




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Editors' Note

Edition 12 of Interesting Journal is made up of 25 pieces of work from the University of Auckland Faculty of Arts. This collection consists of independent academic works that have been written by undergraduate students during Semesters One and Two 2020, Summer School 2021, or Semester One 2021. All works have been peer-reviewed by our editorial team, and reviewed by a University of Auckland staff member who taught or marked the course that produced each work, and are experts in each respective field.

As I sit down to write this year's Editors' Note, I cannot help but feel an unfortunate sense of déjà vu. Once again, we are editing, designing, and proofing from home, plunged into a nationwide lockdown which is somehow static yet volatile. However, despite the uncertainty brought about by the pandemic, one thing we can always be certain about is the flow of insightful student work.

Edition 12 consists of five chapters that successively take the reader back in time. It opens by trying to make sense of the amorphous nature of the post-postmodern era, tying together religious musings with media and the comic. The second chapter looks into social revolution—changes to the structure of society triggered by the Internet and COVID-19, and is accompanied by an essay on the structure of the human mind. This is followed by an examination of power structures and politics, a compilation of case studies ranging from white privilege to a hypothetical refugee crisis, and even a call for the legalisation of bigamy. The fourth chapter is dedicated to Aotearoa and the Pacific, with appeals to remember our both colonial and imperial history and to celebrate the value of indigenous knowledge and identity. Closing the edition is a beautiful exploration of history and memory in which we peruse the alliance between absence and archives.

This concludes my five years with *Interesting Journal*, an experience for which I am unfathomably grateful. Thank you to every member of the IJ team, past and present, for your effort and commitment to the arts. In particular, I would like to thank former co-Editor-in-Chief Alika Wells for their incredible mahi and aroha over the four years that we worked alongside each other. And finally, thank you to the future editors and designers to come—it gives me great pleasure knowing that I will be leaving *Interesting Journal* in excellent hands.

Paula Lee
Co-Editor-in-Chief

The Interesting Journal team would like to thank everyone at the Faculty of Arts Student Development and Engagement Team for their support, with special thanks given to Vandana Minhas-Taneja and Ashley Flavell. We also thank the Dean of Arts, Professor Robert Greenberg, for his continued support of the journal, and all the members of staff who agreed to review and provide feedback on all the publications in Edition 12, as part of our peer review process.

BLURRING BOUNDARIES

It is near-impossible to categorise a sociocultural movement while you are living in it. We labelled the period of European cultural, artistic, political and economic rebirth following the Middle Ages the Renaissance. We named the period of Western philosophy and art production that occurred in the late 19th and early 20th century modernism. The closest ‘phase’ we have to the present day would be postmodernism. And yet, we do not know the discrete ‘era’ that we live in now. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the 21st century is not particularly discrete. The advent of technology has dispersed and connected us, and we are exposed to the geographically and culturally diverse deluge of artistic, political, and social movements more than ever.

Even if we can’t yet classify this post-Internet, post-pandemic period that we are living in, the vestigial hallmarks of postmodernism carry some currency. If postmodernity describes a social condition in which constant change has become the status quo and the distinction between high and mass culture has collapsed, then whatever we are living in now is still characterised by these *blurred boundaries*. The internet, for one, has blurred every boundary imaginable. The widely adopted, yet so atomised process of working from home that many are now familiar with has coalesced the public and private spheres. Emergent forms of media merge and subvert existing forms. The perennial question of *is there divine power* has taken on new dimensions in an increasingly interconnected, sceptical and atheist world. Where do we look to for our gods and prophets?

This chapter begins with Coleman’s investigation into methodological un/belief structures in anthropological studies on religion and spiritualism. She recounts her childhood readiness to accept any belief wholeheartedly, and how now, as an aspiring anthropologist, she might embark on studies safely and respectfully for all involved. She critiques established agnostic and atheist anthropological methodologies and explores proposed alternative methodologies. Coleman presents interesting case studies where anthropologists have struggled with this expectation of detachment.

Coleman’s essay may focus on the study of faith, but Fleming’s essay focuses on faith itself: his essay questions the reasonableness of theistic belief in the face of the Argument from Evil. Presented as a kind of back-and-forth between a theist and an atheist, Fleming discusses the philosophies of J. L. Mackie, Alvin Plantinga, and William Rowe in relation to the ostensibly paradoxical existence of God and the existence of evil.

Fernandes considers whether prophets are simply individuals in ancient biblical texts or whether they can be found today. Fernandes posits Hasan Minhaj, an Indian-American writer, producer, political commentator, and actor, as a modern-day prophet. She draws parallels between academic descriptions of prophets in the Bible and the Quran, and his social justice work in front of and behind the camera.

We then move into two essays that dissect the comic as an art and journalistic medium. The first, by Hambuch, examines Bryan O’Malley’s use of the ‘gutter’ in *Scott Pilgrim’s Precious Little Life*; the comic-specific device that is the negative space between two panels in a comic strip. Hambuch analyses how the gutter blurs as both an ancillary tool to a comic’s main panels and its own activated space.

Finally, there is Cheong’s essay on the offerings of comic journalism over mainstream journalism. Through analysing Joe Sacco’s *Palestine* (1993) and Alissa Torres’ *American Widow* (2008), Cheong argues that comics as journalistic artefacts hold credible weight both despite and because of established conventions. She concludes that the subjectivity brought

about through comics' ability to convey visual and textual narrative is a valuable source of information in testimony and memoir.

These five essays elucidate, interrogate, dissolve, and elasticise the meaning of boundaries. Perhaps the conclusion is that we do not need to categorise the period that we are living in. Perhaps we just need to embrace the blurriness.

Ilena Shadbolt

Anthropology 319

World-view and Religion

Maddison Coleman

The Church of Anthropology: An Investigation into Methodological Belief Structures

In primary school, I was required to engage in ‘studies of belief’ where the school would split into three factions: Bible studies, Nga Tūmanako, and Values. Naturally, I chose a new belief system each term, wholeheartedly believing whatever I was told. I conglomerated each lesson into a pantheon of beliefs, and I remember one night praying to ask God to make sure the taniwha were nice to each other, because I had learnt in my Values class that it was important to get along with your friends. For me, belief came from trusting others to tell me the truth, and the excitement of engaging with multiple worlds beyond what I saw with my eyes. At that time, the only commitment I had was to myself. However, as an anthropologist-in-training, how should I rationalise this naïve zeal for belief? Does it benefit my work? Or is it irreconcilable with the scientific method espoused by professionals in the field? To shed some light on these questions, this essay investigates what role the beliefs of ethnographic researchers play in their fieldwork experiences. I ask what, if any, would be the most beneficial methodological belief structure for anthropologists when working in the field. To answer this question, I examine the current normative methodologies used in anthropological research, outlining the benefits and critiques of methodological atheism/agnosticism. Secondly, I scrutinise the temptation to ‘go native’ in anthropology using three examples from ethnographic research. Finally, I dissect the phenomenon of researcher conversion, a process by which the anthropologist comes to accept and practise the beliefs of their informants. Ultimately, this essay will explore the possibilities of researcher belief methodologies and determine which, if any, should be recommended to future ethnographers when approaching fieldwork.

Current Methodologies: A Rejection of Disbelief

Anthropology is a discipline that emerged post-enlightenment and has therefore been a historically secular field of research. As such, the leading anthropological methodology for studying religious belief is Berger’s (1967) methodological atheism, later developed by Smart (1973) into the now-widely promoted methodological agnosticism. Methodological atheism refers to the practice of standardised disbelief in the supernatural when conducting anthropological fieldwork, while methodological agnosticism embraces standardised ambiguity, acknowledging the unknowable nature of the divine. The rationalisation for these stances is that the realm of the sacred cannot be proven nor disproven, as it exists (if at all) in a state outside human perception and hence unavailable for empirical analysis. As a social science, anthropology has, historically, been concerned primarily with empirical evidence to support claims and theories. Therefore, studying belief outside of its effect on, and manifestation within, culture makes little sense.

Marker (1998) embraces these methodologies, offering further justification for using them. For an academic, he argues, a critical gaze is more relevant than an ‘insider’ one because an ‘insider’s’ gaze could mask power structures associated with the academic study of religion. He uses the example of ‘white shamanism’ to show how researchers at his own university have been known to engage in (generally) shallow spiritual exploration among Native American communities, only to appropriate these teachings into ‘palatable’ courses for undergraduates at the expense of the communities they borrow from. Marker, however, was writing in 1998, and while these issues still appear occasionally in social science, it is far less common than it was over 20 years ago. While justification and rationale for methodological atheism/agnosticism is often rooted in older scholarship, these methodological belief (or disbelief) systems still prevail in anthropology today. Bell and Taylor (2014) offer a more modern reasoning for the adoption of methodological atheism/agnosticism in that it offers an added level of protection for the researchers themselves. While anthropologists are trained academics and fieldworkers, we are also fundamentally human. To have our own deeply held beliefs challenged through our

fieldwork could cause damage to our self-image and identity. Safety in the field, while often a delicate balancing act for anthropologists, should always come first.

However, that is not to say that methodological atheism/agnosticism is left unquestioned in today's anthropology. These methodologies have been extensively critiqued for their limited scope of analysis. For example, Cantrell (2015) argues that 'bracketing out' religious belief is an irresponsible anthropological practice, as belief is inseparable from an informant's worldview. He states that "the 'world' of [...] believers [...] is not reducible to the 'world' of the unbeliever, with the sacred left over as some additional residue" (Cantrell, 2015, pp. 5–6). For him, setting aside the beliefs of informants in favour of more empirical observations neglects to represent an informant's worldview. This is problematised further when one considers that such research, where the full experience and worldview of its informants are not adequately represented, can inform policy in the world outside academia. In this sense, these communities could feel the effects of research that does not accurately represent them (Kahn, 2011). In this way, while agnosticism can seem like an open-minded 'middle-road' for anthropologists to take, it can potentially convey a condescending and irresponsible tone to their informants (Kahn, 2011, pp. 80–81).

Moments of Clarity: A Temptation of Belief

Ewing (1994) laments the stigma around the "embarrassing possibility of belief" (p. 571), also known as 'going native' as an anthropologist. This term refers to when a researcher becomes so embedded in their fieldwork that they take on the beliefs of their informants. She opposes the dominant 'neutral' belief methodologies because "the idea that the anthropologist's own beliefs are 'irrelevant' or merely embarrassing is an illusion [...] not shared by the subjects of anthropological research" (Ewing, 1994, p. 573). In her research studying Sufism in Pakistan, she began experiencing what her subjects interpreted to be prophetic dreams from various saints. While she resisted these interpretations and did her best to maintain stoic scepticism when interpreting the significance these dreams held purely for her informants, the significance of her own interpretation—her own belief—was neglected. This led her to the realisation that by resisting her instinct to believe, she was embodying a form of colonial superiority, in which having beliefs and experiences in line with uneducated Pakistani women was cause for embarrassment (p. 574). She points out that the objectivity that anthropologists cling to while studying belief can be considered discriminatory, as it comes from a desire to distance oneself from one's informants.

Fotiou (2010) also had trouble maintaining the protective guise of an impartial anthropologist when conducting her research on shamanic warfare in the Peruvian Amazon. After a strained encounter with a female shaman, she began to experience consistently bad trips on the ritualised psychedelics, as well as deeply unsettling nightmares. This led her informants to believe she had been cursed by the shaman. After undergoing a cleansing ritual, these experiences stopped occurring almost at once. Like Ewing (1994), Fotiou had difficulty shaking the sense that what had occurred was a real experience with the supernatural. While her training in anthropology informed her that belief is generally a manifestation of cultural forces, this experience forced her to consider that encounters with the supernatural could be legitimate and shared, and then *interpreted* culturally. Using this lens, Fotiou does not resist the 'temptation to believe,' as Ewing (1994) would put it, but also maintains the critical gaze that Marker (1998) emphasises is crucial for professional anthropological scholarship. Therefore, can Marker's argument still be considered grounds for the dominant adoption of methodological agnosticism? Or, is there a way, as Fotiou has shown, to engage in belief without abandoning a critical stance?

Finally, Klin-Oron (2014) describes a fieldwork experience that left him shaken and overwhelmed, walking the line of belief and disbelief. He attended a nine session ‘channelling’ course in Israel, with the main aim being to establish connections with incorporeal entities (pp. 635–636). Throughout this course, he was instructed in meditation and visualisation techniques through which he began to experience visions of these incorporeal entities that he could not explain under an anthropological paradigm of disbelief. As he drove home from a particularly revealing channelling session, he describes feeling at a crossroads in which he *could*, realistically, believe in the mysticism he found himself so caught up in, but to do so would challenge his worldview, and potentially damage his sense of identity. In the end, he resolves to draw back, preserving his worldview and identity by spending the rest of the course primarily observing, as opposed to participating. This case study is interesting because, contrary to what Bell and Taylor (2014) theorised, methodological agnosticism was unable to offer protection when his beliefs were challenged by fieldwork experiences. Instead, his agency as anthropologist to engage and implement different research techniques and methodologies when needed allowed him the flexibility to see a potentially dangerous situation and adjust his behaviour accordingly. Although, one can’t help but wonder what might have happened had he chosen the path of belief.

Conversion: A Reality of Belief

Hatsumi (2017) defines conversion as transitioning from a knower of belief to an actor of belief (p. 197), which is what she did after witnessing the power and dignity of a Holy Week Catholic ritual. In the ritual, displaced Sri Lankan villagers, mere days after the end of a civil war, marched across burnt and barren landscapes preaching hopeful gospel. For her, it is not enough to suspend disbelief. Instead, disbelief must be overcome, as it is useless to write about beliefs and worldviews that one is not ‘touched’ by. Based on this case, she rejects methodological agnosticism outright, espousing the sincerity of her research as a factor in her conversion to Catholicism. While her reasoning is not untrue, per say, there are still problems with this line of thought. Does she mean to imply that ‘outsiders’ to the Catholic faith would invariably fail to grasp the nuances of this community, and therefore produce sub-par research? If so, this would represent a limited view of what is possible in anthropology. While an insider gaze on the part of the researcher can produce interesting insight, so too can the gaze of an outsider. As they are not bound to the belief system they study, they are perhaps more able to cast a critical gaze than the insider (Marker, 1998).

Take, for example, the case of Thompson (2019) who converted to Islam during her fieldwork in Zanzibar and married a Zanzibarian man. The women in this community had a reputation for being immensely private, unwilling to pass on knowledge to anthropologists conducting fieldwork there. However, Thompson’s status as a new Muslim bride afforded her certain privileges to information. She received consent from these previously unyielding women, as they believed that as a ‘good Muslim wife’ she would represent them in the light they wished, as an insider (Thompson, 2019, p. 677). When it came time for Thompson to publish her research, she found herself conflicted between her identity as a professional anthropologist dedicated to accurate scholarship and her identity as an accepted Zanzibarian Muslim woman dedicated to cultural norms of privacy. In the end, she lost contact with her informants and decided to publish her research according to her values and beliefs as an anthropologist. This is interesting as it shows that, though her status as an insider in this community afforded her access to previously unavailable insight, it also compromised her ability to be critical and ultimately fulfil her responsibilities as an anthropologist. It also raises an ethical question of

whether she had the right to publish the accounts of her informants when they had been given under the impression that she had shared similar beliefs that she now only partially subscribes to. Did conversion, in this case, also cause Thompson to fail in her responsibility to her informants?

Conversion in the field can also pose a threat to the anthropologist's sense of self, as well as compromising their relationships in the community they study. Spadola (2011) experienced this when he converted to Islam while conducting fieldwork in Morocco. He described his conversion as a 'parting gift' to his best friend and his host family; a slightly baffling reasoning when one considers the sheer dedication that Islam requires. However, soon after returning to Holland to publish his research, the 9/11 terror attacks happened in the US, and he found himself disillusioned with this belief system, lapsing in his practice. When he returned to Morocco to conduct further research, he found himself performing these beliefs without a full understanding of what they meant to him, lamenting that "managing [his] identity on top of [his] fieldwork [was] debilitating" (Spadola, 2011, p. 7). This led to a deterioration in his friendships, and a sense of despair at the thought of being dishonest with people he cared about. The question is, while the insights he gained through conversion were undoubtedly useful, does that justify the risks to himself as a researcher? It seems that these cases of conversion, while creating fascinating scholarship and some of the most interesting case studies anthropology has to offer, demonstrate undeniable risks to the anthropologists and the communities they study.

To Conclude: A Freedom of Belief

This essay has outlined the various advantages and protections that methodological atheism/agnosticism can offer anthropologists: dedication to empirical evidence, a critical gaze and a set of beliefs that can shield a researcher from a significant identity crisis. Potential evidence for these benefits comes in the form of scholarship in which the researcher converted to their participants' beliefs and suffered for it, both professionally (losing a critical stance or even failing in their ethical responsibilities to their informants) and personally (experiencing a major identity crisis and damaging relationships). However, methodological atheism/agnosticism is still critiqued for the way it does not account for the holistic worldview of informants, as well as the discriminating and colonial attitudes it can foster. Because of this, we have also engaged in the potential for an alternative form of anthropological research, in which belief is permitted—a possibility—but still leaves scope for critical interpretation and a 'retreat' into methodological atheism/agnosticism if need be. To answer my earlier question of what researcher belief methodology (if any) should be recommended to anthropologists in the field, I would advise flexibility in belief structures. Adapting to participant views, as well as your own, seems to be what makes for good scholarship. While part of that little girl will always stay with me, eager to believe in whatever story or divine experience comes her way, I am now dedicated to balancing my commitments and aware of how my beliefs as a researcher can affect those that are a part of my research.

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Philosophy 327

Philosophy of Religion

Harrison Fleming

The Reasonableness of Theistic Belief in the Face of the Argument from Evil

The question of God's existence is old. Very old. Debate has been passionate and storied, spanning different continents, civilisations, and languages across millennia. Of all the arguments which have most concerned the countless great thinkers who have sought to find out if the cosmos really has a creator, the argument from evil is perhaps the most significant. Deceivingly simple in its most basic form, the argument can be formulated in a variety of nuanced ways, and the array of responses posited to defend against the argument are vast. This essay will investigate two of the ways that the argument from evil has been stated as an argument for atheism, exploring the ways that theists might defend the reasonableness of their belief against the force of these arguments respectively. Ultimately, it will conclude that this debate still leaves both theists and atheists justified in holding their views, based on their posture towards religious testimony and experience.

Mackie's (2003) straightforward version of the argument from evil is likely the one that most atheists, and indeed theists, would first consider. It goes as follows (with 'MP' meaning 'Mackie's Premise'):

MP1. God is wholly good (will eliminate evil as far as he can).

MP2. God is omnipotent (can create a world without evil).

MP3. But evil exists.

∴ Either God is not wholly good, or God is not omnipotent, or God does not exist.

This is perhaps the simplest form of the argument from evil. Thus presented, it is a deductive argument which concludes that belief in a wholly good, omnipotent God is illogical, given that such a being would necessarily create a world without evil, but clearly has not done so. As Alvin Plantinga (1978) points out, in order to defend the reasonableness of their belief against this argument, the theist needs to either find a fourth premise which validates a conclusion that God exists as claimed, or else modify one of the first two premises so that MP3 no longer necessitates the current conclusion. The best argument that the theist can raise involves this kind of modification. Namely, it is to argue that evil is necessary as a counterpart to good, in order for freewill to be possible. Obviously, this requires limiting the proposition that God is omnipotent. If evil is necessary for freewill, then God is unable to create a world in which freewill exists but there is no evil. This is not a significant issue for the theist, if they are willing to accept that omnipotence does not mean holding the power to do what is logically impossible.

Now the immediate objection which arises in response to this modified premise is that, according to the Christian tradition, God is claimed to have repeatedly acted contrary to logical possibilities. What is dead cannot come back to life, what is mortal cannot be immortal, what is divine cannot be mere-human, what burns cannot remain unburnt—and yet God is claimed to have orchestrated all these things, and more. The Christian theist may wish to reply that this is simply part of the mystery of God, but as Mackie has pointed out, this does not really provide an answer to the issue that these claims about God require that he is not bound by the laws of logic (Mackie, 2003).

However, the theist might here reply that these miracles attributed to God only involve contradictions of natural laws of the world discoverable by science. These are not the same

kind of laws as basic laws of logic—laws which, if contradicted, produce nonsensical results, or no possible result at all. This is the kind of logic that would be confounded by an attempt to claim that God is omnipotent and wholly good, and yet has created a world with evil. This type of logical restraint on God’s power is captured in Plantinga’s (1978) picture of “Necessary states of affairs [which] do not owe their actuality to the creative activity of God,” which he uses in his response to Mackie.

Under this ontology, whilst God “actualises” (or ‘creates and sustains’) the universe, he is not the creator of either himself or the natural laws of logic, or even, according to Plantinga, basic properties such as the colour red (he sustains these things in his power, but he is not their creator—they just eternally exist as a necessity in the same way that he does). It is not clear why the claim needs to extend to the eternal existence of properties like colour—indeed, this seems a rather strained claim, as a world without colour is entirely imaginable. Plantinga might claim, however, that colour properties would still exist (as abstract objects) in a world without colour. A world without number, however, is not imaginable. Regardless of its specifics, Plantinga’s response does offer what appears to be a plausible defence to Mackie’s question: God must allow the existence of evil for freewill to be possible, because it is logically impossible to have freewill without choice between good and evil, and God, though omnipotent, is still subject to the laws of logic.

At this point, the atheist may reply, as Mackie (2003) does, by arguing that most theists do not really hold to this picture of omnipotence. Instead, they generally hold that logic itself is created or laid down by God—that logic, as understood by the human mind, is simply a set of rules according to which God arbitrarily chooses to conform. This picture of God as the source of logic leads quickly to the paradox of omniscience. An all-powerful God should be able to bind himself to logic, but then having done so, if he remains all-powerful, he should still be able to act contrary to this—suggesting he did not actually have the power to bind himself. Either way, his power seems to be limited in a way that suggests he is not really omnipotent.

However, if the theist is willing to grant necessary logical restrictions on God’s power, then this paradox is not an issue. Instead, the atheist can reply by pointing to the conceivability of a possible world with free agents who always choose good, thus eliminating the need for evil in the world (Mackie, 2003). In a narrow version of this argument, this would involve God creating free agents such that they always choose good. Yet, an immediate reply to this seems clear: this is a logical contradiction, because a being designed such that they only ever choose good is quite clearly not free to make their own decisions. Mackie seems to gloss over this, without acknowledging that his response ignores the concession made by the theist to whom he is responding—that an omnipotent God might still be subject to laws of logic.

As Plantinga (1978) points out, however, there is a broader version of Mackie’s reply which is stronger. The atheist could hold that a considerable factor in how humans make decisions lies in their immediate circumstances, and that previous circumstances (including choices made by other people in their lives) which have formed them into the person that they are, are also present in the moment of making the decision in question (between good and evil). Following this, why did God—who is omniscient and so knows exactly how all free agents

will act in specific circumstances—not create a world with truly free agents, where the agents' circumstances, rather than their very nature, were such that only right choices were made? This would not involve a logical contradiction, so why did God not do this?

The answer, the theist may say, is that either directly controlling a person's actions, or subtly controlling them through changes in a person's environment, is still control either way, and thus a privation of freewill. But surely, the atheist could respond, lived reality is such that one's actions are the result of a complex mix of one's communities, experiences, and emotions, and that it is indeed plausible that these could be manipulated so as to make one take certain decisions. However, the actual decision remains the sole responsibility of the decision-maker. This may be true, but regardless, the theist has a stronger reply to the possibility of an alternative, evil-free, world through Plantinga's notion of 'transworld depravity'. Essentially, this concept delineates that no matter what kind of world God might have created, it could be that all the creatures with genuine choices (which often includes a desire to for both possible options, according to the Christian belief that there is temptation —i.e., a positive evil force) would have made at least some wrong decisions.

This reply from Plantinga is not easily dismissible. It provides a scenario in which the supposedly contradictory propositions of the argument from evil—God's omnipotence and evil's existence—are not actually at odds with one another. In fact, this appears to be a rather reasonable position to hold; surely no person in this world can ever really claim to go even an entire day in which they avoid temptation to do something generally accepted as wrong by theists and atheists alike, such as 'stretching the truth' or breaking 'just a small rule.' It seems quite impossible to imagine there being a world with genuine choice where no wrong decision was ever made. On the whole, the theist who argues along Plantinga's lines seems to have a rather strong reply to Mackie's claim that God's existence is logically inconsistent with the evil one sees in our world. Crucially however, it may seem that no answer is forthcoming from this argument as to why there is so much apparent needless pain, suffering and cruelty in the world which is not attributable to the choices of free agents. It is this form of evil which seems to pose the strongest problem to theist defence of the existence of God. This is the focus of William Rowe's version of the argument of evil, which I now turn to consider.

Rowe's (1979) version of the argument is evidential, rather than deductive. It focuses on a particular kind of 'natural' evil; namely, the suffering of humans and animals which appears to happen needlessly. His famous example is that of a fawn which suffers intense agony over multiple days as it endures a slow death following burn injuries sustained in a forest fire. Another tragically common type of suffering of this class would be a person who suffers a long, cruel battle with cancer before eventually dying. The suffering of family and friends as they witness their loved one's pain creates an added layer of seemingly pointless misery in this situation. It is, however, open to the theist to claim that the love and courage shown by the people in these challenging circumstances is a good that would not have occurred without the evil—though one might well retort that surely this good does not warrant such immense suffering and heartache.

Regardless, Rowe's example is a particularly pertinent instance of pointless suffering, because the fawn endures secluded suffering which takes place away from any possible aid or compassionate witness, meaning there does not even *appear* to be the possibility of a good of some kind coming about in response to the evil here. This is important, because the atheist must accept that, at present, no absolute proof can be found in this world which would show the contingent necessity of any one instance of suffering. In other words, one can never definitively prove that, in a given instance of apparently pointless suffering, there is not some 'good' which would have been unobtainable without God's allowing this suffering, or some other worse evil which might have happened had God not allowed this evil to happen instead. Omnidience would be required for such knowledge, which is only ascribed to God himself. Thus, as has been shown with Mackie's version, a complete refutation of the theist's possible response to the fawn's suffering—that evil is necessary for maximum good to be obtained—is not possible.

Crucially, however, the reasonableness of the theist's belief in a wholly good, omnipotent God is greatly challenged here. Even the theist must admit that one cannot discern any reason why God should allow evil of this kind. The fawn and cancer patient's suffering does not show evidence of some higher good which is gained, or greater conceivable evil prevented. Furthermore, there does not seem to be any reason, based on either logic or observation of the natural world, to think that there really might be some such unseen good or evil. In light of this discussion, a simple version of Rowe's argument, in which both the first premise and the conclusion are taken to be strongly probable but not definite, can be stated as follows (with 'RP' meaning 'Rowe's Premise'):

- RP1. There are needless evils which exist that are not justified by contingent goods or evils.
RP2. A wholly good, omnipotent God would not allow the existence of needless evil.
. . A wholly good, omnipotent God does not exist.

One response a theist might offer to this problem of 'natural' evils, as Plantinga (1978) notes, is to point to Satan and demons. They might hold that there are non-human free agents in the universe with significant power to bring about suffering, whose goal is to increase the evil in the world. Perhaps God could not create such agents any differently, or create circumstances any differently, such that there would be less evil in the world than there actually is now. This may technically be a valid explanation, but questions certainly arise as to how likely it is, or how much strength it lends towards making a belief in God reasonable in the face of the argument from evil.

For one thing, it is clear from the stories about God in the bible and the testimony of believers that he is held to act in ways that interfere with the evil intent of agents—such as striking down the armies who come before the people of Israel with fear, flood, or sickness. It is not clear why God—who can, and has, acted to counter the effect of agents of evil—would not do so far more often (and impartially) under this explanation. For one thing, as Rowe (1979) argues, the extent and nature of suffering that takes place in this world is not rationalised by this explanation. Even if we grant that God, for some reason beyond human understanding, needs to allow Satan to cause a person to suffer and die from cancer, it surely does not follow that the suffering should be drawn out and so extremely painful. Furthermore, it seems that,

with modern scientific knowledge, one should be less willing to believe that natural evil flows from the activities of supernatural beings. Disease, earthquakes, fires—all can be shown to be a part of natural environmental cycles and evolutionary changes. The suffering of sentient beings in the midst of these things might just be explained as the harsh reality of life in such a world. It seems that more is needed from the theist to explain why it is reasonable to attribute natural evil to supernatural beings other than God.

Rowe (1979) himself notes an alternative response open to the theist, which is to try to prove RP1 to be false. The strongest method of doing this involves a ‘G.E. Moore shift.’ Essentially, this means one negates the truth of the conclusion, accepts the truth of RP2, and therefore negates RP1. This is possible if the theist maintains that they have other grounds for believing in the existence of God, such as appealing to personal experience, testimony, or perhaps an argument in the Thomistic mould such as the teleological argument. This counterargument would go as follows (with ‘CP’ meaning ‘Counter-Premise’):

CP1. It strongly appears that a wholly good, omnipotent God does exist.

CP2. A wholly good, omnipotent God would not allow the existence of needless evil.

∴ There are no needless evils which are not justified by contingent goods or evils.

As mentioned, the strength of this argument depends entirely on one’s position towards positive arguments for the existence of God, alongside religious testimony and experience. Remaining focused purely on the argument from evil, however, the theist can also respond to Rowe in the manner of Stephen Wykstra. Wykstra (1984) argues that, in order for an evidential claim to be reasonable, one must be justified in believing that, if there were further evidence which would work against the claim, one would recognise this evidence. In the context of the argument from evil, the atheist points to what appears to be meaningless evil in the world, and says there is no evidence that shows, or even suggests, the existence of hidden goods for which God permits this pointless evil. On this basis, the atheist claims it is reasonable to believe God does not exist. However, the atheist needs to show the reasonableness of the belief that, if there were any hidden goods which God were serving, humans would be able to comprehend them. The issue for the atheist here is that the very theist claim to which they are responding—that an omniscient, omnipotent God allows evil for the sake of goods beyond one’s comprehension—seems to clearly show that humans, who are decidedly not omniscient, cannot expect to comprehend these goods. For the atheist, who is committed to showing the unreasonableness of the theist’s belief, this is a rather formidable argument to overcome.

One might respond, as Rowe (2006) does, by pointing out that there are many goods in the world which we do know, and indeed which theists hold to have come from God. Therefore, in claiming that there are no rational grounds for believing that, if there were higher goods which justify suffering, we should know them, the theist must therefore be claiming that the goods we do see in the world are not really representative of the goods there are. In other words, God has not revealed much of the good that there really is in the good which he has placed in the world. The theist can indeed claim this, but Rowe points out, it does not sit well alongside the other claims theists generally make about God. Given that God is entirely beyond human comprehension, much of the way in which he is claimed to reveal himself and

be knowable to humans is through situations, relationships and other goods in the world which are analogous to him. The most essential of these is ‘Father’—the idea being that the good seen in the love which a father shows to his children reveals an eternal good which flows from, originates in, and is part of, God.

Yet, this ‘God the Father’ figure seen in the scriptures does not really seem to be recognisable in the world today. Why would a supposedly loving Father allow so much horrific pain and suffering in the world over so many centuries, yet leave so little evidence of his love or presence? This suffering, especially in the face of modern scientific knowledge of the world, would make belief in his very existence an increasingly difficult exercise. Furthermore, if much of the supposed good which we do not yet know awaits one in life after the end of one’s time on this earth, then how is one to reasonably believe this without evidence? Surely the theist, who holds that there are no reasons for thinking the goods we know represent the goods that there are, must recognise that this same scepticism can be turned upon the majority of doctrinal beliefs about God.

