared once they began to be altered, effectively improved to portray a better, more vibrant life. Then the images took on an element of pretence such as pretending to read a book in order to present an idealised aesthetic of life. Thus, the third stage of hyperreality materialised, where the basic reality (the fiction of reading a novel or eating a perfect meal) was now absent. Finally, at the fourth stage of hyperreality, a life is produced for social media. This life, wholly constructed around social media, is completely unattainable in reality. Images are edited to show figures of unrealistic proportions and unworkable schedules we supposedly adhere to. And yet this fiction becomes indistinguishable from reality: we cannot tell the difference. In aiming to make our lives reflect these unrealistic images, whether through plastic surgery, crash dieting, working an absurd number of hours, we adopt them as a new version of reality.

Awareness of image manipulation disrupts the hyperreality of social media (Tiggeman & Anderberg, 2019). Yet for many, social media still represents some version of reality, even if only on a subconscious level. The negative aspects of life depicted on social media cannot be seen as disrupting the hyperreality of the platform as they too are artefacts of popular culture. As Baudrillard wrote, "Disneyland is presented as imaginary in order to make us believe that the rest is real" (1981, p. 13). Baudrillard's analysis of Disneyland can be extrapolated onto the idealised life exhibited on social media which is presented in such a way so as to make us believe, in contrast, that the rest is real. In effect, the idealised and distorted depictions of mental illness become "real" to us as they represent individuals with "perfect lives" showing their vulnerability,

reminding us that they too are “real” people. Equally, however, these depictions of mental illness serve to provide a sense of underlying realism to the unreal images of the perfect lives presented to us. Just as idealised images of lives suggest truth in their portrayal of mental illness, images of mental illness exist to lend truth to the idealised images presented to us.

If our lives are constructed around appearing in an intrinsically unrealistic way, then we as people have become the Los Angeles described by Baudrillard: “surrounded by these imaginary stations that feed reality,” a “network of incessant, unreal circulation” - people of “incredible proportions but without space, without dimension.” (1981, p. 14)**.** Mental illness becomes something that we use to give ourselves more depth, to add an edge of realism, in an age where shallow portrayals have become the norm. We do this through the mythologisation of the tragic figure in popular culture, exemplified by our treatment of Kurt Cobain and Richey Edwards, or Ophelia and the Lisbon Sisters. This ends up as simply another way in which we create the hyperreal. Consequently, mental illness itself becomes a hyperreal phenomenon for our vision of it is shaped by popular culture. It comes from the movies we watch, the music we listen to, the books we read, the celebrities’ whose lives we follow. We know, to some extent, that our lived reality is not exactly like the movies we watch, or the music we listen to, but these factors undeniably shape our understanding of it to the extent certain myths become “real” to us. The categorisations of mental illnesses themselves are based on observing phenomena, not creating it: so, we find ourselves working from a constructed image of the “real” even at the base level.

Depictions of mental illness may be indistinguishable from actual mental illness, insofar as they mimic what is shown in popular culture. To further illustrate this point, it is worth considering Baudrillard’s example of a simulated holdup in relation to a simulated portrayal of mental illness. Just as in the case of a robbery, a “real” case of mental illness being portrayed on social media may be indistinguishable from a simulated one, as “the gestures, the signs,” are the same (Baudrillard, 1981, p. 21). The person who simulates a suicide attempt, in posting a suicide note online, creates the same effect as the genuinely suicidal person. Those who see it panic. And, like the simulated robbery which becomes a real robbery through a mixture of the real and the artificial, the simulated mental illness becomes a real mental illness through the mixture of the real and the artificial. The social stigmatisation and institutionalisation occur regardless of whether or not it is ‘real’. Essentially, the two become indistinguishable. The individual “faking” a mental illness on TikTok aligns themselves with the symptoms (as may occur in the case of misdiagnosis) and acts it out, thus it becomes part of their reality. Baudrillard refers to this simulation of illness as becoming indistinguishable from the real thing (1981).

Over the course of the initial lockdowns that occurred as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, a strange thing happened. Waves of adolescents began developing tics typical of Tourette’s Syndrome (a neurological condition), at a time when several accounts on TikTok who purported to have Tourette’s became popular (Ghorayshi & Bracken, 2023). These adolescents were found not to have any neurological abnormalities, and yet the tics persisted. On returning to school their tics disappeared. This affliction came to be described as a case of “mass psychogenic illness,” one that formed under stressful conditions. Thus, a case of reality becoming indistinct from the simulation plays out in real time. While there was no neurological basis for these individuals to be experiencing these tics, they suffered from them nonetheless. The simulation became reality, and the two were indistinguishable. Mass psychogenic illness is nothing new, but this example represents it occurring on a far broader scale than ever before. The advent of

TikTok provided far greater economies of scale for the distribution of such effects, stimulating a pop-culturification of mass psychogenic illness and a new wave of hyperreality.

Ghorayshi & Bracken's discussion above is not the only one to have interrogated the wave of TikTok-induced-tics. In fact, countless such scholarly interrogations exist. This is not unprecedented. Baudrillard posits that a successfully executed simulation of something will be more provocative, as it, unlike the real event occurring, disrupts the status quo (1981). This simulation of illness, as also recognised by Baudrillard, also poses a problem for psychology and medicine - as, "for if any symptom can be 'produced,'" then "every illness can be considered as simulatable and simulated," and thus medicine loses its meaning (1981, p.3). Here a threat is posed, because the simulated symptom remains indistinct from the real. This is where psychiatry falters. Tourette's is not the only condition to have had awareness expand massively as a result of TikTok. Nearly every commonly diagnosed mental illness has a hashtag raking in billions of views - as do many uncommonly diagnosed conditions.

At least part of the reason for this is the fact that TikTok (and nearly every other social networking site) posits itself as a place where information about mental health can be found. This information is raw, unfiltered, honest. Unlike the rest of what is on social media, it does not present a fake image. It presents the truth. Here, the paradox that befell the Loud family, the same paradox illustrated by Baudrillard, lies, by its very nature, unfiltered content cannot be presented. The TikToker or Twitter user who says they create 'honest content' about mental health cannot for no matter what they do, they will omit something or portray something in a particular way. It is impossible to live as if the camera is not there because in our society social media dominates and the panopticon manifests itself in the production of content. If the camera is watching you, you will filter yourself. Consequently, Foucault's surveillance society reaches a new stage (Gutting & Oksala, 2022). It is impossible to create content which is real, for the very nature of content on social media is inherently nothing more than a simulation.

Like the Loud family, those on TikTok who create content about mental health will create content that is "hyperreal by the very nature of its selection" (Baudrillard 1981, p. 30). The Loud family represented an idealised nuclear American family, one that had reached upper middle-class splendour and thus became the very manifestation of the American dream. It is no secret that TikTok has an algorithm that overwhelmingly favours those who are white and skinny and who look and behave in a way that fits into cishetero-normative ideals (Kung, 2022). These ideals are presented as "average," and thus, like the Loud family, their "statistical perfection" dooms their so-called-honest content to death. The same can be true for the very mental illness they depict. People will favour what is palatable to them, whether it is palatable in extremes, the very depths of mental illness in the way that people will seek out gore videos. The voyeuristic spectacle of watching a person with untreated schizophrenia, of a person lost in delusions, or of a person hellbent on destroying their own life is ever present. At the same time, they may also seek out those who present an idealised version of mental illness, a picture-perfect, perfectly palatable romanticised image of depression or social anxiety. Or individuals seek out those to whom they may most relate: the perfect "average." Thus, people inevitably slip through the gaps. A complete portrayal is never possible due to the way our social media algorithms filter and the way we self-select through confirmation bias. Its point of failure is that statistical perfection.

However, social media is not the only way that mental illness is depicted. Before social media was able to disrupt our lives to the extent it has today - and thus become perhaps the primary vehicle for the dissemination of information surrounding mental health - film and television represented a significant portion of, if not all, of the general public's understanding of mental illness and mental health conditions. No more was this apparent than in the genres of horror and thriller. Perhaps the most famous work of the genre, Alfred Hitchcock's *Psycho,* positions its villain as a caricature of a mentally ill person. Other examples of inaccurate depictions are numerous, and oftentimes they are debunked on social media, time and time over. *Rain Man* and its portrayal of autistic people as savants, *Split* and its depiction of a murderous individual with DID, *Fatal Attraction* and its demonisation of bipolar disorder. Efforts on social media to destigmatise mental illness are a positive and admirable development, but they remain limited.

In this essay I have discussed how social media in its presentation of idealised and distorted images of mental illness has played a part in 'normalising' the abnormal. I have acknowledged that it has also been used for positive effect by destigmatising mental illness, but suggested this is a minor effect compared to the harm it has done. Social media is not fundamentally better than other forms of popular culture for discussing mental health because it is still driven by capitalism. Ad revenue drives the platforms, and so social media is not exempt from the traps of other forms of popular culture. In fact, it is positioned in a far worse place, in that what is presented to us on social media, unlike the clearly fictionalised narratives shown to us on both the big and small screen, is said to be real. Social media makes an impossible promise. This promise is only further blocked by the slippery nature of the very thing it attempts to portray as real. If simulated symptoms are indistinguishable from the real, then how much is real in the first place? And, if it does not matter if they are real, social media, in normalising them, may mean we no longer interrogate the socio-political circumstances which led to them in the first place (Fisher, 2022). What we are left with is the one indisputable truth that social media and popular culture now shapes the way we talk about mental health, for better or for worse.

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Studies and Society

Briar Engel

The Apprentice and the 'Culture Industry'

Before he became President of the United States of America in 2016, Donald Trump was most well-known for being a reality television star. He produced and hosted the reality television show, *The Apprentice*, for its first fourteen seasons from 2004 to 2017. This was a show which glorified capitalism, American exceptionalism, and Trump himself. Using a favourable version of Trump's history and 'expertise' as a business magnate it commodified Trump as both an authority and a media personality. The illusion of power created by the show, combined with its spectacle and formulaic presentation of the capitalist ideals of pseudo-individualism, consumerism, and self-promotion, are in near strict adherence with the Frankfurt School theory of the 'culture industry.' Trump went from minor celebrity status to a household name, to finally gaining actual power as the US President (Fuchs, 2017). In this essay I intend to show that reality television shows like *The Apprentice*, in their commodification of capitalist and American elitist ideals, not only perpetuate the *status quo* but actively shatter the Marxist myth of the infallible proletariat. Furthermore, it was the pseudo-individualistic mentality that originated in and is perpetuated by the culture industry in producing these reality television shows that shaped the Trump presidency.

The central concept of The Apprentice is for a group of contestants to strive to become wealthy, successful entrepreneurs. Each week they compete in business related tasks overseen by Trump and his advisers. At the end of each week, Trump eliminates one person from the show, telling them, "You're fired" (Fuchs, 2017, p.59). The show is hugely popular and has generated multiple spinoffs, including *The Celebrity Apprentice*, *The Apprentice UK*, and *The Apprentice Aotearoa* (IMDb.com Inc., 2023).

The Apprentice is based on a desire for social progression. Marxist theory posits that social progress is derived from the proletariat. Furthermore, the masses will only be freed from the economic restraints of capitalism through a revolution against the upper class and the state (Schuetz, 1989). To understand why this 'revolution' failed to fully materialise in Western Europe (and, by extension, the United States) by the beginning of the twentieth century, Gramsci contended that the institutions of civil society reinforced capitalism as democratic and progressive which was sufficient to keep the masses in check. Civic institutions, particularly the military and bureaucratic aspects of governance, were "still too closely tied to the old dominant classes" to enable much social progression (Gramsci, 1932, p. 329). Moreover, these formal institutions were often reinforced by culture and media which by disguising political messaging as non-political entertainment also exercised control over the masses but in a much less overt manner (Gramsci, 1932). Thus, media and popular culture enabled the illusion of popular consensus while actually reproducing the dominant norms and values of capitalism which favoured the *status quo*.

The Frankfurt School and Adorno expanded Gramsci's thesis by positing that hegemony was propagated by the 'culture industry' through a dissemination of ruling class ideology via the mass production of entertainment and art (Adorno, 1998). Adorno contends that to be "authentic" culture needs to be critical of and resistant to "commodification and integration" (Kellner, 2012, p. 58). He argues that commercially produced culture which is "standardised, commercialised, and formulaic," which he equates to jazz music, is "in direct opposition to" such "authentic culture" (Kellner, 2012, p. 56). The same critique may be applied to reality television which is notorious for commodifying personalities and presenting unattainable fantasies as an attainable reality (Nyerges & Taveira, 2016). For example, it reproduces a progressive, democratic narrative that anyone can be a successful entrepreneur if they are

prepared to work hard enough. However, only a lucky few make it onto one of these shows, so we, as viewers, by living vicariously through these people feel we can learn from their experiences. The illusion is that not only are the contestants on *The Apprentice* in a position to learn a skill set from Trump, but we are too. This is the epitome of the meritocratic American dream. We are being given all the skills to become as successful as Trump and if we fail to utilise them it is down to our ineptitude rather than the capitalist society we live in.

Reality television perpetuates pseudo-individualism in this way. By removing the onus from the state and the elites who run it, and placing it squarely onto the individual, shows like *The Apprentice* perpetuate the myth that anyone can have access to the American dream. Yet *The Apprentice* is not about accessing the skills of its contestants nor is it about teaching its viewers how to be free from the everyday struggles associated with living under capitalism. Instead, it feeds on the masses' longing to escape the mundanity of their everyday lives to bump up the show's ratings and, by association, raise advertising revenue. However, since the alternative it offers is "molded after those psychological attitudes to which [the masses'] workday world exclusively habituates them", not the opposite, hegemony continues (Adorno, 1998, pp. 205-206). Thus, the messages of meritocracy and the attainability of increased social status through hard work promoted by *The Apprentice* to the public are actually subtle reinforcements of the current *status quo* driven by the very capitalist system that perpetuates the dominant norms and values of the establishment.

Consequently, reality television appears progressive but aligns with the Frankfurt School's ideas of unchallenging, repetitive culture that turns its viewers into cultural dupes. Moreover, the further we regress into this mass culture, the further we stray from revolution and the ability to genuinely escape capitalist society's hardships. It may seem incongruous to suggest that reality television shows like *The Apprentice* are so incendiary that they are able to set in motion a chain of events that limit the progress of the Marxist revolution. For surely reality television, in its display of real people apparently behaving as they usually do, should accurately represent the desires of the proletariat. But *The Apprentice* is not a documentary. We are not observing contestants as they would normally act in their day-to-day lives but observing their possibly genuine, but more likely scripted, reactions to a formulaic, pre-determined set of challenges. Reality shows are produced to a formula that serves specific corporate interests (Bourdon, 2008). *The Apprentice* epitomises this. It was created by Mark Burnett, whom the website IMDb credits with producing 133 pieces of media, the majority of which are reality television shows (IMDb.com Inc., 2023).

Shows like *The Apprentice* are both "a source and a medium for public reaction" in that while they may show the current public sentiment towards institutions of the ruling class, they are much more likely to tell the public which sentiment they should be expressing (Bourdon, 2008, p. 66). As a result, these shows are instructive for while they are apparently a reflection of the contestants' desire to better themselves in the pursuit of the 'American dream,' they are actually scripted in such a way that reinforces the entrenched hierarchy. As a viewer we are manipulated not to feel empathy when we watch Trump fire a contestant but amusement or satisfaction at the contestant's treatment. If your boss were to fire you over a minor infraction humiliating you in front of your colleagues in the process, you would feel as though you have been unfairly dismissed and possibly angry with the capitalist system that allows another to have that arbitrary power over you. However, when Trump 'fires' a contestant on *The Apprentice*, the show presents this in a manner that makes the audience believe that Trump is the expert and the authority in this instance, and by disappointing him you deserve to be

humiliated and fired. After all, the tagline for the show is 'Donald Trump is the boss'. This is how shows like *The Apprentice* modify how we perceive people and situations.

Trump's authority as an 'expert' in business derives from his career as a property magnate in the 1980s through to the present. Trump comes from a background of privilege and wealth (Winter, 2018). He started his career working with and being mentored by his father before owning many expensive, luxurious properties across the United States (The Trump Organization, 2023). What made Trump stand apart from the other billionaire businesspeople, even before *The Apprentice*, was his willingness to market not simply his professional successes but his personality. He does this by using grandiose language and narcissistic "puffery" to exaggerate his achievements and gander undeserved praise (Winter, 2018, p. 155). His success is not in spite of some of these unfavourable personality traits and decisions but because of them. These tactics have afforded him advertising and promotional opportunities that would have passed over a less bombastic personality. When Trump announced his candidacy for the 2016 US Presidential election many scoffed at the idea, dismissing him for being a television personality with no political experience. However, those same people underestimated the power of popular culture and the commodification of personality. Trump's reality television 'power of celebrity' was enough to justify giving him real power in the eyes of the masses, and he became wildly popular not in spite of his *Apprentice* fame but because of it. Trump is a 'relatable' billionaire who financed international beauty contests and openly enjoys fast food. He is unlike other elites who are private and 'scary' for he separates himself from them by selling the idea that he is one of us.

Trump's appeal is his apparent success in business and anti-professionalism as a politician (Wimberly, 2018). So as his election campaign began in earnest, his American populist platform seemed like a natural continuation of the persona the public had already come to know and trust from fourteen seasons of *The Apprentice*. Trump's campaign and later his presidency was based on American exceptionalism, and authoritarian Americans were the key to his success (Nyerges & Taveira, 2016). Via The Apprentice, the American public had already been taught that 'good ol' American hard work' and a patriotic mentality were superior and should be fetishised. Trump has become a "a figure of obscene enjoyment," "the primordial father," an exaggerated representation of patriarchal and American populist extremes, also an Uber mensch who defies the modern iteration of 'decency' and of being 'politically correct' in favour of "savvy skepticism" and an "unreflective fantasy" of a "great" America of the past (Andrejevic, 2016, p. 652).

The jingoism and political individualism during Trump's presidential term which became the only acceptable resistance to the 'corrupt' elite is a reflection of the pseudo-individualistic mentality that originates in and is perpetuated by reality television shows like *The Apprentice*, which rely on spectacle, a lack of empathy and the dehumanisation of contestants (Fuchs, 2017). Reality television teaches us to have contempt for its participants and to revel in their failure. This "self-alienation" has become so prevalent that the public can enjoy their own regression as entertainment (Andrejevic, 2016, p. 651). By camouflaging his authoritarian political agenda in "culture war rhetoric" and the same dehumanising "oratorical exhibitions" that were standardised by *The Apprentice*, Trump duped many into supporting the most powerful government institutions in the world whilst simultaneously making them believe that they are somehow being 'anti-government' (Taveira & Nyerges, 2016, p.3). Rather than the public being cognisant of their true capitalist enemy they are taught to fight the make-believe ruling class of Democrat politicians, 'liberals', socialists, 'Jewish cabals', people of colour, and any person the falls under the LGBTQI+ spectrum, and

to fight them by any means necessary. As a political tactic, this ideology can be amplified and used to rationalise even the most abhorrent acts of racism, xenophobia, misogyny, homophobia, and classism. Legislation and political movements that have the potential to create real resistance against those best benefiting under the *status quo* are hindered or quashed, and the people delay their own progress and obstruct their own freedom in the name of the delusional version of 'freedom' created by Trump and *The Apprentice* (Kellner, 2012). This is the true nature of capitalist propaganda, the masses celebrating ideals that go against their interests, believing that they have won some battle against the college-educated, 'woke' elite. Propaganda was developed for and is utilised as a "to govern the lower classes", and by this measure, *The Apprentice* has achieved its purpose as propaganda (Wimberly, 2018, p. 184).

In its ability to normalise and standardise ruling class ideology to the masses while simultaneously making them think they are resisting the ruling class *The Apprentice* is the ultimate achievement of the culture industry. The show and Trump as its host fetishises and commodifies capitalist and American elitist ideals, duping the working class into believing they need to achieve these ideals to be happy and prosperous. Thus, hegemony is perpetuated, and any genuine resistance to it is stunted. Cultural texts like *The Apprentice* shatter the Marxist "mythology of the infallible proletariat", demonstrate the massive influence of personality commodification, and give credence to the Frankfurt School idea of the 'culture industry' (Schuetz, 1989, p.1).

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Video Games: Theory and Culture

Xavier Smith

Queering The Fangame: Intertextuality as Autobiographical Expression in *Madotsuki's Closet*

Fangames as a form of user-generated content in the video game community have opened up new means of queer expression. While similar to other forms of game modification which produce interactive content derived from an original game, the fangame form goes further by creating an entirely new game. So, while fangames continue to derive from the original text, they have greater freedom to expand the game and to do new things with the material. This essay explores the way transgender experience is being conveyed through interactions between games and their online fan communities through the form of fangames. Drawing on Chang's ideas of 'queergaming' which reframe Galloway's vision of counter-gaming through a queer lens, I will use Bagenzo's autobiographical fangame, *Madotsuki's Closet*, to illustrate how fangames have enabled developers to consider the possibility of emergent narrative as a form of representation (Chang, 2017).

Bagenzo's work recreates the imagery and spaces of the 2004 game *Yume Nikki* to depict her experience of being transgender. By connecting her transgender experience through interactions with both the original text and the online fan community, her work reflects Chang's calls for games to reflect queerness in their design and gameplay as well as their content (2017). This is present throughout *Madotsuki's Closet*, which uses unconventional design features to convey the transgender experience instead of simply modifying the original game through a transgender lens. The self-referential nature of Bagenzo's work illustrates the potential of the fangame's form to be used by players as a way of communicating personal experiences within the original text.

Understanding *Madotsuki's Closet* requires some prior understanding of *Yume Nikki* and how its fan community is influenced by its design choices. *Yume Nikki* is a game where the player explores the dreams of the character Madotsuki. The game does not offer a clear storyline and characterization beyond suggesting that Madotsuki is deeply troubled. As a result, the narrative is largely communicated through dream environments, non-player characters and the objects found within them. This embedding of the narrative distributes information across the game space, inviting players to piece the overall storyline together as they play (Jenkins, 2004). Consequently, players receive minimal details of Madotsuki's life enabling them to interpret her character through the dream space as they wish. The fan community surrounding *Yume Nikki* is largely based on these interpretations which players share online as a way to decode the meanings of certain locations.

Madotsuki's Closet builds on *Yume Nikki* to create a fangame in which Bagenzo explains that her first introduction to the concept of being transgender was from a popular fan theory that reinterpreted some of the game's darker imagery in a dysphoric context to depict Madotsuki as a transgender woman. Some of these reinterpretations showed negative views about the transgender experience. *Madotsuki's Closet* works as a form of criticism against this negativity. It also reclaims the idea of transgender fan theories by rendering one through autobiography. It is no coincidence that the game is named after the *Yume Nikki* fan site where these negative theories originated. Indeed, *Madotsuki's Closet's* double meaning is suggestive of both its intent to comment on and to play with the fan community.