In reply, the theist can of course simply point to experience and testimony as their grounds for holding these beliefs. It then appears that the atheist must accept that, in the face of Wykstra’s reply, the reasonableness of a belief (or disbelief) in the existence of a wholly good, omnipotent God comes down to one’s willingness to believe religious testimony, personal experience (or lack thereof), and, perhaps, positive arguments for God’s existence. The existence of evil will clearly impact one’s posture towards these things, but it does not appear to definitively support either theistic or atheistic belief.

The present conclusion to the argument from evil is therefore something of a stalemate. Whilst Mackie’s version of the argument falls before a defence such as Plantinga’s, Rowe’s cannot be easily dismissed by the theist—though the truth of the first premise can be reasonably rejected. Ultimately, the theist seems to be justified in their belief in God’s existence, in spite of the existence of evil, based on their acceptance of the testimony of others, and perhaps their own religious experience. Similarly, the atheist can rationally reject religious testimony in the face of the evil they see in the world, alongside their own lack of experience of God, and thus be justified in holding that God does not exist. For the budding philosopher like myself, perhaps hungry for truth and eager to develop a clear understanding of the world, arriving at this conclusion may be somewhat frustrating. It is, however, rather predictable, given the evidential ambiguity and longevity of the debate surrounding God’s existence.

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Theological and Religious Studies 101G

The Bible in Popular Culture

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Hasan Minhaj: Making Social Injustice a Laughing Matter

The word "prophet" tends to evoke visions of a figure descending from the clouds proclaiming the Word of the Lord or perhaps a bearded old man draped in a robe and sandals. Whatever you imagine, it is certainly worlds away from comedian Hasan Minhaj—although he does have the beard. A millennial man who wears Nike Air Force 1s? A guy who once said we should tax Batman? It almost feels like heresy to call him a prophet... but that is what makes a modern prophet so powerful. Theologian Marcus Borg (2001) characterises the biblical prophets by their familiarity with oppression, passion for pursuing social justice, ability to challenge normalcy and oppose those in power with prophetic action. If we break down our conventional construct of a prophet, we can see that some of these features can apply to people in today's society—'modern prophets'. Furthermore, these characteristics are not limited to religious preachers, leaders, or messages. Almost surprisingly, American-Indian comedian Hasan Minhaj perfectly embodies Borg's definition, rising as an influential secular voice of social justice.

If you are familiar with stand-up comedy and Netflix or are of South Asian descent, you will have probably heard of Hasan Minhaj. Even if the name does not ring a bell, you can be assured that he is one to watch, with over 1.5 million Instagram followers. Finding fame as a correspondent on *The Daily Show* in 2014, Minhaj became known for his satirical skits and stand-up specials—but his own life was not always filled with laughs. In his comedy special *Homecoming King* (Storer, 2017), Minhaj brought to light the discrimination he faced growing up as a first-generation Muslim American-Indian. This was a turning point in his career as Minhaj began straying from just physically representing his community on screen as an actor, to vocalising and representing their struggles. Many biblical prophets were no strangers to oppression either. In fact, Borg (2001) argues that their prophecy (that is, their message of warning, hope, and protest) emerged from witnessing vulnerable situations in their own communities. While today, oppression may not stem from high priests or kings as it did in biblical times, it is still systemically upheld through powerful institutions and ideologies. For Minhaj, living in post-9/11 US meant racial tensions and prejudice were heightened. He opened up about his family home being vandalised, receiving death threats, and witnessing the oppression of minorities just like him in the years that followed. In *Homecoming King*, Minhaj questions why his fellow immigrants put up with racism and abuse as if it is some sort of "American dream tax," or, as his father put it, "the price we pay for being here" (2017).

Through the mainstream platform of film, his questions resonate with those who can empathise with such struggles. These questions are also heard by many who could never fathom the oppression he spoke of. Minhaj's determination to no longer see people complicit with this "American dream tax" became the foundation for his social justice efforts, not just as a voice for Indian and Muslim communities but a voice for all minorities.

After four years of solidifying himself as a relatable and hilarious American through numerous TV appearances and stand-up routines, Minhaj took the next step to make his passion for social justice undeniably evident with the launch of his Netflix talk show *Patriot Act with Hasan Minhaj*. Minhaj, who completed a degree in Political Science before pursuing comedy, was no longer making off-handed satirical jokes about social injustice but directly responding to current and impending issues. In *Patriot Act*, he speaks of issues ranging from protests in South Sudan and censorship in China to cricket corruption and problematic fast fashion. He is not afraid to challenge the viewer's sense of normalcy by covering topics that many public figures would not dare question. Minhaj does all of this with a sense of urgency, making it his mission

to not only inform his audience, but motivate them to take action. He leaves viewers more knowledgeable and hopeful with every episode—which is something that the biblical prophets also mastered. Borg (2001) describes the biblical prophets' ability to effectively motivate audiences using "language to generate hope, affirm identity, and create a new future" and cited Isaiah 40:28, Jeremiah 29:11 and Isaiah 40:3 as examples. The biblical prophets not only energised their audiences for a better future but also condemned their wrongdoing through "prophetic criticising" (Borg, 2001). Although *Patriot Act* episodes tend to close with a joke and hopeful mic drop, Minhaj is not afraid to tell people the truth. This was seen recently in his direct address to Asian Americans titled "We Cannot Stay Silent About George Floyd" (2020). Here, Minhaj confronted his fellow minority community who often stand on the sidelines of the Black Lives Matter movements, despite also fighting for freedom in their home countries. He urged them to be allies, reflect on their own microaggressions, and not pass the exclusive blame to those in authority. However, this does not mean Minhaj refrains from criticising those in power.

Marcus Borg (2001) commended the biblical prophets for their radical critique of a social system that was "controlled and shaped by elites of power and wealth to serve their own interests" (p.127). The prophets faced heavy persecution for their position. Jeremiah was reportedly "beaten by authorities, publicly humiliated, threatened with death and several times imprisoned" (Siebert, 2007, p. 5). Although Minhaj may not necessarily face such extreme treatment, challenging this system today is as controversial as it was then. Most importantly, just like the prophets, Minhaj does not let persecution stop his fight for oppressed groups and inclusivity. He openly reprimanded India's Prime Minister for his xenophobia and oppression of religious freedom. After this episode aired, many viewers claimed Minhaj was "Anti-Hindu and Anti-India" as they threatened to "#BoycottNetflix" (Rajat, 2019). Such backlash does not phase Minhaj. When one episode of *Patriot Act* was removed in Saudi Arabia for criticising the Crown Prince, he took to Twitter claiming this only furthered his message. This proves that Hasan Minhaj dares to speak a truth that is often easily ignored. Because of his audacity, just like the prophets, he faces strong criticism from the elite and their supporters.

Minhaj's criticism does not fall on deaf ears thanks to what Borg (2001) calls the dramatic power of prophetic acts. Prophets like Jeremiah, Isaiah and Ezekiel were all known for their attention-grabbing symbolic actions, like publicly fasting, or wearing a yoke and walking around naked while declaring God's will to dramatise their message. Thankfully, in this modern age, Minhaj can spread his important message through less physically taxing means. He has kept audiences hooked for six seasons with a perfect balance of aesthetically pleasing infographics, an eye-catching stage and well-timed humour. For example, Minhaj grilled Justin Trudeau for selling weapons to Saudi Arabia and Quebec's discriminatory hijab ban. In the same 2019 interview, he humorously likened Canada to Wakanda and Trudeau the "White Panther." Whether you have an opinion on such discourse or not, the way that Minhaj delivers his criticism has to be commended. His humorous criticism does not require the viewer to have a political degree to understand it, while still applying pressure on those in power. Minhaj's video format also allows snippets of his message to go viral. Such was the case for his Trudeau interview, for its humorous yet 'woke' content. Even the stage design of his show aids his grandiose and prophetic theatrics, with informative TED talk style graphics and colourful LED screens. This has proven to be deeply impactful with his show winning an Emmy for Outstanding Motion Design. Time Magazine described *Patriot Act* as "the manifestation of Hasan's whip-smart commentary, charisma and sincerity [...] we've needed since Donald

Trump came down that golden escalator and turned immigrants and Muslims into his targets" (Noah, 2019).

Isaiah 1:17 proclaims that people should "Learn to do good; Seek justice, Reprove the ruthless, Defend the orphan [and] Plead for the widow,"—and this is the same sentiment that *Patriot Act* upholds. Unlike the biblical prophets who were motivated to speak and create change in the name of the Lord (Exodus 3:1–10, Jeremiah 1:4–10, 1 Samuel 3), Minhaj speaks and creates change in a secular setting. You may wonder why anyone would willingly watch a Netflix show that seeks to defend an orphan or plead for a widow. However, the way Minhaj solidifies himself as genuine and funny through his comedy makes us open to letting him preach to us. Professor Terry Giles of Gannon University (2019) describes the way that prophets demanded attention as: "With practised skill, the prophet draws his audience into the alternate world of his drama by weaving together the familiar and the unexpected." I argue that this weaving of the "familiar and unexpected" reflects the modern paradox of the star, a theory posited by British scholar Richard Dyer (1998). Celebrities gain a religious-like status and following which Dyer claims is due to their ability to be both ordinary (relatable and genuine) and extraordinary (charismatic and talented). This is what makes Minhaj's message of social justice so effective. He does not need to claim a divine motive in order for people to listen to his message. This is due to his charismatic ability to draw us in with familiar humour yet lay out the frequently ignored facts surrounding current issues. Minhaj comes off as a friend—someone just like us, who wants the best for society. The fact that audiences connect with him through high production, scripted and well-researched thirty-minute episodes only enhances his message.

In our current uncertain times, Hasan Minaj fulfils the essential role of a prophet, especially in the United States. He reflects Marcus Borg's definitions of the biblical prophets with an effective modern spin and it is this concept of a modern prophet that helps draw parallels between today and biblical times. While Minhaj's message of social justice is furthered through technological advancements, he still faces criticism for challenging social norms and the social elites as the prophets did. However, most notably, he demonstrates the power and influence that prophetic language and action can have, even in a secular context. The fact that a comedian can fight for human rights, political accountability, and environmental sustainability on such a platform begs us to evaluate the influential platforms we grant to other celebrities and, ultimately, the weight that one voice can have.

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Media, Film and Television 222

Comics and Visual Narrative

Amir Jiminez Hambuch

Filling in the Gutter

The gutter is one of the defining features of the comics medium and serves as a gap that separates panels. The reader can infer the meaning of this gap through the content of separated panels and form a coherent sequence of events. Mario Saraceni (2003) describes the gutter as “the space containing all that happens between panels,” and that the reader must “guess the missing elements in order to reconstruct the flow of the story.” Many comics artists manipulate the gutter artistically to produce new meaning, as seen in Bryan O’Malley’s *Scott Pilgrim’s Precious Little Life* (2004). O’Malley’s story supports Saraceni’s claim that the gutter generates a sense of continuity for the reader by implying a connection between separated moments and through stylistic modification of the gutter itself.

Discussing the gutter requires an understanding of its relationship to panels, the “portion [...] of the narrative, where something actually takes place and takes time” (Saraceni, 2003). The gutter is crucial as the space that separates these narrative moments and can take various forms, such as a line or an empty space. In either instance, the “semantic relations between images are the same” (Groensteen, 2007). The gutter and panels cooperate to establish a sequence. This is one of the fundamental aspects of comics that separates it from other mediums such as cartoons, which typically consist of a single panel (Saraceni, 2003). Therefore, the gutter complements the arrangement of panels, as without it, there would not be a sequential narrative. However, the gutter does more than just separate panels. The gutter “marks the semantic solidarity of contiguous panels above all, both working through the codes of narrative and sequential drawings” (Groensteen, 2007). A sequence of separated panels leaves the reader with a series of moments that must be connected. The gutter is ultimately what generates meaning and flow throughout a sequence. The reader is responsible for creating a connection between the isolated panels and the gutter through inference.

The time and effort required for artists to create comics suggests it is unlikely that the fine details within the pages are added without meticulous consideration. The panel layout and use of the gutter are particularly important for artists in conveying their story, as the content of separate panels indicate the possible contents of the gutter. Scott McCloud (1993) describes this inferential capacity as closure—the “phenomenon of observing the parts but perceiving [a] whole.” McCloud (1993) elaborates that the reader uses closure to interpret the meaning of the gutter, taking two individual panels and connecting them to produce a “single idea.” Essentially, narrative within comics depends on the reader’s use of closure to generate continuity throughout a sequence of static images, which occurs in the gutter. For example, between the third and fourth panel of the sequence below, the reader can connect the sequence in which Scott Pilgrim, O’Malley’s titular protagonist, moves his arm.



Figure 1. O’Malley.

The two panels provide the reader with the information necessary to use closure and imagine a coherent and dynamic sequence. Therefore, the contents within panels imply the hidden contents within the gutter. In Figure 1 above, the reader can infer that Scott has been awoken by the ringing phone and his arm has moved due to the shift in visual content between the two panels. Furthermore, in the following panels, the reader discovers that Scott’s sister, Stacey, is calling him, due to the transition from Scott lying in bed to Stacey on the phone. A block of text also informs the reader that she is his sister. O’Malley demonstrates how the gutter can be used to progress a comic’s narrative, but also to transition between settings.

A variety of meanings can be inferred within the gutter, but this depends on the connections offered by the artist within this space of transition. McCloud (1993) categorises the transitions between panels as: “moment-to-moment,” “action-to-action,” “subject-to-subject,” “scene-to-scene,” “aspect-to-aspect,” and “non-sequitur.” The application of these categories depends on the contents of the contiguous panels and influence the reader’s understanding of the gutter’s content. The previous example from O’Malley featured an ‘action-to-action’ transition with Scott reaching for the phone; a ‘subject-to-subject’ transition as he talks with his sister; and an ‘aspect-to-aspect’ transition when O’Malley illustrates the door in the first panel but focuses on the mailbox in the second panel. ‘Non-sequitur’ transitions are less common in comics, possibly because they are more effective in communicating an idea or eliciting a feeling rather than progressing a narrative. However, the remaining two transitions are still present throughout O’Malley’s work.



Figure 2. O’Malley.



Figure 3. O’Malley.

Figure 2 demonstrates how a ‘moment-to-moment’ transition works as the figure in the distance gradually approaches Scott. These transitions are rare in the *Scott Pilgrim* series as the stories often progress through abrupt changes in visual content between panels. Figure 3 offers a ‘scene-to-scene’ transition. The seventh panel cuts to a scene in the past, which is reinforced by the text “a few nights ago.” Each unique transition asks the reader to imagine and produce continuity between separate images through the spaces between them. Saraceni’s claim that readers must interpret the gutter is accomplished in O’Malley’s comic through visual and textual components which push readers to use “closure to make meaning, and also negotiate the spaces where meaning remains contradictory and open” (Gray, 2016). However, the gutter itself can be modified to convey further meaning. While it has been established that the representation of the gutter as a space or a line does not change its meaning, many artists stylise the gutter to convey meaning beyond its narrative purpose.

While contiguous panels aid readers in generating narrative meaning within the gutter, the gutter can be altered stylistically to establish conceptual meaning. Saraceni (2003) adds that “modifications of the panel border are sometimes used in order to convey the idea that the panel portrays the memory or the dream of a character.” This also applies to the gutter, where modifications in style or colour can be used to imply further meaning. Figures 1 and 2 already offer examples of O’Malley modifying the gutter within his story, but the page preceding Figure 2 is even more explicit in this alteration.




Figure 4. O'Malley.

Figure 4 marks the first instance of this stylistic use of the gutter. O'Malley alters the gutter's colour from white to black, emphasising this change with a single panel so that the gutter occupies the majority of the page. This abrupt shift commands the reader's attention and is paired with an equally abrupt transition between panels, as in the preceding page, Scott stands before his childhood house with his girlfriend (O'Malley, 2004). Through this disruption, O'Malley demonstrates how the gutter can be effectively used to convey symbolic meaning as well as continuity.



Figure 5. O'Malley.

Figure 5 also uses another gutter-related technique common throughout O’Malley’s story: an interruption within the gutter. Whenever a black gutter is present, the subsequent panel is a close-up on Scott’s face as he wakes up. This insinuates that the black gutter marks that a scene is set within a dream. In the above example, a non-linear gutter is used to signal the end of the dream and a transition to Scott’s wakefulness. Essentially, this functions as a guide between events that are no longer explicitly separated by the gutter. More explicit examples are included below.



Figure 6. O’Malley.



Figure 7. O’Malley.

Both Figures 6 and 7 feature instances in which characters literally cross over the gutter. This can still be treated as a guided transition, especially in Figure 6 where the crossing of the gutter reflects the physical idea of crossing the street. Brenna Gray (2016) suggests there is thematic value to this stylistic choice, and that O’Malley also portrays the idea of transgressing national borders. Many instances of this gutter crossing are performed by characters from cultures outside of Canada, where the story takes place. This demonstrates how artists can use the gutter to imply meaning beyond the literal. While Gray’s comments are only one possible reading, an artist’s choices allow numerous interpretations from different readers. Artists imply meaning within the gutter through their presence and style as transitions between visually dis/similar panels.

O’Malley’s work illustrates Saraceni’s claim that readers must interpret the meaning of the gutter through the visual and textual contents within panels, but further demonstrates how the gutter itself can be used to imply meaning. The gutter functions as a method of narrative progression and serves to produce thematic value through stylistic modifications. Readers are required to use closure to connect individual panels and fill in the gap that separates them to produce a sense of continuity. This makes the gutter not only a crucial element of comics, but one of the medium’s most defining elements.

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Comics and Visual Narrative

Samantha Cheong

The Fourth Estate Panel of Comics Journalism

According to scholar Amy Kiste Nyberg (2011), comics are advantageous over other forms of journalism because they allow us to “visualise the past” (p. 126). Comics journalism allows us to subjectively experience the past through introspective testimony and memoir, expressed via the spaces created by drawn word and image. This is notably exemplified in the political and personal works of Joe Sacco’s *Palestine* and Alissa Torres’ *American Widow*, which characteristically focus upon personal perspective and sociohistorical trauma. *American Widow*’s illustrator Sungyoon Choi retells Torres’ tumultuous experience of her husband Eduardo’s death in the 9/11 terrorist attacks, while journalist Joe Sacco’s *Palestine* follows his collection of multiple testimonies of Palestinians stuck under Israeli occupation in the 1990s. The comics boldly signal the collapse and shortcomings of mainstream journalism’s objectivity and conventions in favour of comics journalism’s moving power of subjectivity and expressivity, which humanises subjects and expresses the intricacies of remembrance. However, the differences between comic conventions and mainstream journalism conventions are not oppositional, but relative. The two comics ultimately convene in their corroboration of Nyberg’s argument through their spatial portrayal of traumatic memory.

While mainstream journalism strictly favours an objective third-person perspective, comics journalism’s combination of first- and third-person perspective transforms informative accounts into lived experience. Torres and Sacco merge public and private experiences primarily through the spatial tension of framing and personal narration (Chute, 2016, p. 213). *American Widow* uses perspective to re-enact the difficulty of grief. Choi utilises an omniscient perspective throughout, especially when Torres is depressed in bed. The first page of Chapter 5 introduces the presence of loneliness despite high social stimulation. Claustrophobic, circular imagery of her peers’ heads float around her while she lays in bed, condescendingly overarching her. Her bed drifts mid-page, suggesting an emotional stagnation within an infinite void. The arrangement of the heads creates a closing-in and resembles a clock face, suggesting social and time pressure (p. 43). Choi juxtaposes this view with first-person perspective four pages later: Torres’ peers now address the reader directly as Torres confronts them in reality, intrusively emerging from the gutter (p. 47). Dual perspective gives us a sense of the widow’s grief, creating an emotional dimension that mainstream journalism often neglects. In contrast, Sacco merges first-person textual testimony with third-person illustrations. In “The Boys,” Sacco puts young Rifat’s quotes in text boxes and accompanying visualisations below it. “They shot me in the stomach,” the teenager recounts (p. 202). The framing remains as an over-the-shoulder shot of a shooter in Arabic dress, while Rifat flees, receding into the distance. However, on the next page, the framing abruptly tightens as we switch viewpoints to the opposite side. This heightens the threat of the shooter advancing toward Rifat, who, in the first panel of page 203, now crawls towards us for help. A combination of first-person narration and third-person perspective, coupled with the spatial composition of panels, offer a sympathetic *first-person emotion*. The comics achieve an immediacy which mainstream journalism cannot and refuses to accomplish.

Through spatially extensive illustrations that bring individual experience to life, comics journalism humanises its subjects in ways that mainstream journalism neglects to. Sacco himself extra-textually distinguishes that comics “allow a sense of time and place to seep in through images” (Chute, 2017, p. 267). Through spatial relations, we are implored to experience the minute details of the subjects’ lives rather than the often superficial, objective information of mainstream journalism. Comics “transform experience into story” (Nyberg, 2011, p. 118) to offer a more detailed sense of daily life and psychology. A double spread enables us to visualise a vast Palestinian landscape where people go about their day (pp. 198–199). The marginless illustration of the city Jabalia as muddy reveals how the landscape can

become a “character” to whom we can identify with (Chute, 2017, p. 267). No text accompanies these landscapes, but each is distinct and immersive thanks to the realism and organic lack of margin. The characters slog through endless mud, as the effects of war are all-encompassing yet stagnating. Such composition forces readers to slow down and simply *look*, encouraging careful consideration. Sacco’s meticulous drawings force identification through a paradox of anonymity and individualisation, contrary to Scott McCloud’s argument that plain faces allow for greater projection of identity (Chute, 2016, p. 220). Each person is distinguishable, promoting empathy through the identification afforded by Sacco’s realism.

While *Palestine* consistently uses individualised illustrations to suggest a snapshot of everyday life, Choi opts for anonymity to mirror the way that trauma has skewed Torres’ self-conception. For her, landscape is a character of the “traumatic” (Chute, 2017, p. 267). A marginless double spread portrays Eduardo’s wake. The church’s shadows and grandeur imply a conceptual cold and dark emptiness, allowing us to perceive her wordless and expansive grief (pp. 68–69). Torres is indistinguishable, implying a loss of self that mainstream journalism can only describe rather than embody. Both comics challenge the mainstream sentiment that exposition makes for objectivity and comprehensiveness (Heer & Kent, 2009, p. 228) by propelling their visual aspect. The jarring use of double spreads and pure illustration slows readers down. On a subliminal level, this makes us aware of the superficial speed of mainstream journalism (Chute, 2016, p. 201) and their short-lived spectacles (p. 202). Hence, comics challenge us to construct meaning using our “ethical awareness” (p. 201) through strictly visual pages, which, aware that the conventional mix of word and image is the dominant power of comics, Choi and Sacco sparingly use.

The rhythmic and often nonlinear form of comics journalism visually reflects the difficulty of processing memory and the traumatic past. Adrielle Mitchell (2009) identifies that readers are able to construct meaning, even if panels are disarranged and “not immediately contiguous” (para. 3). Comics, as a fragmentation of events, quaintly reflect the reconstruction of memory, which undergoes constant revision as new information enters to be reprocessed. The trauma in *Palestine* and terrorism in *American Widow* double as overwhelming memory. Sacco’s characteristic use of captions is established immediately, where they slant diagonally and occur irregularly, drawing attention to themselves and implying chaos and partial testimony (Chute, 2016, p. 202). In a scene where Israeli soldiers suddenly wreak chaos upon Palestinian citizens, the clipped and spread-out captions signify a sense of urgency and movement through the space: “Kids are running—”, “—hurling stones over the bus” (p. 123). The obliqueness hinders our ability to process the words, mimicking the disorientation the Palestinians experience. Coupled with panels of different temporalities that overlap one another, we are forced to connect word with image to make sense of the captions (Chute, 2016, p. 201). It is strenuous to process the page’s “iconic solidarity” which precipitates a binding of “patterns, resonances and repetitions” to construct meaning (Mitchell, 2009, para. 3). This dynamism of a single event exhausts us (Chute, 2016, p. 201), as it exhausted them. Within a single page, comics effectively express the labour of remembrance from trauma.

Within a chapter, Choi proves that “testimony seems to be composed of bits and pieces of a memory that has been overwhelmed” (Feldman, 1992, p. 5). The way that Choi illustrates Torres’ memories of Eduardo shows her impaired cognitive function due to trauma. A strange, recurring unframed panel shows a seated and vulnerable Eduardo, with variations in framing and page position throughout Chapter Five. Choi finally reveals that it is Torres’ memory of him at an airport. The liminal space in which he sporadically appears portrays Torres’ processing of his traumatic disappearance as her memory of him slowly changes.

Although the durability of comics journalism lies primarily in its unique conventions, it still relies upon conventions of mainstream journalism for credibility. Comics both “adopt *and* adapt the processes of journalism” to maintain its documentary quality while pushing its journalistic role further (Nyberg, 2011, p. 119). By acting as reader stand-in, character, and commentator (p. 118), the authors achieve transparency (p. 118) so that we more readily accept their perspective. Curiously, Sacco formally distances himself from readers, while Torres’ memoir does not require such separation. He refers to print journalism through a section whose page layout mimics the columns of newspapers (pp. 42–50). The monochromatic palette also hints at print journalism, recreating its historic seriousness. Moreover, his speech balloons are often off-page—“Do you visit your son?” (p. 69)—implying his presence as secondary. Finally, he creates subject distance which echoes broadcast journalism (p. 121): Sacco often frames his subjects tightly against a minimal background, forcing us to focus on their words (p. 124) which overlap the gutter. These mainstream conventions “[direct] the reader’s attention to the content, which is traditionally journalistic” (p. 125). Torres further references mainstream journalism by including a double spread of real photos of Eduardo (p. 198–199). This is jarring because of the change in medium and the sudden plethora of colours. Torres acknowledges that “drawings...do not possess the same documentary quality as photographs” (Nyberg, 2011, pp. 117–118). The memoir ends with a photograph of Torres snorkelling with her son (p. 210), following illustrations of the “beautiful” day. The aesthetics of comics journalism make us question how knowledge is expressed and shared (Chute, 2016, p. 207). The use of and reference to mainstream conventions admits comics journalism’s limits, in which recognising traditionalism is crucial because of its connection to credibility. However, comics’ adaptation of these conventions still hold significance.

Through its boundless form and expressive illustrations, comics journalism develops from mainstream journalism to push subjectivity as a valuable form of information in testimony and memoir. Joe Sacco’s *Palestine* and Alissa Torres’ *American Widow* prove that comics need not perfectly differ from their mainstream counterparts to have journalistic integrity. Rather, comics can hold credible weight both despite and because of established conventions. A cross-pollination between comics and mainstream media inevitably occurs between their usage of visual and verbal testimony. However, the subjectivity that comics creates is a strength of the medium that mainstream journalism downplays. To Nyberg, comics’ visual construction of the past is unmatched, and, perhaps, the next stage of empathy in journalism.

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AWE, ANXIETY, AND APPLAUSE

In a technological time of extreme self-awareness in oneself and one's world, propelled by social media, modern science, and the seemingly overflowing pool of academia, we are afforded a growing recognition and perception of what matters most in the world—for that moment. These essays are just as introspective and they are extrospective in their existentialism, and do not shy away from proposing harsh but meaningful truths or questions. *That* is the spirit of study, which we hope you embolden for any scholars you may encounter in the mirror and on the street.

Clarke-Edwards first presents us with an intriguing and relevant exploration of the need for the identification of the mind as a physical object, and offers several questions that may surface for many scholars of any field, as well as anyone who contains a brain. She sceptically yet empathetically takes a physicalist position for us to understand how they consider the mind as explicable in physical terms—despite ontological concerns. She makes the subject of tangibility easy to grasp through her relating back to the external world in which we measure continuity and the experience of life. However, she also admits that some things are unexplainable, or at least, yet to be explained. Perhaps, the mind is physical—plus a little something more that we should leave to the imagination.

Mortimer-Webster then introduces us to the creation of the computer as an historic military device, before pointing out how else this invention has armed users across any line. He enlightens us about the warring world of the internet, in which the computers' capacity to foster vast connections between people of all backgrounds is simultaneously a gigantic filter bubble of intolerance. Through his diverse exploration of what the internet has changed most drastically for our modern world, he makes the case that no other technology has been as influential as that of the internet: at the click of a button, we are able to perch upon the shoulders of giants.

Redzepagic deftly considers the advantages and disadvantages of in-person and non-face-to-face therapy for those with anxiety in her ever-important research. She sets the scene with the rise of anxiety and mental illness, alongside the rise of the need for therapy, plus the growth of technology itself. By highlighting how patients may respond in vastly different ways to certain therapies and presenting the increasing need for e-therapy in particular, Redzepagic identifies the strengths and weaknesses of both types of therapy. Regardless of method, she ultimately celebrates the connection and lifeline that are thrown towards people in need.

With COVID-19 as a scourge that continues to rage around the globe, Kang exposes the failings and biases of the economic system that have been exacerbated by the virus. However, she makes sure to point out that the economy itself is a scourge on the majority of people, who are victims of an unfair and unjust system. Through an anthropological lens, Kang outlines the ways economic inequality affects various demographics from this health crisis. She focuses more on the local side of COVID-19's economic crisis, situating us within New Zealand's current socioeconomic status—which is a different story for many people. Behind this essay beats a humanitarian cry for a drastic change in the economic system, which no virus should have had to expose for us to realise the need for such.

Finally, in his existential essay about the immense anxiety that emerges from the repression of human nature and desire, Waymouth employs a Freudian lens to peer deeper into the plethora of psychological consequences of such repression, which is socially imposed and vastly more relevant in regard to today's commodities. Waymouth further weighs Freud's arguments alongside Marcuse's to discuss two opposing ideas on the degree of repression that is considered necessary for society to continue to function. Despite the overall cynicism of Freud's study, Waymouth offers a certain optimism through Marcuse's argument that, as much as our repression is required in current times, it is simultaneously more manageable than before.

In this second chapter, intense questions about composition continue to crop up: what are we made of? What is our world made of? Is the world we've created for everyone? You may begin to question everything you thought you knew about your own mind and all the terrific treasures in our great and ghastly world. Take from this chapter what you will, if not awe, anxiety, or applause.

Samantha Cheong

Philosophy 200

Philosophy of Mind

Olivia Clarke-Edwards

Is the Mind a Physical Thing?: Outlining the Physicalist Position

Setting the Scene

When inquiring as to whether the mind is a physical thing, it seems that we must first understand why it might—or might not—be important to distinguish this fact. The overarching aim of this question seems clear: To better understand the mind and its relationship to other entities in the world, i.e., what is the kind of world that are we trying to fit the mind into? The thesis of physicalism, which claims that an explanation of the mind requires nothing over and above the physical, is a contentious one. I shall try to lay out the general thesis, and the basic motivation for why one might think physicalism is a promising position from which to understand the mental and its place in the world. One of the strongest objections to physicalism is to question how we can assert that science has all the answers ‘in principle,’ when we don’t know what a complete future physics looks like, and when our current physics can’t definitively explain the phenomena we are hoping to explain at this point (this objection is known as Hempel’s dilemma) (Crane & Mellor, 1990). Dualists argue that we may need to include fundamental mental properties and psychophysical laws, claiming that we can’t describe mental phenomena,—such as beliefs and desires—in terms of brain states without losing any vital information (Dahan, 2019). However, I will attempt to present the physicalist position in a generous light in this essay—as a sceptical thesis on the nature of the world, in the face of a long history of dualism.

So, What is Physicalism Really?

Physicalism is the optimistic empirical thesis that there is no extra feature of the world as we experience it that exists over and above its material nature (Ney, 2008). In physicalism, the aim is that physical science should, ‘in principle,’ be able to explain all entities, relations, and laws in a unified way (Crane & Mellor, 1990). The confidence that this can be done is due to science’s recent success in explaining things, which have previously appeared to be fundamental, in a reductive way (Stoljar, 2010). An example of this is our ability to describe ordinary physical objects as a collection of atomic (or subatomic) particles. Tahua O’Leary, PhD., suggests that the physicalist is not motivated to claim that everything should be explainable by science—the possibility remains open that this will not or cannot happen (personal communication, April 13, 2021). However, he describes physicalism as the historically surprising thesis that the physical theory which we use to explain paradigm examples of the physical, for example, a book, a chair, or a mountain, might also be the theory that can be used to explain mental phenomena, and which can, in fact, give a complete account of our phenomenal experience (personal communication, April 13, 2021). This is done by a process of reductive analysis, not ontological reduction, meaning that things can still exist in different ways but are ultimately explicable in physical terms (Chalmers, 1996).

The theory that explains how we should reduce mental states to brain states is known as identity theory, where mental states and brain states are identical to one another (Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson, 1996). Until fairly recently, the reduction of all things to one theory may have seemed implausible. However, given the degree of explanation available to us in modern science physicalism becomes an ever more promising thesis. It must be noted that although reduction may be a requirement for physicalism, this does not entail eliminativism (Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson, 1996). Our concepts of tables, chairs, and mountains do not have to disappear or become false even though we can reduce them to physical explanations at the level of fundamental particles, properties, and their relations. If physicalism is going to work, it has to explain the whole picture both without losing meaning within our concepts and without adding any special kinds of things to its explanation; it must clearly explain our normal concepts of mental phenomena. To put it in

a nutshell, O’Leary describes physicalism as a thesis that aims to posit the possibility that there is one story, told in one vocabulary, which has the ability to explain everything within our experience (personal communication, April 13, 2021).

How Can we Justify the Physical when we Only Know the Content of our Direct Phenomenal Experience?

(All arguments in this section are the result of a conversation with Tahua O’Leary, Ph.D., April 13, 2021).

It may seem strange to define our mind in terms of objects or entities that are external to us. How can the nature of the mind be determined by these ‘external’ physical notions when the mind seems to be the only thing we can really take for granted? It seems fair to be sceptical of the ability of science to tell us how things actually are. It seems that I can only verify what I am aware of at any given time in my direct phenomenal experience. I exist; I am aware of the appearances of my phenomenal experience right now in space and time. When I sleep, I am not aware of the continuation of the physical world. When I am not directly experiencing something there is no way for me to confirm that this thing continues to exist. The way of getting from this extreme scepticism to the physical world is through contiguity and correlation between the self and the phenomenal appearances that are given to us. When we go to sleep, we take it for granted that when we wake up, *ceteris paribus*, we will appear to be in the same bed. Each day, we expect that the sun will come up and go down—and it does so to an extraordinary degree of regularity (Hume, 2007). This observable regularity of our phenomenal experiences is that which we title the physical world, and the quest of science is to understand this regularity of our experiences through prediction, testing, and confirmation.

Science doesn’t demand a strong causation between events in the sense of Hume’s necessary connection. It is enough to have a high degree of contiguity and correlation between predictions and results. When one event happens, another event usually (in a very strong sense of the world) follows it. If the world required that we were aware of it in order for it to exist, this would pose problems for how things exhibit continuity over time. We solve this continuity by positing an entity that explains and embodies this continuity, calling it the physical (or external) world. If the continued existence of things relied on direct perception by a conscious being, we would have to posit an omni conscious, omni directed god to keep the world existing while we are not personally perceiving it (Descarte, 2013). The physicalist view gives us a theory of an independent substrate which is stable enough for us to make highly accurate predictions of it. Viewing the physical world this way is not incompatible with an idealist theory. However, whether or not the physical world exists ‘within our mind’ or external to us, it is still subject to laws and regularities that are both observable to us and beyond our control.

What if There is a Lil Somethin’ Somethin’ Extra?

One key dualist idea is that even if you take the basic physical fundamental principles and entities of the universe and let them develop into the world as we know it today, not quite everything ends up with an explanation, i.e., there are mental features that remain unexplained (Chalmers, 1996). Most modern dualists will allow that the sciences can explain most phenomena and objects within the world, but require new fundamental properties to science to explain mental phenomena and the mind-body relationship (Chalmers, 1996). The claim is that the mental is fundamentally different from the physical and no amount of fancy reduction is going to be successful—any

attempt will lose something meaningful. The addition of new fundamental entities will also require special laws to explain the way these special entities relate to ordinary physical things (Chalmers, 1996). This ties into the question of how we should define the physical, because if the mental were added into our physical theory then the question of what is physical and what is not becomes vacuous (Crane & Mellor, 1990). One version of this dualist ‘something extra’ idea is the theory of panpsychism (O’Leary, personal communication, April 13, 2021; Allen-Hermanson, Goff, & Seager, 2021). This is essentially the idea that everything that we experience has a mental facet to it; we are just unable to observe it in objects such as a chair or a house, and can only perceive the physical features of these objects. This is problematic for physicalism, because it destroys the *paradigmatic* examples of the objects we take to be obviously physical (O’Leary, personal communication, April 13, 2021). If we cannot even explain the obviously physical things as physical, it seems like the mental might be fundamental after all, and very difficult to explain.

Reductions

We have good reason to think that analytical reduction is viable (Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson, 1996). The immediate negative reaction is to think that mapping mental states to brain states seems insanely complex, and, therefore, may be hard to prove as a legitimate possibility. Saying that mental state “M = brain state N” feels too simplistic. However, it must be understood that this notion does (or at least is able to) take into account the fact that the amount of variables required to understand the mapping of the features of mental states to brain states is immense (Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson, 1996). We must also take into consideration that the mapping may not be as smooth as we envision that it should be. The idea of smoothness is that our neurological categories should match smoothly onto our folk categories of mental states, such that, for each belief and desire there is a tidy and clear-cut brain state (Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson, 1996). However, non-eliminative reduction does not entail smoothness (Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson, 1996): Instead of ending up with a simple and elegant biconditional for each mental state and brain state such that, “Mental state M occurs if and only if neurophysiological state N occurs,” we may end up with a complex web of hyper-specific biconditionals that vary from person to person and context to context (Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson, 1996). This is not a denial of the possibility of reduction, merely an acknowledgement of the inherent complexity in what appears to be a simplistic notion.

Conclusion

The position which regards the mind as physical is a contentious one, but is not without its merits. It is important to recognise the empirical nature of the physicalist’s thesis (which some may consider to be inherently problematic—but the problem of which constitutes the subject of a different essay than the one at hand), and understand the way in which it relates to our phenomenal experience. The physicalist questions the ancient faith that “there must be something else” when it comes to explaining the phenomena of our experience, choosing instead to rely on the methodical system through which science understands the regularity in our perceptions of the ‘external world.’ With the notion of physical being understood primarily through paradigmatic examples, physicalism aims to extend the explanation supplied for these objects to all entities and their relations, including the mind. In the face of the existence of entities such as the mind, which are not currently explicable in physical theory, the physicalist posits a reductive approach, which means that we should be able to explain everything in physical terms. We must remember that physicalism is an empirical thesis; it only tells us of things such that they can be confirmed by our experience of them. Although the opposer of physicalism may feel that physicalism misses

something in its explanation, this isn't a concrete worry for the physicalist. The position is merely an optimistic one, based on the belief that science has a vast scope which stretches into the future and the world beyond our understanding, but, at its core holds the ability to explain our ordinary mental concepts such as beliefs and desires in a reductive and scientific way. The idea is not so much that we must try to define the scope and limits of what it means to explain the way in which something is physical, but that science appears to have the methodology and rigour to provide us with a unified explanation which holds for both paradigmatic physical objects and mental phenomena.

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Arts Scholars 100A/B

Arts Scholars 1

Gali Mortimer-Webster

Wire Tension: The Internet and War

Nowadays, the omnipresence of the internet is inescapable. Computers were a fanciful hobby a mere 70 years ago, yet they are now inextricable from our routine, our economy, and most importantly, our culture. The world of Wikipedia, Google and Grindr stands as proof of a string of social revolutions from last century's analogue beginning. Society is not as it was. According to *Sharing: Culture and the Economy in the Internet Age*, global connectivity "provides an environment in which new cultural practices are developed and appropriated by the public" (Aigrain, 2012, p. 21). That is, the interchange of messages cross-pollinates ideas. The information age warrants inspection: what led us from cottages to cat memes, and how was it war?

The computers we use daily would not exist in their current form without substantial investment of time and money during World War II. Throughout it, Nazi Germany used electromechanical devices called "Enigma Machines" to turn secret messages into code. The British believed breaking their encryption would reveal confidential battle plans and troop movements and were prepared to spend resources cracking it. They tasked an espionage organisation at Bletchley Park with solving the Enigma, which secured £6,500 (Copeland, 2012, p. 64)—worth about 250,000 NZD today—from the war effort to build the "Bombe," a rudimentary computer. Previously, the codes had been slowly cracked by hand or using a mechanical solver which was rendered obsolete by changes to German procedure. The Bombe computer was quicker but highly specialised, incapable of running arbitrary programs; all the Bombe did was solve the Enigma. Bletchley Park later upgraded to the Colossus, which had the same problem. Meanwhile, the United States invested USD\$487,000, or NZD\$10,000,000 today, in a general-purpose computer called the ENIAC (History-Computer, n.d.). Its purpose was to pre-calculate trajectories for aiming artillery (History-Computer, n.d.), but before that task, was programmed to calculate the feasibility of a design for thermonuclear weapons (Rhodes, 1995, p. 251). The varied and complex calculations involved in nuclear physics needed an adaptable computer like the ENIAC, as opposed to the inflexible Bombe.

The two most influential computer science pioneers are Alan Turing and John von Neumann. The former worked at Bletchley during the war and designed the Bombe; the latter designed another kind of bomb, working on the Manhattan Project to create nuclear weapons for the U.S. military, and using the ENIAC to do so. War is woven into every fibre of the computer's origins. Turing was a mathematician, a philosopher, and the inventor of modern conceptions of algorithms and computers. In early 1937, while working at Bletchley, he published a particularly seminal paper, the ramifications of which are innumerable but not essential to understand. After World War II, he continued to research computation, artificial intelligence, and encryption, before the United Kingdom prosecuted him for his sexuality and he tragically committed suicide. (To digress somewhat, it took almost sixty years for Turing to be posthumously pardoned for homosexuality—but that social change is the subject of another essay). On the other side of the Atlantic, John von Neumann advanced computers through research for the Manhattan Project. His contributions included designing general purpose computers which can perform any calculation they are programmed to do, without needing to be rewired. The ENIAC, in contrast, took weeks to rewire whenever it needed to switch tasks, so von Neumann envisioned a way to change a computer's behaviour without touching its hardware. Modern computers follow his improved design. He continued creating such computers as he worked on the U.S. nuclear program throughout the Cold War. Some link the bone cancer that killed him with the many nuclear tests he attended (Jacobsen, 2015, p. 43). War left its imprint on these scientists, and on every computer that they created and inspired.

During the Cold War, the United States continued to invest in computers, which were steadily advancing in global relevance. One initiative was ARPANET, the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network, an early prototype for the internet we take for granted. The internet is a network of linked computers that now spans every country, created for several purposes. Foremost on the list was connecting users, such as researchers, to computers on the other end of the country. However, its decentralised layout was inspired by earlier research suggesting it was the most plausible way for the United States command structure to survive a widespread nuclear attack (Baran, 1964, p. 8). Thus, the internet was partly created out of fear of the Soviet Union.

The internet is commonly conflated with the World Wide Web, although the latter is entirely distinct, born of different circumstances from the internet. The World Wide Web is software for displaying webpages sent over the internet, and for joining pages together with hyperlinks. The Web was invented in 1989 by Tim Berners-Lee at the European Laboratory for Particle Physics (Berners-Lee, n.d.-b) in Geneva. Neither Berners-Lee nor his employer at the time, CERN, have militant goals. The former claims the Web's purpose is communication (Berners-Lee, n.d.-a), and the latter's founding document rejects "military requirements" of their research (CERN, 1954, art. II). The name 'World Wide Web' reflects Berners-Lee's vision of interlinked information shared across the Earth. Regardless of the Web's purpose, it was a link in the war-fuelled chain from the invention of computers to today.

The various facets of modern technology have impacted society in different ways. The Web democratises the creation and consumption of media because anyone can use social networks. The internet links people across borders and oceans, facilitating interchange of ideas between cultures. Computers' speedy information processing makes them an invaluable companion for the average pocket, giving people access to cyberspace on a daily basis. As a matter of course, the population is eternally connected to an entire globe of people, transplanting words, news, and zeitgeists between regions. Given the effect on the past few decades, it is difficult to consider any other social change comparable in magnitude to that of the internet.

Internet communication such as the Web has made instantaneous messaging possible across long distances. Whereas in the past, interpersonal connections would by necessity be formed between inhabitants of the same geographical region, the internet enables contact with a much wider selection of people. This broadening of horizons means members of society are free to look farther abroad to find community. Instead of regional cultural divisions, citizens can form larger group identities based on shared interests or values. The borders between communities are redrawn by ideology rather than physicality, meaning immersion in ideas one shares as opposed to exposure to thoughts one disagrees with. At the same time, these communities collect participants from varied cultures, facilitating understanding of far-flung ways of life. It is almost a paradox: The internet develops tolerance of foreign cultures, but leaves belief systems unchallenged.

Polarisation and extremism find footholds on the Web. It becomes easier to assemble an echo chamber of like-minded people when it does not require a physical trek to meet them. Looking at the United States of America in particular, there seems to be a correlation—although with a statistically insignificant sample size—between wide-scale protests and crises that require staying indoors (therefore necessitating the internet to communicate). Following the murder of George Floyd, and legislation mandating masks or social distancing to rein in COVID-19, protests have broken out across the States, and one can draw a plausible causal link to lack of

physical meetings. Presupposing the average American must use the internet for their modicum of social interaction, it stands to reason that they would have increased contact with people who share their mentality across the country and be better equipped to organise protests. The World Wide Web, the internet and computers seemingly embroil their users in interregional struggles and conflicts.

Computers and the internet are technologies more world-shattering than a hydrogen bomb, and both found their nucleus in the metaphorical trenches of the Second World War. The internet age could not have hit us as it did, had it not been for war. Sir Isaac Newton once ascribed farsighted achievements to standing on giants' shoulders, meaning building new knowledge on the ideas of previous scholars (Newton, 1675). The giant, to represent those who inspired modern technology, is oddly apropos as symbols go; just like in fairy tales, those giants were brutish militants. Ironically, Newton did not invent the metaphor of standing on the shoulders of giants: it was a paraphrase of a saying now attributed to Bernard of Chartre centuries prior (John & McGarry, 1982, p. 167).

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Psychology 310

Introduction to Clinical Psychology

Najla Redzepagic

Battle of the Therapies: Weighing the Pros and Cons of In-Person Therapy and Non-Face-to-Face Therapy for Adults with Anxiety

Modern technology is an ever-developing area which has revolutionised the way in which people work and connect with one another (Olasupo & Atiri, 2013). The expansion of modern technology has required the work force to keep up with the latest technologies—and this includes psychology. Due to these developments, clinical psychology has seen an expansion in the way it delivers therapy, as it now goes beyond the standard use of face-to-face therapies and to include non-face-to-face therapies. Non-face-to-face therapies include e-therapies, which can be defined as a modality aimed at assisting clients to resolve issues through electronic means, whether it be synchronous (simultaneously) or asynchronous (time-delayed) (Olasupo & Atiri, 2013). Non-face-to-face therapies also include telehealth, which refers to the use of telecommunications to provide access to information and services (Brenes, Ingram, & Danhauer, 2011). Some of the different types of e-therapy and telehealth services will be assessed in greater detail. However, the expansion on how therapy can be delivered to clients has raised a question for psychologists: What are the strengths and weaknesses of non-face-to-face therapies in comparison to the strengths and weaknesses of face-to-face therapy? This essay will focus on the strengths and weaknesses of both non-face-to-face therapies and face-to-face therapy for adult clients who have anxiety. It will be suggested that both forms of therapy have their advantages and disadvantages, and that some forms of therapy may be better suited for certain groups of people who have different forms of anxiety.

Non-Face-to-Face Therapy

Strengths of Non-Face-to-Face Therapy

E-therapies can encompass a wide range of non-face-to-face therapies, such as text-based communications and non-text-based communications (Olasupo & Atiri, 2013). One specific form of e-therapy, known as virtual reality exposure therapy (VRET), may be a strength in the treatment of clients with anxiety. This form of non-face-to-face therapy gradually exposes clients to their fears—whether it be objects or situations—and acts as a way of practising or revisiting different skills (Amichai-Hamburger, Klomek, Friedman, Zuckerman, & Shani-Sherman, 2014). This may act as a strength for non-face-to-face therapy for people who have agoraphobia, which is a fear or avoidance of using public transport, open or enclosed spaces, standing in lines or being in crowds, or being outside of the home alone (American Psychiatric Association, 2015). It can also be a strength for people with social anxiety (also known as social phobia), which is a fear or anxiety about social situations where they can be exposed to scrutiny or negative evaluations (American Psychiatric Association, 2015). This is because people who have social anxiety or agoraphobia (as well as other forms of anxiety) may find it difficult, with in-person therapy, to cope with exposure to these live scenarios as a form of treatment. Whereas, with VRET, clients are given avatars which represent them, and they are gradually exposed to the different situations or objects that cause their anxiety (Amichai-Hamburger et al., 2014). For example, someone who has agoraphobia, specifically the fear of public transport, may use VRET to gradually expose themselves to having to take public transport to get to work. This allows clients to slowly expose themselves to the situation if they are still not ready to take on the real-life situation. Some may critique this form of e-therapy and suggest that this is not the same as gradual exposure to the real-world scenario. However, a meta-analysis conducted by Parsons and Rizzo (2008) (as cited in Amichai-Hamburger, 2015) found that VRET for people with anxiety, specifically people with specific phobias (the fear or anxiety about a specific object) (American Psychiatric Association, 2015) had improvements in their symptoms. Therefore, VRET can be classified as a strength of non-face-to-face therapy as it is an effective alternative to reducing different symptoms for people with different anxiety disorders and it may also be a more manageable form of exposure until clients are fully ready

to physically expose themselves to the feared stimulus. However, with this being said, it is also important to note that Parsons and Rizzo (2008) (as cited in Amichai-Hamburger, 2015) suggested that their results may be due to numerous different factors and that more research is needed in this area to establish its effectiveness. However, it seems to be a promising start in helping reduce symptoms of anxiety within adults.

Furthermore, for many, seeking help and addressing their anxiety may be very challenging, and often, people do not report their struggles to medical professionals (Postel, de Haan, & De Jong, 2008). This may be due to shame and stigma associated with what they are feeling (Postel et al., 2008). One population that we see this trend with is the Pacific Island community. Pacific people are less likely to seek mental health services (Mulder, Petaia, Pulotu-Endemann, Tutama, Viali, & Parkin, 2016). For example, only 25% of Samoans with serious mental health problems seek such services (Mulder et al., 2016). A reason for this, as suggested by the Mental Health Commission, is due to people feeling stigmatised and discriminated against and some even feeling the effects of prejudice (Malo, 2000). Therefore, an alternative to face-to-face therapy, which may be of particular benefit to non-Western cultures, is telehealth. With telehealth, clients complete the sessions within the privacy of their own home and this may act as a way of reducing concerns about stigma, as it maintains a level of anonymity (Brenes et al., 2011). This form of therapy has proven successful, as studies have shown that telephone-delivered cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) significantly reduced general anxiety and anxiety sensitivity in adult participants—and this effect was maintained for six months (Brenes et al., 2011). This suggests that telehealth has long-lasting results and has not only been proven to work, but also help clients reduce their fear of being shamed and/or stigmatised. This is because there is a level of anonymity for clients, which in turn allows them to speak more freely about their problems—including their anxiety (Manhal-Baugus, 2001). Furthermore, telehealth may also provide clients with greater accessibility to psychologists with greater cultural competency, as well as a deeper understanding of their cultural background and the influence it may have on their mental health (Olasupo & Atiri, 2013).

A concern some have regarding non-face-to-face therapies is that a working alliance between the client and therapist may not be adequately developed (Cook & Doyle, 2002). A working alliance can be defined as a “collaboration between therapeutic participants to facilitate healing” (Cook & Doyle, 2002, p. 96). This concern may be due to the lack of proximity and ability to build rapport with the client and to pick up on nonverbal cues, which in turn allows clients to form a good working relationship. However, McKenna (1998) (as cited in Cook & Doyle, 2002) found that people with social anxiety are more likely to develop relationships on the internet. This can be seen as a strength of using non-face-to-face therapies to help people overcome their anxiety, as people with social anxiety may find it challenging to be in a face-to-face situation with someone they do not know, due to the fear of being scrutinised or negatively perceived (Cook & Doyle, 2002; American Psychiatric Association, 2015). However, online therapies, such as e-therapies and telehealth, allows for a level of anonymity, which in turn allows people with social anxiety to connect with people in a safe and controlled environment (Cook & Doyle, 2002). Research done by Reese, Conoley, and Brossart (2002) (as cited in Brenes et al., 2011) showed that participants felt a strong bond with their therapist, and this was further supported by Cook and Doyle (2002), as their participants felt a bond with their therapist and had overall positive experiences. Furthermore, as already suggested, the working alliance may also be maintained with people with social anxiety, due to the level of anonymity that online therapies provide. This further acts as a strength, as in-person therapy may be difficult for people who may feel a level of rejection or shame if they disclose their problems (Cook & Doyle, 2002). Whereas that fear is not as prominent in non-face-to-face

therapies (Cook & Doyle, 2002). Overall, this can be seen as a strength of non-face-to-face therapies, as working alliances are maintained for people who have anxiety, which allows for just as beneficial results as with face-to-face therapy.

Weaknesses of Non-Face-to-Face Therapy

Although there are strengths to different forms of face-to-face therapies, there are also some weaknesses. One of the main weaknesses of the arguments that opposers of e-therapy have, is that therapists may be vulnerable to cultural insensitivity and or unintentional discrimination against non-Western clients (Manhal-Baugus, 2001). This is because a large portion of non-face-to-face therapies, including telehealth and app-based therapies, have a lack of critical cues due to the lack of nonverbal communication—which may be indicative of a person’s culture or race (Manhal-Baugus, 2001). For example, someone wearing a cross is likely to be Christian or a person wearing a Star of David is likely to be Jewish (Midkiff & Wyatt, 2008). These nonverbal cues act as an indicator for therapists on how to approach certain clients and to be aware of their cultural background and beliefs. Therefore, without these cues, some non-face-to-face therapies may be unsuitable for people with anxiety, as there may not be a culturally sensitive environment which will create a greater understanding and ability to help clients. As already suggested, people who identify with non-Western cultures, like the Pacific Islands, do not tend to seek mental health services, as there is a stigma associated with it—which may make them more reluctant to open up—and tend to turn towards their faith and family (Mulder et al., 2016; Malo, 2000). Therefore, without understanding how different cultures operate and their views on mental health, it may create prejudiced environments which make it difficult for people to feel comfortable and open up (Malo, 2000). However, in saying this, this problem also occurs in face-to-face therapy (Midkiff & Wyatt, 2008), and there are resources like Cyberspace which provides tools to help raise cultural competency (Manhal-Baugus, 2001).

Face-to-Face Therapy

Strengths of Face-to-Face Therapy

There are multiple strengths to face-to-face therapy, some of which can also be considered weaknesses of non-face-to-face therapies. One of the main strengths of face-to-face therapy relates to adults with specific phobia. Specific phobia can be defined as a fear or anxiety about a specific object or situation (American Psychiatric Association, 2015). Since people with specific phobia have a marked fear of an object or situation, to overcome their anxiety, gradual exposure may be necessary if CBT was used. However, this would be very difficult to conduct through non-face-to-face therapies due to the inability to physically expose the client to the feared stimulus. Therefore, in-person therapy may be better suited. For example, if someone has a marked fear or anxiety about spiders, gradual exposure through CBT can be used to slowly expose the client to the spider until they are willing and able to be in a room with the spider or to even hold it. Heading, Kirby, and Martin (2001) (as cited in O’Kearney, Kim, Dawson, & Calear, 2019) conducted research with participants who had a marked anxiety and phobia with spiders and found that in-person CBT was more effective than online forms of CBT. This was further supported by Andersson, Carlbring, and Grimlund (2008) (as cited in O’Kearney et al., 2019). This suggests that in-person therapy may be more beneficial and appropriate for certain clients who have specific forms of anxiety, as it allows them to have real-world interactions with their feared stimulus.

Another strength to the use of in-person therapy is the long-supported research that shows the effectiveness of CBT for people with anxiety. In-person CBT is one of the most common forms of therapy or intervention used for people with anxiety (Roth & Pilling, 2008). This may be due to the fact that CBT allows people to address their negative thinking and rationalise it and change their outlooks on certain situations, objects, and other stimuli. As suggested by Roth and Pilling (2008), CBT has substantial evidence that supports its effectiveness in treating anxiety and is shown to be more effective than other in-person therapies. For this reason, it can be classified as a strength to in-person therapy, as it is proven to work for people with anxiety. However, it must also be noted that even though there is a long line of research that supports the effectiveness of in-person CBT, this does not mean that it will work for everyone. Therapy is not a one-size fits all. Therefore, in-person CBT—and other forms of in-person therapy—may not be beneficial for some people.

Weaknesses of Face-to-Face Therapy

One of the main weaknesses and reasons people do not undergo in-person therapy, specifically in-person CBT, is due to its inaccessibility (Cuijpers & Schuurmans, 2007). Postel et al. (2008) suggested that there is a significant gap between the need for treatment and people actually receiving treatment. Specifically, the gap for people with panic disorder is 55.9% and the gap for generalised anxiety is slightly less with 57.5% (Kohn, Saxena, Levav, & Saraceno (2004), as cited in Postel et al., 2008). There are numerous reasons for this, one of which includes access barriers: the main one being the cost of in-person CBT (Postel et al., 2008; Andrews, Cuijpers, Craske, McEvoy, & Titov, 2010). Specifically, in New Zealand, a large proportion of people who suffer from mental health problems, including anxiety, are unable to access in-person mental health services due to their inability to afford it. A survey conducted by New Zealand Health in 2013 suggested that 17.1% of adults living in deprived areas are diagnosed with common mental health disorders—including anxiety—and this is 1.6 times higher than adults living in less deprived areas (Mental Health Foundation, 2014). This clearly suggests that in-person therapy is not an easily accessible tool for many people living in deprived areas. Furthermore, those in New Zealand living in deprived areas tend to be of specific ethnic backgrounds—including Māori and Pacific people—and as suggested by the Mental Health Foundation (2014), they tend to suffer from mental health problems at higher rates than non-Māori and Pacific people. Although research has shown that Māori are beginning to access mental health services at an increasing rate (Mental Health Foundation, 2014)—which may suggest that in-person therapy is beginning to become more accessible—the research does not specify what type of services are being accessed and whether they are online or in-person.

Another weakness of in-person therapy is that, due to the long-lasting stigma associated with mental health, people may not want to seek help from mental health services, specifically in-person therapies. This is a weakness for in-person therapies, as people do not tend to access resources out of the fear that they will be judged or rejected (Cook & Doyle, 2002). Cook and Doyle (2002) suggested that people tend not to disclose information in face-to-face relationships—which can include a person’s therapist—due to the fear of being rejected. This would only make it more difficult for people to properly receive help for their anxiety and other mental health issues, especially for people with social anxiety, who are constantly fear being judged or rejected (American Psychiatric Association, 2015). This is a long-standing issue within the health sector. People who identify with non-Western cultures, specifically Pacific people in New Zealand, have stated that stigma and discrimination influenced their ability to recover and have, at times, felt prejudiced by staff (Malo, 2000). This would only further deter people from wanting to seek help through in-person mental health services, as they would not

feel accepted, listened to, nor understood. Therefore, non-face-to-face therapies may provide a better medium for people to express their concerns and struggles and seek mental health services. However, some of the research which examined how people perceive in-person therapy was conducted in the early 21st century. This may mean that within more recent years, due to there being greater discussions and understanding around mental health, people may feel more comfortable and willing to seek help for any problems they are facing, including anxiety. This can be seen by the increased use of mental health services by Māori (Mental Health Foundation, 2014).

Conclusion

Throughout this essay, it has been suggested that face-to-face therapy and non-face-to-face therapies, including e-therapy and telehealth, have strengths and weakness in helping adults address and treat their anxiety. There is somewhat of a divide within the literature, as some support the development of non-face-to-face therapies—and recognise its benefits as a way of keeping up with developing technology—while others find that the delivery of face-to-face therapies, such as CBT, have proven effective in treating anxiety and should continue to be used. However, throughout this essay, it has been suggested that both forms of therapy have their strengths and weakness for people with anxiety. Therefore, no singular form of therapy is better than the other. It can be said that both forms are effective in helping people with their anxiety and some forms of therapy may be more beneficial for clients with certain anxiety disorders compared to others. People come from all walks of life with varying experiences in the world. Therefore, to say that one form of treatment is better than the other would be incorrect. Anxiety treatments and interventions are not a one-size fits all and each approach and form of therapy used, whether it be in-person or through electronic means, should be adapted to suit the individual and their needs.

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Anthropology 331

Anthropology Today: Debates in Culture

Annie (Zi An) Kang

Culture, COVID, and the Crisis of Capitalism: An Exposé on the Failures of our Economic System

COVID-19 has disrupted nearly all aspects of contemporary society. Although its long-term consequences are difficult to predict, we have already seen immediate and devastating economic impacts. Economists believe we are facing a coming economic crisis of a massive global scale. However, I believe the economic crisis of our lifetime is not on its way—it has been here for decades. I argue that anthropology can be used to highlight how COVID-19 has exposed and exacerbated existing failures in contemporary capitalism—specifically staggering economic inequality—and that the crises before us must be framed as an opportunity to create alternative economic policies and systems that promote equality. If we attempt to restore an already broken system, then the injustices of our economy will continue to persist, even if COVID-19 is eradicated. This essay will use anthropological sources and concepts to explore how the pandemic health crisis relates to the economic crisis. It will emphasise the relevance of anthropology to understanding the relationship between these crises, before describing additional anthropological research that could further our understanding of them.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) states that COVID-19 will result in the biggest economic crisis since the Great Depression (NZ Herald, 2020). However, the burden of the pandemic and economic crises is being borne by those who are already most economically disadvantaged (Golds, 2020). Even before COVID-19, income inequality had been increasing at rapid rates within and between nations: The income inequality in the US grew to its highest level in 50 years in 2019, with the richest 5% of the country owning two-thirds of its total wealth (Golds, 2020). In the same year, almost four out of ten adults in the US would have struggled to afford a \$400 unexpected expense (Golds, 2020). The largely unexpected pandemic is thus exacerbating the wealth gap in contemporary capitalist societies (Golds, 2020). While over 29 million people in the US are now collecting unemployment benefits, the net worth of over 600 billionaires in the US grew by about 20% during the first three months of the pandemic (Golds, 2020). Jeff Bezos, CEO of Amazon, saw his net worth increase by \$43.8 billion (Golds, 2020). A similar trend occurred in New Zealand. Before COVID-19, the income gap in New Zealand was at its widest since records began in the 1980s (Rashbrooke, 2013). The richest 10% owned over half of New Zealand's total wealth, while half of New Zealanders lived paycheque to paycheque (Rashbrooke, 2013). Since lockdown began in March 2020, over 67,000 New Zealanders have gone onto unemployment benefits (Olsen, 2020). Interest rates are lowering for owners of assets, which is expected to be of most benefit to the wealthiest New Zealanders (Edmunds, 2020). Consequently, the pandemic is compounding growing economic inequalities.