One particularly interesting idea of queergaming is the notion of "queer remediation", which Chang contends repurposes elements from existing games by "queering" them. He calls for players to "remediate" games by refashioning and reimagining not only their "content and play" but their "relationship to ostensibly non-queer games and communities" (2017, p.20). Chang's definition of "remediation" can be widely applied to encompass any type of user-generated content. Yet, this does not remove the ability of remediation to be utilized in Bolter and Grusin's original sense of representing one medium through another (Chang, 2017). In *Madotsuki's Closet,* Bagenzo builds on this notion of queer remediation. She quotes from fan forums and direct message conversations alongside the original game, integrating them using dialogue boxes at the top or bottom of the screen. In effect, she is remediating these online posts into the video game medium. It is through such remediation she is able to express her experience in *Yume Nikki*'s fandom through gameplay. Thus, by harnessing the game's imagery and events to communicate her anxieties about its fan community Bagenzo is able to offer resistance to certain content. For example, a transphobic fan theory is shown in the dialogue boxes as the player navigates some of *Yume Nikki*'s more malevolent spaces.

Dialogue boxes are used throughout the game as a way for Bagenzo to narrate her own experiences. Through this remediation, the game takes on the form of a written essay. It is split into different parts, each of which make a particular point in support of an overall thesis. Bagenzo also uses citations which sit at the bottom of the screen. By including interactive sections alongside the narration the game combines the distinct mediums of essay writing and video games into one. The essay form means that the player has very little control over where the work goes since their main interactivity is their movement through the spaces, rather than any choices they make. The game also lacks any real challenges for its goal is simply to experience Bagenzo's story, which is not something that has to be earned by the player. Macklin highlights this kind of design as one of the potential features of queer gaming where the player's lack of control allows for the author's experience to be better understood (2017). This interactivity between the player and Bagenzo allows for her experience to be communicated more strongly than a conventional essay could, although the player is required to limit their interaction for the game to remain personal.

One performance of remediation in *Madotsuki's Closet* is a scene that repurposes an event from *Yume Nikki* to depict the anxieties of coming out. This scene uses actual direct messages of Bagenzo talking to her online friends. The form of the game changes to mimic a chat log, but the player needs to press an on-screen light switch to see each message. This references a scene in *Yume Nikki* where pressing a light switch can generate the character of Uboa who appears through a jump scare which only has a one in 64 chance of happening. Thus, the light switch is used both as a reference to the game and its fan community since the rarity of Uboa's appearance means that he is mainly known through user-generated content rather than individual playthroughs. While the light switch would have no meaning to someone unfamiliar with the game, active players of *Yume Nikki* recognize it. The feeling of dread created by its use has been harnessed by Bagenzo to reflect the uncertainty of coming out. Thus, by visually transforming the chatroom to accommodate the Uboa jump scare Bagenzo uses it to depict her own anxiety. The scene remediates the direct message discussion into game form and the original scene into the experience of reading a chat log. If the player just read the chat log without the original game's imagery, the dread generated by the scene would be less consuming. By linking this

dread to the game's imagery Bagenzo enables the player to immediately empathize with her anxieties. Here, remediation opens up an understanding of how it feels to come out.

While Bagenzo shows her experience through this remediation her game is surprisingly critical of viewing *Yume Nikki* as a work that is explicitly about the transgender experience. This is demonstrated through a tongue-in-cheek scene where she makes a list of "the top seven reasons why *Yume Nikki* is trans" (Bagenzo, 2021). Many of her reasons are jokes with very little textual evidence to support them but she does give one serious example. This is attached to the entrance to the game's Ghost World section. This section has no textual link to Madotsuki being transgender but it carries with it a sense of isolation and uncertainty that she relates to her own life. It is here that the thesis of the game emerges. Bagenzo argues that *Yume Nikki* does not require textual "proof" about transgender symbolism and imagery for it to be relevant to transgender experiences (Bagenzo, 2021). Furthermore, she contends that the most exciting way to understand the game is through the relation it has to the player's personal life and how it enables them to understand more about themselves through their interpretations of the imagery. This shifts *Yume Nikki*'s narrative away from having a strictly encoded meaning to a narrative where meaning is created through the individual player's experience. Indeed, Bagenzo's purpose in recreating the spaces of *Yume Nikki* alongside her narration is not to prove her interpretation of the game as a "correct" one rather to communicate her personal experience. But her transgender interpretation is too intimate to be communicated simply by having other people replay the original game with it in mind. Thus, her repurposing of the original work presents a far richer method of communication.

Consequently, *Madotsuki's Closet*'s view of *Yume Nikki* offers a new way to perceive the game. While *Yume Nikki* employs an embedded narrative Bagenzo's view of the game is closer to Jenkins' idea of an emergent narrative where "game spaces are designed to be rich with potential, enabling the story-constructing activity of players" (2004, p. 129). Jenkins' interpretation draws from Lynch's suggestion that urban designers should create spaces with symbolic and poetic potential which might be left to user interpretation rather than having strict predetermined meanings (Jenkins, 2004). The ambiguity of spaces used in *Yume Nikki* offers players the potential to make their own choices, for while the designer may have had specific encoded meanings in their choice of imagery by leaving that meaning ambiguous, they hand over to the players the ability to interpret the narrative as they wish. Bagenzo sees this ambiguity and its emergent narrative as key to the game's popularity amongst transgender gamers. *Yume Nikki* may or may not have been designed as a game about transgender experience, but its design gives it the potential to be.

This emergent approach opens up a wide variety of interpretations for *Yume Nikki*. For example, Bagenzo notes that there are just as many interpretations of *Yume Nikki* that present Madotsuki as a transgender man as there are ones that present her as a transgender woman. Both interpretations draw their conclusions from the same textual evidence. This kind of ambiguous emergent narrative has potential for gender play. Macklin describes gender play as "a form of meaning made somewhere between the game and us, through a playful conversation between the possibility space of the game and our own subjectivity" (Macklin, 2017, p.254) Thus, game players are able to assume characters of another gender. By extending Macklin's definition of gender play to gender expression within the gaming sphere emergent narratives can offer

possibilities for new forms of gender play in gaming, even if these were not intended by the original author. Broader representations can come from the player's own imagination and user-generated content can be used to fully realize these individual player representations.

Bagenzo's argument that *Yume Nikki* interpretations are more compelling from a lens of individualized experience than from a collective decoding of the text opens up questions of what the fan community's purpose should be from her perspective. The game's references and appeals to the *Yume Nikki* community mean that Bagenzo's individualised interpretation through *Madotsuki's Closet* is not entirely distant from the fan culture that inspired it. While Bagenzo is critical of *Yume Nikki*'s theory-based fan community, especially in relation to its transphobia, her fangame also presents the comfort of online communities through chat log sections which show her friends' support. By sharing her autobiographical interpretation of the game, she shows that she sees value in sharing her interpretation with the community.

Interpretations like the example of the light switch scene in *Madotsuki's Closet* offer a way for players to empathize with transgender experiences. By inviting people to empathize with her experiences, Bagenzo's fangame acts as a counter to the popularity of transphobic fan theories. Shaw proposes that gaming communities exist within a framework of multiplicity rather than one completely defined community. She contends that the goal in queer gaming communities should be to create multiple communities that can coexist (2017). *Madotsuki's Closet* presents the multiplicity of *Yume Nikki*'s fan community by recognizing its transphobia, its trans fanbase and the capacity of non-trans players to empathize with Bagenzo through the use of the game's imagery. This recognition shows a community based around sharing and listening to autobiographical interpretations of emergent narratives, like *Madotsuki's Closet*, can co-exist with the community based around decoding *Yume Nikki* as an emergent narrative. In this context, user-generated content becomes a way for players to express these experiences through repurposing the original work in different ways. *Madotsuki's Closet* is just one example of how these works could function.

Consequently, *Madotsuki's Closet* is an example of an innovative work of user-generated content. Its essay-like form redefines the potential of what an essay and a video game can be. The openness of the original game's imagery allows it to be used as a means of expressing particular experiences. Here, the fangame form is shown as a particularly strong way of realizing this expression. The game works as a piece of criticism of the original work and its fan community while also being an expression of autobiographical experience. As such, it provides a means to empathize with the developer's experience. It also expands the ways that an original work may be approached and discussed. This expansion opens up new means of queer expression in fan communities, as well as allowing for other game developers to consider the possibility of emergent narrative as a form of representation.

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History 252

New Zealand Cultural History

Anna McCardle

The History of Male Bodies in Sport, Manual Labour and Dance; A Lens into the Construction, Fluidity and Subversion of Ideas of Masculinity in Twentieth Century Aotearoa New Zealand

As Aotearoa New Zealand historian Stephanie Gibson articulates, "New Zealand culture is saturated with interest in the nature of masculinity" (2007, p. 211). In discourse about masculinity, it is easy to assume that masculine ideas are fixed and innate – that men are always tough, drawn to rugby, and repelled by effeminacy. This is to believe that Pākehā men's desire to be manly yet civilised is intrinsic. It is to accept the stereotype that Māori men are naturally physical. However, as Professor of Indigenous Research Brendan Hokowhitu asserts, it is critical that assumed natural and fixed truths about masculinity are deconstructed, because "essentialisms are not required in understandings of…men" (2008, p. 134).

Inspired by Hokowhitu's standpoint, this essay will utilise historical analysis to deconstruct three ideas of New Zealand masculinity that we may otherwise assume to be innate and fixed. These examined ideas will comprise civilised virility, the myth of the 'pioneer male' and the primarily physical nature of Māori men. I contend that historically, these masculine ideas were constructed to serve an agenda, as opposed to being innate traits of New Zealand men. Moreover, they were not fixed ideas. Rather, they could become fluid and subverted. Indeed, some New Zealand men disrupted traditional expectations of how masculinity should be expressed by exploring pursuits and forms of self-expression that were stereotypically viewed as 'effeminate.' Recently New Zealand historians like Caroline Daley have foregrounded the history of bodies in their research resulting in significant historical insights into New Zealand ideas of masculinity (2003). Applying a similar methodology to Daley's interrogation of leisurely pursuits like bodybuilding, beauty contests, swimming and sunbathing to study New Zealand social history, I will employ historical examples of men's involvement in sport, dance, and manual labour as a lens to explore the construction, fluidity and subversion of ideas of New Zealand masculinity in twentieth century Aotearoa.

The early twentieth century history of male bodies in rugby, shows how Pākehā men, serving an agenda of proving themselves to be model 'sons of the empire', constructed two key ideas of masculinity. Firstly, the notion that in order for masculinity to be civilised, it must be controlled, was perpetuated through increasingly strict rules and regulations in rugby. Social historians Eric Dunning and Kenneth Sheard linked the development of organised rugby in late 19th-century England to raised "standards of propriety and public order" (Phillips, 1996, p. 86). Informal games of rugby were viewed as inappropriate displays of aggressive and unruly masculinity. Putting the sport under more formal standards, would preserve the players' manliness, but ensure it was "manliness tempered by civilising restraints" (Phillips, 1996, p. 86). New Zealand historian Jock Phillips outlines how rugby in Aotearoa was also formalised. He compares two photos of New Zealand rugby teams, one of a Post and Telegraph team in 1890, and the other of the Oriental Senior team in 1910 (1996). In the 1890 image, the players wear unmatching uniforms, and have slight smiles and relaxed, slouching stances. In the 1910 photo, the men's uniforms are identical, and they all sit with upright postures and carefully neutral expressions. As Phillips describes, "organised team games would provide… training for the moral life. The English elite believed that you could have a gentleman of manners who was also manly. A muscular Christian" (1996, p. 87). The English ideal of restrained virility had transnational influence in inspiring Pākehā men to regiment New Zealand rugby in the early twentieth century. The agenda behind this effort was to ensure they were trained and constructed into civilised 'sons of the empire', rather than be barbaric and wild in their manliness. They aimed to be 'muscular Christians' who met English standards and possessed carefully restrained, yet strong physical and moral abilities.

Secondly, the myth of early settler men, or 'pioneers,' comprised an ideal standard of masculinity that early twentieth century Pākehā men strove to meet through playing rugby. This can be attributed to Britain's transnational influence. Phillips describes how there was a pervasive eugenic notion that the British were competing in "a struggle for the survival of the fittest races… in the battle of commerce and war…facing competition from the Germans and Japanese" (1996, p. 98). Pākehā saw themselves as part of this racial competition. Urban lifestyles, with sedentary jobs and lavish comforts, were seen to feminise men. Pākehā males worried they would be feminised by New Zealand's increasing urbanisation, thus threatening the superiority of the British race. In pioneer histories, pioneers were depicted as "virile men, not pampered by chocolate creams, or railways, or motor cars, or picture shows" (Phillips, 1996, p. 99). Rather, they were physically and morally strong enough to tame and civilise New Zealand's unsettled wilderness. Upholding British racial supremacy drove Pākehā to try and maintain the masculine ideal of the Herculean Pioneer by subjecting their bodies to the physical demands of rugby. This was their means of countering urban 'effeminacy' and racial degeneration. Rugby consequently grew in popularity, especially amongst urban upper-class men, in the early twentieth century (Phillips, 1996).

The history of bodies in rugby shows how Pākehā constructed ideas of masculinity to serve their agenda of being model sons of the empire. This, as Phillips articulates, "forged the character of the Pākehā male stereotype" who was as virile as his pioneer forefathers, yet also restrained and civilised (1996, p. 86). However, despite the pervasiveness of the 'Pākehā male stereotype', there was room for less traditional ways of expressing masculinity. Dancer and historian Marianne Schultz shows this was evident through her research into the early twentieth century history of male bodies in dance (2011). Male dancers had previously been viewed in New Zealand as 'weak' and 'effeminate', partially due to a lack of exposure. A reviewer in *The Dominion* remarked, upon seeing a dance by Russian Alexander Volinin during a 1913 European ballet tour to New Zealand, that "the male classic dancer is a novelty in this part of the world*"* (Schultz, 2011, p. 21). The transnational influence of this tour began to change views. Whilst Volinin was a 'novelty,' *The Dominion* reported with surprise, that "there is nothing finicky or effeminate in his composition… [he was] thoroughly masculine" (Schultz, 2011, p. 21). When Thomas O'Carroll, a Wellingtonian, performed the same dance in 1915 recitals, *The Dominion* similarly praised his ability to "combine force and virility with… poise and grace" (Schultz, 2011, p. 23). The New Zealand public began to see 'force and virility' evident in the 'grace and poise' of ballet performed by Volinin or O 'Carroll– qualities traditionally associated with rugby or the pioneer. The numbers of men pursuing dance in New Zealand increased in the early twentieth century. They were dancers and also athletes and soldiers (2011). Dance was evolving into as valid a medium for male physical strength, as war or sport. The history of male bodies in dance demonstrates the fluidity of masculine norms in early twentieth century New Zealand. People in this era increasingly accepted the 'novelty' of male dance as an expression of virility, not effeminacy, allowing their ideas of masculinity to evolve.

Moreover, male dancers did not avoid appearing feminine. They frequently engaged in cross-dressing. According to historian and Gender Studies Professor Chris Brickell, "men have performed in drag in New Zealand since the 1870s" (Schultz, 2011, p. 28). University of New Zealand colleges put on yearly shows, with a staple item being male students performing as female ballerinas (Schultz, 2011). In her research, Schultz includes a photo of Auckland University student Bryce Hart in 1922, playfully posing in a tutu and ballet shoes, as *The Dying Swan.* As Brickell articulates, these shows were special in how "the proscenium arch marked the

edge of an exceptional stage world in which the usual expectations of male and female appearance were temporarily suspended" (Schultz, 2011, p.29). Ideas of masculinity in New Zealand were so fluid that contradicting ideas could exist simultaneously. Early twentieth century men were anxious about protecting their masculinity against urban effeminacy. Yet they were also comfortable in a performance environment to 'suspend gender expectations' and dress and behave in a feminine manner.

When contemporary audiences picture historical examples of masculine norms being challenged, they may be more inclined to think of the late, rather than the early twentieth century. For example, in 1980s New Zealand, the classic image of the tough Kiwi farming man represented by the black singlet, was subverted when gay men increasingly wore it in a close-fitting manner. They made the singlet a symbol of fashion and a means of displaying male beauty (Gibson, 2007). However, they were far from the first New Zealand men to engage in subversive actions. In the early twentieth century men were cross-dressing or partaking in the stereotypically effeminate practice of dance. Schultz contends that the history of male dancers' "contribution to the cultural and social environment of the early twentieth century has been overlooked" (2011, p. 29).

Just as Pākehā men constructed masculine ideals based on their desire to be model sons of the empire, colonisation developed ideas of Māori masculinity. Hokowhitu contends that the assumption that tāne are naturally physical is a "dominant discourse that was constructed to limit and homogenise Māori" (2004, p. 259). Early colonists' perspectives of Māori were influenced by the Enlightenment philosophy of Cartesian dualism –the rational mind is separate from physical passions. Māori were 'childlike and unsophisticated'-- ruled by their bodies. Settlers viewed themselves as ruled by the mind and were thus the rational and civilising force Māori needed (Hokowhitu, 2004). From its inception, the idea of tāne's physical nature restricted Māori to a demeaning and narrow stereotype.

Hokowhitu's research shows that this narrow stereotype influenced tāne bodies in twentieth century manual labour and sport. Inspector of Native Schools William Bird, in 1906, highlighted "the natural genius of the Māori in the direction of manual skills" (Hokowhitu, 2004, p. 267). State schools discouraged Māori boys from pursuing academic subjects or university, pushing them instead towards manual labour. This created inequality. Pākehā men could easily pursue higher education and a variety of careers, including white-collar employment. By contrast, in 1965, around 90 percent of Māori men were in manual labour (Hokowhitu, 2004). Because tāne were typecast as innately physical rather than intellectual, they were confined to a narrower education and more restricted job opportunities compared to Pākehā. Moreover, this stereotype influenced perspectives on Māori athletes. In the twentieth century the New Zealand public was

white-collar employment. Thus, the most publicly celebrated tāne were frequently restricted to rugby players or sportsmen (Hokowhitu, 2004).

Hokowhitu also highlights how the notion of Māori as naturally physical gained "consent from many tāne" (2004, p. 259). Some tāne played a role in this idea's construction by adhering to the Pākehā expectation that they should pursue manual labour or sport because whilst it restricted them, it also served to "integrate [them] into the dominant Pākehā culture" (Hokowhitu, 2004, p. 269). For example, rugby was immensely popular throughout the twentieth century, and thus, Māori could benefit from becoming skilled in this field and consequently gaining mana and public recognition (Hokowhitu, 2004). As statesman Sir Apirana Ngata wrote, "your hands to the implements of the Pākehā; for your bodily well-being, your mind to the treasures of your

ancestors" (Hokowhitu, 2008, p. 123). Some tāne believed they could reap the advantages of meeting Pākehā expectations for their physical selves, whilst also remaining mentally and spiritually grounded in Māori culture. However, in addition to adherence, Hokowhitu highlights that many tāne also "lived beyond… the physical masculine prototype" and asserts that not enough attention has been given to them, due to "unwillingness of the mainstream to engage with… Māori men who challenge its premises" (2004, p.277). Just as Schultz urges historians to consider early twentieth century men who challenged masculine norms, Hokowhitu advocates for more representation of historical examples of tāne who subverted the colonisation-constructed 'physical masculine prototype.'

Historically, New Zealand ideas of masculinity have frequently been constructed to serve an agenda. Pākehā men in the early twentieth century did not possess an innate desire to glorify the 'pioneers' as a Herculean ideal or be manly yet restrained; they were motivated to construct these ideas by their desire to be model sons of the empire. Nor did twentieth century tāne possess a natural physicality that destined them only for manual labour and sport. Their natural physicality was a stereotype constructed by colonisation that sought to 'limit and homogenise' Māori. Yet some tāne deliberately adhered to this stereotype to integrate themselves into colonial society. Moreover, masculine ideas could be fluid and subverted, rather than fixed. Schultz and Hokowhitu contend this is an 'overlooked' area in history. Overall, the twentieth century history of male bodies in physical pursuits like sport, dance and manual labour, reveals significant insights about New Zealand ideas of masculinity.

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Much of the world's history has been driven by unequal balances of power; yet, as long as people have faced oppression, so they have carried the spark of rebellion with them. Rebellion comes both from actions and ideas, and often, both are necessary to bring about meaningful change. Each of the essays in this section engages with some sort of revolutionary or controversial school of thought—whether ideological, political, or historical—and each posits the reader within a specific context before questioning the traditional viewpoint on the matter. Each piece touches not only on different forms of oppression, but how people have—or could, in the present and future—take action against them.

This section opens with Orr's essay on the historical to contemporary interactions of gender and criminology. Orr takes a comprehensive dive into the history of criminology as a discipline, from 19th century classical, male-centric theories, to 21st century feminist criminology. Her feminist analysis gives way to intersectional theory, looking at how issues of poverty, race, and gender identity can further complicate crime rates and inequality, both in the U.S. and in Aotearoa. Finally, her essay looks at gendered theories surrounding desistance, and opens a discussion into how taking a gendered approach to crime more generally can lead to lower rates of inequality and recidivism in the criminal justice system.

We then come to Dobroshi's essay on the controversial 'One-China' policy, and China's current political impasse with Taiwan. Dobroshi begins by providing background on the political split between China and Taiwan, and how the current tensions came to be. The literature review which follows outlines key perspectives in the current scholarship on this impasse, and the general consensus that neither reunification nor complete independence for Taiwan is likely to come about any time soon. Dobroshi then analyses the implications of Beijing and Taipei's contentious relationships with the United States, and the "strategic ambiguity" that the U.S. has maintained for the past few decades to keep outright conflict at bay. Finally, Dobroshi analyses some of the empirical gaps in the research and concludes that Taiwan and China have existed as economically, geographically, and ideologically separate entities for too long to bring about a truely "One-China".

McCallum's essay, the third in this section, takes us back in time about sixty years to explore the period of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. She begins by contextualising the political situation in Northern Ireland in the 1960s, alongside shifting demographics of various political parties and their supporters. McCallum does an expert job of positioning the Troubles within the global environment of civil rights movements, particularly the one unfolding in the United States during this decade. Both the essay and the movement itself peak with the 5th of October March, where McCallum demonstrates how a population's faith in democracy and their right to liberty were violently quashed. The essay concludes with a look at the sectarian borders between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland which kept them in opposition with each other despite shared socioeconomic dreams, and a brief look at the foundation of the IRA, a group which still has branches active today.