Anthropological approaches can help us understand the relationship between the pandemic and economic crisis. David Harvey (2010) argues that economic crises are not just recursive—occurring in cycles throughout the historical trajectory of capitalism—but also directional, as capitalism evolves and transforms the world economy in different ways. He believes that economic crises are normal occurrences of capitalism that result from its contradictions, such as the constant need to keep compound growth going in a world with limited resources (Blim, 2012; Harvey, 2010). From this perspective, the pandemic simply hastened an economic crisis that was already on its way. Even before COVID-19, the neoliberal economic model was facing insufficient demand to absorb surplus capital from continuous capital accumulation; the 2007–8 economic crisis was partly a consequence of this contradiction (Harvey, 2010). The issue of surplus capital led to massive investments in modes of immediate consumption, with up to 80% of contemporary capitalist economies becoming driven by consumerism (Harvey, 2020). However, once COVID-19 lockdowns started, international travel ceased, and consumer spending dropped across the world, sites of capital accumulation—such as airlines, hotels, and restaurants—were no longer profitable (Harvey, 2020). This has resulted in the devaluation of

markets and the labour force (Harvey, 2020). Furthermore, Harvey's concept of accumulation by dispossession describes how a hegemonic state expands capital by taking resources away from others, or by stripping social protections from the working- and middle-classes (Blim, 2012). Neoliberal policies across Europe plus North and South America have cut funding for health and social services to fund tax cuts for the rich, leaving the countries extremely ill-prepared in facing the current public health crisis (Harvey, 2020). It is perhaps no coincidence then, that the least neoliberal countries, such as China, South Korea, and Taiwan, are dealing with the pandemic far more effectively than the US (Harvey, 2020).

Furthermore, the idea that infectious diseases do not acknowledge class or social boundaries is a myth. In actuality, the relationship between COVID-19 and the economic crisis is compounding, as health and income inequalities reinforce each other in a feedback loop. Nguyen and Peschard (2003) argue that disease should be understood as the "embodiment of inequality" (p. 467) and a form of structural violence measured through different morbidity and mortality rates between socioeconomic groups. This violence is evident in the current crises, as individuals of lower socioeconomic status are more likely to contract COVID-19, experience more severe symptoms, and die from the virus or virus-related complications (Fyfe, 2020). There are several explanations for these disparities: Poorer individuals are more likely to have pre-existing health conditions, which place them at higher risk of mortality should they contract COVID-19 (Fyfe, 2020). Furthermore, those of low socioeconomic status face greater barriers to accessing affordable and high-quality healthcare (NPR, 2020). They are also more likely to be exposed to the virus (Fyfe, 2020): Poorer individuals visit grocery stores more frequently than those of higher socioeconomic status, as people living on benefits or surviving paycheque to paycheque often do not have enough savings to stockpile food in preparation for lockdown (Fyfe, 2020). Low-income households are often overcrowded, which makes social-distancing difficult or impossible (Fyfe, 2020). Therefore, disadvantaged individuals are most likely to bear the brunt of the health and economic crises, as the two are entangled together. Those who are poor get sicker, and those who are sick get poorer because they can no longer work. This violence of inequality is further exercised on the body "indirectly through risk and blame" (p. 459) from powerful groups in society (Nguyen & Peschard, 2003). Single mothers, the poor, welfare recipients, and other marginalised groups are marked as high-risk by those with power, which provides justification for stereotypes and stigma (Nguyen & Peschard, 2003). People of low socioeconomic status are blamed for behaviour that they have little ability or power to control, as capitalism and neoliberal ideology emphasise individual responsibility (Nguyen & Peschard, 2003). For instance, people may be blamed for failing to properly social distance, even when they literally cannot afford to in an overcrowded home (Nguyen & Peschard, 2003). This pattern of blame not only occurs within societies, but also between societies of different wealth (Joseph, 2020): In Haiti, forced deportation of Haitians from the US became a source of a community outbreak of COVID-19, while political leaders implored Haitians to abide by stay-at-home orders (Joseph, 2020). Yet, as a Haitian street vendor exclaimed, "If we stay home, it won't be coronavirus that kills us, it will be hunger and poverty." (Joseph, 2020). Therefore, Nguyen and Peschard (2003) argue that anthropological approaches to the body should be used to understand how inequality is embodied across times and societies through wider contexts. In doing so, we may recognise that inequalities in COVID-19 infection and death rates across socioeconomic groups reinforce existing forms of structural violence within our society.

Additionally, Nguyen and Peschard (2003) draw on ethnographies of bio-commodities and bio-markets to analyse processes where those who are economically disadvantaged trade their long-term health for short-term economic gain, to the benefit of the long-term health of wealthier

individuals. Nguyen and Peschard (2003) describe this process as a trade in body parts, organs, and “biological futures” (p. 447). Although Nguyen and Peschard (2003) focus on organ trading, the anthropological idea of the commodification of health is relevant to the current pandemic. Poorer individuals are putting their lives at risk by working in public spaces, largely for the benefit of those privileged enough to not have to. Many workers in higher-paying sectors have shifted to working from home (with the important exception of those in the medical profession) (Bloch, 2020). However, Bloch (2020) observes that the workers deemed most essential—those who must continue going to their workplaces in-person—are often paid the least. These “essential workers” include employees of grocery stores and delivery services (Bloch, 2020). In the US, where there are relatively weak social safety nets, a large proportion of low-paying occupations do not provide paid sick leave, hazard pay, or sufficient safety measures (Bloch, 2020; NPR, 2020). Essential workers with low socioeconomic status may have no choice but to risk exposure to the virus to earn income. Furthermore, workers may spread the virus themselves if they come into work sick, as missing a day of income—not to mention 14 days of income, or the self-isolation period recommended by the CDC—would not be worth it to them (Ranji, 2020). The poor are risking their health for wages, be that through selling groceries, food delivery, agricultural production, or other work that directly or indirectly sustains and benefits those who are better off.

This exchange of biological futures, where the wealthy live longer and healthier lives than the poor, is explored by García-Colón (2020) through studying guest farmworkers in the US. Employer desire for low labour costs in the expansion of capital has led to reliance on temporary and undocumented immigrants (García-Colón, 2020). During the pandemic, the US and European governments declared food as an issue of national security and recognised the need to open borders for guest farmworkers to fill essential agricultural jobs (García-Colón, 2020). Most of these workers experienced exploitation before the pandemic, including low wages, unsafe housing, and abuse (García-Colón, 2020). Their fear of deportation makes them especially vulnerable to becoming trapped in unfair contracts (García-Colón, 2020). The exploitation of temporary and undocumented immigrants has been magnified by COVID-19, as CDC guidelines are often impossible to follow in sectors like food production (García-Colón, 2020). For instance, farmworkers are usually transported to fields in crowded buses that do not allow for social-distancing (García-Colón, 2020). Thus, already disadvantaged temporary and undocumented immigrants are travelling across borders, risking exposure to COVID-19, and exchanging their long-term health for low wages—all to the benefit of those who are more socioeconomically advantaged. After all, labour shortage in agricultural production reflects the inability of employers to attract domestic workers who are willing to work under exploitative contracts, long hours, and low wages (García-Colón, 2020). Since migrant farmworkers help ensure food security of the population by working in unsafe conditions, their biological futures are being exchanged for the futures of domestic workers, employers, and other more advantaged people in their host countries (Nguyen & Peschard, 2003). García-Colón argues that although undocumented workers and guestworkers are designated as essential during the pandemic, their host countries continue to deprive them of decent working and living conditions. Even now, the Trump administration is pushing to reduce the wages of guest farmworkers (García-Colón, 2020). It may be more accurate to describe these workers not as essential, but as expendable in the eyes of the government and agriculture sector (García-Colón, 2020). This is another example of how COVID-19 has exacerbated injustices and inequalities of global capitalism.

Anthropology also enables alternative economic systems to emerge by re-establishing our values. For instance, Kusimba (2020) applies the anthropological concept of embodied value

and “wealth-in-people” (p. 166) to the pandemic and economic crisis. She argues that COVID-19 has exposed the ongoing conflict between capitalism and human value, as social and health inequalities, poverty, and government priorities demonstrate that the economic value of people is being unrecognised, undervalued, and exploited (Kusimba, 2020). President Trump, corporations, and other governing leaders in the US have pushed for the reopening of stores and public spaces out of concern for the economy, even while COVID-19 infection and death rates soar across the country (Kusimba, 2020). Lieutenant governor of Texas, Dan Patrick, has also argued that the elderly should be willing to die for the economy (Kusimba, 2020). Market value is being prioritised over the value of human lives. However, Kusimba draws on ethnographies of sub-Saharan African societies to argue that the wealth-in-people theory illuminates a false choice between the value of lives and economic value; in actuality, the two can be reconciled to form a more democratic and just economy. She defines wealth-in-people as a theory of value “in which people seek to hold rights to other people—to their labour, support, reproductive capacity, or property” (Kusimba, 2020, p. 167). The theory views inequality as a continuum that spans from possession of rights-in-others to being wealth-to-others, with most individuals falling in-between (Kusimba, 2020). Wealth-in-people can also be framed as wealth-in-knowledge, or the cultivation of individuals with unique skills and knowledge to form a collective that is greater than the sum of its parts (Kusimba, 2020). Furthermore, ethnographies of debt peonage and bridewealth systems explore how rights-in-people are acquired by exchanging “things” of material value (Kusimba, 2020). For instance, money is a thing used to claim, transfer, and negotiate rights-in-others by shaping ties of obligation and debt (Kusimba, 2020).

In this pandemic, when promoting the economy is often considered in opposition to protecting human lives, anthropologists can reassert people at the top of our value hierarchy through the wealth-in-people theory (Kusimba, 2020). We must recognise that economies are fundamentally people. This theory conflicts with the definition of capitalism, which measures the value of people through their ability to generate capital—money that is invested in means of production to create more money (Kusimba, 2020). Governments pushing to reopen businesses early amidst the pandemic are not only short-sighted, but also more concerned with acquiring immediate capital through the means of people than protecting their lives. Profit becomes an end in and of itself (Kusimba, 2020). Contrastingly, wealth-in-people prioritises the opposite relationship, where things like money and capital become means of acquiring rights-in-people (Kusimba, 2020). Instead of emphasising wealth as capital that is converted and moved through investments, wealth-in-people emphasises relationships that are inalienable, inconvertible, and endures overtime to make claims on the future (Kusimba, 2020). For instance, the ancient Maya placed pottery in royal tombs to ensure their kings could escape from the underworld and be resurrected as divine ancestors (Kusimba, 2020). This sense of wealth continues across generations through systems of reciprocity and exchange, as kings rely on their subjects to ensure their resurrection, while descendants rely on the status of their ancestors to legitimise their own political futures (Kusimba, 2020). Both sides draw on rights in each other from the past to make claims, rights, and responsibilities that extend to the present and future (Kusimba, 2020). In today’s crises, anthropology reveals the erosion of the value of people (Kusimba, 2020). Simultaneously, the wealth-in-people theory helps us recognise an opportunity to reassert our values, prioritise human lives, and seek an alternative to capitalism. Instead of capital, we may begin to emphasise relationships as an end in and of itself. This may lead to a more moral and democratic economy, where each of us make good on our ongoing obligations to one another.

Thus, the current crises also present opportunities. As Harvey (2010) believes, economic crises are moments of possibility out of which socialist and anti-capitalist alternatives can emerge. Crises expose the irrationality of capitalism (Harvey, 2010). Therefore, as the public becomes increasingly aware of the inequalities, failures, and contradictions of capitalism amidst the pandemic, an anti-capitalist movement could emerge with the purpose of assuming social control over the production and distribution of surpluses (Harvey, 2010). Our ultimate goal must be radical egalitarianism because an ethical, socially just, and non-exploitative form of capitalism does not exist; in fact, it would contradict the very nature of capitalism itself (Harvey, 2010). The pandemic and economic crisis present an opportunity to shift our culture towards values of sustainability and egalitarianism, instead of economic growth and neoliberalism. We must change our current social relations—from selling and owning labour, exchanging biological futures, and emphasising individual responsibility—to relationships defined around wealth-in-people and fulfilling obligations. Such changes are radical, but possible and necessary. As Harvey states, “capitalism must either grow or die” (Blim, 2012, p. 603). And it must die.

Anthropology is highly relevant for understanding the relationship between COVID-19 and the economic crisis. Although it is limited in its generalisability, anthropology is essential in describing the reasons and context for economic action (Blim, 2012). Furthermore, anthropology takes what we assume to be natural or inevitable about our economy and exposes them as arbitrary, fictitious, and culturally constructed. The justification of economic inequalities as a necessary outcome of growth, or the successes and failures of individuals, are understood as narratives enforced by the capitalist class to convince those of lower socioeconomic status to accept their positions in society (Harvey, 2010). Anthropological case studies across cultures, including egalitarian and hunter-gatherer societies, also enable alternative economic systems to enter our public discourse and collective imagination (Blim, 2012). Additional anthropological research could further our understanding of the relationship between the pandemic and economic crisis. For instance, anthropology contributes to our understanding of how high economic inequality correlates with worse social and health outcomes across an entire society (Nguyen & Peschard, 2003). Cross-cultural research demonstrates a gradient effect, where individuals in more egalitarian societies are healthier than those in less egalitarian societies across all income levels (Nguyen & Peschard, 2003). Further anthropological research should focus on why this gradient effect occurs and how socioeconomic equality benefits everyone in society, even the rich. Anthropology also emphasises lived experience. While economists measure the health of economies through the performance of stock markets, ethnographies help us understand that stocks are far removed from the public’s economic reality (Boushey, 2020). Instead, market performance reflects the financial health of the wealthiest among us (Boushey, 2020). Additional anthropological research should emphasise everyday experiences of capitalism and socioeconomic inequalities to develop new methods of measuring economic success.

The COVID-19 pandemic has promoted a global economic crisis. However, the pandemic has only exposed and compounded existing problems, failures, and inequalities in capitalism. The economic crisis of our time has already arrived, and it cannot be solved by eradicating the virus or restoring the system to status quo. Anthropology helps explore the contradictions of capitalism, structural forms of violence, exchanges of biological futures, and other issues made apparent through the relationship between COVID-19 and the economic crisis. Furthermore, the current crises must be framed as opportunities to create alternative systems to capitalism by changing our cultural values. In doing so, we may finally achieve a moral, just, and democratic economy.

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Theory and Society

Matthew Waymouth

The Great Anxiety: Repression, Desublimation, and the Incongruences of Capital

In *Civilization and its Discontents*, Freud revealed that society requires the restraint of our primal, human drives: “It is impossible to overlook the extent to which civilization is built up upon a renunciation of instinct” (Freud, 1930/2015, p. 23). He believed that to progress as a species, our animal urges must be repressed, controlled, and redirected—but this repression kept society in a constant state of tension, threatening destruction at any moment. Marcuse, applying Freud’s insights, suggested that advanced industrial society required greater amounts of repression than ever before, but that it had also devised a way to hold back the inevitable destruction, masking unhappiness through instinctual gratification and a perpetual state of bliss (Marcuse, 1955/2015). Despite this, the last half-century has seen an unprecedented rise in the rates of mental distress (Cohen, 2016; OECD, 2019; Rehm & Shield, 2019). What could be causing this?

Freud’s psychoanalytic theory of mind aimed to reveal the structure of the human psyche—the driving forces behind conscious and unconscious thought. He proposed that the psyche contains three distinct mechanisms: the id, the ego, and the superego (Lear, 2005). The id houses two unconscious animal instincts: Eros, the life-instinct, is the origin of our sexual and libidinous drives and is what leads us to reproduce, eat, and sustain life. Opposite this sits Thanatos, the death-instinct, our primal desire to “return to the peace of the organic world” (Freud, 1922, p. 81). We turn this instinct outward, toward the world around us, manifesting as the aggressive drive. The id also operates on the “pleasure principle,” seeking instant gratification of the drives and the reduction of tension and anxiety (Lear, 2005). He believed that this insatiable desire to fulfil our sexual and aggressive drives through outward expression would invariably lead to conflict: “In consequence of this primary mutual hostility of human beings, civilized society is perpetually threatened with disintegration” (Freud, 1930/2015, p. 31).

For organised human communities to flourish, Freud felt that humans must be compelled by society to repress these sexual and aggressive drives (Freud, 1930/2015). This repression becomes the role of the super-ego: It acts as our conscience—it imposes culturally defined rules of morality, specifies between right and wrong, and defines which behaviours are socially acceptable. Through the super-ego, the expression of the aggressive drive is turned inward and any transgression of its moral rules is swiftly punished, manifesting as guilt (Lear, 2005). This creates a self-governing population: “Civilization [...] obtains mastery over the individual’s dangerous desire for aggression by weakening and disarming it and by setting up an agency within him to watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered city” (Freud, 1930/2015, p. 38).

But Freud saw a flaw in this arrangement: The further we progress towards a rational, organised society, the more strictly we must repress our sexual and aggressive drives. But constantly denying the pleasure principle is a recipe for psychic and social disaster: When our drives remain unfulfilled, we experience mental distress and anxiety, which would ultimately lead to unrest (Freud, 1930/2015). A third area of the psyche, the ego, is the key to maintaining harmony between the id and the super-ego. Operating on the “reality principle,” it uses a process of reality-testing to ascertain what is real and determines how to satisfy our instinctual drives within the moral constraints of the super-ego (Lear, 2005). If the ego determines that the expression of a particular instinctual drive would be harmful to our sense of reality, it must be blocked. It is possible for the ego to delay our gratification, but it can also satisfy the animal instincts through a process of “instinctual sublimation.” Instead of unleashing our destructive urges onto the world, the ego finds ways to harness them, motivating us to work productively toward the cultural goals embedded in our super-ego (Freud, 1930/2015).

Freud believed that sublimation is what provides human civilisation with its power. It is the ability to redirect our psychic energies that “makes it possible for higher psychical activities, scientific, artistic or ideological, to play such an important part in civilized life” (Freud, 1930/2015, p. 22). But despite these benefits, *Civilisation and its Discontents* suggests that there remains an unnameable anxiety bubbling beneath the surface, a “permanent internal unhappiness” (Freud, 1930/2015, p. 39). Society breeds discontent through its inherently repressive nature. Feelings of guilt become mandatory: “The price we pay for our advance in civilization is a loss of happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt” (Freud, 1930/2015, p. 45). Freud believed that if this generalised, grumbling unhappiness were to grow strong enough, it would ultimately prove detrimental to the growth of any society—eventually, a dissatisfied population would seek alternative arrangements.

In the opening chapters of *Eros and Civilisation*, Marcuse suggests that capitalism faced this very problem. To survive, it needed to increase the amount of surplus-value it could harvest—and for that, it needed more workers (Marx, 1867/1995). But as industry forged ahead with its expansion, an increasingly large portion of the working class began to rebel against their exploitation. Eventually, after a century of escalating labour revolts and steadily improving workers’ rights, it became obvious that the capitalist mode of production could not be imposed through sheer force alone (Marx, 1867/1995; Marcuse, 1955/2015). Instead, it needed people to subscribe to its ideals and to exhort its benefits. It required society’s goals to align with the goals of capital. To achieve this, it would need to install a new set of ambitions that would direct people’s behaviour toward the relentless pursuit of surplus-value. In other words, society’s super-ego needed a makeover.

Social democracy, which suggested that improving material conditions could be achieved through state-controlled capitalist growth, brought this vision into reality. It proposed that “the continual increase of productivity makes constantly more realistic the promise of an even better life for all” (Marcuse, 1955/2015, p. 4). In the first half of the 20th Century states across the globe began to enact increasingly social democratic policies, and the rules and regulations of the super-ego were slowly but surely rewritten in the image of capital: “The societal authority is absorbed into the “conscience” and unconscious of the individual and works as his own desire, morality, and fulfilment” (Marcuse, 1955/2015, p. 46). But as the super-ego shifted, it fundamentally altered the reality principle, morphing into what Marcuse dubbed the “performance principle” (Marcuse, 1955/2015, p. 35). In this new reality, the capitalist mode of production was viewed, above all else, as a provider of social wellbeing. To promote production, alienated labour became the norm: Capitalist social relations were cemented, and bourgeoisie domination of the working-class became justified and normalised. The negative consequences of production—exploitation, alienation, environmental destruction—were written off as necessary expenses. Above all, acquiescence to capitalism became rational, because “in spite of everything” it “delivers the goods” (Marcuse, 1964/2011, p. 79).

But Marcuse suggested that this revamped set of rules came with a predictable side-effect: heightened instinctual repression. While Freud felt that all societies require a certain degree of repression to function, Marcuse insisted that the performance principle repressed our drives far beyond what was necessary to ensure the material wellbeing of society. Capitalism demanded *surplus-repression* (Marcuse, 1955/2015, pp. 71–74). Our super-ego created new, restrictive sources of guilt to direct us toward alienated labour. This repressed the ability to express our instinctual drives by isolating us, controlling our time and bodies in increasingly rational and authoritative ways. Above all else, non-productive activities became perceived as irrational (Marcuse, 1964/2011). Life—that is, life outside of work—became a fountain of guilt.

This additional repression would inevitably upset the pleasure principle, but Marcuse realised that capital had found a solution to maintain our happiness. As the productive apparatus surpassed the ability to satisfy our material needs, it turned its sights on our instinctual needs. Using “false needs” generated by advertising and consumerism, our needs could be satisfied through fulfilling a desire to purchase clothing, electronics, entertainment, and leisure (Marcuse, 1964/2011). Our drives no longer needed to be converted into guilt and sublimated, because consumption allowed their immediate gratification. We were left blissfully content, the proud owners of a “happy conscience which facilitates acceptance of the misdeeds of society” (Marcuse, 1964/2011, p. 76). He named this phenomenon “repressive desublimation”: Capital had managed to inextricably bind us to itself by providing a perpetual sense of contentedness (Marcuse, 1964/2011). Marcuse went on to characterise the effects of repressive desublimation as a kind of mental numbness: “If anxiety is more than a general malaise, if it is an existential condition, then this so-called ‘age of anxiety’ is distinguished by the extent to which anxiety has disappeared from expression” (Marcuse, 1955/2015, p. 35).

However, since the publication of *Eros and Civilisation* in 1966, the expression of anxiety has clearly not disappeared: in fact, the world has seen rates of mental illness steadily rising for decades (Cohen, 2016; OECD, 2019; Rehm & Shield, 2019). This trend is particularly prevalent in Western capitalist nations (Whitaker, 2010), where mental illness has gone from being “a relatively rare affliction just 60 years ago” to “everybody’s concern” (Cohen, 2016, p. 2). The OECD believes that mental illness now affects half of adults in economically developed countries, with anxiety being the most common complaint (2019). The World Health Organisation estimates a 13% rise in mental health conditions over the last decade, and places suicide as the second highest cause of death for young adults (World Health Organisation, n.d.). Indeed, here in New Zealand, suicide rates have been consistently increasing for over 20 years (Government Inquiry into Mental Health and Addiction, 2018). If Marcuse considered the 1960s an “age of anxiety”, then our condition must signpost a new era of unease—a Great Anxiety. But what could have caused it?

It is possible this is the result of another increase in surplus-repression. “Social democracy [...] had by the mid-1970s proven inconsistent with the requirements of capital accumulation” (Harvey, 2014, p. 13), and once again, capital was required to shift the population’s collective will. To instigate this, Western political powers began to roll out neoliberal rhetoric, emphasising “individualism, private property, personal responsibility, and family values” (Harvey, 2014, p. 23). Eventually, these new sources of guilt ensured an irrevocable warping of the psyche, this time within the performance principle itself. It retained the core impetus of social democracy: an insistence that growing productivity is rational because it continually increases the material wellbeing of society. But a new focus on the importance of market efficiency meant that the very basis of that rationality, the state’s provision of material wellbeing, could be progressively chipped away through the privatisation of services and a revitalised ability to hoard wealth (Harvey, 2014).

Once again, capital subverted its own impacts: Consumption has become easier, cheaper, and faster than ever before (Harvey, 2014). The entertainment industry has become one of the largest markets of the post-industrial economy (Sigmund, 2019), while the rise of internet has given us near-instant access to any number of instinctual gratifications: film, music, art, and pornography. Our opportunities for desublimation have never been so plentiful, but it may be the burgeoning psychiatric industry that has provided the greatest source of desublimation. Consumption can now satisfy more than just our aggressive and sexual urges; it can also help

to relieve tension and reduce anxiety. Production doesn't just improve our material wellbeing; it benefits our mental wellbeing too.

However, if both repression and desublimation have risen in tandem, overall distress should have remained relatively constant. So why are the rates of anxiety increasing? There must be something else causing our distress. Both Freud and his daughter Anna suggested the presence of another form of repression: defensive repression. To prevent certain potentially harmful impulses from ever reaching consciousness, we could actively keep them suppressed within the unconscious to protect us from ourselves (Freud, 1967). A psychoanalytic contemporary of Freud named Carl Rogers built on these ideas in his Theory of Self. He proposed that the primary drive of individuals is to achieve a "congruence of self"; an alignment between our ideal self, shaped by the societal expectations of the super-ego, and our real self, forged through lived experiences (Rogers, 1957). When we are confronted with a significant incongruence between our expectations and our experiences, we would implement these Freudian processes of defensive repression. He named this process of subliminal self-deception "subception," and suggested that it requires the constant expenditure of mental energy; as a result, "a tension state occurs which is known as anxiety" (Rogers, 1957, p. 97).

This wave of anxiety we are experiencing might suggest that despite capital's best efforts, the incongruences within the psyche of Western society are proving progressively difficult to ignore. The surplus-repression of our instinctual drives is no longer enough we must now repress reality to defend our psyche against the increasingly obvious contradictions in the world around us. The "happy conscience" of repressive desublimation facilitates this, making it easier to not merely *accept* the misdeeds of society, but forcibly repress our own experiences in favour of a comfortable fantasy (Fisher, 2009). Capital now demands 'surplus-subception.'

For instance, surplus-subception is required to repress the contradictions between the performance principle and our reality under neoliberal capital. While the warped performance principle still reassures us that alienated labour provides a greater good, we are increasingly aware that the fruits of our labour are being withheld: We see cut-backs of state-provided services, declining real wages and the unrestrained hoarding of wealth (Harvey, 2014). This growing gap in prosperity reveals an incongruence between ideal and real self. Our ideal self, as defined by the super-ego, is the perpetually productive individual: materially secure, confident in their contribution to society, blissful in their ability to consume. But for many, this ideal sits in direct contradiction to their lived experience. Instead of increasing material security, they face deteriorating material stability as wages stagnate in proportion to the rising costs of living (Milanović, 2016). Instead of stable employment, they face precarity (Neilson & Rossiter, 2008). Despite the promises of a better life, reality fails to deliver.

However, the surplus-subception required to repress the catastrophic effects of productivity-induced climate change may prove the most destructive. Western society has successfully swept the growing climate crisis under the rug for decades—and our anxiety about it is building (Clayton, 2020). Marshall (2015) suggests this is partly because its effects are incongruent with our expected reality, too contradictory to the promises of the performance principle for us to bear. The ideal self, shaped by the super-ego, directs us toward activities that promote growth based on the belief that productivity will benefit humanity. But the experiences of our real self are becoming increasingly irreconcilable with this notion, as evidence mounts that the social good provided by growth is predicated on destruction (Harvey, 2014). We are witnessing temperature rises (Hansen et al., 2006), sea level rises (Nerem et al., 2018), habitat destruction (Laurance, 2010), along with animal and insect extinctions (McLaughlin et al., 2002). It is a

crisis that threatens to displace millions of “climate refugees” if left unchecked (Biermann & Boas, 2010). Even the President of the United States has admitted that the climate crisis presents an “existential threat” (Milman, 2021). Yet capital, insistent on growth, demands we repress this knowledge. Progress is once again touted as our saviour, and capital attempts to pivot production toward “green capitalism.” But to buy into this, we must repress the knowledge that capitalist production is what caused the crisis in the first place.

The capitalist mode of production assumes it can sustain indefinite growth (Marx, 1867/1995; Harvey, 2014). Based on the arguments of Freud and Marcuse, it seems that we must also assume it will cause an indefinite increase of the repression of our basic human drives. So long as growing productivity in the pursuit of surplus-value remains the goal of society, our repressions and anxieties will continue to multiply. There will likely reach a point in which it ceases to alleviate the burden of life: Eventually, our mental burden will overshadow any material benefits. But an increasingly “unhappy conscience” is a pain with the power to prove liberatory. If achieving congruence is our primary human motivation, then we may find some hope: a motivation to begin unpicking the fantasy we find ourselves trapped in. We must work to slowly reveal the incongruences between the promises of capitalism and our lived reality. We will be inevitably faced with anxiety, but this anxiety *must* be our motivation.

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OUR PLACE IN POWER STRUCTURES AND POLITICS

If understanding the push and pull of power structures in our lives was an easy concept, this would be a brief chapter. The chaos that has occurred in all our lives over the last 18+ months—as the world seemingly goes by both in slow-motion and at torrential pace—gives space for reflection, which helps to build the understandings that play out in the next five essays in this edition of the *Interesting Journal*. The uncertainty of life as we move forward and seek out that ‘new normal’ can prompt us to recognise areas of growth or change in all facets of society. It is a great pleasure to introduce the following five authors who have written on matters of politics and power structures, often offering unique solutions for our new sense of normalcy.

We open this chapter with the disturbing balancing act of feminine criminality as it plays out in the theatre of news media. Harrison describes how, as traditional preconceptions of femininity misalign with notions of criminality, women offenders are treated as particularly dastardly and evil compared to their counterparts. The curated narrative of women victims in news media, Harrison continues, creates a dichotomy of who is or is not spared the all-too-familiar, “she deserved it.” These instances of victim-blaming, much like the depiction of a woman offender’s malady, takes attention away from the deeper issue at hand: the continuation of patriarchal discourse in crime and the justice system.

Continuing with another introspective look into power structures, Edwards-Maas analyses manifestations of white privilege and its pervasiveness in education systems around the globe. Eurocentrism, which confers upon whiteness a sense of neutrality and invisibility, is shared with children as the proper way to view historical events or construct knowledge. When white teachers or students are confronted with opportunities to take accountability for their innate privilege, there is great resistance in upturning the power structures at play. Edwards-Maas points towards how recognition can be the first step in successfully revealing and addressing the ongoing effects of white privilege.

Next, Scholtz invites us to ponder the political relationships between global superpowers over the growing tensions and possibilities of a Chinese military invasion in Taiwan. In the fallout of the potentially impending humanitarian and refugee crisis, Scholtz argues for what some scholars may see as an unlikely land of asylum: Japan. Featuring an intricate escape and assimilation plan for Taiwanese refugees, Scholtz depicts how cultural and historical ties to its neighbour, as well as a renowned reputation in disaster recovery, would assist Japan in what could be its unprecedented offering of international aid.