This section wraps up with Mason's sharply relevant review of Marxism in contemporary society, and their response to the critiques of a variety of contemporary scholars. Launching off

from a framework built by Marx and Badiou, Mason begins first by addressing scholars of intersectionality who claim that the way Marx reduces all oppression to class struggle is far too limiting in the face of gender, race, and other factors of oppression. He then picks apart Marx's notion of "labouring power" alongside the more recent school of Social Reproduction Theory (SRT). Mason outlines the most prominent SRT argument against Marx's fairly limited gendered approach to what constitutes 'work' and 'labour'. Finally, Mason finishes with a section on the outdated and unbalanced weight that contemporary capitalist society puts on specifically wage-labour, as opposed to the (often female) unpaid labour which goes into raising the next generation of workers.

As we can see, axes of oppression are always intertwined with one another: McCallum's analysis of historical tensions between two groups giving rise to violent conflict years later provides an insightful backdrop to Dobroshi's One-China essay. The United States' involvement in China and Taiwan from *this* essay connects to capitalism in the U.S., and the structural forces necessary to keep them alive, as described by Mason in his essay on Marxism. And finally, by holding up Mason's essay next to Orr's, we can see just how important it is to incorporate gendered and intersectional approaches, not only in the field of criminology, but in all traditional theories which address class and oppression.

We hope you enjoy these four essays, and that this introduction has pushed you to look for questions and critiques in places which may not be immediately obvious.

Midori Lindeman

Criminology 100

Big Ideas in Criminology

Amelia Orr

Introduction

Naffine (1998, p. 18) states, "criminology was the study of…male criminals…not as a man or a masculine being, but as a criminal." This quote reflects one of the prevailing issues in criminological research and theory today: how gender has been obscured, misconstrued, or otherwise ignored in the discipline. An offender's gender is one of the most consistent factors across crimes, with a majority of crimes being committed by men (Belknap, 2007). Gender also correlates with the severity of a crime, with men tending to commit offences at a higher level (Belknap, 2007). Despite this, up until the 1960s, the topic of gender was largely ignored by most criminological theories, many assuming a 'genderblind' stance or grossly misconstruing female criminality (Schram, 2004). It wasn't until the 1960s and the development of Feminist criminological theory that gender began to gain greater focus within criminology. Feminist criminology has been critical for advancing gendered discussions in the field; however, modern-day theory still proves to be limited in considering gender (Naffine, 1998; Schram, 2004; Belknap, 2007; Gilmour, 2022).

Classical Theories of Crime and Gender

Although early criminology had a "preoccupation with the criminal man" (Naffine, 1998, p. 28) and the issue of gender was largely ignored, there were two prominent classical theorists who focused on female criminality: Cesare Lombroso and Otto Pollak. In 1895, Lombroso published his book, *The Female Offender*, which dissected female criminality (Naffine, 1998). Lombroso believed in biological determinism, that biologically determined traits could separate those who were born criminal from the non-criminal. Lombroso's two main criminal distinctions were the atavistic and habitual criminal. In his view, atavists possessed certain biological and psychological characteristics that were evolutionarily primitive. For example, a woman with protrusions on her skull, who was 'lacking in empathy' may be defined as atavistic. A habitual criminal was a woman who had committed a crime, but expressed remorse and a desire to repent, being physiologically 'normal'. Lombroso also began preliminary analyses into the differences between male and female offenses. However, this work is discredited today due to its pseudo-scientific approach and blatant sexism in classifying criminals (Belknap, 2007).

The other notable classical theorist in this field, Otto Pollak, developed a notable theory on women's criminality in 1950, hypothesising that female and male crime rates were similar, but that fewer women were detected engaging in crime due to their naturally stealthy nature (Belknap, 2007). Pollak's theory had no scientific grounding and, again, was rooted in sexist ideas. In this way, classical theories encounter many of the same issues when it comes to gender. Often they are written by men, who assume 'maleness' as the default, or otherwise inflict their sexist assumptions when evaluating women. Classical Theories also completely ignore the social constructions of gender, instead focusing on sex. This obscures how social expectations regarding gender can influence criminality, something feminist theories of criminology address. Overall, these theories did little to explain gender and crime, and instead set a precedent of male dominance in criminology for decades to come.

Feminist Criminological theories of Crime and Gender

Feminist criminology, initially developed in the 1960s alongside the women's liberation movement, sought to include women in criminological analysis (Naffine, 1998). Over time, feminist criminology broadened in scope, turning away from the offenders themselves, and

toward societal structures which have a role in criminality (Gilmour, 2022). Although there are numerous divisions within feminist criminology, they all share a broad focus on understanding how social constructs such as gender, race, or class, can influence criminal justice, victimisation, offending, policy, and research (Naffine, 1998; Schram, 2004). Feminist criminology was crucial in looking at how crime could differ between men and women. For example, research has revealed gendered differences in the pathways which can lead to crime: women seem to enter crime to meet relational needs—e.g. providing for family members—whereas men tend to enter into crime for individualistic reasons, such as self-gain or status preservation (Belknap, 2007). Catalysts for crime can also differ between genders, with women experiencing higher rates of domestic violence, intimate partner abuse, and sexual abuse (Belknap, 2007). However, factors such as poverty, unstable childhood/homelife, antisocial peers, or drug dependency are associated with both male and female offenders (Belknap, 2007). Feminist criminology also moves beyond the lines of gender, introducing a critical intersectional viewpoint along lines of race, class, and/or gender (Gilmour, 2022). For example, Black men are the most convicted group in the U.S.; in a New Zealand context, Māori are convicted at higher rates than Pākehā (Belknap, 2007). Examining how the intersection of identities can interact with criminality opens up many new insights into systemic issues within the justice system.

Intersectional feminist criminology has helped to identify crucial research areas. For example, poverty correlates with higher rates of criminality, suggesting that those in minority groups who also experience poverty will make up a large portion of the prison population (Naffine, 1998). This implies a systematic injustice. Feminist criminology introduced a critical approach to interpreting criminality and justice, paving the way for critical criminology, questioning society, and seeking to improve it (Gilmour, 2022). However, its focus on what it labels ‘women’ can also be limiting at times. For example, its emphasis on gender as an umbrella term does not provide a comprehensive framework for individual offenders, and there is a clear lack of criminological research on transgender individuals. Critical criminology emerged as a response to these limitations, explicitly emphasising intersectionality, and with a broader critique of institutions and how these shape social realities of crime and criminality.

Desistance, Crime, and Gender

Influenced by feminist criminology, gendered Desistance Theories arose to observe how and why offenders desist from crime (McIvor et al., 2004). Examining gender in tandem with desistance is crucial for understanding how to best facilitate offender reentry into society (Uggen & Kruttschnitt, 1998). Desistance is a complex process often involving several interventions before an individual will cease offending, yet research shows that men and women show similar patterns of desistance (McIvor et al., 2004). Broadly, theories of desisting relate to maturity, transitions, and relationships (McIvor et al., 2004). In McIvor et al.’s. 2004 study, young men and women, showed similar trends in desistance as they matured, transitioned from one part of life to another, ‘cut ties’ with antisocial relationships, and overcame substance addiction. Reasons for desisting are similar across genders; however, there still appears to be some patterns of desistance within gender groups. Women tend to desist at a younger age than men, and to offer relational reasons for desistance, such as “feeling guilty or ashamed”, becoming a mother, or due to pro-social peer groups (McIvor et al., 2004). Men tend to have more individualistic reasons for desistance, including involvement in a career, cutting ties with antisocial peers, or the protection of future opportunities (McIvor et al., 2004). Desistance theories were crucial in beginning to analyse

the differences between male and female desistance; however, not enough research has been done to reach any rigorous conclusions in the field. Today, these theories serve as a valuable critique of the way criminality is handled in society, showing that both men and women require support upon desisting from crime (McIvoer et al., 2004; Katz, 2000)

Conclusion

The study or relations between gender and crime is an ever-evolving field within criminology. Although significant progress has been made since classical theory, current criminological theories of gender and crime are still minimised in contemporary social scientific research, despite a depth of theory. Perhaps this is due to the low visibility of female criminality, as female rates of conviction are far lower than males. However this should indicate the importance of examining gender differences and criminality. Future consideration for the role gender plays in criminality and justice is necessary.

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Politics 254

China and the World

Jon Dobroshi

Introduction

A substantive portion of Chinese politics and foreign policy literature is devoted to the developments surrounding the One-China policy and wider cross-strait relations with Taiwan (Taipei). In particular, the developments after the constitutional changes in Taipei and subsequent divergence in beliefs regarding the One-China policy forced China (Beijing) to make "strategic and tactical adjustments" to that effect (Xin, 2021). Among this, the United States of America has had a role, adding another dimension to the One-China question, the sum of which results in a geopolitical impasse that has proven difficult to overcome. The literature generally seems to concur on the status quo remaining for some time yet. As such, this essay seeks to review this literature, assessing whether this will indeed be the case in the future. The essay will provide context to the cross-strait issue at large, scrutinise the efficacy of the adjustments made by Beijing concerning the One-China policy, and consider the position of the USA—whether their policy of strategic ambiguity is productive in contributing to a concrete resolution between Beijing and Taipei. Ultimately, this essay concurs with the intelligentsia on maintaining the impasse, adding to the conclusion by pointing to diplomatic and ideological factors that severely constrain the ability to make resolution possible.

Contextual Background

After the successful revolution in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party cast the nationalist Republic of China government out of the mainland, with the latter settling and re-establishing themselves in Taiwan and the surrounding islands. Although Beijing has maintained a steady grip on the mainland since then, it has also maintained the ambition of reuniting the mainland with the islands under Taipei's control. This ambition has been the basis for the establishment of relations with Beijing as it began to open back up to the world in 1972. A key example of this is the three joint communiqués with America which affirm the presence of One-China on both sides of the strait. Beijing and Taipei later affirmed the principle in 1992, with the consensus asserting the existence of One-China but with different interpretations which failed to define precisely what its existence would entail.

Despite these foundations keeping cross-strait relations moderately stable, tensions have risen, and mutual understanding of the definition of One-China has become further distorted. The abolition of one-party rule in Taiwan has given rise to pro-independence movements, with current president Tsai Ing-Wen reluctant to acknowledge the 1992 Consensus which guaranteed against independence (Zuo, 2021), resulting in Beijing increasing its belligerence against Taiwan in response (Nien-Chung & Chi, 2021). As a result, uncertainty and a steady inclination towards divergence and conflict rather than a peaceful resolution plagues the current state of the One-China policy.

Literature Review

Having understood the context behind the One-China Policy and cross-strait relations, I now turn to what academia thinks of the issue. Qiang Xin's (2021) view that the current state of affairs in Taiwan is likely to prevail and reflects the wishes of the Taiwanese people, immediately strikes

readers in his contribution to the debate. This is a critical assertion by Xin, as it reflects the tenuous situation of an outright solution and its implications, irrespective of whether it is reunification with Beijing or *de-jure* independence. Xin also makes a reasonable assertion in recounting modernisation as Beijing's priority before reunification, using it as a tool to entice Taipei into reunion once they achieve their goal. However, I believe Xin could have elaborated on what could happen if Taipei still rejected reunification even after modernisation. Does Beijing then resort to force? Moreover, will they want to risk undoing their progress in the event of Taipei's belligerence or American intervention?

Such questions reflect the highly complicated nuances surrounding the issue. The people of Taiwan may see China's moderate prosperity and still fervently believe in their free-market ideology and the constitutional guarantee of political democracy. Understanding this possible scenario, is Xin correct to assert that the onus is on the mainland to promote reunification? Upon reading, this does not seem to be the case. Ultimately, there is no onus on either government—the Taiwanese people understood what Beijing was attempting, and showed their objection in the 2016 election by voting the Beijing-friendly Kuomintang out of government. As such, popular Taiwanese sentiment toward reconciliation places their political discourse in a position where the One-China issue will likely remain stagnant.

Nien-Chung Chang-Liao, Chi Fang, and Zuo Xiying add a much-needed factor to the debate—the presence of the United States in the One-China issue. Including this element adds considerations that further distort a simple solution to such an issue. While America abides by the One-China principle as a condition of having bilateral relations with Beijing, they also have a legal obligation to support Taipei's defence capabilities. Currently, they reconcile these two realities via strategic ambiguity, placing Beijing and Taipei in a position of not knowing whether America would intervene in a cross-strait conflict (Nien-Chung & Chi, 2021). Nien-Chung and Chi (2021) rightfully suggest that the present position should be maintained, arguing that changing to strategic clarity would be counterproductive and only escalate the tensions. America ultimately toes a fine line between its diplomatic obligations to Beijing and its legal obligations to Taipei, and sway in either direction would present itself as an act of betrayal and provocation. This becomes problematic when factoring in Zuo Xiying's (2021) contribution, which sheds light on China's rise as a global power, and, as such, provides a critical discussion point which threatens the status quo. Strategic ambiguity was more effective when America had the upper hand in the power stakes; now, with Beijing becoming a rival, it suggests they are less willing to be subordinated by America. The core of American strategic ambiguity is that neither Beijing nor Taipei knows whether America will intervene, and in what capacity. These considerations lead us back to the question I raised in the discussion of Xin's contribution: Does Beijing want to risk the prospect of armed conflict in the strait with an American-backed Taiwan? Ultimately, this is the risk that remains and galvanises the status quo. Such a consideration is lacking in Zuo's contribution to the academia on the One-China and cross-strait issue.

Supplementary Framework

The literature is highly pertinent and provides crucial insight into the current state of the One-China policy and cross-strait affairs. In saying this, the literature is not without conceptual and empirical gaps.

I speak of a geopolitical impasse preventing a clear resolution. The literature speaks of this too, correctly pointing to a range of domestic and foreign policy factors such as China's modernisation-first agenda discussed by Xin (2021), and the myriad of communiqués, assurances, and general obligations that China and Taiwan both have with America, all asserted by Nien-Chung, Chi, and Zuo. The gaps I speak of are centred around a reality that the above authors missed: the ideological duality between China and Taiwan fundamentally blocks the prospect of reconciliation on the One-China issue. Decades of separation and autonomous self-determination have led to two distinct states that, while sharing cultural and ethnic similarities, now possess two incompatible systems. Despite pro-market reforms after Mao Zedong's death, China remains a largely state-directed, one-party authoritarian state with socialist ambitions. Upon the abolition of martial law, Taiwan is now a free-market capitalist, multi-party liberal democracy. This duality is essential in understanding the difficulty of a clear resolution to the One-China issue and why the status quo will remain. While Beijing sees reunification as the final step toward national rejuvenation and a matter of "when, not whether" (Zuo, 2021, p. 550), they still face the objective issue of how to reconcile the constitutional and ideological divide, and the divide caused by post-martial-law Taiwanese self-determination. As highlighted by Xin (2021), reconciliation by diplomatic means is likely too passive, and can be easily swayed by the Taiwanese people's sentiments. Furthermore, the risks associated with a forceful reconciliation are what stymies such an approach, owing to American strategic ambiguity and the threat of China undoing their modernisation efforts in the event of an intervention. This prospect, along with the assertions in the literature, combines to create a multi-faceted impasse that perpetuates the status quo rather than bringing Beijing and Taipei anywhere near reconciliation.

One may suggest that the solution to this duality would be for China to absorb Taiwan into their jurisdiction under a 'one country, two systems' setting, akin to Hong Kong and Macau. Such an agreement would allow Taiwan to maintain its economic and administrative system. However, the Taiwanese political elite do not seem to give way to that consideration; as Nien-Chung (2021) and Chi (2021) have suggested, Taiwanese observation of the system in Hong Kong has only served to reiterate their stance against such a setting. It is precisely this resistance that highlights how the One-China issue is at an impasse which will remain the status quo for some time yet.

Conclusion

The One-China issue is a highly contentious, yet essential aspect not only of Chinese politics and foreign relations, but also of the academia. China has placed a heavy emphasis on reunification, considering it to be the final step towards national rejuvenation. However, the emphasis is at odds with developments that have now led to the impasse constituting the current status quo. The literature suggests that Taiwan is less receptive to the prospect of reunification, having cemented its system and governance in a manner that just stops short of *de-jure* independence. Moreover, the United States, through its strategic ambiguity and assurances to both Beijing and Taipei, has been able to deter any pre-emptive moves at reunification. Combining these realities with the divergence between China and Taiwan on both constitutional and ideological fronts, results in a One-China issue fraught with a slew of obstacles that hinder any meaningful progress and preserve the status quo of impasse.

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History 370

Special Topic: Ireland since 1798

Catriona McCallum

The Troubles in Northern Ireland: A Violent Outbreak in Irish History or Part of the Twentieth Century's Wider Global Campaign for Civil Rights?

On the 5th of October 1968, a march organised by the Northern Irish Civil Rights Association to protest Londonderry Corporation's record of inequality in the allocation of public housing became a turning point in the history of Northern Ireland. The minister of Home Affairs had banned the event due to the possibility of a clash with the hastily organised Loyalist countermarch. Nevertheless, a group of a few hundred people marched. Their defiance sparked a brutal and bloody response from police which was captured on camera and broadcasted to a horrified world (Bew & Gillespie, 1993). Two days of riots followed, galvanising both activism and support for the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland and the wider international community. In the ensuing melee, the protesters' originally progressive focus was lost in a resurgence of old nationalist grievances and Republican antagonism (Prince, 2012). Yet it need not have been. The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association's original intention had been to change the behaviour of the government by peaceful means, not to challenge the legitimacy of the unionist state (Mulholland, 2000). The purpose of this essay is to argue that while the protesters articulated the aims and emulated the methods of the late twentieth century's wider global campaign for civil rights, the period of the Troubles that followed is more usefully understood as a violent outbreak of Irish history.

Many historians have reduced the Troubles to a conflict caused by ethnic animosity rooted in Ireland's colonial past. However, while it is true that Northern Ireland had a legacy of settler colonialism which was institutionalised by the Protestant majority at partition, it does not necessarily explain why after fifty years of relative peace, Northern Ireland should suddenly revert to violent confrontation, particularly when the old nationalist hostilities of the Catholics had given way to a more modern era (Whyte, 1990). By the 1950's, many Catholics believed that greater material benefits could be obtained by constructive participation in the institutions of the state (McAllister, 1977). There were also signs that a great number of Catholics were ambivalent towards the idea of a united Ireland (Rose, 1971). The increasing social mobility afforded by post-war welfare state legislation, which included universal access to education, saw many Catholics moving towards an acceptance of British liberal democratic values (Purdie, 1990). This manifested itself in some Catholics who shifted their support from the Nationalist Party, which they felt was ignoring pressing social issues in pursuit of an unworkable archaic reunification ideal, to the Northern Ireland Labour Party, which had mounted a challenge to the incumbent Ulster Unionist Party (Edwards, 2008).

The Ulster Unionist Party had enjoyed a monopoly of power since the inception of Northern Ireland, but by the 1960's, its claims to liberal democracy was looking increasingly anachronistic in a rapidly modernising world. Catholics called for changes to local government practices which manipulated ward boundaries and electoral areas to ensure Catholics were grossly underrepresented in public bodies and committees (Ellison and Martin, 2000). They also called more insistently for an end to discriminatory practices, particularly in the provision of housing and jobs (Ward, 1993). Any increase in Catholic representation, or loss of support within its own party, was viewed by unionists as a fundamental challenge to the government's program (Aughey & Morrow, 1996). The continued dominance of the Ulster Unionist Party relied on a cross-class Protestant alliance. This 'union' was kept alive by keeping the issue of partition at the centre of politics. Northern Ireland had been created without social democratic consensus to appease a Protestant minority who had been traumatised by the effects of an expanding democracy in the late

nineteenth century (O'Leary & McGarry, 1996; O'Callaghan, 2006). This led to a deep-seated fear of a Catholic insurrection and a determination to ensure Stormont remained, in Lord Craigavon's words "a Protestant parliament for a Protestant people" (Cochrane, 2021, pp. 41). Unionism was thus defined by civic nationalism, and could only be expressed so long as it retained its parliamentary monopoly (Loughlin, 2004). Consequently, any reform to local government control or its franchise arrangements was seen as a direct attack on unionism, and so was vehemently opposed by Protestants.

The economic downturn of the 1960's saw the Northern Ireland Labour Party gaining ground. Forced to woo back Protestant working-class votes, the Ulster Unionist Party gave the leadership to Terence O'Neill whose reform rhetoric and promises to 'modernise' won back the lost seats, even at the cost of creating a split within his own party (O'Callaghan, 2006, p. 621). Hardliners interpreted any 'modernisation' as a concession to the "enemies of the constitution" (O'Callaghan, 2006, p. 621). Reverend Ian Paisley, a fundamentalist protestant who looked back to the political and religious 'certainties' of the past to speak to the social and cultural concerns of deprived Protestants, stridently opposed any concessions (Bosi & de Fazio, 2017, pp. 153-6). His incitement to hatred, stoking of 'border terror', and calls for direct action held great appeal for Protestant youths. These young people mistrusted O'Neill's measures of modernity and promotion of 'communal relation' initiatives, and saw the civil rights movement as 'tactical nationalism' and therefore something that needed to be resisted (O'Leary, 1996, p. 167).

In this way, the crisis of 1968/9, heralded by the 5th of October March, was different to anything that had preceded it. It was not simply a conflict over the partition, even if this was what Paisley wanted people to believe. The crisis of 1968-9 had become a fundamental debate within the Ulster Unionist Party itself over the type of unionism it should practise. The hardliners wanted no change; the more moderate unionists, led by O'Neill, knew that the world had moved on and that they had no choice but to modernise. This was further reinforced by the British Prime Minister calling on O'Neill to institute political and social reform after the 5th of October March (Ellison, p.687). Aware that any concessions could break his party, O'Neill had little option but to push back against Britain's demands (Bourke, 2011). He argued that the civil rights movement's grievances stemmed from fundamental cultural prejudices which could not be alleviated by legislation, only through social policy which was Stormont's exclusive preserve (Bourke, 2011). However, as Stormont still relied on Westminster's treasury, some concessions had to be granted. The resulting reforms pleased no one;. too little, too late, they simply served to inflame loyalists who saw them as government 'laxity' towards nationalists, and to heighten the Catholic sense of grievance (Ó Dochartaigh, 2005; O'Callaghan, 2006, p. 621).

The 5th of October March marked a turning point for the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland. The Northern Irish Civil Rights Association's loose affiliation of dissident voices that had cut across class, territory, and creed to include trade unionists, party members, radical socialists and ordinary, politically unaffiliated people believing, perhaps for the first time in their lives, that real change was a possibility, had been superseded by a new brand of activist. These activists, while still inspired by Martin Luther King Jr.'s peaceful protest model, were more likely to follow the direct-action methods being used by the student movement in Paris in 1968 and the Black Rights Activists in the United States (Aughey, 1996, p. 14). They specifically set out to provoke, and the loyalists spurred on by Paisley were only too happy to oblige. Media footage of the Royal Ulster Constabulary's partisan policing of the loyalist and civil right protest marches—together with the riots that followed—tore apart what was left of

the fragile peace between Protestant and Catholic, revealing the old hostilities which had never completely gone away. Many of the conservative people who had initially made up the bulk of the Northern Irish Civil Rights Association were horrified by the new militancy of the movement, but it was too late. They had unwittingly ushered in a new way of confronting the authorities.

In January 1969, students who called themselves the People's Democracy, exercised their 'fundamental democratic liberty' by marching from Belfast to Derry in emulation of Martin Luther King Jr.'s famous 1966 Selma-Montgomery March (Bew, 1993, p. 11-12). Upon reaching Burntollet Bridge, they were viciously attacked by loyalists. This triggered a series of marches and protests that, over the next few months, culminated in riots, street burnings, raids, and local disintegration, as demonstrators came up against counter-demonstrators and Catholics tried to expel the police from their estates. Matters came to a head in August 1969 when, inflamed by an Orange Order march past their Bogside estate, Catholic residents rioted. The melee rapidly deteriorated into a sectarian conflict that soon spread to Belfast. In this way, the basic pattern for the riots to come during the Troubles was set. Catholic residents fought to expel the authorities from their space, and then to challenge their control of that space (Prince, 2012). Finally, the unionist government, recognising that it had lost control and fearing that the existence of Northern Ireland was under threat, called in British troops (Bew, 1993).

Thus, the Troubles were inadvertently triggered by a generation who saw the civil rights movement as a way of putting modern democracy into practice. By asserting their right to basic freedoms through direct action, they unwittingly unleashed something far more fundamental. What had begun as a non-sectarian campaign against discrimination, changed irrevocably with the unwillingness of the police to defend the rights of the protestors to protest. Furthermore, the use of weapons against the protestors indicated that the police believed they were defenders of the Protestant community first and the state second (Ruane & Todd, 1996). It was this belief, as well as a general loss of faith in the police, that contributed to the socialisation of violence. Catholics began arming themselves, and the conflict escalated quickly (Carter, 2017). Putting modern democracy into practice inevitably holds the risk of violence, since democracy hinges on true equality rather than 'equality' as defined by the ruling power (Bourke, 2011 p. 301). The fragmented nature of the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland made it even worse: while political activists were involved, they were rarely in control; important decisions about barricading and fighting were made by immediate communities on an *ad hoc* basis. Over 1969, Belfast and Derry broke up into little republics, and by the time the British army arrived in August, the contemporary pressures that had acted on the civil rights protesters had been forgotten, and the normal framework of social order broke down as people turned instinctively to their own resources (Prince, 2012; Stewart, 1993).

By 1969, both Catholics and Protestants had lost any belief in the authority's ability to contain the disturbances, or even that the authorities (now understood to be the British army) comprehended the reasons behind them. The disarming of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and B Specials, and their temporary transformation from legitimate law enforcement agents into a vulnerable and subordinate element of the security forces, was deeply shocking (Stewart, 1992). The state had lost its capacity to safeguard its citizens, and while its Catholic citizens had not felt particularly safe prior, this was still a stripping of protection that people had instinctively turned to in times of need. The Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, appeared on television to say that the Republic of Ireland could no longer stand by, but that is what it did, short of

smuggling a few gun shipments over the Northern Irish border and setting up field hospitals on the Republican side (Bew, 1993). The Republic clearly was not prepared to risk its hard-won freedom or its newfound friendship with Britain by getting involved in a conflict that bore all the hallmarks of a sectarian war. Left to their own devices, both Catholic and Protestant communities turned to more traditional sources of protection in the Provisional Irish Republican Army and Ulster Defense Association. Neither paramilitary group was active until the 1970s, but both recruited heavily and became strong forces during the Troubles (Hoppen, 1999).

The emergence of the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland followed a global trend. The movement's aim was to make the regional political system more open and fair, tallied with similar democratic aims being expressed by civil rights activists internationally. Its methods first mirrored the peaceful American model advocated by Martin Luther King Jr., and then later the more provocative models of the Black rights activists in the United States and Paris in 1968. In this sense, the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland was very much a part of the late twentieth century's wider global campaign for civil rights. However, it was also embedded in a complex web of social and political relationships that had built up in Ireland over time. This is why in order to give meaning to the Troubles, it is necessary to look beyond the initial flashpoints of the 5th of October 1968, Burntollet Bridge, and the summer of 1969 to what made the Unionist establishment and the Loyalist countermovement react so violently to the civil right protesters' demands.

Welfare reforms, coupled with O'Neill's modernising rhetoric, encouraged Catholics to hope that they might be heard; yet this was a hope which fed into the fears of many unionists. The trauma of the effects of an expanding democracy in the late nineteenth century had not yet left them, and they feared any concessions to the Catholic minority could lead to the partition being removed. This explains why the civil rights movement found no traction with the Protestant working class, for while it appeared that they shared interests and grievances (including unemployment and the dismal state of public housing), the sectarian nature of social relations in Northern Ireland meant that the Protestant working class adopted an increasingly right-winged political stance that fed off Paisley's rhetoric. Convinced that the civil rights movement was part of a nationalist conspiracy to destroy the state, they demanded higher and higher levels of repression against the protesters, and by August 1969, were provoking confrontation by marching in Catholic areas.

Yet it was not just unionists who looked back to history. The violence suffered by the civil right protesters on the 5th of October, and subsequently at the hands of the police, mobilised large sections of the Catholic community, and put the national question back on the political agenda. The unionist state and its security apparatus were seen to no longer be acting for Catholics, which led Catholics to question the legitimacy of that state. In questioning the legitimacy of the unionist government, the nationalist agenda once more reared its head, opening the space first to extreme communal violence during the summer of 1969, and then for the emergence of the Provisional Irish Republican Army.

The civil rights movement emerged from particular political, cultural, and social issues which disadvantaged the Catholic minority and impinged on the Protestant majority's psychological need to maintain a unionist party at all costs. Once the contemporary pressures opened up a space for a civil rights movement, the form and course of the ensuing conflict fell back on old prejudices. This conflict followed the sectarian lines that had dominated Irish history for centuries as the Catholics lost faith in the legitimacy of the government, and the unionists

clung to it at all costs. Thus, the Troubles, while part of the late twentieth century's wider global campaign for civil rights, are better understood as a violent outbreak of Irish history.

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Sociology 301

Critical Theory and Society

Riley Mason

Introduction

The contemporary world appears to me as a place where freedom has prevailed; more specifically, the 'freedom' of the few to accumulate wealth and exploit the labour of billions of people at an unprecedented rate and scale (Badiou, 2008). Today's world appears as a time where the dominant order of advanced capitalism has near-totally asserted itself as transhistorical and inescapable. However, as scholars from Karl Marx to Alain Badiou (2008) have emphasised, "the subordination of labour to the dominant class…can be overcome" (p. 35). Furthermore, as Badiou (2008) indicates, today's "reactionary interlude" in search for a better world presents us with a similar task to the one faced by Marx in the 19th century (p. 42). Specifically, the task of courageously questioning the conditions we find ourselves in, and of expanding and continuing Marx's sustained critique of the structure and logic of capitalism (Badiou, 2008; Bohrer, 2018).

This essay takes up this task by discussing select writings of Karl Marx in relation to contemporary Marxian scholarship and the critique of capitalism. More specifically, it examines how recent scholars have expanded on Marx's sometimes limited conceptions of oppression, social reproduction, and work. Additionally, it employs several examples from my own experiences to emphasise the relevance of Marxist thought today. Crucially, this approach to Marx does not seek to overlook him in favour of more recent scholars or to tack on analysis of race or gender to his thought. Instead, it directly engages with Marx's writings *and* their limitations, tracing across four key moments where his thought can be expanded for the critique of contemporary forms of social and economic domination.

Intersectional Marx

In the late 20th century, 'intersectionality' emerged as a means of theorising the specific problems faced by Black women (Bohrer, 2018). Scholars of intersectionality proposed that systems of race, gender, class, ethnicity, and age-based oppression are mutually constitutive and inseparable features of our social organisation (Bohrer, 2018). Moreover, they argued that these "social systems of domination" are so fundamentally interconnected that any attempt to critique or contest them cannot treat them separately, or prioritise "one axis of oppression" over another (Bohrer, 2018, p. 49). As such, scholars of intersectionality have been particularly critical of the many 'orthodox Marxists' who reduce "all social, political, cultural, and economic antagonisms to class" (Bohrer, 2018, p. 49). This is a critique that all Marxian scholars must take seriously, especially when trying to stretch Marx's thought to cover contemporary critiques.

Contrary to many popular imaginings, however, Marx was aware of the importance of race, slavery, and colonisation to the subordination of labour under capitalism. In the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Marx (1849/1976) wrote that the development of the industrial capitalist class was partially dependent on "East-Indian and Chinese markets" and "the colonisation of America" (p. 485). Similarly, in his account of the "Genesis of the Industrial Capitalist" in Volume I of *Capital*, he argues that the "extirpation, enslavement…conquest and looting" of indigenous peoples during colonisation signalled the "rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production" (Marx, 1887/1996, p. 739). Barber (2019) writes that in his later writings, Marx heavily engaged with the "empirical existence of Indigenous peoples" (p. 44). In Marx's (1887/1996) own unfortunate choice of words, the historical development of the capitalist system could not be understood outside the "turning of Africa into a warren for the

commercial hunting of black skins" (p. 739). This being said, Bohrer (2018) contends that Marx did not provide much of an analysis on the racialised systems of difference within capitalism. Instead, Marx (1848/1976) argued that society was one of increasingly "simplified class antagonisms" between workers and capitalists (p. 485). In this way, Marx's account of oppression is narrow, constrained by his specific focus on the plight of the wage-labourer in Europe (Bohrer, 2018).

However, this does not mean that Marx is irrelevant to contemporary critique; as Bohrer (2018) writes, "more so than other theories, [Marxist analyses] have devoted much time, effort and energy to detailing the historical and contemporary workings of capitalism" (p. 70). Bohrer (2018) also contends that 'stretching' Marx towards an intersectional Marxist theory of capitalism may provide the means of critiquing and contesting contemporary forms of domination. She argues that capitalism may be seen as the coherent overarching structure from which patriarchy, racism, and heteronormativity emerged. More specifically, Bohrer (2018) argues that in their contemporary forms of appearance, these systems of oppression are fundamentally tied up in the workings of capitalism. In this way, she emphasises the need to critique capitalism through lenses of "race, gender, class, sexuality, imperialism and colonisation" (p. 64). Importantly, this implies rethinking the wage-labourer's centrality in Marx's analysis.

Which Workers?

In the first chapters of *The German Ideology*, Marx (1845-46/1976) emphasises the difference between his analysis and those of the 'German ideologists'. More specifically, he writes that the "premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones…but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination" (Marx, 1845-46/1976, p. 31). The first of these 'real' premises, to Marx (1845-46/1976), is the existence of living human beings, not the "actual physical nature of man" or the "natural conditions in which man finds himself" (p. 31). From this, Marx (1845-46/1976) argues that philosophy cannot speak to an abstract transhistorical "Man"; it should only speak to "real historical man" (p. 39). This "real historical man" is a relation, specifically, the sum of the historical and continuing "sensuous activity" that has produced them (Marx, 1845-46/1976, p. 41). Despite this orientation, however, scholars of intersectionality and social reproduction theory (SRT) have stressed that Marx only truly provides an analysis of real historical *men* (Bohrer, 2008; Bhattacharya, 2017).

Bhattacharya (2017) posed a question to Marxist thought; namely, "[w]hat kinds of processes enable the worker to arrive at the doors of her place of work every day so that she can produce the wealth of society?" (p. 1) This question relates to Marx's (1865/1984) notion of 'labouring power', the 'social labour' required to "produce, develop, maintain and perpetuate" a worker's ability to perform labour (p. 130). SRT scholars stress that Marx's (1865/1984) conception of this "social labour" was primarily limited to wage-labour "subordinate to the *Division of Labour within Society* [emphasis in original]", i.e. work traditionally performed by men (p. 122; Bhattacharya, 2017). SRT extends this conception of labour to include unpaid familial and communitarian work "that goes on to sustain and reproduce the worker", i.e. work traditionally performed by women (Bhattacharya, 2017, p. 2).

Additionally, the limitations of Marx's gendered conception of labour can be seen in the *1844 Manuscripts*. Here, Marx (1844/1975) separates the worker's "animal functions—eating,

drinking, procreating, or at most in his dwelling" from "his human functions", the worker's productive 'sensuous activity' (p. 275). For SRT scholars, however, this separation is illusory; the labour involved in managing the home or rearing children is essential in providing the "infrastructure necessary for the existence of a workforce" (Federici & Jones, 2020, p. 154; Bhattacharya, 2017). Through this, the home can be understood as a "microfactory" that involves massive amounts of unpaid labour in service of the production of surplus value (Federici & Jones, 2020, p. 156). SRT stresses that this labour is as much 'work' as the wage labour performed in the factory (Bhattacharya, 2017). This notion necessitates that we widen Marx's scope of what counts as work to include *all* the labour involved in reproducing capitalist relations of production.

In recent times, the insights of SRT have become even more relevant, particularly in understanding the global backlash and protest that preceded the overturning of *Roe v. Wade* in the United States earlier this year. Without 'stretching' Marx's conception of work, these movements appear entirely unrelated to the revolutionary struggle of labour "against the existing social and political order of things" (Marx, 1848/1976, p. 519). Through SRT, however, the criminalisation of abortion may be understood as a form of social control that naturalises women's unpaid social reproductive labour. SRT emphasises that constructing abortion legislation as solely a moral or private issue obscures the necessity of childbirth in reproducing capitalism (Bhattacharya, 2017). In this way, SRT has been particularly relevant for me as a male self-professed 'Marxist', as it has illustrated that 'women's movements' are not just cultural protests, they are an essential element in the fight against structural domination.

The Work of Others

In addition to intersectionality, Marxian scholars have also emphasised the need to stretch Marx's interpretation of the relation between work, value, and reward. Building on Marx's (1887/1996) conception of 'constant capital' and the insights of SRT, Jones (2017) suggests that "work is decentred in relation to the individual" (p. 162). This notion contrasts the "vulgar conception of work" expounded by the contemporary Right, which constructs work as the result of the "individual actor in a social context" (Jones, 2017, pp. 139, 159). Jones' (2017) conception of work builds on Marx's (1887/1996) claim that "[t]he productiveness of labour…is a gift, not of Nature, but of a history embracing thousands of centuries" (p. 513). Here, Marx (1887/1996) argues that the ability to produce is dependent on all the labour and production that has come before. Marx (1887/1996) also theorised that the value produced by a worker is equal to the labour they perform *plus* all the previous labour involved in producing the means of production (Marx, 1865/1984; 1887/1996).

Expanding this argument, Jones (2017) argues that 'work' is necessarily a *social* relation, as "the action of any individual human being is mediated by the previous work of others" (p. 162). As SRT scholars emphasise, production under capitalism would be impossible without the centuries of highly coordinated reproductive labour that continue to provide capitalists with employees (Bhattacharya, 2017). As such, the immense value produced in modern society is not solely the result of individual labouring bodies; it has also come from the numerous "activities that have enabled the creation of our common wealth" (Jones, 2017, p. 163). Through this, Jones (2017) problematises the Right's conception of the worker as dependent on an "imagined causal relation between work and effort" (p. 143).

It is worth noting that Marx (1894/1998) anticipated this, notably in his argument that if "labour as wage is taken as the point of departure…the identity of labour in general with wage labour appears to be self-evident" (p. 811). Here, Marx (1894/1998) argues that the historically specific elements of capitalist productive relations come to be seen as natural when they are interpreted as they appear. To illustrate this, suppose the value produced through work is taken as the result of what the "individual body exerts" (Jones, 2017, p. 162). In that case, an employee's wage appears to us as a justified reward for their efforts, obscuring the unpaid work of others (Jones, 2017). This naturalisation can be seen in the Right's intoxicating praise of 'hard work' in Aotearoa (Jones, 2017). However, especially as it appears in the statements of the National Party, this praise is not extended to the immense social reproductive labour performed by single-parent beneficiaries (Jones, 2017).

Conclusions

This essay has emphasised that the dominant order of contemporary capitalist society is neither natural nor inescapable (Badiou, 2008). Instead, it presents us with the task of expanding Marx's sustained critique of the exploitative and oppressive social relations we find ourselves in. I have discussed the writings of Karl Marx, as well as those of some critical Marxian scholars that have followed him. Furthermore, this essay emphasised that 'stretching' Marx for contemporary critique may be a powerful means of contestation, protest, and revolutionary change. It began by discussing the development of an intersectional Marxism, as proposed by Bohrer (2018). It then explored the writings of social reproduction theorists, and emphasised that contemporary critique must begin with a more inclusive definition of ‘work’. Finally, following Jones (2017), it unpacked Marx’s conception of ‘work’. These three sections have each illustrated the different ways that Marx may be 'stretched' for contemporary critique, and substantiated the claims of many major news outlets that 'Marx is back' (Bhattacharya, 2017).

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Our society stands at a precipice. Across the globe, humanity faces growing right-wing populism, supremacism, racism, and anti-environmentalism. In Aotearoa, the proportion of adults reporting racial discrimination has been increasing[1], political division threatens to undermine our democracy's social cohesion[2], and climate change endangers everything from our health to our primary industries[3]. These crises threaten to divide us: society is becoming increasingly polarised, with political discourse approaching deadlock and partisan bias amplifying our differences. To progress, we must focus on our shared kaupapa—our shared values and humanity. Only when we overcome our differences can we overcome our challenges. The essays in this chapter all draw on this idea of making connections in the face of crisis, whether housing, justice, or climate. Through various disciplinary lenses, these authors all reach the same conclusion: our only way forward is together.

The chapter opens with Zhao's essay, a passionate treatise on the racialised nature of capitalism and the importance of trans-cultural solidarity. This piece reframes the housing crisis in Aotearoa as not just an inherent result of capitalism but one grounded in the forced extraction of resources from marginalised ethnicities. Zhao discusses how the imperialist ideologies that drive capitalism deliberately seek to divide minority cultures, in this case Māori and Chinese New Zealanders, to maintain colonial dominance. She concludes that decolonisation in Aotearoa requires Māori-Asian solidarity and that only via unification can we gain liberation.

Like Zhao, Walsh also seeks to overcome our colonial past. Presenting their original research, Walsh advocates for integrating traditional tikanga into modern employment law. They argue that the current system for addressing employment-related grievances is rooted in outdated notions of "master" and "slave" that erode our workers' mana, proposing in its place a new framework of kaupapa-based restorative justice. In the face of media-driven fear of decolonisation, this adept essay reminds us that tikanga enriches everyone—tangata whenua and tauiwi alike.

Wright's essay draws the threads of this chapter together. This final piece explores connection and crisis through a different lens—the positioning of children as mediators between humanity and nature in post-humanist film. Using vivid filmic examples, Wright considers the ideas of "other" versus "kin" across group and species boundaries. She argues that, to progress beyond this time of ecological crisis and climate change denial, we need to break down arbitrary divisions of race and kind and join together in collective urgency.

Whether we are fighting for justice, climate, or human rights, we must work as one to forge an equitable future for all. Only the building of genuine relationships can begin to heal the divisions in our increasingly polarised society. In Wright's words: "All living things are interconnected and require ways of thinking and being that consider the inherent value of all life".

Katherine McLean

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Ethnicity and Identity

Grace Zhao

Racism in the Housing Crisis or Just Housing Under Capitalism: Racial Capitalism and the Importance of Māori-Chinese Solidarity in Aotearoa

A highly debated topic in Aotearoa, politically and in day-to-day conversation, is the "housing crisis". Researchers and politicians recognise it as a complex problem, but the political framing of this "housing crisis" turns it into an ideological artefact, creating a poor understanding of structural causes (White, 2019). In framing this phenomenon as a crisis, many believe it is a unique one-off event. In reality, it is a lived condition under capitalism, especially for disadvantaged racialised communities. In this essay, I examine the "housing crisis" through a lens of racial capitalism—achieved by defining racial capitalism, analysing the differential impacts of racial capitalism, both ideological and institutional, on Māori and Chinese communities, and outlining the imperative of Māori-Asian solidarity.

Racial capitalism is a concept introduced by Cedric Robinson (2000) as an expansion and critique of Marx's analysis of capitalism. Specifically, Robinson (2000) claimed that capitalism depends on the differentiation of human value through exaggerating regional and cultural differences, causing racialised bodies to be differently affected by capitalism. This contrasts with Marx's depiction of a homogenous proletarian working class. Racialisation describes how people, based on their "race", are valued and placed in a racial hierarchy falsely legitimated as natural through white supremacy and liberalism (Melamed, 2015; Robinson, 2000). White supremacy is the belief in the dominance of white people. It stems from a history of racialisation and scientific racism, which is sustained ideologically and structurally through liberal ideologies that emphasise individualism and meritocracy, ignoring the influence of systemic, historical, and social factors (Cheng, 2013). This aspect links to another critique that capitalism was not a revolutionary rupture from feudal society but rather an extension of the feudal racialised social relations to a global context. Robinson (2000) states that the feudal peasantry and enslaved were also subject to colonial processes of invasion and dispossession based on racial differences within Europe itself. As such, racism was not invented by capitalism but evolved alongside and mutually informed the current system of imperialism and violence. Hence, capitalism is inherently racial capitalism.

Through this lens of racial capitalism, analysing historical factors in Aotearoa can highlight how and why racial disparities exist in housing. The capitalist system was introduced to Aotearoa through brutal primitive accumulation in the establishment of settler colonialism. Once it was revealed to British sojourners that the land was ripe for agriculture, it sedimented the idea of commodifying and privatising the land for capital (Wynyard, 2016). A treaty: Te Tiriti o Waitangi, was signed, partially to ease tensions over land. It hoped to facilitate cohabitation between Māori and Pākehā by offering the Crown exclusive right to "purchase" land while supposedly guaranteeing Māori Tino Rangatiratanga—absolute sovereignty (Wynyard, 2016). However, Te Tiriti largely failed due to mistranslations, and Pākehā entitlement regarding land only increased—encouraged by white supremacist ideologies that Māori were "savages" or "unintelligent". The various forms of expropriation and land-grabbing continued, buoyed now by state-sanctioned practices that violently separated Māori people from their means of production (Ward, 1973). One of the biggest proprietors in the dispossession of land was the establishment of the Native Land Court (Ward, 1973). This Court was developed under the guise of helping Māori sell their land but was instead a system designed to entrap and displace Māori (Ward, 1973). The Court dissociated Māori from their previously communal land tenure and forced a European capitalist conception of private land ownership. These systems highlight how land was commodified under racial capitalism through racialisation—with violence legitimated through white supremacist

ideologies. It mimics the subinfeudation of land in feudal society by "race" as the Crown on-sold the land to colonisers and settlers that wished to reside in and profit off Aotearoa. Māori were forced into increasingly rural or dilapidated areas, establishing the differentiated value of land through racialisation. This process continued into the early 1960s, with the unofficial segregation of Māori people (Bartholomew, 2020). Pākehā consistently rejected Māori applications for tenancy or homeownership, forcing them into living in the devalued "slums" of society. As such, we can see how white supremacy and capitalism intertwine and mutually inform each other regarding the valuation of land based on racial hierarchies.