A unique depiction of power structures in the form of fictional, homo-erotic relationships can be found in Yang’s analysis of a genre of Japanese manga known as *bōizu rabu* (boy’s love). On the one hand, the predominantly women creators of *bōizu rabu* manga continue to affirm the social structures of patriarchal Japan via the heteronormativity of gender norms hidden in feminised male characters. Conversely, power structures can be challenged as women readers reimagine gendered interactions via *yaoi megane* (*yaoi* glasses), which serve as a queer gaze.

We close our chapter with another glimpse into political frameworks: this time, Shrimpton analyses the current criminalisation of bigamy and its restriction on consensual non-monogamy. Analysed through the lens of Rawls’ theory of justice, Shrimpton brings to light the illegitimacy of New Zealand denying legal recognition to marrying the people you love. In a democratic society, the outlawing of bigamy undermines the ability to marry another spouse, infringes upon religious rights, and leaves no protection in the form of the regular social and economic rights typically observed under marriage. Shrimpton concludes their essay with areas of further research and suggestions for implementing bigamy into law.

I would like to thank my five authors for bringing forth such a wide breadth of diverse, challenging, and thought-provoking understandings of the various structures of power and politics as they play out in their essay topics. May you remain ever-questioning, and of course, thoroughly interesting.

Kaitlin Outtrim

Criminology 303

Gender, Crime and Justice

Caitlin Brooke Harrison

The Antithesis Between Crime and Prescribed Femininity: News Media Portrayals of Female Criminality and Victimisation

CONTENT WARNING: This article references child sex abuse, domestic violence, victim-blaming, sexual assault, and the Grace Millane case.

Subsequent to an escalation in female-perpetrated violent crime in the 1990s, public anxiety and sensationalised news media reporting emerged. Despite the substantial prominence of violent crime committed by men, women were depicted as more deleterious than their male counterparts and emblematic of societal decay in their blatant transgression of traditional notions of femininity (Berrington & Honkatukia, 2002). That is, female offenders were perceived to be doubly deviant and doubly damned in their infraction of both criminal law and the informal rules of appropriate femininity (Barlow, 2015). Crucially, in an effort to disparage the threat of female criminality and to mitigate public anxiety, news media reports utilised over-simplistic and deterministic explanations of female offending appertaining to inherent depravity or psychological malady (Barlow & Lynes, 2015). Similarly, female victims were subject to dichotomous archetypes of an ideal victim who is deserving of a great deal of sympathy, and a culpable victim, who deserves relatively little (Collins, 2016). Consequently, and of great significance, Berrington and Honkatukia (2002) indicate that: “In the context of these prevailing discourses it is difficult to understand how women who kill make sense of their crimes at a personal level. Stereotypical perceptions of violent women render them ‘members of a muted group’” (p. 54). The following will examine the portrayal of female offenders in news media, briefly contrasting such representations with that of male offenders. Moreover, an analysis of the portrayal of female victims will be conducted, particularly in relation to sex crimes and victim-blaming, along with a final consideration of the detrimental consequences arising from such inadequate portrayals.

The Dichotomy of Female Offenders: Inherent Depravity and Psychological Malady

The dichotomous portrayal of female offenders in news media as either inherently depraved or psychologically afflicted attains newsworthiness due to the abnormality and rarity of such occurrences. With an added layer of gender deviancy, violent female offenders induce a “double fascination” in that they simultaneously horrify and titillate news media consumers (Barlow, 2015; Berrington & Honkatukia, 2002, p. 57). To elaborate, the label of inherent depravity is allocated to female offenders who seemingly embody evil and intentionally defy prescribed notions of femininity (Barlow & Lynes, 2015). An apt example of this is recognised in cases of female child sex offenders, which prompts an important contrast. At the core of conventional femininity are expectations of warmth, care, and nurturing; a female child sex offender then is the stark antithesis of a good woman and therefore her actions are difficult to comprehend (Barlow & Lynes, 2015).

On the other hand, their male counterparts are constructed as *unsurprisingly* monstrous. That is, notions of masculinity align with depravity; so while his actions are deemed monstrous, they are also understood to be natural. Thus, the conceivability of a male child sex offender reduces any sense of shock or betrayal that is otherwise prominent in the case of a female child sex offender (Barlow & Lynes, 2015). Similarly, in cases involving the murder of a heterosexual partner, while male offenders are perceived to have breached criminal law, they have not transgressed conventional notions of masculinity. Indeed, Berrington and Honkatukia (2002) indicate that “[...] men’s actions are frequently depicted as an extreme version of expectations around masculinity and the gendered exercise of physical power” (p. 58). In contrast, women who murder their heterosexual partner are portrayed as doubly deviant and are depicted in news media as “...a threat to the stability of patriarchal and familial relations and expectations” (Berrington & Honkatukia, 2002, p. 59).

The label of psychological malady in the portrayal of female offenders resorts to hormonal or biological explanations citing hysteria and mental instability. Occasionally, under this category, female offenders are also regarded as victims of tragedy or trauma that have altered their character (Barlow & Lynes, 2015; Berrington & Honkatukia, 2002). It is argued in scholarly discourse that the allocation of this label is associated with sympathetic treatment and is more likely among female offenders who appear to adhere to conventional notions of femininity (Ballinger, 2019). Ballinger (2019) provides a direct example of the label of psychological malady, particularly in relation to the offender as a victim, in cases of domestic violence and female retaliation. However, it should be noted that garnering sympathy in this case may become problematic in the presence of patriarchal discourse which focuses on provocation. According to Berrington and Honkatukia (2002), “[e]vents are construed in terms of her failure to conform to the patriarchal norms of domesticity, through her ‘nagging’, drinking, adultery, or promiscuity. Thus his response becomes understandable and, implicitly if not explicitly, condoned” (p. 58).

That is, domestic violence perpetrated by men may be conceptualised as a justified disciplinary response to female gender deviancy from a patriarchal perspective. Female retaliation in this context then, could be interpreted as a double-retaliation: directly in the murder of her male partner, and indirectly against patriarchal expectations, ultimately deeming her doubly deviant. Ballinger’s (2019) example of psychological malady then, could easily become labelled as inherent depravity in the presence of such patriarchal explanations that are prominent in both news media and the law (Barlow, 2015). That is, labels allocated to female offenders are not always fixed; instead, they may be transposed according to differences in individual interpretation. This, however, causes a further distancing from critical and adequate understandings of motive and agency behind female criminality. While dichotomous labelling already serves as a reductive mechanism that denies women substantive equality, the fact that such labels are transposable according to interpretation trivialises female criminality to the point where devised accounts quash personal accounts completely (Ballinger, 2019).

The Dichotomy of Female Victims: Ideal Victims and Culpable Victims

While the ideal victim is portrayed in news media as an “[...] innocent, naïve bystander[] swept up by a crime that is both fearsome and unexpected” (Collins, 2016, p. 298), the culpable victim is portrayed as a “[...] demonized woman who likely has been accused of alcohol and drug abuse, sexual promiscuity, and dressing provocatively” (Collins, 2016, p. 298). That is, perceived adherence to conventional femininity will afford a victim sympathy, whereas perceived failure to do so will deem the victim culpable. As with female offenders, the transposability of dichotomous labelling is evident among female victims in cases of sexual assault. Indeed, Garcia (2012) indicates that a victim of sexual assault must align with the notion of an ideal woman in order to be labelled and treated as an ideal victim. An apt example of transposability in the labelling of female victims is in the recent case of British tourist, Grace Millane.

Sexualisation amplifies the resonance of news media material and therefore, cases of rape and murder figure prominently (Berrington & Honkatukia, 2002). Following Millane’s murder, news media coverage focused intensely on her personal life and alleged sexual preferences after the accused’s defense rested on the notion that Millane “[...] enjoyed “rough sex”, and that her death was an accident that came about as a result of consensual choking” (Woodyatt, 2020, Introduction). The dissemination of such patriarchal explanations in news media not only deems Millane a culpable victim but further provides credibility to the man charged with her

murder (Garcia, 2012). In fact, while news media coverage focused on Millane's personal life and sexual preferences, the man accused was described in the New Zealand Herald as “[...] a promising athlete who represented New Zealand in his chosen sport” (Leask, 2018, p. para. 1).

The news media portrayal of Millane as a culpable victim however, may be transposed in the context of feminist discourse. It is argued here that adherence to notions of conventional femininity is irrelevant, and thus, while Millane is recognised as neither a culpable nor an ideal victim, she is perceived as an undeserving victim nonetheless. Importantly, Susan Edwards (in an interview with CNN), explains how the propensity of news media to sexualise content consequently normalises sexual violence, exacerbates victim-blaming, and enables male perpetrators to rely on such narratives, as is the case of Millane (Woodyatt, 2020, A Culture of Victim-Blaming). Moreover, Toni Van Pelt (also in an interview with CNN) highlights a fundamental bias in victim-blaming as the absence of an emphasis on men and male behaviour. That is, Millane's murderer was not extensively showcased in news media in regard to his sexual history or his history of violence against women; he was simply recognised as a successful and promising sportsman. The emphasis was rather that Millane “[...] deserved it, because she enjoyed or had pleasure from sex” (Woodyatt, 2020, A Culture of Victim-Blaming).

Patriarchal Explanations and Sexualised Othering

While feminist discourse seems to offer a more substantive and less reductive explanation of female crime and victimisation, patriarchal explanations remain predominant in news media. Crucially, Barlow (2015) indicates that female criminals are constituted as ‘other’ in their encounter with the law and news media because both institutions are “[...] constructed around a masculine subject and an associated set of masculine characteristics” (p. 471). That is, female criminality cannot be positioned in an institution designed by and for men—their experiences and perspectives are antithetical to perpetuated notions of masculinity *and* femininity, thereby signalling their ‘otherness.’ The utilisation of dichotomous labelling enables journalists to reinforce this established abnormality of female offenders, particularly among those who commit serious or violent offences. Collins (2016) concisely explains:

Their attempts at criminal behaviour are sexualised and made in some sense playful, up to some ill-defined moral threshold. Female offenders who cross this threshold (by killing their spouse, for instance) are treated more harshly by the media than their male counterparts. They are portrayed as cold and calculating, and their crimes are less likely to be blamed on exceptional circumstances or mental instability. (p. 306)

Indeed, Collins (2016) conducted a quantitative analysis which found that among 1190 crime articles, not a single instance could be identified in which a man's appearance was the primary focus of an article. Thus, sexualisation in news media is arguably reserved for female offenders and victims in a plausible attempt to reinforce their abnormality as ‘sexualised others.’ Moreover, Collins' (2016) analysis further discovered “[...] decreased rationalization for the crimes of female offenders [...]” accompanied by “powerful stereotypes” (p. 305). Such findings are consistent with the aforementioned notion that female criminality cannot be positioned in institutions of law and media that are designed by and for men. Thus, alternative, dichotomous narratives that reduce agency and rely on detrimental stereotypes, position the female offender and victim in a separate arena of ‘sexualised other’.

Social and Political Consequences

It has been suggested in the current discussion that dichotomous labelling is detrimental to the development of critical and adequate understandings of female criminality and victimisation. Moreover, the potential for a label to be transposed according to interpretation merely serves as further trivialisation, in which devised accounts of an event, whether by news media or patriarchal discourse, completely quash the personal account of the offender. Importantly, Collins (2016) indicates that the consequences of such labelling extend beyond a lack of understanding and additionally influence public opinion and policy. That is, news media journalists have a propensity to integrate messages of moral decay and heightened and unavoidable crime in their narratives of female offenders and victims (Collins, 2016). In doing so, evidence suggests there is a shift towards more punitive treatment of female offenders as gender norms are perceived as being under immense threat (Collins, 2016, p. 298). A final important consequence to be noted is the institutionalisation of stigma through dichotomous labelling in news media. According to Collins (2016):

Stigmatized female offenders often experience great difficulty holding a job, having a home, getting access to any needed services and enjoying mutually supportive relationships with family and friends. In turn, women who are denied legitimate social roles are more likely to engage in repeated criminal activity. (p. 306)

Upon establishing the consequences of dichotomous labelling a crucial need for a change in discourse becomes apparent. Indeed, Fitzroy (2001) acknowledges that while female criminality may emerge out of abusive or oppressive contexts, it must be acknowledged that women are also capable of violent crime as active agents. Thus, revised discourse on female criminality should “[...] acknowledge women’s oppression in the broad social fabric of their everyday lives, but still name women’s agency and make women accountable for the violent crimes they choose to commit” (Fitzroy, 2001, p. 26). While altering the current discourse would prove difficult due to the inherent patriarchy in the law and the media, persevering attempts at doing so may finally afford women the agency they possess, thereby liberating them, and female victims alike, from the belittling constraints of dichotomous labelling in news media.

Concluding Remarks

The perceived abnormality of female criminality by masculine institutions of law and news media prompt reductive explanations of female engagement in, and experiences of, crime. This essay focused on the perpetuation of such patriarchal discourse through the utilisation of dichotomous labelling in the portrayal of female criminals and victims in news media. It is argued that while the allocation of these labels serve as a reductive mechanism, their potential to be transposed according to interpretation further trivialises female criminality and victimisation, so much so that devised accounts gain prominence over personal accounts. That is, female offenders, and victims alike, become “members of a muted group”—a silenced and ‘othered’ cohort on display to be examined and interpreted by those intrigued (Berrington and Honkatukia, 2002, p. 54).

The consequences of such over-simplistic and deterministic explanations have proven detrimental to understanding women’s agency and have additionally prompted stigmatisation

and policy changes regarding more punitive treatment of female offenders. Revised discourse surrounding female criminality should acknowledge the likely oppressive and abusive contexts in which women commit crime, while simultaneously recognising that women indeed demonstrate agency in the perpetration of violent crime also. Crucially, in the reformation of patriarchal discourse, female criminality and victimisation can begin to be understood in their rightful complexity.

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Geography 305

Population, Health and Society

Lianne Edwards-Maas

White Privilege in Education

Resulting in the hierarchical organisation of society, privilege refers to the spontaneous assigning of unearned benefits to members of a dominant social group or category. Though privilege exists in many forms, white privilege is particularly pervasive in the institutional systems that structure daily practices and lived realities. As a form of relational power, white privilege involves the granting of advantages to white persons, which place non-white persons at a social, economic, and political disadvantage. In the context of education, white privilege is practised through the reproduction and maintenance of racial ideologies, racial identities, and institutional racism. However, education is also recognised as an important context for challenging racial discrimination, with multicultural policies and pedagogies changing how privilege is acknowledged in the classroom. In this essay, I will first examine how white privilege is maintained through its normalisation and invisibility, and the resulting unequal provision of social capital. Secondly, I will identify how the acknowledgement of white privilege is met with resistance, as well as educational strategies that have been developed to overcome this resistance. Finally, I will highlight how white privilege affects racial minorities, by drawing attention to the consequences of disproportionate representation and racial innocence. Overall, this essay will examine how white privilege operates at both an individual and institutional level, by providing examples of how white privilege is practised in the context of education.

A significant consequence of white privilege is the framing of whiteness as the norm for humanity. As a result of this normalisation, the white experience is deemed neutral, universal, and prestigious in nearly every situation and context (Rose and Paisley, 2012). In contrast, the lived realities of people of colour are viewed to deviate from the norm, and are identified as the alternative way to experience the world (DiAngelo, 2018). In the context of education, these generalisations are most evident in educational policies, which determine what is taught in schools and what is considered knowledge (Baumgartner and Johnson-Bailey, 2010). Acting to reproduce legacies of Eurocentric thought, the creation of educational policies is essentially a political process, which has traditionally been developed and overseen by white Europeans. This overwhelmingly white influence and control over educational curricula has resulted in both texts and discourses that privilege white knowledge and ignore alternative understandings (Dowling and Flintoff, 2018). As such, though schools are increasingly comprised of a diverse student population, educational curricula have changed little from when the student population was predominantly white (James, 2015). Such is portrayed by the educational curricula of England and Norway, which label the provision of non-white knowledge as indigenous studies, and historically centred knowledge—such as maths and science—as standard or compulsory studies (Dowling and Flintoff, 2018). A similar example is identified by Berry (2015), who notes that the requirement to teach history as part of the curriculum, refers solely to teaching students about the white version of history, which, in New Zealand, commonly involves a very narrow and often check-box style teaching of the Land Wars and the Treaty of Waitangi. As these two examples demonstrate, the curriculum results in the reproduction of white privilege by continuing to normalise the supposed differences between ‘us and them.’ Furthermore, these examples show how educational policies portray whiteness as neutral, and sustain the marginalisation of non-white knowledge (Carr, 2015). As such, white privilege can be seen to be practised through the continued construction and circulation of a racially biased curriculum.

White privilege is also reproduced through the active conservation of its invisibility, which functions to make recognising and challenging white privilege extremely difficult. The importance of invisibility for maintaining white privilege is emphasised by Fitzgerald (2014), who notes that white people are socialised to count on the invisibility of white privilege, as it frames racial discrimination as an unrelated issue and thus absolves them of responsibility. In

the context of education, the invisibility of white privilege is maintained by the notion of meritocracy and coded language. According to Stoll (2013a), meritocracy refers to the idea that, through hard work and effort, any individual can achieve success in modern society. As such, meritocracy stresses the agency of individuals and is widely encouraged by educators, who wish to abstain from identifying the effects of race, for fear of violating educational policies of equity (Solomona et al., 2005). Such ideas are echoed by the white students interviewed by James (2015), who firmly believe that race has not influenced the opportunities they have and that their achievements are purely a result of their individual efforts. Evidently influenced by neoliberal ideas, this understanding of society is highly problematic, as it disregards the impact of race on a student's ability to access equal opportunities (DiAngelo, 2018). The invisibility of white privilege is also maintained through the use of coded language, which refers to the use of words that have an underlying and often critical meaning. An example of coded language being used in the context of education is identified by DiAngelo (2018), who observes that terms such as 'urban' and 'low-test score' are used as codes to refer to non-white and ostensibly less desirable schools. The use of this coded language has a similar effect of removing race from view—while simultaneously implying that failure and success are inexorably linked to race (Solomona et al., 2005). Thus, in the context of education, white privilege is practised through the continuous insistence of meritocracy and colour-blindness, which result in the maintaining of its invisibility.

The combined effects of normalisation and invisibility lead to white people being afforded a sense of belonging and familiarity in nearly all seemingly neutral spaces and contexts. This sense of belonging occurs due to the unearned social capital that is gained through white privilege, which gives white people an advantage over non-white people in regard to understanding and relating to certain experiences (Rainer, 2015). In the context of education, access to social capital and a sense of belonging can be observed to greatly influence the experiences of white and non-white students with the admission process. As highlighted by Baumgartner and Johnson-Bailey (2010), modern admission processes typically favour white students, with such processes usually having been designed and overseen by white educators. For example, many tertiary programs require applicants to submit transcripts, test scores and letters of recommendation. The standardised exams and subjects used to generate these documents disadvantage people from marginalised racial groups, as they require an in-depth understanding of what institutions are looking for and ask questions that favour those with white social capital (Berry, 2015). The social capital afforded to white people through white privilege can also be seen to influence access to scholarship opportunities, with white students tending to be more aware of their existence (Baumgartner and Johnson-Bailey, 2010). This heightened awareness compared to non-white students is due to the past exclusion of and ongoing barriers faced by racial minorities from tertiary education, which has resulted in many contemporary non-white students being the first to attend tertiary education in their families. As such, non-white students rarely have access to the same level of knowledge and social networks as white students (Solomona et al., 2005). Furthermore, familiarity with the admission process and scholarship opportunities impact the retention rates of students, with white students at the University of Georgia being up to 10% more likely to complete their course than non-white students (Baumgartner and Johnson-Bailey, 2010, p. 31). Thus, the unequal provision of social capital due to white privilege results in the continued favouring of white students and the systemic exclusion of non-white students.

People with access to white privilege rely on its invisibility to avoid having to accept accountability for ongoing racial discrimination. As such, on the rare occasions that it is made visible, those who benefit from white privilege tend to resist its acknowledgement (Fitzgerald,

2014). In the context of education, white students and teachers tend to react very negatively to being made aware of their role in maintaining white privilege and racism, with such newfound awareness frequently resulting in feelings of guilt, anger, and denial (Delano-Oriaran and Parks 2015). Referred to by scholars as white fragility, the tendency for white people to become defensive when confronted with white privilege often results in an attempt to shift the source of inequity onto class or gender, and thus restore the invisibility of white privilege. As such, though feelings of guilt have significant potential to motivate change, acknowledging white privilege in an educational setting rarely has the desired outcome (Comeau, 2015). Such is evident in research conducted by Berry (2015), whose students became increasingly agitated when confronted with a course on whiteness. More specifically, the students claimed that race could not be the underlying cause of modern inequality, as according to such a logic, white people could never fall into poverty. A similar reaction is documented by Stoll (2013a) and Dotts (2015), who recorded the resistance of teachers against the African Centred Curriculum and Mexican American Studies Program, respectively—due to both programs highlighting the presence of white privilege in standard curriculum programs. As demonstrated by both of these examples, the recentring of whiteness ensures that the focus of discussions remains on the experiences and opinions of white people, which consequently results in a shifting of blame onto other social factors (DiAngelo, 2018). Furthermore, this evident resistance towards acknowledging the consequences of white privilege demonstrates an unwillingness to take responsibility for ongoing racial discrimination and inequity (Fitzgerald, 2014). Thus, the continued inability of white people to acknowledge their role in preserving white privilege prevents it from being challenged, and therefore persists in maintaining racial inequalities.

The potential to acknowledge and challenge white privilege is also hindered by white solidarity and conferred dominance. Similar to discourses surrounding privileged resistance, white solidarity refers to an unspoken and internalised agreement among white people to protect the advantages afforded to them by white privilege (DiAngelo, 2018). As such, white solidarity involves the consolidation of views surrounding race-related issues, which are circulated and normalised by way of daily interactions (Carr, 2015). In the context of education, white solidarity is preserved through teacher training programs, which are founded on white ideologies of enlightenment, and rarely require white teacher candidates to acknowledge their racial identities (Case, 2013). As such, these programs often fail to provide teachers with the necessary tools to address white privilege, and candidates are frequently unaware of how their racial ideologies impact their teaching practices and interactions with students (Solomona and Daniel, 2015). The pressure on educators to maintain white privilege through white solidarity is emphasised by Carr (2015) and DiAngelo (2018), who note that the consequences of breaking white solidarity can be quite severe—such as having the potential to jeopardise career advancement. Despite this, some educators have developed teaching methods that encourage students to acknowledge white solidarity and actively engage in discussions on white privilege. Such methods were employed by educators at an American tertiary institution, who created safe discussion spaces for students, by shifting to an informal classroom layout and dismantling the traditional power dynamics between student and teacher (Case, 2013). A similar pedagogy is described by Delano-Oriaran and Parks (2015), with two professors facilitating discussions on the effects of white privilege through the provision of a student-led online discussion platform. Thus, despite the apparent limitations presented by white solidarity and conferred dominance, discussions on white privilege can be successfully facilitated in education settings.

The conferred dominance afforded to white people through white privilege is also enacted and maintained through racial innocence. According to DiAngelo (2018), racial innocence refers to the historicisation of racial inequalities and the extensive internalisation of whiteness.

Furthermore, racial innocence involves the prevailing and problematic view that white people do not experience race and are therefore uninformed on its effects (Solomona et al., 2005). In contrast, non-white people are socialised to constantly be aware of race and are consequentially not seen as racially innocent. Thus, a common outcome of racial innocence is the expectation that non-white people should be responsible for teaching white people about racial discrimination (Rainer, 2015). When applied to education, this expectation is most evident in courses on diversity and multiculturalism, which often involve non-white students being framed as ‘native informants’ (James, 2015). Though non-white students can provide a unique standpoint, they are often hesitant and unwilling to discuss their personal experiences of race. Such reluctance was expressed by the non-white students interviewed by James (2015), who asserted that they resented teaching white students about race, because it often involved having to share personal experiences and face denial or hostility from white classmates. As this example demonstrates, when teaching white students about racial discriminations, non-white students often risk invalidation and retaliation (DiAngelo, 2018). Thus, racial innocence can be understood to reinforce unequal power relations, and continue to objectify the experiences of racial minorities (Solomona et al., 2005). As such, in the context of education, racial innocence maintains white privilege by obscuring its connection to racial discrimination and exoticifying non-white experiences.

A similar way in which white privilege affects the daily experiences of people is through racial stereotypes. These stereotypes are framed as biologically determined, instead of socially constructed, and are commonly internalised as a result of racial socialisation (Fitzgerald, 2014). The form of racial socialisation experienced by white and non-white people is fundamentally different, with the former being unaware of their race and the latter constantly being defined by their race (Stoll, 2013b). As such, stereotypes associated with non-white people often consist of particular traits, behaviours, and attitudes that are ascribed to the entire race. One such stereotype attributed to race is the assumption that there is a link between race and intellectual ability (Dowling and Flintoff, 2018). Once again, in education, this racial stereotype has resulted in a disproportionate representation of white educators in senior positions, compared to equally-qualified non-white educators. Although policies have been introduced to rectify this imbalance, in practice, employment equity in educational institutions continues to be overlooked, and demographics have remained relatively static (Solomona et al., 2005). A similar example of unequal representation can be observed in special education facilities, which cater for students with behavioural disorders and learning difficulties. As described by Blanchet (2006), non-white students are 2.41 times more likely to be referred to special education programs (p. 24). Furthermore, this research found that non-white students are less likely to be reintegrated back into general education than white students, with special education thus acting as a form of structural segregation. The impact of this disproportionate representation is that non-white students are less likely to graduate with a high school diploma and are therefore unable to access tertiary education (Blanchet, 2006). Thus, the racial stereotypes that exist in parallel to white privilege act to maintain white dominance, and are unlikely to be challenged until the role and impact of white privilege is recognised.

To conclude, white privilege impacts the everyday lives of people at both an individual and institutional level. In this essay, I have examined how white privilege is maintained and continues to gain power through its normalisation and invisibility, as well as how these common characteristics of white privilege result in the unequal distribution of social capital and differing experiences of racial socialisation. Furthermore, this essay has demonstrated how white fragility and white solidarity emerge as forms of resistance to the acknowledgement of white privilege, and act to shift the cause of modern inequality onto other social issues and

categories. In the context of education, white privilege is reproduced and communicated through the notions of meritocracy and colour-blindness, coded language, and racial stereotypes. As such, white privilege affects both the structural aspects of education—such as educational policies, curricula, and admission processes—and the experiences of individual students and educators—due to disproportionate representation and race-based assumptions. Overall, white privilege exists in relation to the oppression of racial minorities, which is exemplified by the education system. Thus, it is important to recognise how white privilege is practised and reproduced in the context of education, as educational settings are a key focal point where white privilege can be successfully uncovered and challenged.

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Transnational Asia: Challenges and Possibilities

Tyler Scholtz

Japan's 21st Century Refugee Crisis: A Forced PLA Military Reunification of Taiwan and China

Introduction

Taiwan's de-facto independence is at the forefront of national security concerns for several global actors within the Asia-Pacific region. As reported by Reuters (2020), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is resorting to "grey-zone warfare" to subdue Taiwan into reunification by exhausting their military, and by extension their economy, ideally without firing a single shot. Xi Jinping has made it clear a reunified Taiwan is one of his top priorities, with his administration currently not ruling out the possibility of a military annexation by the People's Liberation Army (PLA), leaving Tokyo very concerned (Shih, 2020). Reporting outlets and think tanks relating to Taiwanese/Asia-Pacific security tend to focus on the implications of a reunified Taiwan, but few focus specifically on the transnational consequences of a military invasion, usually citing it too unlikely due to Taiwan's readiness for such an event. Hence, I wish to investigate what seems a largely neglected externality in the event of a hypothetical PLA military invasion; the possibility of a large influx of Taiwanese refugees arriving at Japan's shores.

Taiwanese political analyst, Sanderson's (2019) article for *The Diplomat* intrigued me regarding the possibility of Taiwanese fleeing the island in the event of a PLA invasion, and where they would go. Sanderson argues that by virtue of geographic proximity, historical linkages, and cultural similarities, Japan is likely to be the ideal place for Taiwanese to resettle. However, Japan is known for its poor contribution in resettling displaced peoples. Speculations as to why Japan's immigration policy is so shockingly poor involves Tokyo's fear of conflict with North Korea (Chan, 2018).

In my research, I aim to expand on Sanderson's proposal to examine the extent to which Taiwanese may flee to Japan en-masse, Japan's response, and the various consequences to Japan for such an unprecedented migration. By analysing Taiwan's historical and cultural linkages to Japan and Japan's plan for a potential North Korean refugee crisis, I aim to discuss the feasibility of this Taiwanese refugee crisis and predict Japan's response. This includes the routes Taiwanese may take, potential challenges along the way, the extent of allied (US) support, and how well Taiwanese can be accepted into Japanese society. Finally, I will make recommendations on how Japan could improve national security protocol to better prepare for this potential crisis.

Why Japan is the Destination of Choice

Taiwan was annexed by Imperial Japan following the 1895 Sino-Japanese War and was ruled until 1945 (Peng-Er, 2004). 50 years of rule by the Japanese empire set historical and cultural foundations for the relationship between the two states. Despite initial resistance to colonial rule, the Japanese empire significantly improved infrastructure and promoted economic growth. Peng-Er (2004, p. 251) notes that most senior Taiwanese politicians at the time were educated under the Japanese system, with many retaining the "language and a strong cultural affinity for Japan." Despite being "second-class" colonial subjects, in hindsight, Japanese imperial rule was generally more favoured by Taiwanese than their subsequent "occupier" the Kuomintang (KMT) mainlanders (Peng-Er, 2004, p. 251). Corruption, lack of law and order, and the 1947 "incident" where the KMT massacred 10,000–50,000 Taiwanese made Japanese rule less abhorrent by comparison. Scholar of Taiwan affairs, Huang Chih-huei, further notes "Taiwanese people's resistance to the KMT was the primary cause of their seemingly paradoxical pro-Japan attitude" (Peng-Er 2004, p. 251). Japan's industrial development has also led Taiwan to industrialise into an advanced capitalist economy.

In the 21st century, Japanese influence on Taiwanese society can still be seen; there remains a sense of allegiance to Japan amongst older Taiwanese, further aiding ties. Most Taiwanese

youth are heavy consumers of Japanese media and view Japan positively. Japan's soft-power diplomacy also has a significant influence: J-pop, Japanese cuisine, variety programmes, and adult content reportedly instil specific consumer tastes in Taiwanese youth (Peng-Er, 2004). Taiwanese affinity to American culture also serves as an essential cultural fusion between their allegiance to Japan and the West, as Japan underwent significant westernisation following their US occupation. For Japanese, a majority have positive images of Taiwan, especially as Taiwan has rarely criticised Tokyo for colonial atrocities or demanded apologies. Following Prime Minister (PM) Junichiro Koizumi's controversial 2002 visit to *gokoku* Yasukuni Shrine, Taiwan's Foreign Minister called for tolerance despite criticism from other neighbours. In an official statement, he asserted: "Although we cannot forget history, we must face it with a spirit of tolerance; Taiwan approves of Japan's efforts in recent years to play a positive role in promoting peace in the Asia-Pacific" (Peng-Er 2004, p. 252). Reasoning for Taiwan's lack of criticism stems from the Japanese colonial era, especially considering Taiwan was Imperial Japan's first annexation. Taiwan served as a springboard for Japan's subsequent expansion into the Korean Peninsula and Mainland China. Hence, the extent to which Taiwan aided Japan's invasion of Asia was rather significant, especially as Taiwan benefitted economically from Japanese rule.