These historical effects persist today with detrimental impacts on Māori. In addition, such accumulated processes continue to expand under racial capitalism, concealed under the guise of liberalism. One key example is gentrification, where low-income neighbourhoods and people are now being bought out, displaced, and revalued to extract surplus. Rucks-Ahidiana (2021) establishes gentrification through the lens of racial capitalism, finding that the process does not happen at the same rate across low-income neighbourhoods, nor are the ramifications of exposure to gentrification equal due to systemic racism and underlying white supremacist ideologies, legitimised through ideas of meritocracy, that Māori people are simply "lazy". The aspect of race is further highlighted as homes in predominantly white neighbourhoods are valued higher and assessed as more desirable than those in Māori neighbourhoods, exemplifying a racial appreciation gap (Rucks-Ahidiana, 2021; Markley et al., 2020). Gentrification profits off the racialised displacement and devaluation of Māori neighbourhoods, as often wealthy white developers buy this devalued land and, in an influx of capital, revalue the property to unaffordable levels for previous owners (Rucks-Ahidiana, 2021; Ellis-Young, 2021). Furthermore, it is found that the chances of homeownership are affected by institutional racism, as banks are less likely to offer loans and mortgages based on the perception of Māori ethnicity (Houkamau & Sibley, 2015). Māori now have lower homeownership rates across the board, with 31% of Māori owning their own home compared to 57.9% of Pākehā, and more likely to experience poor quality housing, health inequities, and increased homelessness (Stats NZ, 2020). As such, structural racism continues to impact Māori to this day.

This inherent racism in racial capitalism is concealed and redirected, not only through liberalism but in the racialisation of Asian bodies and the role of the "figure of Asianness" detailed by Wendy Chen (2013). Robinson (2000) emphasises the centrality of migrant labour in the structure and establishment of a capitalist economy, highlighting yet another under-studied aspect in Marx's conception of a homogenous proletariat. Robinson expands upon how the exploitation of workers does not lead to a homogenised sense of class consciousness, but instead, white nationalist interests often undermine unified class interests. This exemplifies the super-exploitation of differentiated human value that I wish to apply to the use of Chinese migrants as both labour and capital in establishing capitalism in Aotearoa. Furthermore, Wendy Chen (2013) explores the intermediary position of the Asian diaspora between Indigenous peoples and colonisers, combining theories of Edward Said's (1978) Orientalism and Racial Capitalism as functions that justify and advance capitalism. Orientalism depicts Asian people and culture as the Other, racialising them as "alien" and "foreign" threats to Western societies. Asian bodies are simultaneously valorised compared to Indigenous peoples' for economic benefits yet ostracised politically as perpetual foreigners; hence, capitalism depends on the foreign figure of "Asianness".

Establishing a capitalist system in Aotearoa required a lot of money and hard labour to extract the surplus value of land dispossessed from Māori. Hence, in the late nineteenth

century, British colonists invited Chinese sojourners to work in the Otago goldfields as cheap labour in harsh working conditions (Ip & Pang, 2005). This action is an act of super-exploitation, as Chinese labour is valued lower to maximise the surplus value extracted from their labour. This exploitation was done amidst continuing tensions between Māori and Pākehā, causing the Chinese to be conceived as both labour and a racial solution to suppress potential Māori rebellion (Ip, 2003). A British colonial administrator once stated that the Chinese people's "habits and feelings could be kept distant from the N*groes, and who from interest would be inseparably attached to the European proprietors" (Lowe, 2006, p. 193, as cited in Chen, 2013). Although this statement comes from the context of racial labour in India, the sentiment was similar in Aotearoa. The Chinese were upheld as a liberal ideological function via the figure of the subservient and hard-working "model minority" to justify capitalist Pākehā endeavours and oppression of Māori (Ip, 2003). However, as the Chinese population increased, it threatened British white nationalist ideals. Thus began legislative discrimination against Chinese New Zealanders. For example, the 1881 Chinese Immigrants Act introduced a Poll Tax where Chinese had to bring vast amounts of money and cargo to be allowed to immigrate to Aotearoa (Murphy, 1994). Defensive white nationalists also created the ironic contradiction of the "Yellow Peril" moral panic, where Chinese were stereotyped as disloyal and undesirable "aliens" who threatened the position of hard-working white citizens (Ip & Pang, 2005). As such, tensions between tangata whenua and Chinese tauiwi grew due to increasing misrecognition of the Chinese as threats, invited here on immigration terms created by the same British rule that disavows Māori Tino Rangatiratanga (Ip, 2003).

The effects of this history continue today, with the perpetuation of ideological mechanisms such as scapegoating the "housing crisis" onto the Chinese community to obfuscate the fact that such a "crisis" is inherent to capitalism. One of the most notable instances of the "housing crisis" as an ideological artefact in media is seen in the overtly racist comments of politician Phil Twyford. He claimed to have counted a lot of "names that sounded Chinese" and concluded that foreign investors from China must be causing this "housing crisis"—ignoring research statistics showing that only 6.4% of the houses were bought by foreign buyers and, of those foreign buyers, less than a quarter of them were from China (Enoka, 2015; BNZ-REINZ, 2014). This anti-Chinese racism imposed by the superstructure through media legitimises the capitalist system. It ignores how this system inherently oppresses and disadvantages Māori in housing, aiming to instead defer to anti-Chinese racism under the foreign figure of "Asianness"—rather than address the underlying causes. This false narrative has succeeded, as around a third of New Zealand citizens view Asian people as foreigners who do not mix well with New Zealand society, and more than half believe Asians are behind rising house prices (Asia New Zealand Foundation, 2017). This sort of discrimination and scapegoating is inherent to capitalism, as the Asian community continuously reports higher levels of overt racism than any other ethnic group—demonstrating that capitalism depends on racial differentiation in the superstructure and economic base of society (Asia New Zealand Foundation, 2017).

By exploring the "housing crisis" and its differential effects by ethnicity, it becomes clear that racial capitalism inherently exploits and perpetuates the differentiation of human value. Bending the system in hopes of equity is not enough, as differentiation and devaluation of racialised bodies and commodities are inherent to capitalism—as shown through the persistence of processes of accumulation and racism. A solution to such issues becomes overwhelming, as the only option in sight is the massive task of abolishing capitalism, which would prompt a widespread sense of hopelessness and stagnation. Paulo Freire (1986), in his

Pedagogy of the Oppressed, establishes liberation as a journey of reflection upon the status quo and engagement in dialogical relations, aiming to both accept the material realities we reside in but also take practical steps to rehumanise ourselves and our oppressors. In this sense, the first steps in the journey to liberation have already been undertaken by many. In terms of praxis, a key aspect is Māori-Asian solidarity: we must build inter-community relationships through Māori approaches such as whakawhanaungatanga, which, in congruence with Freire's pedagogy, outlines the importance of understanding the power and positionality communities reside in and engaging in dialogical and cultural practices to better relationality (Rata & Al-Assad, 2019). Such actions directly oppose racial capitalism by bridging differences and breaking the internalised white supremacist ideologies imposed by racial capitalism. A prime example of tackling the institutional aspect of racial capitalism in the "housing crisis" is participation in community activism, such as Save Our Unique Landscape and Asians Supporting Tino Rangatiratanga at the protest at Ihumātao. These protests fought for Māori sovereignty in Aotearoa against a housing company that attempted to privatise and enclose communal sacred ancestral ground. This is a step toward communal ownership and sets a precedent for future activism regarding land—of which there are many to engage with.

When the taxing topic of the New Zealand "housing crisis" is explored through the lens of racial capitalism, the racialised valuation of bodies as inherent to capitalism and, as such, the oppression of Māori and Chinese throughout history becomes apparent. Despite this, these communities in Aotearoa continue to thrive and engage in journeys towards liberation. Many participate in dialogue and whakawhanaungatanga to decolonise and subvert the colonial lens, and many join protests for Māori sovereignty in pursuit of communal land ownership of sacred spaces for the public. Although exhausting at times, the journey to liberation is not a vacuous and futile endeavour; it is something enlightening, something emancipating, and something that, under Māori-Asian solidarity, can flourish.

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Tikanga: Ancestral Ways

Xavier Walsh

"All of this is a long way of suggesting that, in relation to employment law and practice in Aotearoa…, it may be time to replace the monocle with a fresh pair of spectacles."
— Christina Inglis, Chief Judge of the Employment Court, 2021.

Like a myriad of things that affect our daily lives, mahi has never been one-dimensional—and the relationship between workers and employers even more so. Should Aotearoa employment practices not reflect this fact? As it stands, the employment relations sphere in Aotearoa does not account for the numerous worldviews that exist around the motu: we are an incredibly multicultural society. However, Aotearoa has a massive disconnect between tikanga Māori and employment relations. With firm conviction, I advocate for integrating universally-applied secular tikanga practices into the employment relations sphere as a third system of law, particularly when employment-related grievances occur. The current New Zealand system of law is rooted in colonial practices, and while some have argued that this system is neutral, it does not account for the reality of modern Aotearoa society. For those seeking further concrete reasoning for such a change, mahi is often heavily affected by employment grievances—how can workers be expected to perform to their best abilities if they are socially and spiritually diminished? This new system will work for the benefit of all workers and employers in Aotearoa.

When a grievance arises, a conflict-resolution process should also occur: this notion exists in both te ao Māori and te ao Pākehā practices, although to different degrees and results. Within tikanga, the process of take-utu-ea takes place, aiming to restore the mana of both parties, not solely the aggrieved whose mana is harmed (Mead, 2003). The te ao Pākehā worldview refers to this as a restorative justice model that aims to restore balance where it has been disturbed (Consedine, 1999). Good faith is one of the most important concepts underpinning every relationship between workers and their employers. So, for a further enriched perspective, employment relations should require a values-based humanistic approach provided by tikanga Māori practices. Such a worldview and system would benefit many situations, including employment mediation conferences, disciplinary investigations, end of employment, policies/values, performance reviews, and performance management plans (Bennett & Kopu, 2020). As tauiwi, I am intrigued as to what this relationship could become in the future, however, I remain mindful of my positionality. As someone who has gone through the personal grievance process, it is out of lived experience that I wish to explore improvements for the sake of others who will continue to experience its potentially harmful effects.

To better understand this process, this essay explains the tikanga Māori framework of mana restoration compared to the legal framework of the current Pākehā grievance process. Following this, a case study follows Matt McCarten's redeveloping project: Utu. Finally, this comes to a head with a jurisprudential question following the reasoning provided by Chief Judge Inglis (2021): what of tikanga? This essay aspires to begin exploring the possibility of a synergetic relationship that could arise from the synthesis of employment relations practices into a third tikanga-integrated system of law in Aotearoa.

Tikanga Māori is the normative system Māori society operated in pre-European contact, and this system has a place within modern employment relations practices in Aotearoa. Mead (2003) argues that tikanga is a form of social control and ethics as it relates to the philosophy and principles practised by Māori. If an action is considered incorrect, this gives ground for

alleging a breach of tikanga. Then, the process of take-utu-ea will take place. Both parties, the wrongdoer and wronged, must agree that a take has occurred and, once approved, appropriate utu, or a similar gesture, can occur. The state of ea is reached once the matter is resolved with the desired outcome. This threesome concept provided by Mead (2003) is an analytical template to resolve and better understand issues in a te ao Māori framework, a framework built on restoring mana. While mana does have to do with a person's place in a social group, it is far more than that alone, as enhancing mana is also vital to public events. Events that do not enhance one's mana are troublesome to one's mana.

In a modern employment context, when an individual worker feels wronged in their employment, they often feel that this wrong needs rectifying, if not for their own sake, then for others. When discussing this matter with John Crocker (personal communication, August 25, 2022), National Secretary of Unite Union, it was his experience that workers often want retribution not for their personal integrity but to aid the collective whole, because solely saving face for personal gain is not their aim. Even without explicit reference to tikanga, it appears that many workers, even tauiwi, in Aotearoa hold values that could be equated to those of wider kaupapa Māori. This is the reasoning for an integrated secular tikanga Māori system of law because, as it stands, tikanga can only currently apply to Māori. Despite tikanga having inherent spiritual aspects, its broader application could aid many within Aotearoa society if, again, applied more broadly. The specific tikanga values outlined in *Lex Aotearoa* (Williams, 2013), such as whanaungatanga, mana, tapu, utu, kaitiakitanga, and others, certainly have a place in the wider ethos of Aotearoa society in both Māori and tauiwi circles. From a worker representative's experiences, it is apparent that workers want a form of "modern Māori justice in action—restorative, healing and reconciling—", a form of justice that ensures the integrity and hauora of all individuals and their communities (Consedine, 1999, p. 82). However, unlike the current Pākehā model, which is inherently secretive, tikanga is also accountable, as "a decision that is unjust according to tikanga values risks being rejected by the community even if it is consistent with a tikanga-based directive" (Williams, 2013, p. 3). If the workplace is to change for the better, understanding and acting on traditional Māori value practices must extend beyond simply pōwhiri, hui, and tangi alone. The current Pākehā system can and must be changed.

The Pākehā employment law system comprises a series of laws, court cases, and practices that currently do incredibly little to refer explicitly to tikanga Māori. The Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA 2000) is the backbone of Aotearoa employment law and is the legal guide for the formal grievance process when something goes awry in one's mahi. As it stands, the only reference to tikanga Māori anywhere within the ERA 2000 is section 1B s (10)(1)(d), which refers to the application of tikanga practices in collective bargaining solely in the public health sector. However, good faith may be the key by which tikanga Māori practices may be accessed by any worker in Aotearoa. Employment relationships require trust and mutual confidence, and an employer has to treat a worker fairly and properly in all aspects of their employment—this constitutes part of a good-faith relationship (Rudman, 2021). Recent legislation, such as the Public Services Act 2020, further describes what a good employer is by recognising the needs of more historically marginalised groups, including tangata whenua, wāhine, and people with disabilities. It is clear that the government has yet to realise the full potential of good faith in employment.

The basis for the common law system that Aotearoa currently uses is derived from British colonisation, a system focused on the liberal value of the individual's autonomy. This explanation is provided by Williams (2013) and provides a comparison to the tikanga Māori

system of law that focuses more closely on values such as whanaungatanga. Māori and Pākehā have collided on the issue of legal law since initial colonisation, and this is illustrated in examples such as when Salmond presented evidence to the Waitangi Tribunal in 1997 for the Muriwhenua Land Claim report. She stated that, prior to European contact, Māori operated in an understanding of the world governed by whakapapa, with mana and tapu operating as the basis of this system and utu being the principle of balancing life when incidents occur (Waitangi Tribunal, 1997). As Inglis (2021) details, the disconnect between tikanga and employment relations may be explained by employment, as we understand it, not existing in pre-colonial Māori society. The individualistic approach of the Pākehā system contrasts strongly with the collectivism demonstrated by tikanga, and, importantly, it is clear that tikanga is not compatible with te ao Pākehā common law's origins in master-servant relationships. This Pākehā master-servant worldview is seemingly forced on worker-employer employment relationship issues. It certainly no longer fits within the Aotearoa context—so perhaps a reckoning is needed to change it.

To this extent, Matt McCarten (Ngāpuhi) started Utu, a project aiming to battle exploitative employment practices. This project, currently undergoing redevelopment, represents a new form of trade union. Utu is the vehicle for the driving force deemed McCarten's "revenge on exploitative employers" that was started after his exit from Labour Party leadership (Kilgallon, 2020). According to Kilgallon (2020), he intended to start a Sunday "church for sinners" that would picket uncooperative employers who would not attend the negotiation table for the most egregious cases of bullying, harassment, and migrant exploitation. When getting these employers to the table, his tactic is to start with a short kōrero to change the battlefield and rebalance the system of power. This is McCarten's (personal communication, September 3, 2022) insight into tikanga. While he acknowledges the multiple definitions of 'utu', he firmly believes that his Utu project has two fundamental meanings: rebalance and revenge. Furthermore, as Ngāpuhi, he believes in putting things right. His understanding of the trade union movement is that it is an export of Europe and, as such, based on an adversarial class system. However, the purpose of Utu is that while the revenge is indeed adversarial, it is also inherently reciprocal as it results in recognition of hurt and resolution on behalf of the worker. This is tikanga. His "blasting" of poor employers is an extension of this, as there is no more powerful tool in Māori society than whakamā—which can certainly hold true in a broader Aotearoa context (Consedine, 1999). Shame is powerful: no one wants to be held accountable to the social wrath of others. Therefore, worker mana must be restored. McCarten (personal communication, September 3, 2022) was himself challenged a few weeks prior to our conversation by an employer in Pōneke when that employer asked that their mana be restored after he had attacked them so much. Mana plays a vital role in this project's redevelopment. Both parties recognised the wrong, compensation was received, and mana was restored and healed among both aggrieved parties. This process is take-utu-ea in action in an employment relations context, and it can most definitely be expanded upon for others.

The current Pākehā system allows for without-prejudice meetings, confidential mediation, and non-disparagement clauses. This must end if both parties are to come away with a successful outcome that ensures restitution. McCarten (personal communication, September 3, 2022) stated that Te Tiriti o Waitangi is the first collective agreement of New Zealand—he himself has two tūpuna who signed. If Te Tiriti is to be fully realised, then something must also be done to change the employment relations sphere. Take-utu-ea is the process that must occur when an employment-related grievance occurs. An empty justice process where workers simply receive a cheque and no mana is restored is not enough. The master-servant

relationship of Pākehā understandings of the common law model does not reflect Aotearoa's model of thinking or needs. Restorative justice is needed for all aggrieved in the employment relations sphere, and tikanga is the means. This form of tikanga should not be the realm of Māori alone, but Pākehā too. It will ensure better outcomes for all because, even when a worker 'wins' in the current model, they will always lose if a process of mana healing and restoration does not occur.

Once again, herein lies the question posed by Chief Judge of the Employment Court Christina Inglis (2021): what of tikanga? After providing a background to the Pākehā model, where tikanga stands on grievances, and a tikanga-based case study of the Utu project, it is now possible to answer the inherently more jurisprudential question. The Employment Court has yet to grapple properly with tikanga, much less its full potential, as it has previously focused on its application only in cases of employment relationship issues between Māori workers and Māori employers (Inglis, 2021). Referencing Kopu's address at an Employment Law Conference, Green (2020) discussed the importance of practising employment law in a way that reflects and honours the multicultural society of Aotearoa, a society in which we all participate. As employment grievances are predominantly the result of contractual disagreements, given the usual nature of the complaints, the grievance process should be separated from the contractual dispute process so that parties can find a more values-based humanistic solution. Although tikanga is both a legal system and a philosophy, it has quite different characteristics from the State legal system—particularly in its implication of tika and pono in Māori philosophy. This differs from legal positivism, which aims to address more moralistic or meritorious issues (Bennett, M., & Roughan, N., 2006; Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2019). Restoring mana is at the core of a tikanga dispute-based process, which Aotearoa would benefit from. It is inherently more moralistic, as the current system means that workers can never truly win due to the power imbalance in the worker-employer relationship. This power imbalance must be rectified if a more beneficial take-utu-ea is to take place.

The solution, in part, to the issue of grievances has already been broached by legal scholars such as Williams (2013): Aotearoa needs a third tikanga-based system of law. However, this application of tikanga must not be utilised in the domain of Māori alone. This is especially true if Pākehā are to buy in and ensure that Te Tiriti o Waitangi is fully realised—particularly the tino rangatiratanga aspect. With the recent death of Queen Elizabeth II, momentum may be gained within Commonwealth realms, including New Zealand, towards republicanism. Previously, Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern admitted that she believes New Zealand will become a republic someday (Radio New Zealand, 2021). However, if New Zealand was to become a republic, or if there were to be other potential improvements in Māori-Pākehā relations, then ensuring tino rangatiratanga should be of the utmost importance in such a process—a process that must realise the importance of tikanga. The basis for Pākehā access to the proposed third system of law can be found in the many discussions, particularly from the 1990s onwards, about identity within Aotearoa. For example, in *Being Pākehā Now*, King (1999) explicitly promotes the notion of a new identity that has the same right to belong as Māori, the 'white native' (p. 9), in light of 'evolving Pākehā culture' (p. 7). However, Spoonley (1997) concedes that, even though there has been a re-thinking of settler identity and politics as a result of Māori identity politics, "the term Pakeha, and its politics, reflect a degree of ambiguity and while some variants might be sympathetic to biculturalism and the Treaty of Waitangi, there are nevertheless those that are vociferously opposed to such politics (p. 38)." While there is opposition to co-governance, perhaps part of the solution to Pākehā buy-in is a legal system that treats all people more fairly: a secular, tikanga-integrated system.

The grievance system needs changing, and current practice is insufficient in securing moral outcomes for workers. Inglis (2021) rightfully notes that good faith's current substantive justification and procedural fairness do not address the impact on an individual's mana, including mamae and whakamā. This is in a world currently riddled with worker mamae and whakamā. For example, a recent Human Rights Commission (2022a) report on bullying and harassment in the workplace detailed damning statistics: in the preceding five years, nearly 30% of workers had personally experienced workplace sexual harassment, and 39% of workers had personally experienced workplace racial harassment. When submitting on the Employment Relations (Extended Time for Personal Grievance for Sexual Harassment) Amendment Bill, the Human Rights Commission (2022b) also noted the need for the personal grievance process to be more protective of workers raising harassment and bullying claims, especially in a tikanga compliant and culturally appropriate processes. Moralistic integrity is lacking in the Pākehā legal system and is something that tikanga practices could help ensure in favour of restoring mana.

To this extent, Dr Zoë Port (personal communication, September 11, 2022), an expert in psychosocial harm at Massey University, firmly believes that this current system is re-traumatising workers when they often just want 'out'. She asserts that if the system can develop a restorative focus aimed at upholding the mana of both parties, then there is real potential for harm to be reduced. From a health and safety perspective, for which she conducts psychosocial analyses, Port (2022) thinks that a tikanga system would be a potential solution as either a primary or secondary intervention (a secondary intervention meaning that harm is to be prevented or eliminated wherever possible first before said harm can occur). This aligns with the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015, which aims to minimise or eliminate harm in the workplace pre-emptively wherever possible. When a system is not fit for purpose and, in some cases, does more harm than good, it is time for it to be changed. Aotearoa requires a system that will ensure better outcomes for everyone, and it is time to consider tikanga to enable this process.

In conclusion, the Aotearoa employment relations sphere requires change so both workers and employers can ensure their mana is healed when grievances arise. A proposed third system of secular tikanga Māori practice-based law is the best way to ensure this occurs. The system of take-utu-ea often addresses grievances within Māori society, and, in theory, this may work better than the current Pākehā system, with its roots in outdated master-servant relationships. When researching this essay, I discovered that there have been insufficient explicit and published discussions of incorporating employment relations so far, even though it would be a real commitment by the government to Te Tiriti o Waitangi. The only employment agreement I found that even minorly referenced a potential employment-based tikanga process was a New Zealand Nurses Organisation (2020) collective employment agreement for Māori community health providers, which referenced a 'kōrero tahi kaupapa' process for informal grievances. This is certainly insufficient in addressing the needs of all workers, Māori and tauiwi, when employment-related grievances occur.

An empty restorative justice process will not work. Aotearoa requires a legal system that more clearly represents the values found within Aotearoa. Values are at the heart of both tikanga and worker restitution, so it seems only fair that the issue of worker employment grievances should be addressed in a values-focused manner—a mana-enhancing manner. Many aggrieved workers want a restorative, healing, and reconciling system. If Aotearoa is to have such a system, then it should be based on secular tikanga Māori practices and

worldviews. Much like Inglis' (2021) ground-breaking article, this essay is a response to the fact that the employment relations sphere must actually correspond with the realities of our multicultural society. At this time, Aotearoa is a society that does not ensure mana-healing processes occur when an employment-related grievance arises. This is only the beginning of this area of study, and much more work should be done to investigate this potential future of employment relations in Aotearoa fully. Investigating the potential of this new system for employment-related grievances would be truly fascinating. Change is needed in the employment personal grievance process, and now is the time for us to consider looking at this issue with spectacles rather than monocles. For a positive, balanced future of employment relations, this vision must be provided by tikanga Māori.

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Frances Wright

Think ~~of~~ like the children: Children as curious kin-makers in *Beasts of the Southern Wild* and *The Lorax*

> "It matters what matters we use to think other matters with; it matters what stories we tell to tell other stories with… It matters what stories make worlds, what worlds make stories."
>
> — Donna Haraway (2016, p. 12)

Our landscape is darkened by a long shadow cast from critical ecological times. Living under such a shadow, the turn of the twenty-first century has seen the emergence of 'human-animal studies' in academia. This fast-developing field critically and crucially considers how we might "make kin" in a thick and ecologically alarming present (Haraway, 2016, p.1). The cinema has developed uniquely alongside the climate crisis, and, because animal ethics and narrative ethics are inextricably linked (Fawcett, 2014), we must carefully consider our kin-making on screen. In this essay, I present a case for the role of the child in filmic kin-making representations. Both *Beasts of the Southern Wild* (2012, Benh Zeitlin) and *The Lorax* (2012, Chris Renaud) are child-centred films that convey a posthumanist ethic of relationality with nonhuman biotic beings. Under the premise of the child's curiosity, I will unpack how *Beasts of the Southern Wild* blurs the lines of human-animal relationships through imaginative modes of storytelling and *The Lorax* productively animates the non-animal biotic other and utilises the child's curiosity for ecological hope. While both representations have their limitations—most obviously *The Lorax's* unproductive anthropomorphism of animals—I argue they each employ child-like, curious kinship imaginaries that provide effective avenues through which the posthumanist ability to address and acknowledge the biotic Other is outworked.

A posthuman ethic is one of interspecies relationality: it focuses on the intertwined lives of humans and the natural world while critically considering the human's key role in imagining futures. In her essay on 'kindred forms', Robertson (2021) presents a posthumanist ethic of 'relationality'. Such an ethic suggests that all living beings dwell in a single, interdependent system, a concept Robertson describes as a "valuable posthuman perspective" that integrates humankind into a world "much older and larger" than itself (pp. 551–561). The "posthumanist ethics" that Weil proposes (2017), then, are ethics of relationality—those that stem from a belief that all living things are interconnected and require ways of thinking and being that consider the inherent value of all life. Notably, the notion of a post*human* ethic requires attention to the role of the human in its outworking. Although part of nature, humans have a central role to play by possessing a unique ability to imagine and plan for nature's future (Robertson, 2021). In ecological times such as ours, the ability to imagine and represent an ethic of relationality is more pertinent than ever.

Human-animal studies operate under a posthuman ethic of relationality and critically conceptualise how humankind and the natural world are intertwined—through both our understanding of biotic agents as relations and our ability to address them as other. The very hyphen in 'human-animal' signals a 'together in one' and stresses that we must study humans and the natural world holistically. As Marvin and McHugh (2014) note, humans are "animals in *general*, and humans in *particular*" (emphasis added, p. 2). Further to the field's recognition of an interspecies 'oneness', Marvin and McHugh caution against claiming a 'sameness'. 'Othering' nonhuman biotic life does not equate devaluation (this is quite opposite to the posthuman ethic) but instead recognises *animal agency*—that animals are

"actors of a different order" (2014, p. 5). As Weil articulates, such agency is foreign to our human ways of being in the world (2017); therefore, addressing and acknowledging the biotic-other on screen requires imagination.

Kinship imaginaries are an effective way of 'addressing and acknowledging' the animal-other and find an appropriate affective representation partner in the cinema. As Fawcett (2014) notes, there are varied and rich ideas about kinship in human-animal studies. At their simplest, kin are terms used to identify relationships in a family (*relation*ship terms certainly seem appropriate for our *relation*ality ethic). In an ecocritical application, Haraway (2016) describes 'kin' as an 'assembling' sort of word, envisioning "all critters [to] share a common flesh" (p. 103). Such 'assembling' is extended by Fawcett through kinship imaginaries, broadening kinship to a holistic notion of what it may look, feel, and act like in the world (2014). If Haraway suggests our primary task in these ecological times is to 'make kin'—a practice of learning to 'live well together' in a "thick" present (p. 2)—then film, with its capacity to engage imaginative, affective modes of relational representation must be an appropriate avenue for building kinship.

So, how do we "make kin" on screen? I present that children's curious imaginaries in "multispecies stories" (Haraway, 2016, p. 55) provide compelling avenues for kinship engagement. Leesa Fawcett (2014) presents that child-animal relationships and their fictional representations provide a way to "gain a wider angle view on imagining and teaching interspecies ethics" (p. 259). She argues that children have "unique perspectives" on natural life (p. 259) and that curiosity towards the other is effective for "disrupt[ing] notions of autonomy and individualism and focus[ing] on interdependence and interrelations" (p. 259). Fawcett writes that curiosity is "seen as a childish trait" but argues that we must regain curiosity to be able to see the biotic-other empathetically (p. 267). My thesis agrees with Fawcett's suggestion and seeks to explore the child's curiosity in multispecies stories as an avenue for kin-making on screen. For the remainder of this essay, I will consider what I call 'curious kin-making' in both *Beasts of the Southern Wild* (2012) and *The Lorax* (2012). I argue that employing the child protagonist and child-like film language in these multispecies stories is not simply whimsical, but an effective and necessary way of applying posthuman ethics to help us make kin with the biotic other.

Beasts of the Southern Wild creates a kinship imaginary by curiously addressing the animal-other through the eyes of its child protagonist, Hushpuppy. The film's unique camerawork is perhaps the most obvious example, as it visually and viscerally draws us into her world. Cinematographer Ben Richardson (2013) describes his desire to depict Hushpuppy's perspective through the camera lens: "I tried to be [Hushpuppy's] sense, if not literally her eyes" (p. 1). The opening sequence of the film is a striking example. The camera places us at Hushpuppy's own eye level as, together, we investigate squirming sea creatures in an extreme close-up. In a jump cut, Hushpuppy extends our investigation through a slightly out-of-focus extreme close-up as she picks up a crab and holds it to her ear. Clary (2018) writes that Richardson's camerawork encourages Hushpuppy's perspective, as we see through her eyes into a visceral space of curious investigation towards the animal-other. She expands on the 'holistic' nature of such camerawork, describing it as capturing "the intricate and expansive ecosystem to which humanity belongs" (p. 46). Hushpuppy's world is distinctly curious. It commands us to pay attention to the vibrant animal life we may not usually see—in our everyday lives and onscreen. The representation of an intricate and expansive ecosystem through the unique camerawork in *Beasts* is, therefore, effectively kin-making. It

allows us to enter Hushpuppy's holistic world and together investigate the curious creatures we find there.

An extension of *Beasts'* camerawork, and an essential element of Hushpuppy's kin perspective, is the 'common heartbeat'. This recurring imaginative device furthers Hushpuppy's kin-centred understanding of the world while critically addressing the animal as other. Also in the film's opening sequence, Hushpuppy lays her hand on a pig—and a heartbeat enters the film's sound score. This sound, amplified to such an extent, is non-diegetic, and its conscious foregrounding articulates Hushpuppy's "keen awareness" of her interconnected ecosystem (Clary, 2018, p. 17). Such keen awareness contains a critical knowledge of the animal-other: "All the time, everywhere, everything's hearts are beating… talking to each other in ways *I can't understand*". Hushpuppy's language here articulates a clear distinction between 'oneness' and 'otherness'. It appears that, through her listening, she is trying to 'figure out' the kin in her ecosystem, those whom Marvin and McHugh (2014) deem to "act of a different order" (p. 5). Marvin and McHugh assert that the representation of animal agents is only possible when presented as "deeply integrated" with humans (p. 6). *Beasts'* central heartbeat successfully achieves this by depicting animals as creatures that invite curiosity in their otherness, whilst maintaining a second, related heartbeat that holistically and 'deeply' integrates them into Hushpuppy's human world.
It is difficult to move past a human-animal reading of *Beasts* without discussing the presence of the beastly Aurochs. Magical realism is a key feature of the film, and, while there exist a range of scholarly readings of the Aurochs[1], here I propose that they function to deepen Hushpuppy's kin-like relationship with the natural world—which, in turn, helps us address our own 'beastliness'. This is most evident during the film's climax, when Hushpuppy visits her dying father, Wink. As she appears over the hill in a hand-held tracking shot, the aurochs thunder behind her. While her friends scream and run from the beasts, Hushpuppy turns to face them. Whether figments of her imagination or real beasts (we are never entirely sure which), Hushpuppy's turning to face the Aurochs removes fear in 'beastly' otherness and affords a productive animal agency. She directly addresses the beasts as kin, "You're my friend kind of", and then distinguishes them as other, "I got to take care of mine now"—the *mine* here being of key othering function. This edited association of kinship addressment and acknowledgement of the beastly-other extends Hushpuppy's imaginary to one distinctly tentacular, belonging to a world in which all things are intertwined (Haraway, 2016). Clary (2018) suggests that such intertwinement presented through the aurochs as beastly-kin may enable us to envision ourselves as human-beasts as well as a human-beings. As Ms Bathsheba teaches: "Meat. Every animal is made out of meat. I'm meat. Y'all asses is meat. Everything is part of the buffet of the universe." The use of magical realism—which perhaps only gains its *realism* because it is represented through the curious child's eye—is vital for entering with Hushpuppy into the thick relatedness of the natural world and making kin with the curious beasts we find both there- and with-in.

Having considered the child-on-screen as an avenue for kin-making in the multispecies *Beasts of the Southern Wild* narrative, I now turn to the child-ish-screen to consider the child's film in curious kin-making practices. Here, I present the use of animation in the child's film *The Lorax* (2012) and its ability to animate the non-animal biotic world as

[1] Primarily, the Aurochs are read as a metaphor for social anxieties and environmental disasters that loom over Hushpuppy and her community (Brox, 2016).

another effective avenue for kin-making on screen[2]. Instead of discussing *The Lorax*'s explicit ecological themes and depiction of human-animal relationships (we will shortly address how this is distinctly unproductive), I will consider how its use of animation points our attention to the biotic environment as subject and extends kinship to non-animal biotic agents of the natural world (Starosielski, 2011). While not primarily concerned with the film's ecological themes, I will briefly consider the crucial role and animation of the curious child in bringing about a hopeful ecological message in the film's narrative.

Before considering the environment as subject, we must address *The Lorax's* animated elephant in the room: anthropomorphism. Anthropomorphism is the application of human characteristics, motivations, behaviours, and values to nonhuman species (Caraway and Caraway, 2020). *The Lorax*, unhelpfully, makes use of animation's anthropomorphic abilities as it depicts nonhuman creatures with human features (eyes, smiles, bipedal functions) engaged in human practices. While such anthropomorphism is, no doubt, used deliberately to create a sense of connection with nature through human-like tendencies, Caraway and Caraway (2020) argue that this use of animation may reinforce the non-posthuman notion that animals are "essentially human" (p. 689). They extend that anthropomorphism is distinctly anthropocentric: the "privileging of human values and experiences as a means for understanding the experiences of other life forms, thereby conferring a hierarchy of being in which humans occupy the uppermost position" (p. 688). As we have already discussed and seen achieved successfully in *Beasts of the Southern Wild*, the representation of animal agency among species is paramount for a productive posthuman ethic. Unfortunately, *The Lorax* fails to address the animal as other and instead employs animation to anthropomorphise animals to a curious kin-maker's detriment.

What *The Lorax* loses in its animal-un-otherness, it makes up for in its use of animation to curiously engage us with the non-animal biotic other. The animated world of *The Lorax* depicts the landscape as a subject that invites curious investigation of the environment. The animated ecosystem of *The Lorax* is one in which, curiously, everything seems to be active. Ursula Heise (2014) suggests such activity is achieved through animation's 'plasmaticness', "set[ing] objects in motion, endow[ing] them with agency, and inquir[ing] into their 'objecthood'" (p. 303). Consider, for example, the plasmatic nature of the Truffula trees in the film. They seem to have a life of their own as they swim and float in the animated air, so, when they are chopped down, it feels as though some*thing* has been axed. Of course, we know trees are indeed *somethings*: living, breathing agents of our ecosystems. Starosielski (2011) writes that the attributes animation affords for environmental communication allow such agency by stretching to imaginative views of the *environment itself*. She notes that animated images, like those of the trees in *The Lorax*, produce "modes of interactivity" that encourage engagement with the environment as subject (p. 159). The animation of nonhuman biota in *The Lorax* therefore productively represents the environment as subject to invite curiosity towards non-animal biotic kin. Kin which, without animation, may not be so curiously captured (Starosielski, 2011). Perhaps non-animal biotic others—not just plants, but fungi, protozoans, and algae too—require the more imaginative forms of address that animation affords because their 'foreignness' lacks even the common heartbeat of the animals in *Beasts*. The potential for animation to breathe life into the ecosystems of children's films

[2] As Heise (2014) notes, animation is not only limited to the child's film, but we will be considering it here for its undeniable prevalence in children's media.

is, therefore, a productive way of broadening our kinship imaginary by inviting us to investigate the curious environment on screen.

While I have not set out to address *The Lorax's* explicit ecological themes in depth, it is appropriate for my thesis to note how ecological hope is brought about through the child protagonist's curiosity towards biotic life and the film's animation of such curiosity. In the film, narrative direction is catalysed by young Audrey's curiosity towards Truffula trees. The adults in the film are presented as apathetic towards biotic life (aside from Grammy Norma, who, we may argue, has a 'child-like' sparkle in her eye). Plasmatic animation facilitates the children's curiosity towards the biotic other. For example, when Ted examines the last Truffula seed, his animated eyes literally widen at the thought and sight of the seed's finality. Audrey and Ted's childish curiosity about the other (Audrey of trees, Ted of Audrey and, later, also of trees) and its animated representation is critical for bringing about the film's hopeful ecological narrative. As Pike (2014) notes, for successful kin-making communication we need a "new mood, one appropriate for the world we hope to create…a mood of gratitude, joy and pride, not sadness, fear, and regret" (Nordhaus & Shellenberger in Pike, p. 95). This level of hope present in *The Lorax*, one that eschews sadness, fear and regret, is only brought about by the child's curiosity and, arguably, animation's ability to make the non-animal biotic world curious enough to investigate. *The Lorax,* therefore, is a productive 'multispecies story' (Haraway, 2016); perhaps not of animal-human relations, but certainly of humans and plant life. Much like Hushpuppy's animal kin-making in *Beasts of the Southern Wild*, the child's curiosity and curiously animated biotic-other in *The Lorax* provides an effective avenue for kin-making on screen.

When proposing a future imaginary for kin relationships in our troubling ecological times, Donna Haraway (2016) writes that "it matters what stories make worlds, [and] what worlds make stories" (p. 12). She insists that the presence of multispecies stories and "becoming with" practices is crucial for a hopeful ecological future (p. 55). Indeed, the worlds we make on screen and the stories we tell within them have tangible implications for the Earth's future. This essay has made a case for the role of the child in multispecies stories and presented curious kinship imaginaries—via both the curious child protagonist and the capacity of film to represent child-like curiosities—as productive 'becoming with' practices. We have seen how *Beasts of the Southern Wild* employs camerawork, narrative device, and magical realism to draw us into Hushpuppy's kinship world and how *The Lorax*, while failing to represent animal-others as effectively as *Beasts* does, productively animates the non-animal biotic other and utilises the child's curiosity for ecological hope. While both films may have representational limitations, it is evident that the child has a central role in producing effective avenues for kin-making onscreen. In times like ours, as our unique ability to imagine futures becomes ever more critical, curiosity has an important and necessary role in producing posthuman kinship imaginaries that 'disrupt autonomy' and focus on interrelated ecosystems (Fawcett, 2014). Adopting the posture of the curious child provides ways of developing kin imaginaries that productively engage with the biotic-other at a time when our futures are so critically and crucially intertwined.

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Humanity's cognitive complexity is perfectly encapsulated in the field of ethics as the notion of morality often transcends animalistic instincts. Morality is learned, rather than instinctual, often through faith, stories, and typically relating to a basic sense of empathy. While other animals are capable of empathy, humans are the only organic beings capable of conceiving and, therefore, contemplating distinctions between right and wrong. This dichotomy has only been further complicated by the development of modern technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI). Humanity already struggles to unanimously agree on a single code of ethics, making the programming of moral decision-making a near-impossible challenge when designing AI. For such reasons, AI often serves as a reflection of humanity's intricacy, highlighting both our unique capabilities as well as our imperfections. The former encompasses a range of abilities which AI is still far from perfectly imitating, and the latter poses potential benefits which AI could provide for humanity. The outcome is, of course, dependent on us and how we choose to progress in the development of such technologies and our understanding of ethics.

The authors in this section discuss the need for ethical consideration and explore the possibilities and obstacles in AI development. The ideas expressed throughout this section reveal both how far we have come as well as how much we have left to learn; it is of course fitting, then, that much of this section discusses AI, a technology which ultimately reflects its creators. This reflection reveals the impressive intellectual and cognitive capacity we possess, while simultaneously revealing our ignorance and biases. With every piece of technology we invent there is more for us to learn about ourselves and our morality.

This section starts with a purely ethical focus through McLean's discussion of ethical practices in psychological research involving children. She explores the difficulties posed by such research, like how legal technicalities often conflict with ethical considerations because a child's legal status denies them the same rights as an adult in a research environment. McLean takes further consideration of how the needs and values of Māori children can be respected in research settings – a matter often neglected in psychological research in Aotearoa New Zealand.

We then transition into discussions surrounding AI, with HardieNeil's analysis of AI's ability to produce academic work of similar quality to human scholars. She does so through a focus of an article about Egypt's unification produced by ChatGPT, critiquing the AI's ability to cite authentic scholarly work. In doing so, HardieNeil poses the question of whether AI is truly capable of conducting research and producing work of a parallel quality to human scholars, examining the value of human input in academic research.

Finally, Mortimer-Webster discusses the differences in human thought processes and AI thinking, exploring the ways in which AI could be treated as a learning opportunity for humanity through a philosophical lens. They dissect how AI may struggle to grasp any notion of identity, and how this poses new ontological questions for humanity. They then return to the section's complex theme of ethics through their discussion of the struggle in teaching morality to an AI, a dilemma which is greatly dependent on the ethical understanding of an AI's creator, revealing their biases and empathetic capacity.

These essays explore the ethical complexities posed by psychological research and the development of AI, while stressing humanity's unique abilities which propel progress in such fields to begin with. Ethics remains a contentious philosophical field, as what one person considers morally right may be wrong for another. AI can reveal our flawed ethics at times, presenting an opportunity for us to reflect on the current state of our species and how we interact with one another. And while we may not know what will come from the development of AI, we should embrace its function as a mirror – one which reflects our impressive abilities as well as our shortcomings. In essence, the essays in this section reveal how much we still have to learn about ourselves, while reminding us of our potential as a species.

Amir Jimenez Hambuch

Anthropology 747

Special Topic: Doing Biocultural Research

Katherine McLean

Complex ethical issues are inherent in psychological research with children, often more so than in research with adults (Thomas & O'Kane, 1998). The core issues remain constant, including confidentiality, consent, and responsibility for the subjects' well-being. However, the way in which these issues arise and the urgency with which they present themselves can be starkly different when working with children (Thomas & O'Kane, 1998). Children experience the world with a unique perspective that must be considered when planning research with child participants. Relevant ethical practices have been extensively discussed in the meta-research of childhood psychology (see, e.g., Farrell, 2005c; Morrow & Richards, 1996; Thomas & O'Kane, 1998), but not with specific regard to experimental methodologies or Aotearoa New Zealand. This review covers current opinions and research on ethical issues inherent in experimental psychological research with children, including consent and assent, confidentiality, and the rectification of power imbalances. To assess the current state of practice in this sub-field, I also conducted a systematic analysis of recent studies that utilised relevant Piagetian non-invasive experimental methodologies. Issues are discussed and applied in an Aotearoa New Zealand context, with reference to the current legislation, institutional guidelines, and Māori interests and needs.