Overall, Tokyo's relationship with Taipei is multidimensional with a shared colonial history and a mutual allegiance for a US-dominated Pacific. The relationship between Taiwan and Japan and their geographical proximity leads to only one conclusion—Japan will become the destination of choice in the event of conflict.

Japan's Plan for a North Korean Refugee Crisis

The question of a PLA military invasion of Taiwan is not the only fear which has brought national security concerns to Tokyo in recent decades. Since the 1990s, Japan has feared a potential conflict involving North Korea. Multiple missile tests aimed at the Sea of Japan were conducted in May of 1994. That same year, North Korea's ambassador to India, Cha Song-ju, told *Yonhap News* that their "nuclear arms, if developed, would be primarily designed to contain Japan" (CNS, 2021). Japanese defence agencies became increasingly concerned about possible North Korean missile attacks, guerrilla incursions, and a refugee crisis (Hughes, 1996). Kwan-soo's (2017) report compiled for the *Korean Journal of Defence Analysis* also provides further insight into North Korean refugees entering Japan. Of an estimated 1.2 million refugees, only 3,600 are likely to flee to Japan (Kwan-soo, 2017). However, most will not stay in Japan as many are likely seeking a re-route to South Korea—only those with family members in Japan are likely to resettle permanently. Most North Korean escapees to Japan are currently sent to South Korea as per their wishes (BBC, 2011).

Regarding a hypothetical North Korean crisis, Deputy Prime Minister Aso Taro states "it is the cabinet's job to think of an emergency response" (Japan Times, 2017). According to government sources, Tokyo is also concerned with North Korean agents "blending in" with refugees (Little, 2017). In 1994, the US military and Japanese Self-Defence Force (JSDF) drew counter-measure plans in the event of such a crisis; the specifics of these compiled plans remain confidential. However, news of these plans has come out following Trump's visit to Tokyo in early 2017. From what we know, Japan has been steadily reinforcing its coast guard patrol and looking to private fishing boats and coastal city residents to keep watch (Little, 2017). When a refugee is intercepted, they are reportedly transported to the nearest port where background and criminal checks are conducted. Those who are not deemed a security risk will undergo quarantine at "provisional reception facilities" (Little, 2017).

Japan's North Korean Scenario Applied: Routes and Logistics of a Taiwanese Escape

Tokyo's naval security is indirectly tied to Taipei via the 1997 US-Japan treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation (Sanderson, 2019). As Japan is heavily reliant on resource and energy imports via the Taiwanese Strait, US and JSDF naval forces are likely to increase concentration surrounding the seas west of Taiwan and the southern Japanese islands of Yonaguni and Ishigaki to protect shipping interests. Hence, ongoing US-Chinese armed conflict for Pacific dominance can potentially displace millions of Taiwanese over many years. As previously noted, Tokyo's existing fear that North Korean spies could "blend in" with regular displaced people will likely extend to CCP agents aiming to blend in with Taiwanese refugees. As nearby Okinawan US military bases will be a crucial military hub in war with China, it is likely for Tokyo to undergo extensive screening of arrivals to find CCP-empathisers who aim to undermine allied defence efforts.

Taiwan currently has an estimated 23.8 million residents, with 78.9% living in urban areas and 7.8 million in Taipei (Worldometer, 2021). Over 90% of Taiwan's population resides in the mainland-facing West, suggesting those not residing on the northern/southern ports are likely to cross the mountainous terrain to the east for a better chance in avoiding PLA vessels. As official military documents simulating such a crisis remain classified, the following figures regarding potential refugees are estimates at best. In the wake of an incoming Chinese invasion, Sanderson (2019) argues those with the financial resources to flee will do so. Sanderson further notes that around 65% of Taiwanese do not believe their military can fend off a Chinese invasion; hence, most will flee in the weeks following the beginning of a conflict. Given these numbers, it is estimated that over 30-40% of Taiwan's population may attempt to flee. At its closest point, Japan's island of Yonaguni sits approximately 120 kilometres from port town Yilang and 150 kilometres from Taipei. Yonaguni features a small runway and a port which may house some refugees or act as a midway point as safe passage to the Okinawan capital Naha. The closest foreign port other than Japan is Manila located over 1000 kilometres away—too dangerous and far to be a feasible route. Based on population density figures, we can roughly estimate of evacuees that ~40% will come from the northern points of Taipei, a further ~40% making the mountainous trek from the populous east to the western ports of Yilang and Hualien counties, and a final ~20% via southern Kaohsiung country.



Potential Taiwanese escape routes (Google Maps, Photoshop).

Escapees from the northern/western coasts of Taiwan are likely to head to Yonaguni as an interim point before carrying on to the main Okinawan island for better protection. As the northern route intersects with the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, there may be increased PLA naval presence. On the other hand, those fleeing from the south are likely to make the longer journey to Ishigaki Island before continuing to Naha. Furthermore, the US military bases are likely to be a significant source of temporary refuge. US military and JSDF presence in the seas west of Taiwan are expected to serve as an escort to the Japanese islands where the refugees can be processed.

Mass-Taiwanese Migration: How Japan Can Integrate & Recommendations

Regarding Tokyo's short-term and long-term responses to a Taiwanese resettlement in Japan are where Sanderson and I differ in opinion. I do agree that Japan is currently ill-equipped to deal specifically with a refugee crisis, but Sanderson fails to acknowledge Japan's excellent general disaster relief capabilities along with the extent at which the US can assist. Despite international criticism of Japan's lacklustre Covid-19 response coupled with the go-ahead of the delayed Tokyo 2020 Summer Olympics, Japan has historically demonstrated excellent crisis response competencies. The rapid post-war rebuilding of Japanese cities following allied fire and nuclear bombings, the 1995 Great Hanshin earthquake, and the 2011 "triple disaster" have all contributed to Japan being regarded as one of the best countries prepared for disaster (Pollmann, 2015). In a 2015 statement, PM Shinzo Abe pledged funding to train a team of 40,000 people in disaster preparedness, further highlighting Japan's ability to mobilise civilians during times of crisis (Pollmann, 2015). In addition, the Biden administration recently announced a new Pentagon task force on Taiwan; this follows the 2021 Taiwan Relations Act being written into US law which aims to stop a forceful reunification of China and Taiwan (Davidson, 2021).

Despite evident economic strain to Japan due to this potential refugee crisis, I cannot entirely agree that there is little hope of integration. Sanderson (2019) argues that Taiwanese asylum seekers will be "transformed by national media and popular culture into economic scapegoats." While this may be the case in the short-term, it is easy to doubt long-term economic concerns. Since the 1980s, Japan has been battling with the existential threat of its ageing population situation, in recent years focusing on tourism, foreign migration, and technology to combat the crisis (OECD, 2018). Taiwan boasts similar levels of literacy rates to Japan, and more Taiwanese hold some form of tertiary degree than Japanese (Hsueh, 2018). High-value immigrants will bring much needed long-term stimulus to a stagnating Japanese economy, and Taiwanese are likely the highest value of migrants to aid Japan's declining population.

During a potential war with China, economic mismanagement and social unrest are likely to strain public opinion of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), of which an opposing party may capitalise on. Historically, the few times that the LDP has lost majority control of the Diet were in favour of progressive socialist parties—suggesting if the LDP lose support, a party more sympathetic toward Taiwanese refugees is likely to take control. When compounded with a growing positive sentiment of foreigners and multiculturalism amongst younger Japanese, Taiwanese refugees will likely have positive long-term integration prospects (Stockwell, 2020).

Taiwan's Overseas Community Affairs Council (2013) estimates 300,000 ethnic Taiwanese descendants live in Japan, tracing back from colonial rule. Japanese government statistics provide there are 63,000 Taiwanese immigrants currently holding residency status in Japan (e-Stat, 2020). Overall, ethnic/mixed Taiwanese make up approximately 0.29% of the Japanese population and are one of Japan's top ten most populous minority groups. Hence, Taiwanese diaspora communities in Japan are likely to reduce the strain of refugee's cultural integration

into urban Japanese society. Additionally, as previously acknowledged by Peng-Er (2004), many of younger generation Taiwanese feel a strong cultural tie to the US, suggesting some may look to the States for permanent relocation after arriving in Japan. It is likely for the US to provide relocation support to some of these Taiwanese to further aid its ally Japan, similar to how Washington passed a bill in December 2020 to expedite Hong Kong resettlement in the US following widespread crackdown on protesters (Elegant, 2020).

Overall, the geopolitical landscape seems somewhat optimistic for Taiwanese wishing resettlement in Japan. However, Japan currently lacks appropriate resources to approach a refugee crisis. Mizorogi (2021) from *Nikkei Asia* reports that LDP legislators are seeking to create new defence laws that echo the recent 2021 US Taiwan Relations Act; but without appropriate consideration of a refugee plan, any law Tokyo passes will be ill-equipped. Hence, I wish to provide suggestions for a comprehensive Japanese response to Taiwanese refugees. First, the Japanese government must create an agency to plan and respond to refugees; especially monitoring the islands of Okinawa, through which refugees are expected to travel. This new agency should make detailed preparations such as arranging accommodation, food, related necessary goods, and the establishment of administrative support systems. US-Japan collaboration regarding Taiwanese refugees should be strengthened to minimise the strain put on local economies and resources. Furthermore, US-Japan intelligence collaboration must be strengthened and should improve observations for signs of mass refugee displacement at early stages. Finally, relocation agreements should be negotiated between Japan, the US, and other allies to lower the strain on Japan.

Concluding Remarks

Japan will become the country of choice for millions of Taiwanese fleeing their homes in the wake of a Chinese invasion. Historical ties, cultural similarities, and geographical proximity play prominent roles in determining Japan as the ideal place of resettlement. Despite lacking experience with a large influx of refugees and their recent mismanagement of the ongoing pandemic, Tokyo does have decades of experience planning for human displacement caused by disaster. I disagree with Sanderson's (2019) suggestion that Japan is fundamentally ill-equipped to deal with a refugee crisis, pointing to Japan's world-renowned disaster relief capabilities from its experience of typhoons, tsunamis, earthquakes, and nuclear meltdowns. Furthermore, allied US support is guaranteed in such a situation to maintain status-quo power in the Pacific. Taiwanese are the perfect candidates to fill the high-skilled worker gap in Japan's ageing population and weakened LDP support in a time of economic instability is likely to favour a majority party more sympathetic to Taiwanese. Compounded with a growing positive sentiment of young Japanese regarding multiculturalism and diversity, we can expect long-term integration to play out relatively well.

Further Research

To better understand the bigger picture for Japan in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, further research should be conducted regarding the effect of such a conflict on Tokyo-Beijing relations. In addition, research should be done regarding how displaced Taiwanese may battle with their identity and the possibility of discrimination based on a growing neo-nationalist sentiment in Japan, with consideration of historical discrimination of *zainichi* Taiwanese. A final research recommendation lies in whether the implications of a US-China conflict in the Pacific may create a shake-up for Japan's longstanding constitutional pacifism.

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Comics and Visual Narrative

Ivy Yang

From Repressed Desire to Significant Subculture: Reflecting and Shaping Japanese Society through *Bōizu Rabu* Manga

CONTENT WARNING: This article contains mention of suicide.

Manga, or Japanese comics, are a significant part of Japanese popular culture because they have the ability to both reflect and shape Japanese society. By focusing on the genre of Boys Love manga, I argue in the first part of this essay that manga reflects the reality of Japanese society by reproducing conventional norms. Through the interpretation of Shungiku Nakamura's *Hybrid Child* (2005), I find that the contents of these "revolutionary" Boys Love manga have actually affirmed the dominant social and gender norms in contemporary Japanese society. In the second part of this essay, I argue that Boys Love manga also shaped Japanese society by contributing to the creation of *yaoi dōjinshi*, the practice of *yaoi megane* and the formation of the *fujoshi* community as significant subcultures. Using Hidekaz Himaruya's *Axis Power Hetalia* (2006) as an example, I argue that these predominantly female-driven subcultures are so influential that they have extended beyond its origin of Boys Love manga to manga genres directed at a male audience, and have influenced the Japanese convergence culture in a positive way.

Boys Love manga, also known as *bōizu rabu*, BL or *shōnen ai* manga, are comics that focus on romantic affairs between "beautiful boys," produced by female authors and targeting a predominantly female audience (Suter, 2013). Boys Love (BL) manga is a subgenre of *shōjo* manga (manga for young girls), developed in the 1970s by the *24nengumi*, a group of female manga authors who were born around the 24th year of the *Shōwa* period (Shamoon, 2008). They attempted to reform the *shōjo* manga genre by subverting the existing gender norms, shifting the focus from girls and their experiences onto romance between boy protagonists (Suter, 2013). However, the introduction of boy protagonists in *shōjo* manga is highly controversial. Critics have pointed out that the BL genre reflects the inability for girls to expressively reveal their desire in a patriarchal society, where their image as pure and innocent *shōjo* forces them to project their repressed desire onto the male protagonists (Matsui, 1993). The visual representation of the boy protagonists by the *24nengumi* were highly feminised, which enabled the female readers to associate themselves with the boy protagonist as their "displaced selves" (Matsui, 1993). Therefore, creating and reading BL manga has become a safe way for women to escape the conventional gender norms imposed by society, satisfying their romantic and sexual fantasies while maintaining the physical purity required of a *shōjo* under patriarchal views (Shamoon, 2008).

The intention of producing BL manga might be to challenge conventional gender norms. However, the content of these BL manga seems to run counter to this intention, by reproducing the heteronormative attitudes of Japanese society where same-sex relationships remain forbidden. This is evident in the works by the *24nengumi* in the 1970s, where the stories are generally set in the borrowed space of a romanticised Europe, visually transporting the readers to a fantasised world where same-sex desires and interest in sexuality was relatively less oppressed than in Japan (Welker, 2006). This Occidentalism in BL manga is still evident in the relatively recent work, *Hybrid Child* by Shungiku Nakamura (2005). It contains three short stories about the Hybrid Child, an android that develops emotional bonds with its owner and can grow if it receives love and care in return. Although set hundreds of years in the past (late Edo–early Meiji era Japan), the androids in the comic appear in western-style shirts and suits, whereas their human owners always wear traditional Japanese *hakama*. This contrast in visual style reflects the period of Meiji Restoration in Japanese history when western ideas and technologies were first introduced into Japan after a long period of isolation. It also suggests to the readers that because the androids are products of western technologies, they are not restricted by traditional Japanese norms and are allowed to develop romantic relationships with

their owners. The fact that in all stories it was the androids who chase after their human owners and pursuing love also reflects the common attitude that Japanese men are supposed to repress their feelings towards someone of the same sex. The use of exotic elements such as the western style clothing and androids in *Hybrid Child* is a narrative strategy used by Nakamura which enables readers to remove themselves from these social and gender norms of contemporary Japan, and to experience this “forbidden” love in a fantastical space (Suter, 2013).

Another common feature of the early BL manga was that the stories tend to end with the tragic death of one of the lovers, which is seemingly reflective of the antagonistic attitudes towards homosexual relationships in Japanese society. The same reflection of attitude is evident in *Hybrid Child*, despite the manga being produced in 2005, under a social context which was supposed to be relatively more open than the 1970s. Nakamura has deliberately made clear the contrast between the first two stories, featuring two happy-ended love stories between the androids and their human owners, and the third story, which is the only tragedy within the three. The third story can be read as a reflection of conventional Japanese attitudes towards homosexuality. Within the three short stories, it is the only story concerning love relationships between two human characters, Kuroda, the creator of the androids, and his deceased lover Tsukishima, who committed *seppuku* (cutting the belly, a form of Japanese ritual suicide) as part of his duty to restore honour to his defeated clan in the war. Tsukishima’s tragic death and the fact that the two characters haven’t got the chance to confess their feelings towards each other seems to suggest that homosexual relationships are forbidden and bound to be tragic in a heteronormative society.

Other than reflecting social norms and attitudes, BL manga also shapes Japanese society by contributing to the creation of *yaoi dōjinshi*, the practice of “*yaoi megane*,” and the formation of the *fujoshi* community as significant female-driven subcultures. These subcultures have remarkably influenced the Japanese convergence culture. *Dōjinshi* refers to self-produced, self-published comics by fans based on the plot and characters of an original manga (McLelland & Welker, 2015). These derivative works are distributed within small circles between like-minded fans outside of the commercial sphere (Hemmann, 2015). Manga created by the *24nengumi* authors in the 1970s has fostered the distribution of *dōjinshi*, and it was within these *dōjinshi* circles where the genre of *yaoi* was created. The term *yaoi* is an acronym for “*yama nashi, ochi nashi, imi nashi*,” literally translated as “no climax, no point, no meaning” (McLelland & Welker, 2015). This term has first come into use in 1979 by the creators of BL *dōjinshi* in a self-mocking way, to indicate that these derivative works mainly focus on the graphic representation of homoerotic relationships between men, and pays little attention to the plot development (Suter, 2013). These *yaoi dōjinshi* came into public attention through its association with the Comic Market, a publicized event that provided amateur artists a place for selling and distributing *dōjinshi* (Welker, 2015). The first Comic Market was held in 1975, a year after Hagio Moto’s most renowned BL manga *The Heart of Thomas* (1974) was published, and 90 percent of the participants at this first event were female readers enamoured with works by Hagio and other *24nengumi* authors (Welker, 2015). By the mid-2000s, the Comic Market had become a mass annual event, with total attendance exceeding 500,000 over each three-day event (Welker, 2015). This reveals the influence that early BL manga had on the creation of *yaoi dōjinshi* as a new genre, and the distribution of these *dōjinshi* as a significant form of subculture.

The consumption of commercial BL manga and the popularisation of fan-created *yaoi dōjinshi* has led to the establishment of the *fujoshi* community as a female-driven subcultural outgrowth of the dominant *otaku* culture (Lessard, 2019). *Fujoshi* is a gender-specific, self-critical term

referring to a social type constructed through a variety of media representation, which literally means “rotten or depraved women/girls” (Hester, 2015). The term refers both to producers and consumers of *yaoi dōjinshi*, but the original work of these parodies has extended from commercial BL manga and novels to other genres, such as the mainstream commercial *shōnen* manga (manga for young boys), webcomics, original animation, and other parts of the entertainment world (Hester, 2015). An example is Hidekaz Himaruya’s *Axis Power Hetalia* (2006), a historical comedy manga by a male author marketed toward *seinen* (young adult men) audiences, but has nevertheless became the most adapted work by *fujoshi* fans in the form of *yaoi dōjinshi* (Miyake, 2012). These *fujoshi* fans reframe the homosocial interactions between male characters as homosexual through “*yaoi megane*” (*yaoi* glasses) (Neville, 2020). This term refers to the practice of reinterpreting gender-hegemonic narratives through the lenses of a “queer gaze”; it is a mode of interpretation that challenges the dominant gender norms by imagining alternative possibilities in a homosexual way (Lessard, 2019).

In the case of *Hetalia*, the original manga personified the countries around the world into manga characters, presenting a graphic allegory of historic and political events as well as drawing cultural comparisons through the interactions between the personified countries. The *fujoshi* fan are able to see homosexual dynamics between these characters through the *yaoi megane*. For example, a *fujoshi* may find the character Britain having a strongly mixed feelings towards America, whom he raised from a small child (referring to the history of the United States used to be a British colony), but later fought for his independence against Britain and won. Through the *yaoi megane*, the *fujoshi* fan reinterpreted the American War of Independence as the beginning of the love-hate relationship between the two characters. The *fujoshi* fans employed the queer gaze to create their own interpretations of back stories about the war, and share their interpretations with other like-minded fans through self-produced *dōjinshi*. In a way, this queer interpretation of the relationships between male characters by the *fujoshi* fans creatively subverted the dominant gender norms implicit in many manga narratives targeted at a male audience (Hemmann, 2015).

These creative interpretations offered by the fan-created *dōjinshi* have affected the Japanese understanding of convergence culture, which is based on a ‘media mix’ model. The term ‘media mix’ describes the development of a particular media franchise across multiple media types by Japanese media producers (Hemmann, 2015). For example, apart from the original manga, *Hetalia* has also been developed into net animation, movie, video games, drama CDs and even musicals. The Japanese media producers allow and encourage *dōjinshi* to exist as part of the media mix, because these fan works fuel the enthusiasm of readers to explore more about the original work, as well as purchasing officially licensed products, which will allow the media mix to flourish (Hemmann, 2015). Moreover, the producers depend on the creators of *dōjinshi* as primary shapers of market opinion to discover profitable trends (Hamann, 2015). Sometimes, these fan activities are even able to change the manner in which the story of the original manga is written and produced in Japan (Hemmann, 2015). Manga shapes Japanese society in a positive way by introducing fan-generated subcultures like the distribution of *dōjinshi* into the media mix, which has made the Japanese convergence culture more progressive than most other countries in terms of facilitating audience participation, and has made other media cultures begin to follow the Japanese media mix model (Hemmann, 2015).

Manga reflects the reality of Japanese society by reproducing conventional gender and social norms. Female authors and readers of manga have tried to subvert the existing gender norms by producing and consuming BL manga. However, contrary to their intention, the contents of these BL manga have in fact affirmed the dominant social and gender norms in contemporary

Japanese society. On the other hand, BL manga shapes Japanese society by contributing to the creation of *yaoi dōjinshi*, the practice of *yaoi megane* and the formation of the *fujoshi* community as significant female-driven subcultures. As these subcultures and practices gained more recognition and influence, their incorporation into the Japanese media mix turned them into significant driving forces for the manga industry and an important progressive element in the Japanese convergence culture.

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Social Justice

Sophie Shrimpton

Three's (Not) A Crowd: A Rawlsian Perspective of Bigamy

Relationship structures in the Western world are rapidly becoming more diverse. 8% of adults participate in consensual non-monogamous relationships, and that proportion is steadily increasing (Levine, Herbenick, Martinez, Fu, & Dodge, 2018). However, bigamy is still criminalised in New Zealand. This essay evaluates whether it is legitimate and just, in a politically liberal society, to prevent people from legally marrying more than one person. I find that it is not.

Rawls' theory of justice idealises a fair, democratic society made up of free and equal citizens. His political liberalism and theory of justice as fairness establishes criteria for the legitimate and just exercise of political power. In the first part of this essay, I provide background information about bigamy and non-monogamy. Throughout the essay I assume that a politically liberal New Zealand would legitimately recognise legal marriage, therefore restricting my discussion to marriage's extension to non-monogamous relationship structures (Hartley & Watson, 2012). In the second part, I discuss Rawls' larger vision for political liberalism and whether criminalisation of bigamy is compatible with that vision. I find that it is not; therefore, criminalisation of bigamy is an illegitimate use of political power. In the third part, I will examine whether criminalisation of bigamy is compatible with Rawls' principles of justice. I will find that it is incompatible with two of the principles, and therefore criminalisation of bigamy is also unjust. Consequently, criminalisation of bigamy is both illegitimate and unjust in a Rawlsian liberal democratic state. Bigamy should not be banned in New Zealand.

A Brief Overview of Bigamy

Before applying Rawlsian theories to determine whether bigamy should be banned, we need a clear picture of what bigamy is. Bigamy is a criminal offence in New Zealand (Crimes Act 1961, s 206). It is defined as the act of marrying or entering a civil union with a third person, or marrying or entering a civil union with someone who is already in a marriage or civil union (Crimes Act 1961, s 205(1)). For New Zealand citizens, this includes people within New Zealand and overseas (Crimes Act 1961, s 205(c) and (d)). Anyone who commits bigamy may be liable to imprisonment for up to seven years (Crimes Act 1961, s 206). Therefore, there is a broad, but strict, regime criminalising entering a marriage or civil union with more than one person. For the sake of brevity, I will refer only to marriage throughout this essay. However, the same principles apply to civil unions.

The criminalisation of bigamy primarily impacts two communities: religious polygamists and secular polyamorists. Both are forms of non-monogamy. Non-monogamy is the umbrella term for a wide variety of relationship structures that involve intimate, romantic, or sexual relationships between more than two people (Emens, 2004). Polygamy is the marriage of more than two people. This can take the form of polygyny (man with multiple wives), polyandry (woman with multiple husbands), or a mixture of diverse gender identities. Religious polygamists are those who choose to marry more than one person because of the dictates of their faith. Secular polyamorists are those who choose to be in committed romantic relationships with more than one person, regardless of their faith. Secular polyamorists may want to be married to their partners for a variety of reasons. For example, to express a public commitment to a significant relationship, access a bundle of rights, cement legal obligations towards each other, and so on. However, the criminalisation of bigamy in New Zealand prevents both religious polygamists and secular polyamorists from entering into marriages with more than one person.

Political Liberalism

Criminalisation of bigamy is only a legitimate exercise of political power if it is compatible with Rawls' theory of political liberalism. Political liberalism requires political power to be exercised "in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason" (Rawls, 1993). Criminalisation of bigamy cannot be justified because it aligns with a conception of the good that only endorses monogamous marriage, because imposing a single comprehensive doctrine on the public would not be reasonably endorsed by all and is an oppressive use of state power (Rawls, 1993). In other words, bigamy cannot be legitimately criminalised merely because the majority believes it is immoral, incorrect, or wrong. Rather, criminalisation of bigamy needs to be a mutually acceptable rule compatible with ideas implicit in the public political culture (Rawls, 1993). Therefore, in a democratic society such as New Zealand, criminalisation must contribute to respecting citizens as free and equal, and ensuring society is a fair system of cooperation (Rawls, 1993).

Under the above criteria, criminalisation of bigamy is not legitimate. The decision to be monogamous or non-monogamous is part of an individual's conception of the good. People should be free to pursue their individual conception of the good, as long as it does not undermine the equality or freedom of others, or the fair system of cooperation in society. Diverse relationship structures do not have any bearing on the freedom or equality of others. Therefore, the state should not exercise its political power to criminalise certain relationship structures (non-monogamy) or validate and incentivise others (monogamy) through institutionalisation. If it does so, it is imposing some people's preferred comprehensive doctrine on others, which is illegitimate. Additionally, given polygamy does not inherently strive to use coercive political power to impose conformity on citizens with different beliefs (e.g. forcing monogamists to become polygamists), it is a reasonable comprehensive doctrine and can be accepted.

Another reason it is illegitimate to criminalise bigamy is because it undermines the three ideas implicit in the public political culture of any liberal democracy: free and equal citizens in a system of fair co-operation. These ideas are developed within my analysis of Rawls' principles of justice below, however, even a cursory analysis of the ideas in their raw form demonstrates that criminalisation of bigamy is illegitimate. Secular polyamorists who wish to be married are not treated as equal citizens when bigamy is criminalised, as their partnerships cannot acquire the same legal status, or access the same attendant bundle of rights, as monogamous married partners can. This political and social inequality means that those who are non-monogamous are viewed by themselves and by others as inferior, which undermines their status as an equal citizen (Rawls, 2001). Criminalisation of bigamy also restricts the negative and positive liberty of secular polyamorists. In terms of negative liberty, they are not free to pursue legal marriages with more than one person, despite the lack of harm it does to others (Berlin, 2002). In terms of positive liberty, non-monogamists are prevented from accessing the same bundles of rights as monogamists, and therefore from developing themselves and their relationships to their full potential (Berlin, 2002). Though some liberties can be legitimately restricted in some circumstances to pursue equality and other liberties, restriction in this case does not result in increased equality or liberty for any other person or group of people. Therefore, *prima facie*, criminalisation of bigamy does not respect non-monogamists as free and equal citizens, and is an illegitimate legal rule.

The criminalisation of bigamy does not meet the basic requirements of political liberalism; therefore, it is not a legitimate exercise of political power. If the rule does not meet the lower threshold of legitimacy, it will not meet the higher threshold of justice. Rawls' principles of justice are merely a more specific enunciation of the values of political liberalism. Nonetheless, I will analyse criminalisation of bigamy against those principles to demonstrate the extent of its injustice.

Justice as Fairness

To determine whether the criminalisation of bigamy is just, we must assess it according to Rawls' theory of justice as fairness. The first step in applying Rawls' theory is determining whether bigamy is something that falls within the scope of the theory. Principles of justice apply to New Zealand as it is a liberal, democratic society. However, the principles of justice are only applied to the arrangement of the basic structure. The basic structure consists of the major political and social institutions of a liberal society which have a profound and pervasive effect on the lives of citizens, as they distribute the main benefits and burdens of social life (Rawls, 2001). This includes the legal system. The criminalisation of bigamy is a feature of the legal system, and therefore can be evaluated according to the principles of justice (Rawls, 2001).

I will now determine whether the principles of justice support criminalisation of bigamy through the method of wide reflective equilibrium. This requires us to determine what specific judgment about the criminalisation of bigamy will cohere with the fixed, abstract principles of justice, to strive for reflective equilibrium. The closer we get to cohesive reflective equilibrium, the more justified the law on bigamy is. Though the method of wide reflective equilibrium usually uses provisional fixed points, in this case I use permanently fixed points—the principles of justice. This allows us to determine whether criminalisation of bigamy adheres to a specific theory of justice, and the constitutive principles of justice of that theory must be fixed points which we reason from. The principles of justice are lexically ordered, so I will analyse them each in turn. If even one of the principles are not met, the criminalisation of bigamy is not just.

The first principle of justice is that each “person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all” (Rawls, 2001, pp. 42–43). There are two rights relevant to this debate: the right to marry, and religious rights. The right to marry is a basic right implicit in New Zealand public political culture. This is demonstrated by New Zealand's ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which codifies the right to marry (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, art 23). Rawls also assumes that legal marriage in some form will be part of any politically liberal society (Rawls, 1997). The right to marry should be equally available to monogamous and non-monogamous people. Non-monogamists deserve to have equal access to the benefits of marriage because relationship structure is a morally arbitrary attribute akin to sexuality, gender, and race. People do not deserve to have more or less benefits of social cooperation merely because of their relationship status. To limit the right to marry based on relationship status would be to introduce arbitrary inequality of rights into the law, which is not just under the first principle. Therefore, non-monogamists have an equal right to marry more than one person.

Religious rights are also infringed by the criminalisation of bigamy. Religious rights are implicit in New Zealand public political culture as indicated by codification within the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. Article 15 states that “[...] every person has the right to manifest that person's religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, or teaching, either individually

or in community with others, and either in public or in private” (New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 15). Indiscriminate criminalisation of bigamy violates the religious freedom of those who see polygamy as an integral part of their religious observance and practice. This includes people from a variety of religions, including the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Weber, 2019), Islam (Jawad, 1998), evangelical Christianity (Baloyi, 2013), and Zoroastrianism (Crone, 1994). A person has the right to marry multiple people for religious reasons under the right to manifest their religion. Therefore, criminalisation of bigamy is unjust.

Two objections are commonly raised at this point. First, a person should not be able to marry multiple people because it infringes religious doctrine and therefore religious rights (*Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 1993). Second, non-monogamy is structurally discriminatory against women, in violation of freedom from discrimination (New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 19; Human Rights Act 1993, s 21). Both are invalid claims under Rawls’ conception of justice as they involve imposing certain comprehensive doctrines, such as monogamous religiosity and gender-equal personal relationships, on individuals. Even if they are framed as human rights arguments, rights to religious freedoms and expressions do not protect the right of religious people to determine how others should structure their relationships, but their rights to act according to their personal religious doctrines (New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 15). Therefore, religious monogamists are free to decline to participate in non-monogamy but are unable to prevent others from doing so.

Additionally, non-monogamous marriage is not discriminatory against women because freedom from discrimination applies to public acts, not to private relationships (New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 3). Although legalisation of bigamy is a public act, human rights claims would be directed towards specific discriminatory relationships, not the law in abstract. The oppression of women is not inherent to non-monogamous relationships; therefore, the anti-discrimination provision cannot be applied to the law in abstract (Calhoun, 2005). Women can be oppressed within both monogamous and non-monogamous relationship structures; non-monogamy does not inherently produce oppression. Therefore, the concern would be directed towards a discriminatory individual, not the structure itself.

Criminalisation of bigamy is unjust because it infringes the right to marry and religious rights, which violates the first principle of Rawls’ principles of justice. Infringing one principle is sufficient for the policy to be unjust—however, I will analyse its compatibility with the second principle to demonstrate the extent of injustice.

Rawls’ second principle has two parts. The first part requires social and economic inequalities “to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls, 2001, 42–43). This principle ensures citizens with the same talents and willingness to use them have the same educational and economic opportunities (Rawls, 2001). Discrimination on the basis of marital status is prohibited in New Zealand (Human Rights Act 1993, s 21(b)). Consequently, non-monogamous people will not be explicitly prejudiced when striving for public positions. Criminalisation of bigamy will not influence fair equality of opportunity, therefore does not infringe this principle.

The second part of Rawls’ second principle requires social and economic inequalities “to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society” (Rawls, 2001). This requires us to determine who is worst-off, and whether their position will be improved by criminalisation or legalisation of bigamy. Two hypothetical contenders emerge: a non-monogamous person, and a person who does not want to be in a non-monogamous relationship

but is coerced into it. Academia usually presents the latter as a woman in a religious, polygynous environment (Brooks, 2012). People who are not personally involved with non-monogamy, such as those who are morally opposed to non-monogamy but are not concretely affected by it are irrelevant, because they would not be materially affected either way. This is despite any moral gratification they may get if the law accords with their views on non-monogamy; the theory is not concerned with how well the law encapsulates individual comprehensive doctrines, but whether it is politically just.

Normally, the next step would be to work out which hypothetical person is worst-off under the status quo, and whether criminalisation or legalisation of bigamy would benefit them most. It is difficult to compare harms generally, but in this specific situation it is particularly difficult given that both communities are marginalised. There is little academic literature about the harms suffered by either non-monogamous people or people who are coerced into non-monogamy, let alone quantifying and comparing them. Fortunately, if one option is better than the other option for both hypothetical people, then comparison is not necessary. That is the case here. Legalisation of bigamy benefits both non-monogamous people and people coerced into non-monogamous relationships more than criminalisation.

Legalisation of bigamy benefits non-monogamous people in two ways. First, it provides access to the bundles of rights and duties attached to marriage. Second, it normatively validates non-monogamy. The bundle of rights includes rights related to: succession, inheritance, intestacy, immigration, social security benefits, taxation, relationship property, maintenance, and custody of children. Access to these rights would provide significant social and economic benefits. For example, in 2020 the High Court of New Zealand determined the Property (Relationships) Act could not apply to three people in a polyamorous relationship with each other, but only to a couple (*Paul v Mead*, [27]). This meant that their shared family home was only split equally between two of the three members of the relationship, instead of all three, leaving one person with no economic acknowledgement of their contributions to the home (*Paul v Mead* [61]). If bigamy were legalised, that person would have had an equal portion of the home's worth, recognising their presence in and contribution to the relationship. Analogous implications would apply to the other areas listed above—non-monogamous people would have legal rights in situations where they had none before.

Legalisation of bigamy also gives normative support to non-monogamous relationships. The status quo creates a division between monogamous relationships, which are validated, and non-monogamous relationships, which are not. This social inequality means that those who are non-monogamous are viewed by themselves and by others as second-class citizens (Rawls, 2001). Legalisation gives monogamous and non-monogamous relationships equal normative status, therefore reducing the stigma experienced by non-monogamous and potentially non-monogamous people.

Some academics have expressed concern that legalising bigamy would encourage the coercion of people into participating in non-consensual, non-monogamous relationships (Baines, Barak-Erez & Kahana, 2012). Particular concern is shown for women in patriarchal religious communities. The core anxiety is that religious indoctrination and social pressure forces women to enter polygynous arrangements against their wishes, and that legalisation will encourage and normalise this (Baines, Barak-Erez & Kahana, 2012). While legalisation does provide normative validation to non-monogamy in general, it does not necessarily follow that it will encourage an increase in coercion. Coercive behaviour is distinct from non-monogamous behaviour, even if coercion can occur in non-monogamous contexts. Regardless, if polygyny

is already a strong social norm in certain communities, it is likely that any related coercion would occur whether or not bigamy is legalised. Legalisation also does not neutralise the normative support that will still exist for monogamous marriage—non-monogamy will not have a preferred normative status in law, but one equal with monogamy.

Even if legalisation incentivises more coercion, access to marriage will have a socially and economically protective effect for those who are coerced into non-monogamous relationships (Hartley & Watson, 2012). These benefits will probably outweigh any increase in coercion. Protections have been built into modern marriage to protect the socially and economically vulnerable—usually women. Legalising bigamy will allow people who are coerced into non-monogamous relationships to access a suite of protections that they otherwise would not have. For example, marriage is a site of economic redistribution. The Property (Relationships) Act ensures that the contributions of all members of the relationship, whether financial or non-financial (such as domestic labour), are taken into consideration when distributing the shared assets of the relationship after it separates (1976, s 1C(1) and 11B(2)). If bigamy is legalised and a woman is coerced into a polygynous relationship, then is forced to leave by her husband, the Property (Relationships) Act will recognise her contribution to the relationship in economic terms. If bigamy is criminalised, she would not be entitled to anything, just like the third partner in *Paul v Mead* ([27]). There are numerous analogous rights (listed above) that protect those who are vulnerable in marriages. On top of this inherent benefit, legalisation should require consent from all parties and enhanced education and support for people who are non-consensually coerced into participating in non-monogamous relationship structures. These protective benefits outweigh any potential increased coercion. Overall, legalisation is socially and economically beneficial to those who have been coerced into non-consensual non-monogamous relationships. Therefore, the second half of Rawls' second principle is infringed by criminalisation of bigamy, because it makes the least-advantaged worse-off than legalisation of bigamy.

Overall, criminalisation of bigamy is not just as it infringes two of Rawls' principles of justice: the first principle securing basic rights and the difference principle. These infringements also violate the social bases of self-respect, undermining the self-worth and confidence of non-monogamous citizens, adding insult to injury (Rawls, 2001).

Conclusion

Bigamy should not be banned in New Zealand. Criminalising bigamy is illegitimate as it undermines the ideals of political liberalism—namely a democratic society made up of free and equal citizens. It is also unjust as it infringes basic human rights and the difference principle. A Rawlsian theory of justice requires New Zealand to allow people to legally marry more than one person. There are a variety of areas that could be the subject of future research. This could include the implementation of legalisation, including how non-monogamous relationships can be embedded in the law and receive the same rights as monogamous relationships. Theoretical issues may arise around numerosity requirements and whether there should be a limit on how many people a person can marry.

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NAVIGATING PAST AND PRESENT: AOTEAROA AND THE PACIFIC

Too often, colonisation is relegated to the distant past. Yet the past and present are inextricably linked. Colonisation did not simply dissipate over time; it remains entrenched within the fabric of Aotearoa New Zealand—in our languages, institutions, and history. When reflecting on colonialism, we also cannot forget this country’s history of imperialism across the ocean against our Pacific neighbours. This section explores Aotearoa New Zealand’s tangled colonial inheritance through recourse to the past, while firmly rooting colonisation in the present as a continuous process to be resisted. However, these essays also look beyond colonisation, by critically engaging with indigenous knowledge and culture as inherently valuable for the present and future in Aotearoa and the Pacific.

This section opens with Lloyd’s sweeping analysis of the Takaparawhā Bastion Point Protest. Lloyd underscores how land occupations function as a subversive, powerful protest to the forceful removal and alienation of iwi from their land. The essay also highlights the occupation’s influence on Native American activists in Alcatraz Island, situating it within a broader international context of indigenous protest, while emphasising its unique focus and engagement. Through careful and comprehensive analysis, Lloyd argues that the Takaparawhā occupation was a successful exercise of *tino rangatiratanga*, and a powerful example of indigenous resistance to the continuous, ongoing experience of colonisation.

De Silva’s essay explores similar themes around colonisation from a different angle: New Zealand’s imperial history in the Pacific. De Silva examines the theoretical frameworks that fuelled and shaped New Zealand imperialism, specifically, racial superiority, paternalism, social Darwinism, and fatal impact theory. A candid, powerful analysis of the cruelty of New Zealand’s colonial administration of the Pacific, this essay is a searing reminder of an overlooked, too easily forgotten facet of New Zealand history. De Silva’s essay implores us to learn and remember this history, especially as New Zealand increasingly embraces its position as a leader in the Pacific.

Building upon De Silva’s exploration of imperialist ideologies in the Pacific, Nakamura Todd examines the imposition of Western knowledge in the Pacific. Nakamura Todd effortlessly weaves the specific, real-world experience of Pasifika people with abstract theory, to argue how the House of Modernity sidelines Pacific knowledge systems. The essay explores how Western knowledge eclipsed—and even deliberately suppressed—Pacific knowledge across education systems in the Pacific and abroad. Nakamura Todd underscores the rippling effects of this on Pasifika pursuing jobs or higher education. However, Nakamura Todd also offers a way forward, arguing for the continual revival and recentering of Pacific knowledge. For this to be achieved, Nakamura Todd argues that the “walls of the house [of Modernity] must shatter.”

Leaning deeper into the Pacific, Ha’unga offers a critical analysis of Purity culture in the Pacific. Ha’unga traces the roots of Purity culture to Christianity, particularly in the contrasting biblical depictions of Eve and Mary. The essay skilfully shifts from an analysis of biblical verses to a detailed exploration of Purity culture and its manifestation in contemporary Pacific communities. Ha’unga underscores the adverse impact of Purity culture on women, especially its emphasis on sexual purity and modest behaviour and dress. As argued by Ha’unga, Purity culture creates a culture of stigma around women’s sexuality and contributes to gender-based sexual violence.

Vai’s beautifully written and deeply personal essay on hybrid identity concludes this section. Vai ruminates on the privileges and tensions underpinning her hybrid New Zeangan identity, and her experience of living between two cultures. By challenging the notion of ‘authenticity’

as determinative of identity, Vai gestures towards cultural agency—the power to continuously reforge one's cultural identity with shifting contexts. Vai's essay is not only an exuberant celebration of hybrid identity, but a striking look into the complex, pluralistic identities that constitute Aotearoa New Zealand.

These essays explore and reflect the rich history and plethora of identities that make up Aotearoa New Zealand, and serve as a powerful reminder that indigenous knowledge and experience is far from static or monolithic. We hope these essays encourage you to critically engage with the past and present in Aotearoa New Zealand and the Pacific.

Jacca Chang

Politics 229

Mana Māori Motuhake / Māori Politics and Public Policy

Emily Lloyd

"Whatungarongaro te tangata, toitū te whenua": The Takaparawhā Bastion Point Protest and Land Occupation as a Path to Self Determination

The forced removal and displacement of indigenous peoples from their land is widely considered to be one of the most significant and damaging processes of colonisation. Internationally, indigenous peoples have used land occupations to protest this process. In Aotearoa New Zealand, colonisation has dismantled traditional Māori structures of communal land tenure in favour of a private, individualised model. The latter half of the 20th century saw several key land occupations in response. The longest of these was the 506-day occupation of Takaparawhā Bastion Point, from 5 January 1976 to 25 May 1977. In this essay, I shall argue for the significance of this occupation, and explore its successes and failures. Furthermore, I shall place this movement in an international context, by comparing it to the occupation of Alcatraz Island by Native American activists.

The Takaparawhā Occupation

The occupation at Takaparawhā was the culmination of a long history of dealings between Ngāti Whatua and the Crown that began in 1840. These resulted in all of Ngāti Whātua's lands being sold or otherwise alienated until the iwi was left "landless" (Walker, 1980). The catalyst for the occupation came in 1977, when the community learned of government plans to subdivide twenty-nine acres on Bastion Point. Prime Minister Robert Muldoon "held a strong view that return to the Crown should be maximised," and thus was in favour of selling the land to private developers (Morrison, 1999). Grant Hawke (in Morrison, 1999) explains that the iwi made numerous attempts to sue the Crown over the aforementioned land confiscations, but that the Courts consistently ruled that the "Crown had nothing to answer to." Therefore, Ngāti Whātua "had to look at another way of promoting [their] cause." (Hawke, in Morrison, 1999). This was made easier since this period was marked by international and local activism, and indeed, the occupation occurred two years after the historic Land Hīkoi protest march, which the occupation organisers took part in (Morrison, 1999).

The occupation began on 5 January, the day before the subdivision was drafted to begin (Harris, 2004). It was headed by the Ōrākei Māori Action Committee (OMAC), which included Joseph Hawke and Ross Stevenson. By 16 January, over thirty tents were set up, 1,200 square yards of garden dug, and over 5,000 people had signed the OMAC's petition (OMAC, in Walker, 1979). With the onset of cold, wet weather in April, caravans and makeshift houses began to replace tents. A disused warehouse building was donated to the occupation, and it became Arohanui Marae. Support for the occupation came from numerous people and organisations, and the occupation survived through the steady stream of monetary and material donations. Although a core group of occupiers lived on the land full-time, there were constant visitors throughout the occupation, particularly when the occupation was threatened, wherein supporters would rally and return (Robb, 2018).

All accounts of the occupation discuss its mental and physical tolls, from the persistent threat of government action, to the stress of surviving through the harsh winter with only basic necessities. The loss of Joanne Cooper-Hawke on 28 September during a tent fire almost ended the protest (Johnston, 2018). Despite such hardship, however, the occupation lasted until 25 May, when protesters were forcibly removed by police and military forces.

Was the Occupation Successful?

When evaluating the success of the occupation, there are multiple factors that must be considered. Firstly, there is material success. The immediate goal of the occupation was to stop development, which it accomplished. The long-term kaupapa was the restoration of all of Bastion Point to "the people of Tāmaki Makaurau [...]" (OMAC, in Walker, 1979). The hapū submitted a claim to the Waitangi Tribunal in 1986. The Tribunal's 1987 report found that "the Crown at various times and

in various ways [...] failed to meet its obligations to the Ngāti Whātua people of Ōrākei under the Treaty of Waitangi” (p. 253). The three most significant recommendations stated that three hectares of land should be returned to Ngāti Whātua for their own development, with a payment of \$3 million to assist in funding this. Furthermore, the headlands around Bastion Point were to be returned to the iwi and used as public parks in joint management by the hapū and Auckland Council (Waitangi Tribunal, 2016). A final Deed of Settlement was completed in 2011, that included both cultural and financial redress (Office of Treaty Settlements, 2011). There is substantial debate about whether or not treaty settlements could generally be considered ‘successful’; treaties should be honoured rather than settled, and the process of colonisation must be settled before the treaty can be properly honoured (Mutu, 2019). Furthermore, in most cases, settlements are incredibly small compensation for what has been lost (Te Aho, 2017). One could argue that because Ngāti Whātua was not granted full control over their ancestral lands, the occupation and their subsequent claims were unsuccessful. A counter argument could be made that the iwi now has the opportunity to exercise tino rangatiratanga through the power sharing system between the Ngāti Whātua Trust Board and the Council. This co-management model is in keeping with the spirit of Te Tiriti, especially since the land was settled with the hapū as a whole, and not merely a few powerful actors. The Trust represents a more contemporary model of collective tenure, following the privatised model of land ownership that was forced onto iwi post-contact. Furthermore, the legal recognition of the Trust and its partnership with Auckland Council has greatly improved the material resources of Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei, with projects such as a papakainga ensuring that the iwi has guaranteed housing, and property leasing in Auckland City providing revenue (Ngāti Whātua Ōrakei Whai Rawa, n.d). This would not have been possible without the initial protest action taken by OMAC.

A second success of the occupation was that it provided an opportunity to strengthen and grow whānau and community bonds. Although there were opposing perspectives within the hapū about the right means of action to take, Harris (2004) observes that Takaparawhā “became a living papakainga,” (p. 84), and Susan Hawke (in Morrison, 1999) describes how “it was like one big family.” There were opportunities for learning te reo, tikanga, and tāhuwhu kōrero, and the menial tasks required from day to day fostered a sense of togetherness. This camaraderie was enhanced by the communal belief in the cause. Moving onto the land that Ngāti Whātua had been forced off was an exercise in tino rangatiratanga and self-determination that was strengthened by the number of people who participated in its occupation.

One of the most commonly cited successes of the protest was that the sheer scale and length of the occupation pushed the issue into Pākehā media, and generated support for Māori issues in general. It was a controversial issue, largely due to the contradictions between how the occupation was represented, and the occupants’ reality. Historically, reporting on Māori issues in Pākehā media has been dismissive at best and blatantly racist at worst. The Bastion Point occupation was no different (Morrison, 1999). These oppositional perspectives were given particular weight because they were repeated in governmental messaging. Prime Minister Muldoon was especially opposed to the occupation, and diverted attention away from land issues in favour of “red baiting” tactics to discourage public support, by claiming that the occupation was manufactured by socialist and communist parties (OMAC, in Walker, 1979; Morrison, 1999). Despite the negative impacts of these representations, many have argued that Muldoon’s inability to “[see] the moral question” revealed to the public “that there was no respect for Māori issues at all.” (Walker, R. and Hawke, S., in Morrison, 1999). The government’s image was further damaged by its excessive response in evicting the occupants. Former Superintendent Pat Gaines explains in Morrison (1999) how “representatives of the army and the airforce” accompanied the Armed Offenders Squad, and six

hundred police officers from across the country in removing the protesters from the land. This approach was condemned by many as an “overkill,” especially because the protests had been entirely peaceful. Indeed, the occupiers stood singing waiata while the police forcibly removed them (Mita, 1980).

International Comparison: the Alcatraz Island Occupation

A key international example of indigenous land occupation is that of Alcatraz Island by the Indians of All Tribes (IOAT) the United States of America, from 5 November 1969 to 11 June 1971. Johnson (1999) explains that “no one cause can be considered the catalyst for the occupation” (p. 56). Rather, the occupation was in response to the generations of systemic oppression that Native Americans had faced, and that they sought to bring white America’s attention to these injustices (Engle, 2019).

McDowell (2007) notes that Māori activism in the 1960s and 1970s was inspired by the tactics used by civil rights and indigenous movements in America. He states that protesters at Bastion Point were specifically inspired by the movement at Alcatraz Island, and thus, it is unsurprising that many of the base facts and methods are similar (McDowell, 2007). Both occupations spanned a long period of time; the Alcatraz occupation lasted for nineteen months, and Takaparawhā for seventeen. Moreover, both occupations relied heavily on support and donations from the public for basic necessities (Johnson, 1996; Robb, 2018). They both remained relatively peaceful throughout and ended when occupiers were removed by government forces (Johnson, 1996; Mita, 1980). The negative biases and representations in both American and New Zealand media compelled organisers to use their own means of disseminating information. The IOAT’s most successful method was ‘Radio Free Alcatraz,’ which broadcast throughout the occupation, while the OMAC utilised newsletter bulletins and ‘word of mouth’ communication (Engle, 2019; Morrison, 1999; OMAC in Walker, 1980).

Despite the numerous similarities between the two occupations, the differences in organisation, wider community engagement, and state context are very distinct. Firstly, while both occupations were headed by a named organisation, the nature and role of the organisation was very different, which led to different end results. On Alcatraz Island, the IOAT emphasised that there was no single leader, and that all decisions were made through consensus, in keeping with tribal custom. There was an attempt to cultivate a sense of pan-tribal loyalty, but tensions between collective and tribal interests became increasingly pronounced and divisive as the occupation continued (Johnson, 1999). In contrast, there was no such division amongst the OMAC and Takaparawhā occupiers. This was largely because the members of the committee were from the same hapū. Furthermore, there tends to be a stronger sense of pan-tribal identity amongst Māori. This is evidenced by how we tend to discuss “Māori issues,” while indigenous issues in North America tend to be discussed in relation to the relevant nations. Secondly, Peter Blue Cloud (in Johnson, 1996) describes how entry to Alcatraz Island was restricted for non-Native Americans; “When we near Alcatraz [...] an amplified voice booms at us, ‘Indians only. If you aren’t Indian, please keep going and don’t try to land. If you are Indian, welcome to Indian land!’” (p. 115). The Takaparawhā occupation, on the other hand, held the view that “a massive and peaceful turnout at Bastion Point” was crucial for the continuation of the occupation, and the achievement of its goals. In the Takaparawhā Bulletin No.5, the OMAC published a “special appeal to all New Zealanders,” where they encouraged all people to “come and stay at Bastion Point.” (OMAC, in Walker, 1980). Finally, there is a large difference in the state context for the two occupations. While both the OMAC and the IOAT cited treaty breaches as reasons for their occupations, the contexts of these treaties, and the resulting historical fallout, is quite different. The United States government signed numerous

treaties, with a common feature of these treaties being the reservation of land for Native American nations (Bureau of Indian Affairs, n.d.). Reservation communities are notoriously impoverished, and most lack fresh running water, health or education services, and adequate sanitation facilities (IOAT, in Johnson, 1991). In Aotearoa, however, only Te Tiriti o Waitangi and the Treaty of Waitangi were signed, and nothing equivalent to the reservation system exists. Although Māori and Native Americans are at the lowest ends of socio-economic measures in their respective states (Ministry of Health, 2013; American Community Survey, 2019), the reasons for this, and material realities of their poverty, are different.

Conclusion

The Takaparawhā Bastion Point occupation is a key example of a successful Māori protest movement. The occupation is a significant part of Aotearoa New Zealand's history—not just because it largely achieved its stated goals, but also because it raised awareness of Māori issues within the collective Pākeha consciousness. Furthermore, both the movement and its outcome are examples of Māori exercising their tino rangatiratanga and upholding the spirit of Te Tiriti o Waitangi. When examined in relation to the occupation of Alcatraz Island, one can appreciate that indigenous issues and protest models may transcend international and tribal boundaries in some cases, while remaining unique in others.

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Pacific Studies 314

Pacific History: New Zealand in the Pacific from 1900

Tommy de Silva

Racism, Pseudoscience, and Cruelty: New Zealand's Imperial History in the Pacific

The history of imperialism perpetrated against tangata whenua on Aotearoa-Te Waipounamu and their neighbouring motu is acknowledged by all. Yet, most know little, if anything, about the history of imperialism the settler state that formed on those motu, New Zealand, would commit against its Pacific neighbours. Similar to the imperialism on the motu of our nation, New Zealand's foreign imperialism, caused by colonial ideology, had a destructive impact on the world and worldview of le tangata o le Moana. In this essay, let us examine New Zealand's imperial expansion through a series of interconnected theoretical frameworks that make up colonial ideology: racial superiority, paternalism, social Darwinism, and fatal impact theory. Because of the colonial ideology that New Zealand employed in the historical formation of its Pacific empire, the administration of its Pacific colonies was very cruel and autocratic.

However, before I begin this analysis, my positionality must be outlined. As a Māori, I hold a highly negative view of imperialism and its effect of colonialism. My tūpuna were violently betrayed and coerced by the Crown into becoming third-rate citizens in their rohe. Therefore, I greatly empathise with the plight of New Zealand imperialism that our Pacific brothers and sisters experienced. Yet, as someone who is also Pākehā, my ancestors have benefited from this very imperialism. Having a bipartite whakapapa, yet living in a Eurocentric nation, means my mind is not yet fully decolonised. This is particularly true when it comes to finding and understanding historical and academic sources. My proficiency in using primary sources, which can provide the best evidence on the Pacific, is much worse than my proficiency in utilising secondary, Eurocentric ones. Therefore, many of the sources used in this essay are inherently racist, yet where possible, I will challenge these bigoted views.

To begin our analysis, imperialism, imperial expansion, and colonial ideology must be defined. Johnson frames imperialism as the economic, military and political control from a metropole, outward to other, formerly sovereign, territories (Johnson, 2002). By combining antiquated, Marxist sociological and modern political theory ideas on the cause of imperialism, those being capitalistic exploitation and national security respectively, Johnson provides a broad definition for imperialism (Johnson, 2002). Associate Professor Katerina Teaiwa, a Pacific-African American scholar, claims that imperialism in the Pacific also had a profound ecological, spiritual, and cultural impact on a structural level (Teaiwa, 2015). Imperial expansion is thus the external proliferation of imperial authority. What then is colonial ideology? Colonial ideology is the belief systems and worldview leading to the policy of imperialism (Pihamo, 2017). Science is supposedly the basis of colonial ideology (Poncelet, 2020), but the true foundation of colonial ideology is pseudoscience. The theoretical frameworks for this essay are themselves pseudoscientific. Let us then explore these theories.

Rogers summarises social Darwinism as “the application of Darwin’s theory of natural selection to the evolution of human society” (Rogers, 1972). Natural selection is the process whereby nature’s operation causes either the growth or lack thereof of an animal population to the point of extinction (Gildenhuys, 2019). Social Darwinism, therefore, implements the idea of ‘survival of the fittest’ in regard to groups of people. Fatal impact theory is a concept subsidiary to social Darwinism, claiming that after exposure to ‘superior’ peoples, ‘inferior’ peoples would go extinct due to the survival of the fittest idea (Belich, 2011). Social Darwinism and fatal impact theory provided part of the basis for an idea of racial superiority, which the Pālagi leadership subscribed to during the age of empire. At the time, it seemed fatal impact theory was occurring (Phillips, 2014), therefore Pālagi believed they were the ‘superior’ race due to the survival of the fittest idea. However, in reality, racism is a more prevalent factor than social Darwinism in the construction of a Pālagi sense of racial superiority. This racism was caused by centuries of xenophobic Christianity dating back to a fifteenth-century papal bull. A

sense of racial superiority caused paternalism among Pālagi. Paternalism is the practice of controlling subordinates like a father may control his children (Oxford Dictionary, 2021), which is an attempt to protect and benefit subordinates (Dworkin, 2020) by removing their agency in the decision-making process (Oxford Dictionary). Paternalism can be understood as an extension of racial superiority, by viewing the Pālagi as the father and the Moana Peoples as the helpless child. These four theoretical frameworks make up the colonial ideology of New Zealand imperial expansion in the Pacific and help us to understand this history. Yet we must be critical and assert the fact that these theories are inherently racist and greatly immoral.

New Zealand's Pacific empire was not an abrupt occurrence, and Salesa notes that since Aotearoa-Te Waipounamu became a British colony, its settlers dreamt of their Pacific imperial destiny (Salesa, 2012). This destiny was, however, clearly paternalistic and racist. Some of New Zealand's most infamous 'big public men,' Grey, Vogel, Stout, and Seddon, spoke this Pacific destiny into being (Hoare, 2014). Seddon, who actioned our imperial expansion, understood there to be two main reasons for imperialism. In a parliamentary speech in 1900, Seddon discusses "profit" and "markets" (Seddon, 1900) as a reason for imperialism. Secondly, Seddon believed that a Pacific empire would be a buffer zone between New Zealand and hostile foreign powers (Fraenkel, 2012). Seddon's justification for imperial expansion, capitalistic exploitation and national security, fit comfortably within Johnson's aforementioned imperialism definition. The timeline of New Zealand's imperial expansion in the Pacific began with the annexation of the Cook Islands and Niue on the 11th of June 1901, followed by the invasion of German Samoa in 1914, and the assumption of sovereignty in Tokelau in 1926 and Nauru through a shared mandate in 1945 (Fraenkel, 2012). Now, as we have a clear understanding of all the contextual information for this essay, let us investigate how in the Cook Islands and Samoa colonial ideology led to administrative cruelty.

In 1901, the Cook and other Islands Act established one resident commissioner's position as the highest New Zealand office in both the Cook Islands and Niue (MacKay, 1901). Through an amendment to the Cook and other Islands Act in 1903, a separate resident commissioner position was created for Niue (MacKay, 1903). Thereafter, the two territories were administered separately. As instituted in the 1901 Cook and other Islands Act, the resident commissioner's role was to work within the already existing political infrastructure of these territories (MacKay, 1901). Yet, the resident commissioner's position soon became an autocratic one that undermined Indigenous power structures. Supreme authority became vested in the resident commissioner, and the Indigenous Peoples became politically mute (Anderson, 2014), a clearly autocratic power structure. The political silencing of Indigenous Peoples fits comfortably within the definition of paternalism, as it removed their agency in the decision-making process. It also implied a social Darwinian sense of racial superiority whereby one group falsely believed that their innate character permitted them to govern over others. This paternalistic and racist political takeover occurred extremely quickly.

The first resident commissioner of the Cook Islands, Gudgeon, assumed all significant powers within a few years (Mills, 1964). Gudgeon appointed himself the chief justice and chief judge of the Cook Islands Land and Titles Court (Fraenkel, 2012). These two roles were arguably the two most powerful positions in the territory aside from the resident commissioner, as they controlled access to and use of land, the most important natural resource. All Indigenous judges were replaced (Mills, 1964) with close family and friends of Gudgeon, a trend that would continue throughout his administration (Fraenkel, 2012). Indigenous leaders were only permitted to make some village level decisions, yet these still had to be approved directly by Gudgeon (Fraenkel, 2012). Through his swift assumption of arguably absolute power,

Gudgeon's leadership can unquestionably be characterised as autocratic. Within half a decade, Gudgeon had destroyed the independent local economy that produced and exported goods prior to annexation (Mills, 1964). The Cook Islands education system was also dismantled by Gudgeon, who closed the high school believing that the Indigenous population should only receive an elementary level education (Mills, 1964). Finally, Gudgeon attempted to sabotage the Indigenous culture by restricting when "native singing, dancing or drum playing shall take place" (Mills, 1964). Gudgeon's autocratic style of governorship in the Cook Islands had a destructive effect on the Cook Islands' economy, culture, education system, and political structures, proving that his administration was deeply cruel. However, Gudgeon was only one of a number of cruel autocratic New Zealand leaders in the Cook Islands. Resident commissioner Tailby, for example was another New Zealand official resented for his authoritarianism (Anderson, 2014). The source of resident commissioner autocratic cruelty is clearly paternalism (Thompson, 1994) and a sense of racial superiority. New Zealand officials believed it was their right and responsibility to govern "all Polynesians" (Fraenkel, 2012) as they saw fit, evidently a very paternalistic attitude. Many scholars attribute Gudgeon as being a 'strong man,' or in other words, a paternalist. Gudgeon and subsequent resident commissioners were products of an inherently racist society that believed in social Darwinism and racial superiority. Therefore, we can safely claim that New Zealand's Cook Islands administration was cruel and autocratic because of colonial ideology.