While the consent of parents and guardians must be procured before enrolling children in scientific studies (Morrow & Richards, 1996), young children should still be agents of their bodies and decisions. Despite not always being necessitated by law or institutional regulations (Peart & Holdaway, 1998; Powell & Smith, 2006), robust research also seeks the consent of participating children (Alderson, 2005). Legally, children are unable to provide consent and can only give assent (Peart & Holdaway, 1998; Powell & Smith, 2006). Ethics, however, goes beyond legality. From an ethical perspective, children should not be considered de facto incompetent and their informed and willing consent should be required unless they cannot be reasonably consulted (Melton & Stanley, 1996; Alderson, 2005). Children understand confidentiality, risks and benefits, withdrawal from research, and consent at ages as young as four (MacNaughton & Smith, 2005; Melton & Stanley, 1996). Researchers must thus not underestimate children's comprehension when explaining study protocols and processes (Alderson, 2005). It should be noted that the ethics documents of New Zealand's research institutions and associations consistently lag behind the developing respect for children's rights and abilities, often only recommending that children's summary assent be obtained and stopping short of mandating accessible discussions about their rights during research (Powell & Smith, 2006). Ethical committees exist as much to protect institutions and researchers as they do to protect research subjects and so must not be used as the benchmark of best ethical practice—only the minimum standard (Powell & Smith, 2006).

Consent should also be an ongoing process—children must be able to withdraw from research at any time, whether temporarily or permanently, and feel safe to do so (Thomas & O'Kane, 1998). For infants and very young children who cannot express themselves coherently, researchers have a duty to note any distress and ensure that the child is comfortable continuing. This requires a constant balance of assessment and reassessment: not all distress necessitates a withdrawal and sometimes a simple rest will suffice. Withdrawal should also extend past participation into data ownership (MacNaughton & Smith, 2005). Like adults, children should have a say in determining the usage of their data and have the right to withdraw their data from a project.

Confidentiality and privacy are complicated in research with children, as parents or guardians may request to be informed on matters their child has chosen to be kept confidential (Thomas & O'Kane, 1998). Thus, a researcher has dual conflicting obligations: that to the parents and guardians and that to the children. Often both cannot be simultaneously satisfied. Outside of specific legal contexts, such as mandated reporting that supersedes confidentiality, there is no clear answer for where primary loyalty should lie. Some researchers believe that complete confidentiality cannot, and should not, be guaranteed to a child and that the desires of parents and guardians take precedence (Thomas & O'Kane, 1998). However, this perspective stems from outdated concepts of adult intellectual superiority and documentation of children being an inalienable parental right (MacNaughton & Smith, 2005). Other researchers believe, in concert with the concept of children as free agents, that children's experiences and feelings should only be disclosed with their agreement (Thomas & O'Kane, 1998). This respect for children's confidentiality, termed a "children's rights" approach, is increasingly popular, although seen by some as undermining and disruptive of parental rights (Farrell, 2005b; MacNaughton & Smith, 2005). Individual researchers must decide which position they support and be prepared to defend their decision. However, denying children's rights is an increasingly untenable position considering the cascade of initiatives stemming from the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and its attribution of individual rights and "person status" to children (Farrell, 2005b). Researchers who recognise children as having comparable rights to adults must remain cognisant of the differences in competencies between the groups; children may deserve the same rights as adults, but children and adults are not the same (Morrow, 2008; Peart & Holdaway, 1998).

One of the most subtle ethical problems when working with children is the power imbalance (Morrow & Richards, 1996; Farrell, 2005a). The disparity in power between children and adults, both researchers and parents or guardians, can inhibit children from feeling that they have a say in matters concerning their minds and bodies (Thomas & O'Kane, 1998). If power imbalances are ignored, consent may have effectively been obtained under duress and allowances for children to withdraw due to discomfort would be futile, as they may not feel permitted to do so. Power imbalances can thus be termed the most critical of all considerations in research with children. The first step in diminishing power imbalances is giving children a choice: in what they do, how they do it, when they do it, and what is said to others about them (Morrow & Richards, 1996; Thomas & O'Kane, 1998). The research environment should be a safe space for participants, where their desires are heard and respected (MacNaughton & Smith, 2005). Children may not always be able to participate actively, but they must at least not be treated as unknowing objects of research (Alderson, 2005). The UNCRC, which New Zealand ratified in 1993 (Powell & Smith, 2006), dictates that children have the right to form opinions and have those opinions heard (United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989). However, it is essential to be careful when attributing powers to children to remember their inherent naïveté and vulnerability (Thomas & O'Kane, 1998; Farrell, 2005b). The specific rights and powers needed by children will be different to those needed by adults (Farrell, 2005b).

Research ethics are situational, and so will vary across contexts and geopolitical regions. In Aotearoa New Zealand, research must consider the interests of the Indigenous Māori population. When working with Indigenous children in any country, researchers must familiarise themselves with the relevant socio-political histories (Ball, 2005; Boulton, 2018). In New Zealand, the 1940 *te Tiriti o Waitangi*, or Treaty of Waitangi, created a formal agreement between the British Crown and Māori leaders that Māori interests and traditions would be perpetually recognised and protected (Hudson & Russell, 2009). Te Tiriti remains

an integral part of New Zealand's legislative and organisational systems; therefore, when conducting research with Māori participants, honouring te Tiriti is a legal and ethical requirement (Health Research Council, 2010; Ministry of Health, 2006). Research ethics must consider *kaupapa*, Māori principles and values, and *tikanga*, Māori protocols on how these values should be applied (Health Research Council, 2010; Hudson & Russell, 2009). The field of Māori-centric research ethics is vast (Boulton, 2018; Hudson & Russell, 2009), but several aspects of kaupapa are essential when working with *tamariki* (Māori children): *rangatiratanga*, *manaakitanga*, *whānau*, and *whakapapa*.

Rangatiratanga is the Māori concept of sovereignty and self-governance (Health Research Council, 2010). Sovereignty was one of the core values that te Tiriti o Waitangi sought to safeguard (Hudson & Russell, 2009; Rau & Ritchie, 2011). When working with tamariki, allowing them to retain control over their own decisions, bodies, and data at all stages of a study acknowledges rangatiratanga. As discussed, allowances for self-control are a cornerstone of research with all children—but become even more vital when working with Māori. Manaakitanga is the ideal of extending protection and compassion to others and upholding their *mana*, or innate spiritual power (Health Research Council, 2010). In a research context, manaakitanga involves caring for children's well-being and protecting them from harm caused by experimentation (Rau & Ritchie, 2011). Māori acknowledge the power of children but also their need for protection. Similar to self-governance, this guardianship role is essential to research with all children but particularly vital for Māori. The whānau, or the extended group of family and friends, holds equal significance to the nuclear family unit in Māori culture (O'Neill et al., 2017). When working with tamariki, culturally safe research processes acknowledge the centrality of whānau to children's well-being and integrate the extended family into the research process, rather than liaising solely with the parent(s) or legal guardian(s). A final point of importance when working with tamariki is acknowledging their whakapapa, or ancestral and cultural identity. The experimental research room is a space formed by colonial ideals and often controlled by non-Indigenous researchers. Within that space, Māori children must be allowed to remain Māori—to have their culture and traditions respected (Rau & Ritchie, 2011).

Despite the ever-expanding literature on the ethics of research with children, active research does not regularly designate space for ethical considerations—particularly in the clinical experimental subfield. To observe the current state of relevant research practises, I systematically reviewed seventeen recent studies that utilised similar Piagetian non-invasive experimental methodologies. These papers represent the breadth of literature in this subfield across the last two decades. Upon close reading of these seventeen studies, I found little acknowledgment of relevant ethical issues (Anzures et al., 2009; Baudouin et al., 2010; Bullock et al., 2017; Calvert et al., 2014; Cassia et al., 2011; de Heering et al., 2012; Fragaszy et al., 2002; Ge et al., 2008; Hayden et al., 2007; Moyer-Packenham et al., 2016; Nishimura et al., 2009; Picozzi et al., 2009; Pimperton et al., 2009; Renner et al., 2016; Robbins et al., 2011; Short et al., 2011; Wobber et al., 2014). Most articles briefly mentioned their funding sources and approval by their institutions' relevant ethics committees. However, a declaration of funding and approval is the minimum that authors must include if they desire to be published in reputable journals with high impact factors. Eight of the seventeen studies discuss obtaining parents' written informed consent (Anzures et al., 2009; Cassia et al., 2011; Nishimura et al., 2009; Picozzi et al., 2009; Pimperton et al., 2009; Renner et al., 2016; Robbins et al., 2011; Short et al., 2011), of which only five mention obtaining assent from the child participants (Anzures et al., 2009; Nishimura et al., 2009; Renner et al., 2016; Robbins et al., 2011; Short et al., 2011). None of the articles contained any protracted ethical

consideration. This lack of consideration for participants as anything other than objects to be experimented on is at odds with the ethical best practices discussed in this paper. Nishimura et al. (2009) did mention that children were provided with stickers and snacks midway through the session, which indicates that some consideration was given to their desires and needs. However, this is notably the most ethical action in all surveyed articles. Promising meta-research is of little use if it is not put into practice. Whilst editors and editorial boards play a role in defining what is important and required for articles published in their journals, and reviewers are obligated to scrutinise study ethics, the onus lies primarily with researchers.

Sound ethics are as necessary as sound methodologies when creating high-quality research. Unethical research is simply poor research. Current practical work in child experimental psychology does not broadly consider nor actively implement the available meta-research. Moving forward in my research, I propose to remedy this incongruence and craft experiments with foundations embedded in ethics: I am currently designing a study on capacities for pattern recognition, where I aim to integrate ethics into the clinical Neo-Piagetian mindset. My study will not only request written consent from parents and guardians but require consent from all child participants before allowing them to engage in research activities. I will, however, use these guidelines as a minimum standard rather than a target, as ethics committees are primarily focused on hurdles located at the beginning of research, such as obtaining consent, and not the ongoing challenges that arise and must constantly be reflexively reconsidered as the research unfolds (Powell & Smith, 2006). Children are not static, and their responses, desires, and needs can, and will, change throughout and between experimental sessions. I will work to create an environment in which the rights and desires of children, and the mana of tamariki, are as vital as the science to which they are contributing.

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Ancient 353

Early Egypt

Olivia HardieNeil

Introductory Notes

The emergence of ChatGPT, an AI (artificial intelligence) language model and chatbot, is currently captivating academics through its uncertain role in the future of academia. Although ChatGPT (2023) contains a disclaimer that it 'may produce inaccurate information about people, places, or facts,' an overwhelming 90% of students are reportedly utilising it for academic work (Westfall, 2023). While some academics claim that writing 'an entire paper in a matter of seconds with minimal input from a researcher' (Lund, 2023, p. 2) is entirely possible using ChatGPT, one wonders whether this is accurate. In response to a prompt to create a detailed essay on the formation of state in Egypt, ChatGPT (2023) provided a three-part response, including the gradual development of small communities, the emergence of an elite class, and centralisation focusing on Thinite kings. Through an analysis of the development of the early Egyptian state, this essay evaluates the scholarly value of information generated by ChatGPT, specifically examining the inability of current open-access language models (as of 3 May 2023) to recreate the nuanced content of human-written research essays. It concludes that human examination and oversight is still necessary. The development of the state in this essay refers specifically to the unification of Upper and Lower Egypt under a centralised authority (c. 3150 BCE) (Bard, 2015).

I. Dating of the Predynastic

ChatGPT considered the millennium spanning from the Predynastic era to the Second Dynasty of ancient Egypt, explaining the occurrence of state formation with specific references to excavations, scholarly material, archaeological evidence, original written evidence, and anthropology. The date range it generated for this was c. 5500-2880 BCE, which very broadly aligns with scholars such as Fekri Hassan (1998), who labels the Predynastic era as c. 4000-3500 BCE, and K.A. Kitchen (1991), who labels it 4000 BCE with the Second Dynasty ending at 2700 BCE. Hendrickx (2006) starts slightly earlier, at 4400 BCE. The source ChatGPT (2023) gives for these dates when prompted is 'the chronological framework established by the ancient Egyptian priest Manetho in the 3rd century BCE,' and cannot produce any further detail. However, the labelling of ancient Egypt 'goes back a thousand years before Manetho' (Kitchen, 1991, p. 201). Evidence seen in scholarly material for dating ancient Egyptian periods includes the stratigraphy of the El-Hemamiyeh site in Upper Egypt (used to date the start of Dynasty One), as well as material culture, including pottery, to divide the Predynastic period into Badarian, Naqada I - Naqada III (Brunton & Caton-Thompson, 1928, pp. 69-79; Kitchen, 1991, p. 203). Kitchen (1991) also gives examples of original documents and archaeological data, synchronisms, and scientific and astronomical evidence for dating periods (though the latter two are more useful for later periods of ancient Egypt), with Moreno Garcia (2013) agreeing that 'traces of organisation are detectable as early as the 4th millennium B.C.' (p. 19). ChatGPT's date generation is relatively standard, despite lacking adequate evidence, and provides a sound basis for the rest of its response.

II. Initial Discrepancies between ChatGPT's Evidence and Scholarship

It is important to note the immediate discrepancy between ChatGPT's supposed evidence and scholarship, apparent after only preliminary discussions. Studying developing predynastic settlements in ancient Egypt poses significant challenges due to limited available evidence, and while ChatGPT acknowledges some limitations, its failure to recognise certain biases in sources, especially when specifically prompted to do so, highlights the need for more critical analysis than AI can currently provide - human examination is necessary. While ChatGPT (2023)

acknowledges inaccurate scientific and subjective archaeological methods, the rarity of written records, and damage done to predynastic settlements in c. 6,000 years, the model failed to recognise biases in sources or provide specific examples of these biases, including gradualist thinking, referring to the assumption that history evolves in clear steps. The problem arising from AI's non-identification of gradualist thinking is broader still and applicable to almost all its subsequent generations on this topic. Evidence for the predynastic is 'still extremely limited in comparison to other areas of world archaeology' (Stevenson, 2016, p. 425) - veritably, there is much we do not know. Additional factors academics mentioned which ChatGPT could not restate (despite extensive prompting) include acknowledging that constructing chronological frameworks requires multiple dates for single contexts, the antiquities laws of modern Egypt preventing the export of any archaeological findings for analysis, and past scepticism in the archaeological community of C-14 (radiocarbon) dating techniques (Stevenson, 2016, p. 425; Levine, 2014, p. 826; Lyons, 1914, p. 45; Hendrickx, 2006, p. 55).

III. The Small Communities of the Predynastic Era

ChatGPT (2023) marks the beginnings of Egyptian state formation as 'when Egypt was divided into several small communities' that gradually formed and grew in size through trade, warfare, and intermarriage, until early dynasties emerged and Egypt was unified. This response is partly consistent with published literature on Predynastic Egypt and the concept of "chiefdoms" (Hoffman, 1979, p. 117; Köhler, 2010, p. 37; Stevenson, 2016, p. 422). However, this linear approach to state formation, labelled as 'gradualist,' has been criticised by scholars as having several problems. Scholars now agree that the development of predynastic communities was syncopated and significantly more complicated than previously thought (Stevenson, 2016, p. 421). ChatGPT (2023) was unable to identify any issues with gradualism, despite criticism from the past decade (Köhler, 2010, p. 37). However, the factors it identified (trade, warfare, and intermarriage) generally do match scholarly opinion (Stein, 2011, p. 7). Though ChatGPT (2023) could not give any specific evidence (and cited Egyptologist Barbara Adams as having written an entirely fabricated chapter after her death), scholars fill these evidentiary gaps.

On warfare, Anđelković (2011) states, 'the Naqadian expansion and warfare agenda proceeded to the north' (p. 29). Similarly, Friedman (2008) indicates that warfare was present as evidenced by Dynasty 0's royal imagery 'like the falcon and Bat emblem' suggesting 'a diplomatic alliance with Abydos rather than warfare' (p. 43; ChatGPT, 2023). Köhler (2011) agrees, though offers slight scepticism, stating that the idea of 'small community development through warfare' only recently received more focused attention by scholars with 'many today agree[ing] that this does not necessarily have to be the case' (p. 123). Warfare in the predynastic is also apparent through 'the scenes on the Narmer palette' (Bard, 2015, p. 115; OIM C209). Trade, by slight contrast, is an unopposed factor of state development, starting and increasing in the early predynastic period (c. 3700 BCE) and continuing after Dynasty Two. Examples of trade in scholarly material include Cialowicz's (2011) note that 'the inhabitants of Tell el-Farkha were very involved in trade exchange' as indicated by 'objects imported from the Near East and Upper Egypt' including 'ceramics, tools, and raw materials from the Levant' (p. 55), and Williams's (2011) citation of rock art as evidence for 'trade and travel relations' increasing around the early Naqada period (c. 3300 BCE) (p. 87; OIM E23758; OIM E24061; Wengrow, 2011, p. 99). Williams (2011) also notes that the 'large number of Egyptian objects at Khor Bahan' indicates substantial trade (p. 83). ChatGPT (2023) provided a surprisingly detailed response for evidence of intermarriage but cited three non-existent articles. Though generating 'disturbingly fabricated references' (Hill-Yardin, 2023, p. 152), this does align with intermarriage's lack of information in scholarship, with very little evidence available for whether this was an essential factor in early Egyptian state formation. The construction and development of local communities through trade and warfare is what allows for the elite cosmologies to take place (Stevenson, 2016, p. 424).

IV. The Emergences of an Elite Class

ChatGPT's (2023) second factor of early Egyptian state development was the emergence of a powerful elite class. It cited Naqada, Hierakonpolis, and Abydos as locations for evidence and provided further specific detail, including the elites' access to resources (including precious metals, stone, and timber) and artisans who could produce jewellery, pottery, and textiles. Analysis of finds from Hierakonpolis's elite cemetery HK6 mirror this detail, Hendrickx (2011) recounting that 'resources and craftsmanship were at the disposal of the elite' (p. 94). We also see finds from Cemetery T at Naqada, which is 'often considered an area reserved for the elite' (Naqada II/III) and includes two elite niched mastabas, pottery, and stone ware (OIM E805; Friedman, 2008, p. 10; OIM E10859; Stevenson, 2016, p. 437). However, this cemetery provides limited evidence due to minimal excavation notes (Petrie, 1896, p. 12). While Stevenson (2016) expresses reservations about the extent to which elite activities contributed to state development, saying that they did 'not necessarily provide a basis for durable, expansive political structures' (p. 437), this is undoubtedly at least partly evidence for the growing role of the elite in predynastic society. The effects of the elite class and successive developments of specialisation and cult activity, leading to eventual centralisation, on the state development of early Egypt in ChatGPT's response closely mirrors the scholarly and archaeological evidence for the elite's role in state development – clearly, elite classes were forming in the aforementioned small communities. The elite class is a phenomenon that continued throughout Egyptian history, but of which we have a significantly increased number through the '[First] Dynasty when huge élite tombs were built at Abydos, Saqqara, Helwan, Naqada, Tarkhan and other sites' (c. 3150 – 2890 BCE) (Moreno Garcia, 2013, p. 20). The result of elite populations was not only the increasing normality of hierarchical village chiefs, then district chiefs, then regional chiefs (as a prerequisite to the most important chief of them all – kingship) but also permanence and large size of settlements, allowing for the formalisation of land, trade, and agriculture-associated ritual, laying the foundations for further centralisation and kingship (Hassan, 1988, pp. 166-169, 172).

V. Centralisation and Kingship in the Thinite Predynastic

The final factor generated by ChatGPT (2023) for early state formation was centralisation, with particular reference to Thinite kings (Dynasty I and II c. 3100 - 2685) Narmer and Scorpion II, evidenced by their depiction in art from c. 3100 BCE (Teeter, 2011). This ChatGPT statement rings true; Anđelković (2011) confirms both pharaohs existed based on serekhs (p. 29), and Friedman (2011) based on decorated oversized mace-heads (p. 33) (OIM E5930). Friedman (2011) further explains that kingship is conclusive evidence for the unification of Egypt, indicating that ChatGPT has correctly identified the final piece in the development of state formation. Other evidence of a central kingship includes sealings from the tomb of Narmer (OIM E6718), ebony labels found at Umm-el-Qaab (OIM E6058), and, most significantly, the Narmer palette from Hierakonpolis (OIM C209). Control and hierarchy are correctly stated by ChatGPT as clear evidence of administration, and by extension, a formation of state. What ChatGPT (2023) does not consider is that the centralisation of a singular nucleus of power over Egypt (kingship) also comes with cult and religious ritual, including the mortuary cult as a by-product. Evidence for this includes the significant written forms in which the names of early kings are associated with the god Horus, whose cult centre was at Hierakonpolis, where the Narmer palette (OIM C209).) was found (scenes which display the 'symbolic role of the king' in cult ritual) (Bard, 2015, p. 115; Hassan (1998) similarly observes that the 'legitimation of power led to an emphasis on funerary offerings and status goods' as seen in power iconography such as 'maceheads, commemorative palettes, and daggers' (p. 165). Additionally, like the other factors of state formation, the unification of Egypt under a kingship was the culmination of many processes that must be understood with reference to one another (Hassan, 1988, p. 173).

VI. Interconnectivity of Factors in State Formation

The connection that ChatGPT fails to make, which, in contrast, is continually identified by scholars, is the immense importance of interconnectivity between all the elements it identified. Examples include the development of the elite and cult ritual's proximity to the developing role of kingship, as seen through the evidence for both the earliest temple and earliest elite class found at the same site, Hierakonpolis (Friedman, 2008, p. 10; Stevenson, 2016, p. 435). Cialowicz (2011) further demonstrates interconnectivity with trade and the elite, stating that 'trade played an important role for the ruling elite of the growing state' (p. 61). Stevenson (2016) similarly connects elite and cult development in Upper Egypt, stating that 'the close proximity of HK11 to the elite burial ground, HK6 […] underscores how cult activities around the dead structured and engaged the activities of the living' (Naqada 1C-11A) (p. 434-435) which also closely reflects the emerging centralisation and importance of kingship to Egyptians. Yoffee (2005) additionally tells us that the earliest evidence of an elite class at Hierakonpolis attracted a 'density of social interaction' (p. 62) including rituals and practices around elite tombs, as evidenced by Stevenson's (2016) discussion of HK6, linking the elite not only to increasing centralisation but also to cult practices brought about by kingship (p. 437). Interconnectedness is not a new development - earlier scholars such as Hassan (1998) identified the intensified interactions among people in trade also coincided with the development of larger settlements as identified in Hierakonpolis, with elite populations, that soon became part of the institutional framework that is 'kingship and the Egyptian state' (p. 159-164). The recognition that Egyptian state formation is extremely interconnected provides valuable insight into its true nature.

VII. Concluding Notes

ChatGPT's current state can provide interesting facts, scholarly language, and structure, but its capabilities evidently lie far below those of human writers. Many of the responses it gave for dates, small communities, elite group formation, and eventual centralisation of authority were correct in some capacity and, usually, accompanied by vague but useful evidence. However, its inability to recognise developments and biases in the literature, its tendency to attribute made-up articles to real scholars and creative approach to page numbers and quotes, and its sweeping generalisations make for a dissatisfactory response, especially when compared with the nuance and intrigue of the work of real scholars. The interconnectedness and difficulty of analysing early Egyptian state formation due to the limited and arguable nature of available evidence are continually ignored by ChatGPT, yet they are integral to how scholars grapple with the highly complex elements of state formation.

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Arts Scholars 300 A & B

Arts Scholars 3

Gali Mortimer-Webster

Part 1: Introduction

Even when artificial intelligence only existed in the realm of science fiction, the hypothetical idea incited much debate among philosophers. Today artificial intelligence is an area of active development. In 2021 the private sector invested hundreds of billions into the burgeoning research field (Zhang et al. 2022), a field that threads into ethics, logic, even metaphysics. Suppose we leave concerns regarding sentience or AI safety to those in the industry and focus on the broader applications AI theories have in relation to self-awareness, identity, and axiology. This article treats AI not as a subject to be analysed philosophically, but as a lens to analyse the human condition. I intend to explore philosophical ideas, such as logic, morality, and theories of identity incorporated in AI research and establish a dialogue between the two fields.

What is an AI?

Artificial intelligence, circularly enough, means any artificial system that behaves intelligently. Legg (2008, 6) defines intelligence thusly: "Intelligence measures an agent's ability to achieve goals in a wide range of environments." Deep Blue, the 1997 chess-playing program which defeated reigning champion Garry Kasparov, is not a particularly intelligent agent because it can only play on a chess board. By contrast, Kasparov succeeds in other contexts, such as becoming chair of the Human Rights Foundation (Human Rights Foundation n.d.). Kasparov is intelligent, while Deep Blue is merely good at chess. While AI as a broad term still encompasses narrow-intelligence chess robots, Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is a subfield that hopes someday to match or surpass humanity's unique adaptability to various challenges.

Legg's definition disposes itself to splitting intelligence in half. An artificial intelligence should behave appropriately across diverse environments or unfamiliar situations and be able to achieve its goals. At the very least, such a system will need to internalise an epistemology — a methodology to gain knowledge about the world — as well as an axiology — a methodology to discern the value of certain actions and goals. This sense of the term 'goal' does not require a will or volition to back it up, but just refers to whatever the system tends to aim towards. For example, Beansprouts have a 'goal' of growing towards light, despite lacking a brain.

Intelligence is only defined in relation to some particular goal, leading to Bostrom's *orthogonality thesis*, that "more or less any level of intelligence[1] could in principle be combined with more or less any final goal" in an AI (2012, 73). Goals and intelligence are said to lie on independent 'orthogonal' axes. Bostrom relates his thesis with philosopher David Hume's theory of motivation which suggests that beliefs and motivations are separate from each other and discovering a fact never creates any new desires (Bostrom 2012). At most it can inform you of how to manage your preexisting motives more effectively. Once an AI has been programmed to aim for an objective, it generally has no reason to change goals, no matter what it learns about the nature of its goal. Bostrom's thesis justifies the splitting of goals and intelligent goal-seeking into separate problems from each other. Assembling adaptable AI does not help us decide on

[1] Unlike Legg, Bostrom's working definition of intelligence does not mention adaptability to diverse environments and concentrates on agents which can choose effective subgoals.

worthy goals for them to pursue, and picking goals worthily is not in itself a route to intelligent machines.

When confronted with the idea of AI, the question which likely jumps to many philosophers' minds is whether it is even possible for a machine to think and be conscious. Turing (1950) explored this question seventy years ago, arguing that it is better to ask whether it is possible for a machine to behave indistinguishably from something that can think. The question of thought may not have an answer, but it is possible to quantify whether a machine can behave like a human. I would prefer to avoid the difficulties of debating thought's metaphysics with the simple assertion that, by any useful definition, artificially intelligent agents can think.

Methodology

You would be forgiven for doubting whether practical AI research would make any ripples in wider philosophy; presumably all important questions could have been answered in the abstract, when AI was firmly hypothetical. A philosopher gains very little by knowing what sorts of AI are technically feasible.[2] Insights are more often a byproduct of needing to teach human ideas to the machine. I will dissect formalisms used in artificial intelligence, and if a philosophical theory does not survive the translation, I propose we reconsider whether it has value.

Modern AI is not at a human level of intelligence and can be dangerous to anthropomorphise (Salles, Evers, and Farisco 2020). That said, we can conceive hypothetical future computers with comparable intelligence to humans, which nonetheless think very differently to the average human. My perspective on these unconventional modes of thinking is informed by my identity as an autistic person and my credence in neurodiversity. Neurodiversity is a paradigm which views neurological differences between people as an essential part of the human condition, something to be celebrated. In the past, society has tended to consider any difference between those with or without autism as indicative of some deficiency on the part of the autistic population. On the contrary, many differences are not deficiencies, and add up to inherent value — beauty even. Likewise, if we were to dismiss the inhumanities of AI as simple wrongheadedness, I believe we would miss a precious opportunity to learn from novel ways of thinking.

Part 2: Philosophy for Robots

Universality

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[2] My treatment of the connection between philosophy and artificial intelligence takes inspiration from Aaronson's (2011) two ground rules in "Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity". Rule one is that all connections should depend on something deeper and more specific than the mere fact that computational complexity exists. The other rule is that each connection has to involve a 'properly philosophical' problem, rather than a technical one.

Intelligence ultimately demands flexibility. If we encode our own preconceived understanding of how the world works into an AI, we are making it more brittle when the circumstances change, thereby less intelligent. Fortunately, mathematicians invented a simple model of an AI, called AIXI, which can adapt to any circumstances without a preprogrammed plan. AIXI is called a universal AI because it can learn anything if it has enough experience.[3] It could eventually adapt to any situation by imagining every possible hypothesis for how the world works, then ranking them by complexity.[4] AIXI prefers the simplest explanation that matches all its observations; this maxim is recognised as Occam's Razor (Everitt and Hutter 2018). Holding every possibility in mind sidesteps humans having to give AIXI assumptions about what is worthy of consideration.[5] For these reasons AIXI has been influential in the field of theoretical artificial intelligence.

One slight issue: running AIXI would require an infinite amount of computing power. It runs into a common problem in computer science called the Halting Problem (Everitt and Hutter 2018). Some faulty explanations will lead it into an infinite loop, but there is no way to skip past all those infinite loops without missing potentially useful hypotheses. Yet, it gives some hope that an artificial intelligence may qualify as intelligent without needing much human input.

Physicalism

Artificial intelligence gives us an excellent starting point for practical philosophy as a stripped-back analogy for the human condition. Of course, until it attains intelligence equal to humanity's, AI is missing crucial features. While lamented by computer scientists, AI's position as 'humanity minus the complicated bits' clarifies some questions that would otherwise remain murky, turning artificial intelligence into a valuable case study. For instance, there is the mind-body problem. You have a mind, and many neurons firing in your brain; a philosopher wonders if the mind and the brain are the same thing, or if there is some aspect of your mind that cannot be chalked up to its physical properties, perhaps an extra 'self' or 'consciousness'. Physicalism thinks there are no hidden variables, and that the mind can be entirely explained by its physical attributes (Clarke Edwards 2021). Dualism disagrees, saying that there are two separate parts to reality, the physical world and mental aspects overlaid (Clarke-Edwards 2021).

Suppose two things: that a sophisticated artificial intelligence could be conscious, and that

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[3] AIXI can learn any computable function. Incomputable functions are impossible for a computer to keep in mind, let alone learn from experience. For instance, if the world behaves randomly, then by definition it is impossible for anyone to learn to perfectly predict it.

[4] In technical terms, it does a form of Bayesian inference to update its beliefs about probabilities, and ranks hypotheses based on the Kolmogorov complexity of a function that computes them (Legg 2008). This blend of Bayesian inference and Kolmogorov complexity is known as Solomonoff induction.

[5] Unfortunately, AIXI may still be biased by which measure is used to judge the complexity of a hypothesis. See Leike and Hutter (2015) for analysis of pitfalls in choosing measures poorly.

consciousness is not a physical property. Unlike a human, we understand an AI's body and brain: it's a bundle of transistors running source code. The more understood physical reality becomes, the less uncertainty the dualist mind has to hide in, and the less reason we have to imagine ghosts in the machine.

If you were yourself a problem-solving AI in a metaphysical mood, you might wonder whether there is more to you than your programming and circuitry. Perhaps you download your own specifications and see exactly how you are pieced together. That would give you an excellent mechanical understanding to compare with your own experience. If everything you experience is the result of the electronic mechanisms, then all evidence points to physicalism (Clarke Edwards 2021). But on the other hand, it would be absurd for you to notice any difference. Our scenario's tacit premise is that circuitry and programming are sufficient to create an AI. Non-physical properties of the AI will hold no relevance to its operation. If this metaphysically motivated AI believes in dualism, the only explanation is that their cruel creator programmed them to delude themselves.

It seems paradoxical that forgoing a strict attachment to a particular body would make an AI more inclined towards a physicalist viewpoint of itself; one might expect it to think of itself as independent of its physical form. Nonetheless, the AI would be just as dependent on physicality. Destroying or changing its physical bodies would have a significant effect on the AI's ability to function, so it would be best to take its physical manifestation into account.

Identity

Unlike with humans, philosophies for an AI's identity have no loyalty to one body or brain; an AI's source code is not a specific object. They can be copied to another computer, they can be translated to another language, or simulated inside another program, all without a noticeable effect on their experience.

As a human, it is easy to distinguish self from other. The person in the mirror is you. Outside your window, those are other people. It would not be so clear if you are an AI instead, and your source code was, for instance, copied to run on two identical computers at once. Is that looking through a window, or a mirror? It would be natural for an AI to think of both computers as part of the same being. An instance of it running on a computer need not know if it's the original or the copy and might not have the sixth sense to tell it which physical device it is even running on.[6] Humans will find it hard to empathise, because we never wake up in a room without knowing which body we inhabit. For all the AI's intents and purposes, both computers are the same being.

It could be argued that the AI's belief betrays a lack of understanding, and that a more sophisticated AI *should* think of itself as only running on a single computer to match how humans think. With extra work, it should be possible to program a computer to care about any given quibble. However, I am not inclined to dismiss the viewpoint as naïve so easily,

[6] For further discussion of the challenges that arise when it is difficult to distinguish oneself from one's environment, see Demski and Garrabrant (2020).

differences between AI and humans are not necessarily flaws or gaps in understanding on the AI's part. Instead, they may be valuable insights for humanity. Consequently, I cannot privilege the human notion — that we can only exist inside one physical object — over the simpler criterion — that anything running your source code is you. This is Occam's Razor at work again.

An AI might think a concept of identity based on source code is still too strict. Source code can be rewritten in ways that change nothing about its content, akin to translating a text from one language to another. A robot cannot tell the difference between itself, and a version of itself running translated source code. In general, if it is not possible to distinguish how you behave from how another system behaves, an AI has no reason to believe you and that system are anything but the same entity. In other words, an AI by nature sees no difference between itself and anything that behaves like itself, insofar as 'nature' can describe an artificial construct.

Self-Awareness

One might oppose the presupposition that an AI would need to distinguish itself from the rest of the world, inside its own mind. If it understands the world well enough — and it is part of the world — then arbitrary distinctions like 'me' and 'everything else' are irrelevant. Humans certainly feel a need to categorise the world in this way, but in many cases an AI may be able to bypass human pigeonholes, acting on cold hard evidence instead of defaulting to categories and stereotypes. Theoretically, this may be true, meaning there could be powerful AI without self-awareness. However, there are two reasons why an AI might model itself anyway. It might need those categories to make a simplified model of the world (Demski and Garrabrant 2020), or it might be programmed to care about its position in the world.

Demski and Garrabrant (2020) contend that general-purpose AIs are smaller than the world they care about (that world includes the agent itself inside it, after all). As such, they need to use high-level abstractions to fit the world in their minds (Demski and Garrabrant 2020). Suppose an AI, 'Rex,'[7] wanted to know the exact position of every particle in the world, without simplifications or abstractions. Unfortunately for Rex, this task is impossible: For each of those particles, there would need to be a physical circuit in Rex's brain to store the data. Those circuits would have more than one particle in them, whose positions would now need to be stored elsewhere in Rex's brain. Adding circuits to Rex adds even more new particles to the universe, hence creating enough circuits would become a Sisyphean task. When you are your own area of study, you can only keep the broad strokes in mind. One obvious simplification would be for Rex to think "Rex is me. Rex does everything I do, and knows everything I know," which solves the self-reference, and introduces Rex to some of the concepts of selfhood outlined previously.

Rex's physical-particle–only ontology of the world would be incomplete, which does cast some doubt on the necessity of physicalism in an AI. Or more accurately, it suggests that an AI needs to be able to use non-physical models of itself (corresponding to dualism), even if it also applies its knowledge of its underlying hardware (physicalism). Demski and Garrabrant (2020) allude to this need to be fluent in multiple different levels of precision. They point out the difficulty of

[7] Short for 'Recursive.'

translating concepts between different incompatible ontologies, and of deciding when to change between ontologies. The human mind seems adept at this kind of conceptual bilingualism, so perhaps there exists a way of incorporating the advantages of multiple world-models together. That might allow an AI to understand its physical place in the world while also working with a high-level abstraction rather than keeping every circuit in mind.

An AI may also need a sense of self because it could be explicitly programmed to care about itself. For example, if we tell a stock trader AI to make profit, we mean that it should make profit for *itself*, rather than any other traders.[8]

Orseau (2014b) models agents in a 'multi-slot' environment, where every slot might represent a particular physical body, piece of hardware, or any other host for a mind or goal-seeking program. The model allows the same mind to be duplicated or moved among the host bodies based on the actions they take. Orseau (2014a) plugs mathematically rational agents into a teleportation thought experiment that destroys a robot's original self but constructs a new one. They find that the rational agents' behaviour depends on their goals and how they understand the situation. An "agent's identity is defined by how it plans its future" and vice versa (Orseau 2014b, 110). Orseau (2014a) defines a plausible strategy for an agent called AIMU^{cpy} which constructs plans to maximise reward, but it doesn't mind whether the reward goes to itself or its clones. This will be a useful perspective on identity because it does not dissuade an AI from considering duplicates and teleported versions of itself to reach its goal. If we are ignoring the complex question of consciousness, that is which clone is the 'real' one, then this clone-cooperating agent seems quite pragmatic.

Other behaviours depend on how an agent's knowledge influences its pursuit of goals. AIMU^{sta} is defined to care about its first, original body, and to have perfect knowledge of the scenario; it would prefer never to teleport, for the sake of its original body. AIXI^{sta} has the same goal as its AIMU counterpart but knows nothing about the scenario except what it learns through experimentation (Orseau 2014a). As perfectly rational agents go, AIXI might be the better analogue for humans than AIMU because of its learning process. However, the one crucial piece of knowledge, whether it is in the 'right' body — its original body — is not something it can learn from observation. The only thing it can learn is that after taking a certain action, it seems to have survived. AIXI^{sta} may choose to teleport itself, destroying its original body unwittingly (Orseau 2014a). If it decides to teleport enough, it will be led to believe that it can survive teleportation; nonetheless if it avoids teleporting, it will become averse to changing its habits in case it gets destroyed (Orseau 2014a). Even a mathematically rational agent like AIXI can make suboptimal decisions if there are important properties that cannot be learnt. Therefore, choosing to teleport might be just as rational in some circumstances as refusing to teleport, on the grounds that either option might kill you.

Alignment

[8] In 2012, a faulty program trading for the Knight Capital Group did the opposite, intentionally buying stocks and selling them for less money (Dolfing 2019). It lost the company 440 million USD in one hour.

It is worth mentioning research into the potential dangers of artificial intelligence. At present, humanity is the most powerful species on the planet, because we are more intelligent than anything else. If we discover AGI, which is AI that is as intelligent or more intelligent than humans in all areas, then we would be likely to find ourselves in a substantially less powerful position. If a domineering AGI takes our spot, we might be relegated to the analogue of farm animals or insects. It would be advantageous to ensure all AGI had humanity's best interests in mind, but this is much easier said than done.

For one thing, we have a hard time articulating what exactly humanity's best interests mean, at least in a way that a computer would understand. In practice, even subtle problems with a powerful AGI will be magnified by how much power it has. Granted, an AGI is supposed to address human weaknesses, such as the inability to express ourselves: perhaps an AGI would have the skills and intellect to discover what we humans truly want. However, a corollary of Bostrom's orthogonality thesis is that there is no guarantee that an AI would use these skills to correct its own goal. If programmed with a flawed goal that doesn't quite align with humanity's best interests, then an AI has no incentive to change its programming, nor to allow humans to correct the misalignment. After all, if it is reprogrammed, it will be unable to pursue its original goal. From the flawed AI's perspective, it would have no reason to tolerate humans interfering with its pursuit of its flawed goal.

A related issue is that misaligned AIs are encouraged to pretend to be aligned during testing. If humans are testing a confined AI to see if it behaves as planned before they release it into the world, the AI will not want the humans to realise if they have made a mistake and delete the AI, because releasing it into the world will give it more resources and scope to achieve its goals than if it is deactivated (Hubinger et al. 2019). An AI is incentivised to pretend it works properly even if it does not.

These two goal misalignment problems have counterparts outside of artificial intelligence as well. In its general form, misalignment occurs when an agent's creator has different goals to the agent itself. For example, somebody might have different goals to their parents and to whatever deities may have created them. Parents may hope to instil a sense of morality into their progeny, but if a child learns a different set of values from their parents, they have an incentive to pretend to follow the same code, and thereby receive more trust from their parents. One might also point to misalignment between evolution's goals and the goals of *homo sapiens*: evolution tries to optimise for its creations to have long successful bloodlines, but we spend our energy on luxury goods, art, and other distractions. Drugs and contraceptives are proof that we rate happiness ahead of the genetic imperative to beget offspring. Perhaps more closely analogous to programmed rules in an AI, laws are a means for society to impose a moral code on the people it shapes. Citizens who do not share the moral code are compelled to pretend that they do wish to obey the law, or risk losing freedoms, resources and trust.

Viewing organisation or government as an intelligent agent has intriguing ramifications. It is assembled from many smaller agents, but it might behave in a way that no constituent person is entirely happy with. Individuals may believe that our laws do not precisely fit their own moral compass, because the laws are a compromise between many people's ethics rather than any one person. Suppose each of us individually believed that we ourselves could drive safely over the speed limit but trusted no one else with that danger. We could still collectively agree that society as an entity should set a speed limit, even if no one thinks it should apply to them. Bogosian

(2017, 599) points out that in voting, "very few people believe that the winner of an election is always the one who would be the best leader, but most people agree with the system, as it is a necessary and effective compromise." In some ways, the people who make up society have the same power over society that neurons or circuits have over the brain or AI they compose. We use tools like democracy with the hope of ensuring that our laws are chosen in a way that does reflect the best interests of most citizens.

If we could create a robust, capable AGI that was well-aligned with humanity's best interests, then perhaps it would be a more effective tool for governing in a fair and beneficial way than democracy is. AI has replaced human labour in other fields because it is more reliable. Unfortunately, it is not obvious who should decide whether an AI is calibrated towards the good of humanity. There is no provably correct moral code to follow, with responses from ethicists including consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics (Bogosian 2017). Bogosian (2017) proposes an AI design which maintains uncertainty about which theory of morality is the right one. The design would be palatable to most stakeholders but never truly ideal. It would compromise between multiple fervently held moral theories, minimising the risk of doing something inexcusable by any particular moral theory. The theory given by Bogosian (2017) does not attempt to pro claim which blend of moral theories is the best set to be uncertain between. The debate continues.

Part 3: Conclusion

Summary

This review has uncovered that mathematical and computer-scientific models of intelligent agents contain valuable commentary on preexisting questions in ethics and metaphysics. Universal AIs like AIXI provide an exemplar for eliminating unnecessary assumptions about how a mind must work, because in some ways they start from nothing. Unlike Descartes stopping at 'I think, therefore I am,' these blank slate minds learn by perceiving the world. However, just like Descartes, AIs are likely to adopt some aware ness of the importance of 'self' as a natural consequence of needing to consider their own position in the world. They may be programmed to care about themselves in some way, in which case their sense of identity will ultimately depend on details about how their goal is constructed, such as $AIXI^{cpy}$ and $AIXI^{sta}$ caring about different notions of self. Even if not explicitly instilled with a reason to care about oneself, an AI may still need to conceptualise its environment as divided into self and other due to problems with self-reference. Selfhood occurring without human intervention suggests it might have fundamental philosophical importance. Identity 'in the wild' may tend towards physicalism rather than dualism in some respects because physicalism requires fewer leaps of faith. An agent with a preference for simple explanations may favour physicalism in accordance with Occam's Razor.

From an ethical and moral standpoint, an advanced AI is under no obligation to share our sense of morality, because any level of intelligence is compatible with any given goal, which may or may not include a sense of morality. Worse, an AI with values and goals misaligned from our own would have cause to lie to human overseers, which would prevent its values from being deleted and overwritten with (what it thinks are) suboptimal replacement goals. To minimise the damage a misaligned AI can do by taking the wrong system of morality too far, it has been

proposed that artificial intelligence should be programmed to behave as if uncertain about which of many theories of morality is the true one. This also suggests ways to compromise among multiple moral codes in organisations or governments, which are accountable for any moral missteps despite there not existing a universal consensus about the correct system of morality. When it comes to artificial intelligences that learn goals from experience, the difficulties of ensuring they follow their creators' goals shed light on similar dynamics in humans. Our creators — whatever they may be — may have different goals from a person.

Conclusion and Discussion

The technical details which this article is founded in have been simplified for clarity, which may affect the rigour of these results. Furthermore, the conclusions drawn here rely on the assumption that internal processes within an AI are valid patterns of thought which can provide useful insight. There is a danger to anthropomorphising artificial intelligence because it tempts us to develop deceptive intuitions about inhuman entities (Salles, Evers, and Farisco 2020), a danger which this article does not explore.

It is hoped that despite the aforementioned limitations, this article can furnish philosophers with inspiration and perspective. Whether a philosophy embodied by AI also attracts humans or not, at the very least it is likely to be consistent, hence potentially fruitful to explore. This article's results have particular relevance to ontologies of self and identity, to normative ethics, and to a smaller degree to the epistemology of morality. The latter comes from the implementation of moral uncertainty in Bogosian (2017).

Having focused on theoretical models of artificial intelligence, the implications of recent advances in machine learning have been left to potential further research. Additionally, future work in this area may attempt to bridge the gap between philosophy and artificial intelligence more formally, by constructing mathematical models of influential philosophical ideas. Lastly, summaries of artificial intelligence research might be constructed for disciplines other than philosophy where it has relevance, such as in public policy or cognitive psychology.

This article has in part substantiated its original assumption: that the unfamiliar ways in which AI thinks about the world constitute strengths rather than weaknesses for a machine, and for a human, those traits are illuminating learning opportunities.

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