Samoa is another setting where colonial ideology led to a cruel and autocratic New Zealand administration. At the beginning of the First World War, New Zealand bloodlessly conquered German Samoa under the leadership of Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Logan (MCH, 2015). Even though he had no knowledge of the Samoan culture, worldview, or lifestyle, and no experience in any management as complex as Samoa, Logan assumed the role of the allied military administrator in Samoa (Munro, 1996). Wellingtonian and Allied entrustment of such an unqualified individual to govern Samoa highlights the extent to which they believed in racial superiority. There was a collection of capable Samoan political leaders to promote, such as any of the paramount title holders or Ta'isi Olaf Nelson. Instead of empowering a proven Samoan leader, or group of leaders, to govern their own nation a Scottish-New Zealand sheep farming, county-level official turned soldier was selected (Munro, 1996). A Royal Commission in 1919 found Logan's efforts as the administrator of Samoa 'negligent' (Munro, 1996), which can also be interpreted as cruel. Munro notes that Logan was singularly permitted almost absolute power during his governorship of Samoa, "bound only by the rules of war" (Munro, 1996). Having such unchallenged, pervasive power is a sign of autocratic rule. The unchallenged nature of his power meant that Logan exercised paternalistic power over Samoans through excluding them from the decision-making process.

Logan's negligence began early, as he did not institute a plan for his administration other than a continuation of the German model (Munro, 1996). However, Logan's negligence was at greatest display in his handling of the 1918 influenza virus. Under Logan's leadership, the influenza outbreak in Samoa was "one of the most disastrous epidemics recorded anywhere in the world," according to a 1947 United Nations report (MCH, 2020). Within three weeks of the outbreak, 20% of the Samoan population had succumbed to the virus (Munro, 1996), and in total, around 8,500 Samoans died from influenza, equivalent to 22% of the population (MCH, 2020). What makes Logan so negligent and cruel in his handling of influenza is the fact that it was completely avoidable. Logan refused to quarantine the SS Talune, which brought influenza to Samoa, even though he knew it carried the virus (Munro, 1996). Therefore, Logan's autocratic leadership is singularly responsible for the death of roughly 8,500 Samoans. If Samoans were allowed political authority within New Zealand's wartime administration, they

undoubtedly would have ensured that the SS Talune was properly quarantined, saving thousands of lives. Furthermore, Logan refused medical aid from American Samoa due to a miscommunication (Munro, 1996). Unfortunately, Logan's mishandling of the influenza outbreak was not the only cruel administrative act of New Zealand in Samoa that led to needless death.

Discontent with the New Zealand administration quickly grew due to continued autocratic rule, paternalistic exclusion of Samoans from politics in their own country and remembrance of New Zealand's role in the influenza outbreak (MCH, 2014). Samoans were also frustrated by New Zealand's non-consideration of their many petitions for Indigenous political authority (MCH, 2014), further exemplifying how paternalistic New Zealand rule was. This discontent culminated in the Mau independence movement, supported by nine out of ten Samoans, which advocated for 'Samoa mo Samoa' or 'Samoa for Samoans' (MCH, 2014). The New Zealand administration went on a tyrannical campaign against the Mau that included banning their uniform, prohibiting their meetings and using marines and military police to arrest or banish Mau leaders (MCH, 2014). New Zealand's war on the Mau came to a violent cataclysm in late 1929 when military police murdered eleven Mau on what would become known as 'Black Saturday' (MCH, 2020). New Zealand's negligence in its handling of influenza in Samoa, alongside the violent repression of the Mau, were both highly cruel acts. It is clear that New Zealand's administrative cruelty in Samoa was caused by paternalism, that found its provenance in racial superiority. In official documentation, Allen, the New Zealand administrator in Samoa during Black Saturday, called Samoans, their intellect, and reasoning capability child-like (Field, 1991). Allen's kōrerō is undoubtedly paternalistic, as was the entirety of New Zealand's administration in Samoa, since Samoans were repeatedly excluded from the political decision-making processes.

New Zealand's imperial expansion caused great administrative cruelty and autocracy, not only in Samoa and the Cook Islands, but in New Zealand's other colonies too. This historical fact is clear, yet it is equally clear that racist colonial ideology was the cause of New Zealand's immoral administration of its empire. Although the four theories of colonial ideology outlined early in this essay were not discussed evenly in its body, they are all interconnected, forming and being formed by one another. Therefore, all theories are of equal importance. Superficially, paternalism seems to be the theory that caused the most cruelty. However, it cannot be forgotten that paternalism is formed by racial superiority, which itself is formed by fatal impact and social Darwinism, alongside extrinsic historical factors. No matter the reasoning for historical imperialism, New Zealanders must learn our history of imperial cruelty to help us truly move forward as a modern leader in the Pacific.

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The Pacific in the World

Naya Nakamura Todd

Separability in the Pacific: Breaking the House of Western Knowledge to Breathe Life into Pacific Epistemologies

For 4,000 to 30,000 years, the people of the Pacific have moulded, shared, and passed on generations of knowledge (Vaiioleti, 2006). Their ways of knowing and being stem from Pacific epistemologies. However, this has been eclipsed by the modern worldview historically enforced by European colonists. The European colonists have greatly altered the Pacific way of life, including the ways that the people of the Pacific think, learn, and engage in their daily lives. The European colonists believed their knowledge to be more credible in comparison to Pacific knowledge, whose knowledge was considered primitive and powerless. It is only in the last four decades in which the Pacific have actively strived to reignite their knowledge systems (Thaman, 2014). The framework of our modern world-system can be understood through Stein et al's (2017) concept of the House of Modernity. This paper will delve into the aspect of separability under the House of Modernity and will evaluate its characteristics in relation to the education system. Particularly, in the ways the Western regime plays a role in devaluing Pacific knowledge, as well as examining how the House of Modernity affects the people of the Pacific through means of social differences and exploitation. This paper will follow through with ways Pacific knowledge must move forward.

Separability sits at the bottom of the House of Modernity and is a central element to our current world system. According to Stein, et al. (2017) it is the foundation of the house that separates humans from the rest of nature and, correspondingly, ranks separate beings according to their presumed value. In this form, separability builds a hierarchy in which one type of ideology is favoured over another. In our current world system, the Western way of knowing is presumed as the 'right' way. Accordingly, what is known about the world, essentially the Western knowledge systems, sits inside the House of Modernity. However, the House neglects the knowledge systems that are on the outside. Stein et al. (2017) explains how the house "forces certain people to build and maintain the house for those inside of it [...] for little or no pay" (p.73). This brings forth the inequity and disparity that comes along with 'separate' beings coming against each according to their perceived utility (Stein et al., 2017). As a consequence, separability is evident in the Pacific through how the people of the Pacific have adjusted, sustained, and worked towards fulfilling the ideals of the European colonists.

The first facet of separability is that it separates people from nature. Historically, colonists believed that the people of the Pacific Islands were primitive and powerless. Hau'ofa (1994) explains how colonists believed they were unable to depend on themselves and required external authority. Although this outlook has significantly altered through the likes of Hau'ofa's (1994) interpretation of the Pacific being "a sea of islands," there are still connotations of the Pacific being underdeveloped and scarce of resources. One extensive example is encapsulated through the education system. As early as 1797, missionaries began to settle in the islands of the Pacific and introduced schooling (Baba, 1985). Baba (1985) explains how the missionaries were fully committed to converting the islanders to the church and bringing complete societal change. Therefore, schools played a predominant role in this quest. Their teachings were based on Christian principles through which Pacific Islanders were taught how to lead a more "civilised" life. As a consequence, the education system in the Pacific Islands evolved into Eurocentric ways of knowing. Before the missionaries brought their ideas of education, older members of the villages in the Pacific were at the forefront of teaching (Baba, 1985). They followed a system of informal education wherein the wider community joined together to share their "oral history, dance, song, poetry, proverbs, material culture, and culture rituals" (Leenen-Young, 2020, p. 72). Marcia Leenen-Young (2020) highlights how the teachings were derived from Indigenous Pasifika epistemologies and based on imitation, reflection, and intuition, as well as teaching from ancestors. However, the Indigenous Pacific perspective of teaching was scrapped by the Western education system. Following the lead of

missionaries, colonial administrators and governments began to take over schools (Thaman, 1993). Education began to target a manual labour-based education system where any work above manual-labour required higher level education. Thus, pupils of the Pacific became entangled in a Western form of education, persisting in a worldview that instructed them to believe that the only way to flourish in the world was by gaining an international education. Simultaneously, pupils of the Pacific gradually and unknowingly disconnect themselves from Pacific pedagogies.

Subsequently, separability holds an underlying hierarchy that is visible through the lingering academic impacts on Pasifika in New Zealand compared to Pākehā. Throughout the last century, thousands of Pacific Islanders have migrated to New Zealand for work and a ‘better’ education (Baba, 1985). This idea of ‘better’ has been falsely entrenched by colonists who viewed their system to be of higher value. The education system in the Pacific was not only replaced, but the Western system was further devalued in the Pacific (Thaman, 2014). A fault of the world-system is the notion that education in Western nations is worthier than non-Western nations. This is recognised in global university rankings as well as through the numbers of Pacific people who travel to foreign countries for education. Moreover, Thomsen et al. (2021) acknowledges that, specifically in New Zealand that caters for a large number of Pacific students, Pacific knowledge is still foreign to universities. Naepi (2019) points out this growing concern by addressing the lack of Pasifika professors in New Zealand universities. She describes how “diverse bodies engage in invisible labour that is not valued by the institution” (p. 229). Rather than holding positions of high authority, Pasifika are often left to do the work that is neglected and taken for granted. Although the number of Pasifika graduates is growing, from 2012 to 2017, the number of Pasifika in academic positions remained stagnant (Naepi 2019). Furthermore, aside from the University of Auckland and the Auckland University of Technology, there were only around forty-five Pasifika academics employed across nationwide institutions (Naepi et al., 2020). Additionally, when examining the ratio of undergraduate students to professors and deans in relation to ethnicity, Pasifika held the highest ratio of one Pasifika professor or dean to 1829 Pasifika undergraduate students. By contrast, Pākehā held the lowest at one to ninety-five (Naepi et al., 2020). As a consequence, significant social disparities are evident through institutional values in Western education in comparison to Pacific as well as by the underrepresentation of Pasifika in academic positions in comparison to Pākehā.

Under Eurocentric dominations, the people of the Pacific have also faced exploitation in the pursuit of higher education. Specifically in New Zealand, the government has initiated multiple policies for the people of the Pacific to engage in Western education. Airini et al. (2009) states that in the 1970s, the government introduced a scheme that allowed a few Pacific nations to work in New Zealand on a three-month visa to fill the openings of unskilled labour. For many Pacific Islanders, education was one of the greatest reasons for migration (Airini et al., 2009). Baba (1985) explains how this was due to the Commonwealth’s power and the hope for upward mobility through “greater opportunities” overseas. However, these job roles as well as educational opportunities were met with remarkable disempowerment due to little social and economic improvement across the generations in both sectors (Vaiioleti, 2006). Therefore, through this endeavour, Pasifika fell into the trap of providing cheap labour in exchange for high profit and consumption goods. Yet, this profit is often given to what Wallerstein (1984) refers to as the core nation—the powerful, highly industrialised nations. Therefore, many Pasifika are left unpaid. Moreover, Naepi (2019) addresses how New Zealand universities are following suit with international universities by increasing the use of casual labour. As a result, Pasifika in casual positions are prone to deteriorating working conditions in which they receive

little money for the amount of work they undertake. Thus, many Pasifika are susceptible to filling a labour gap and receiving an education that hinders them from easily returning home.

In fulfilment with the Pacific perspective, Hau'ofa (1994) sheds light on the view of the Pacific being “a sea of islands” instead of “islands in the sea.” In order to revive Pacific ways of knowledge, the people of the Pacific must recognise the ideas of the Western worldview imposed upon them. The wisdom of their knowledge must be acknowledged so Pacific peoples can strive through the significance of their roots and their epistemologies. Moreover, Western ways of knowing are not the only ways of knowing; there is equal power in Pacific knowledge and all other Indigenous perspectives. Institutions should revolve around relationality rather than separability to allow various worldviews to be equally acknowledged and applied. Methods of building inclusion of cultural identity can be carried out by creating schools based on Pacific knowledge, speaking the specific language of their culture, and engaging in traditions through everyday practices (Airini, 2009). This lifts some of the barriers that Pacific pupils face in a Western-based education system and can foster effective learning as well as successful education outcomes. Thaman (2014) encapsulates this by stating, “if we were humble, we would see those aspects of our cultures that are ‘borrowings’ from other cultures not as examples of domination but rather of adaptation; and we would see the new creations as examples of meaning-making, rather than feeling guilty about our new creation” (p. 312).

Altogether, across the centuries, Pacific knowledge systems have been heavily reinforced and replaced by Western colonialist views of thinking. From the concept of the House of Modernity, it can be inferred that Western thought has caused Indigenous perspectives to be forgotten and lost outside the house. The bottom ground of separability has separated beings, built a hierarchy, exploited those who try to adapt, and forced all people living under the house to believe that there is only one correct way of living. This paper has highlighted this issue by examining the education system that pupils of the Pacific have endured. Ultimately, in order for Pacific epistemologies to be seen and upheld, the walls of the house must shatter.

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Religion, Gender and Sexuality

Etina 'Etivise 'Ala Ki Vailahi Ha'unga

The Battle Between Nude and Evil: The Adverse Effects of Purity Culture, Modesty, and 'Godly' Femininity in the Pacific

CONTENT WARNING: This article contains mention of sexual violence.

Purity culture has been a much-debated topic throughout history due to its detrimental effects on women's sexuality. These effects extend as far as to sexual bias, 'justified' violence, dehumanisation, and marginalisation. Women, especially religious women, are at the forefront of this battle of having to fulfil standards of purity and modesty and thus forfeit their sexual freedom. In this essay, I will highlight the adverse effects of Purity culture, modesty and 'Godly' femininity, with a focus on Pacific women. The autonomy of women has been stripped, and religion influenced policies (Purity culture) are partly to blame. My experiences have led me to focus on Pacific women because Purity culture has led to significant issues, such as those mentioned above.

A Comparison of Eve, the Mother of All Women and the Virgin Mary

The first portrayal of women in Christian theology is the biblical character of Eve. However, Eve does not become a dominant character in the book of Genesis until she succumbs to temptation and similarly 'tempts' Adam.

When the woman saw that the fruit of the tree was good for food and pleasing to the eye, and also desirable for gaining wisdom, she took some and ate it. She also gave some to her husband, who was with her, and he ate it. Then the eyes of both of them were opened, and they realised they were naked; so they sewed fig leaves together and made coverings for themselves. (Genesis 3: 6–7)

A theory put forward by Gregory of Nyssa states that if there had been no sexual reproduction, the human race would have been able to procreate by non-sexual (or angelic) means. The interpretation of the original sin in this light implies that if Eve had not 'sinned,' sin itself would not exist and the covenant between God and man would not be broken. Under this interpretation, Eve was the first to 'lust' and seduce Adam; Purity culture thus arguably prevents women from falling again into temptation and dragging their male counterparts along with them. Contrary to Gregory's theory, Edwards (2018) proposes that Genesis 3 symbolises the introduction of Adam and Eve into adulthood. Edwards surmises that Eve's intentions were pure and faultless and argues the importance of rereading Genesis 3 with an outlook of it symbolising 'growing up' (Edwards, 2018). With this perspective in mind, we would realise that Eve's supposed fall into sin was actually for their survival (that is, to have children and raise them). Regardless of which theory stands true, both rest upon the infamous idea that Eve was the initiator. The notion that Eve is a temptress, alluring in nature with evil intentions, has become a lineal label concerning all women; thus, mainstream media has shown this to be true. The concept of a femme fatale or, more simply, the seductive and menacing woman was common among painters in the 1800s with renowned artists such as Franz von Stuck, Michelangelo, and Henry Fuseli producing works that portrayed Eve in a negative light. Moreover, popular advertisements such as that of DKNY's perfume, which are inspired by the infamous idea of a temptress Eve, have chosen to portray her in a hypersexualised way like a temptress to skilfully lure their buyers, even if that means objectifying women (Colette, 2015).

The prioritisation of Eve's transgression in mainstream media reconstructions have not only centralised Eve's supposed personality but led to the creation of 'Purity culture' so that women remain virtuous and become nothing like Eve. This, in turn, limits their free will and subjects them to shame, humiliation, and marginalisation.

On the other hand, the Virgin Mary is viewed as the shining example of purity and virtue. We are introduced to the Virgin Mary in a different setting than that of Eve.

In the sixth month the angel Gabriel was sent from God to a city of Galilee named Nazareth, to a virgin betrothed to a man whose name was Joseph, of the house of David; and the virgin's name was Mary. And he came to her and said, "Hail, O favoured one, the Lord is with you!". But she was greatly troubled at the saying and considered in her mind what sort of greeting this might be. And the angel said to her, "Do not be afraid, Mary, for you have found favour with God. And behold, you will conceive in your womb and bear a son, and you shall call his name Jesus. (Luke 1: 26-31)

In Luke, Mary is chosen by God to be the vessel through which Jesus, the saviour of the world, is born, thus she is favoured by God because she is a virgin. Although many assume this story as harmless, what Church culture has achieved through this story is harmful. Reverend Ruth Everhart quotes:

Mary is not responsible for what we have done for her story. Church culture has overfocused on virginity and made it into an idol of sexual purity. When it comes to the female experience, the church seems compelled to shrink and distort and manipulate. (Everhart, 2016)

Purity culture uses the stories of Eve and Mary to show a parallel distinction. The comparison between Eve and Mary arguably establishes the difference between good and evil; while Eve was banished from the Garden of Eden, Mary was invited to dwell in the presence of the Lord and give birth to a saviour.

The Beginning of Purity Culture

The campaign for purity originates in reform movements of the nineteenth century that aimed to eliminate prostitution, increase the age of consent, and limit pornography. These campaigns, mostly led by women, encouraged men not to misuse their social and sexual power over women (Whitaker, 2019). Although Purity culture was constructed for both men and women, women inevitably became the sole focus of Purity culture. By the twentieth century, Purity culture intensified, with girls pledging their virginities to their fathers and female virginity becoming a prized possession that her future husband could purchase.

The culture of stigma and sexual ignorance arising from the emphasis of sexual purity has been covered immensely. Moreover, there are two notable outcomes: sex outside marriage was seen as the greatest form of sin, and women who endured sexual abuse were traumatised by their church's teaching about purity and shame, and thus, would not report their abuse (Whitaker, 2019).

Purity culture in the Pacific Islands is very much present, but its dangerous repercussions are not given enough discussion. Sex outside of marriage is a persistent garland of shame that most women in the Pacific islands wear. Purity culture, which followed Christianity, accentuates the importance of women remaining pure not only for her future husband, but for the pride of her family. In Tongan culture, girls are the pride and joy of the family. Tongan girls can either abide by the rules of purity and be celebrated, or embrace their sexuality and face ridicule and shame. Although celebrations such as a twenty-first birthday or wedding may appear ordinary, in the Tongan culture, they are events that can expose the purity of a woman. For instance, if a girl turns twenty-one and remains a virgin, then she is celebrated. However, if she is not a virgin, she will not be celebrated. Similarly, weddings reflect this idea and glorify the virginity of women.

The white sheet ceremony, in particular, has haunted me since the day I was informed about it. This ceremony, which is unique to Tongan culture, involves the bedsheet from the marriage consummation with blood on it. The sheets are first shown to the bride's mother and aunties, before it is given to the groom's family as proof of the bride's virginity (Manu-Sione, 2013). Although my mother never forced this tradition upon me and my sisters, I could not help but sympathise with the many Tongan girls who could not escape this tradition. Upon reflection of the adverse effects of Purity culture in my own culture, it is undeniably evident that a gendered bias exists for sexual purity.

Furthermore, for men, the costs of losing the battle of purity are not as severe compared to women (Whitaker, 2019). Present-day purity balls also reflect sexual bias since there are no equivalent arrangements for boys. It is customary in most religions for women to be punished more than men for improper heterosexuality (Fahs, 2010). Fahs (2010) highlights how purity balls and chastity ceremonies are said to cultivate purity, happy marriages, and fidelity; discourage sin; and foster healthy marital relationships. Women "marry" their fathers during these rituals and are often made to swear abstinence and wear rings that mark their bodies as property at the end (Fahs, 2010). However, the ripple effect of these problems does not end here, but also forms the gateway to 'justified' violence.

In a study by Boodoosingh et al., which focused on women's attitudes to gender-based violence in Samoa, one interviewee mentioned that if a father was to commit sexual violence against his daughter, it was the mother's fault for not protecting her daughter and not sufficiently satisfying her husband's sexual needs (Boodoosingh et al., 2018). Many participants underlined that all others—like the victim and mother—were to blame, but the perpetrator themselves. One might question the applicability of Purity culture with justified violence, but it is the division between men and women manifested in Purity culture that contributes to the acceleration of justifiable violence. Moreover, Purity culture creates a culture of shame where women are unable to speak up about their experiences with sexual violence, as religion offers a way to domesticate and defuse it.

Modesty is a Man's Best Friend

I also want the women to dress modestly, with decency and propriety, adorning themselves, not with elaborate hairstyles or gold or pearls or expensive clothes, but with good deeds, appropriate for women who profess to worship God. (1 Timothy 2:9–10)

Modesty, according to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, is an attitude of propriety and decency in dress, grooming, language, and behaviour (Modesty, 2020). Modesty in the Old and New Testament emphasises the importance of women making modest dress choices. The biblical book of 1 Timothy 2:9–10 has thus become the backbone upon which Christian women use to advocate modesty. The level of interpretation and application of this bible verse, however, differs depending on the religion. Modesty not only denies women the freedom of clothing choice but manipulates them into believing that they are to blame for a man's fall into lust and sexual temptation. Although many conservative Christians believe this lie, recent scientific research shows that men can control their sexual urges. Burnett quotes: "sexual arousal may be a powerful thing, but the brain also has many processes that counter it. The orbitofrontal cortex, for example, is implicated in regulating/suppressing sexual behaviour" (Burnett, 2018).

In conclusion, shame, purity and sexual ignorance continue to haunt Christian communities around the globe. Sexual purity is often celebrated and exalted in religious communities; however, the consequences women face as a result of guarding their virginities and subduing their sexual desires are dangerous. The idea that women should subdue their sexualities and remain pure and untouched for their husbands is absurd. Realistically, attaining religious and biblical 'perfection' is impossible. Women's agency is as deserved as male agency; thus, we must learn to accept the decisions women make, whether it is about their clothing choices or sexual preferences, while unmarried.

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Sociology 213

Ethnicity and Identity

Vaisioa Vai

A New Zealand Born Tongan's Navigation

I am a New Zeangan

New Zealand is a part of Oceania because the Pacific Ocean surrounds New Zealand. This means that you cannot think of the Pacific without accepting New Zealand as belonging to the Pacific. Similarly, I cannot be perceived as only identifying as a Tongan, without considering my birthplace, New Zealand. I encapsulate both. Pacific Studies scholar Epeli Hauofa (1993) states that “Oceania is vast, Oceania is expanding, Oceania is hospitable and generous, Oceania is humanity rising from the depths of brine and regions of fire deeper still, Oceania is us” (p. 16). I am transnational, I am diasporic, and I am continuously navigating my ethnic and national identity between New Zealand and Tonga because Oceania gives me this opportunity. This autoethnography will use the concepts of hybridity, authenticity, and national identity to attest that New Zealand and Tonga are the two countries that make up my racial, ethnic, and national identity. Identities form due to societal constructions, relationships, and expectations which explain why I identify myself as a New Zeangan.

My Privilege

Brigitte Wallinger-Schorn (2011) rightfully argues that “cultural hybridity subverts the categorization and strict differentiation of cultures, and is celebrated for promoting cultural reconsideration and change” (n.p.). I am a New Zealand born Tongan. Therefore, although I am born in New Zealand, I am as Tongan as much as I am a New Zealander. The experiences I have gained from inhabiting a diasporic contemporary society enable me to feel a sense of privilege in having a hybrid identity. I am able to experience the best of both worlds, between New Zealand and Tonga. New Zealand annually celebrates Tongan Language Week, which embraces Tongan culture, customs, traditions, and food. At the airport in Tonga, they greet me in English because they know I am from New Zealand. A diasporic and transnational contemporary society has also enabled Tongans to embrace and speak phrases from New Zealand. Likewise, I am also able to reply in Tongan because I have refrained from letting people call me a ‘palangi loi’ (Tongan term for ‘fake European’). This depicts a shift from culture as being regarded as bound to belonging to a specific ethnicity but now, it encompasses different cultures and thus promotes cultural change and reconsideration. The experiences I have encountered in New Zealand and Tonga demonstrate that culture is not static, but a fluid process that is continuously changing and adapting.

It is always a humbling and privileging experience to travel to Tonga. It is humbling because the lifestyle of most Tongans is very different compared to my lifestyle in New Zealand. According to Stuart Hall (2012), hybridity means “to see and recognise the different parts and histories of ourselves, to construct those points of identification, those positionalities we call in retrospective our ‘cultural identities’ (Hall & Ghazoul, 2012, p. 237). The lifestyles I have witnessed in Tonga remind me why my parents left Tonga to search for a better life in New Zealand. However, I cannot disregard my parents’ upbringing or where my ancestors came from and are buried, because those are the roots of my Tongan-ness. Although I am a New Zealand citizen by birth, I feel a sense of connectedness and solidarity with Tonga because that is my parents’ birthplace and the place where their placenta is buried. The way my parents have raised me to speak fluent Tongan and to embody and embrace Tongan customs and traditions, as well as my many trips to Tonga, have allowed me to affirm my hybrid identity as a Tongan New Zealander. In New Zealand, people will identify me as a Tongan and in Tonga, people will identify me as a New Zealander. This is initially what hybridity is as explained by Wallinger-Schorn (2011) “cultural hybridity, which accordingly can constitute no threat to the purity of cultures, and is, rather, an integral part of cultural development and progress” (n.p.).

For this reason, it is crucial that people with hybrid identities embrace their uniqueness because it is authentic and valid to me to be a New Zealand born Tongan.

Palangi loi—Tongan Term for ‘Fake European’

I can speak fluent Tongan and I am confident in identifying as a Tongan, however, Tongan people still call me a ‘palangi loi.’ Similarly, when I come across non-Tongans, they tend to question my authenticity as a Tongan due to my physical appearance, which can be disheartening. I have fair skin, so my skin colour is why non-Tongans usually question my existence as an authentic or inauthentic Tongan. As much as I try to be Tongan and display my Tongan-ness, I am usually regarded as a ‘palangi loi’. During a trip to Tonga in 2019, the Reverend of my grandmother’s church confidently said that I have a European father. This was not an assumption, but an assertive statement claiming that he knew my father was European. However, my parents are both Tongan.

In his text, King (2011) describes “a cultural ritualistic, and a kind of pretend Indian, an Indian who has to dress up like an Indian in order to be recognised as an Indian” (p. 45). I can reason with King’s statement because in New Zealand and Tonga I have felt the need to dress up as a Tongan, speak Tongan, and fully embrace being Tongan to be considered by others as Tongan. Authenticity has misled people, including myself, to act a certain way in order for the approval of society that I am a Tongan. King also states, “you’re not the Indian I had in mind” (p. 48); this reflects Tongans and non-Tongans thinking that I am not the Tongan they had in mind. How do you identify a Tongan? What is an authentic Tongan? The debate around authenticity more significantly demonstrates that social ascription and narratives of what is Tongan can mislead people, including myself. In reality, there is no single definition for an authentic Tongan. There is no authentic Tongan because culture and ethnicity are not static, but change with time, which Rose-Greenland (2016) highlights in her statement that “authenticity, in sum, is an outcome of our own experiences and socially cultivated understandings” (p. 99). Those that believe a specific cultural identity is bound to a degree of authenticity and are a part of cultivating this mindset have arguably been blinded by the colonialist worldview that frames cultures as being completely distinct and pure. Therefore, I will not let social ascriptions and people who want to question the authenticity of my identity belittle me. I am proud of my hybrid identity as a New Zealand Tongan and I am proud of my national identity as a New Zealander.

Best of Both Worlds

I have the privilege of being a ‘New Zeangan’ (a term coined by myself to represent my identity being a combination of New Zealand and Tonga). I have the best of both worlds—my Tongan ethnic identity and my national identity as a New Zealand citizen by birth. Bechhofer and McCrone (2014) state that “in different situations people employ identity markers, such as birthplace, accent and ancestry, to make claims about their own national identity” (p. 1351). When the Kiwis play against Australia in Rugby League, I support New Zealand because that is my place of birth and where I live. However, when the Kiwis play against Mate Ma’ a Tonga, I support Tonga because I have a stronger cultural attachment and shared connection with my Tongan roots. Therefore, my national identity changes in terms of context and this is supported by “conceptions of national identity and the way identity is deployed shift as the context changes” (Dei et al., 2005, p. 155). Dei et al. (2005) state that “the rules of national identity must always be seen as being applied flexibly in a manner appropriate to a particular context”

(p. 154). The flexibility and fluidity of hybrid identities is similar to national identity. My Tonganness cannot be measured because it is authentic to me, and I have sole agency over it.

A hybrid identity enables me to better understand my national identity. My hybrid identity means that as much as I am a New Zealander, I am Tongan as well. This makes accepting my national identity easy. My national identity as a New Zealander does not mean I am completely subject to identifying myself as a New Zealander because I am also a Tongan. National identities “always involve narratives—of the nation’s past” (Said, 2002, as cited in Mawani, 2004, p. 33). I believe these narratives are important, but they should not form the basis for a national identity. For example, my family and I do not have primordial feelings of attachment to New Zealand through blood or ancestry. My parents migrated to New Zealand so we cannot connect with the narratives of New Zealand’s past. However, our residency in New Zealand, what we do in New Zealand, and how we contribute to New Zealand’s economy is more than enough for my family to have a New Zealand national identity. Moreover, as already emphasised, national identities, like hybrid identities, are fluid and flexible. Therefore, I have the best of both worlds because my national identity transforms with my connection to what is at issue.

I Will Always Be a New Zeangan

I am a full Tongan and I was born here in New Zealand. Therefore, in terms of my ethnic identity and national identity, I will always regard myself as a New Zealand Tongan. By exploring the sociological concepts of hybridity, authenticity, and national identity I conclude that I am as Tongan as much as I am a New Zealander. My hybrid identity opens my eyes to the privilege I have in holding both a Tongan and New Zealand identity. Moreover, my physical appearance will not stop me from being viewed as an inauthentic Tongan because my identity is inherently valid. From my experiences, I have become aware of what other people like me endure in New Zealand, and how authenticity creates internal and external challenges. Nevertheless, Tongans, New Zealanders and diasporic peoples should not rely on others to validate their identity because identities are constructed, shaped, and inevitably change over time. I can freely embrace being a Tongan and a New Zealander because I am the product of Tongan migrant parents to New Zealand and I was born in New Zealand. I am transnational and this gives me the freedom to relate to ethnic identity and national identity in ways that are meaningful to me.

I am transnational; I am diasporic; I am at liberty; and I am continuously navigating my ethnic and national identity between New Zealand and Tonga because Oceania gives me the opportunity to. “Oceania is vast, Oceania is expanding, Oceania is hospitable and generous, Oceania is humanity rising from the depths of brine and regions of fire deeper still, Oceania is us” (Hauofa, 1993, p. 16).

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Every now and then, we fall into the trap of thinking history is a simple thing. We circle a date, we read about what happened then, and we move on. We treat history as just another old and heavy book, destined to collect dust at the bottom of our bookshelves. But when we finally brush the dust off of history's surface and look inside, we realise it's much more complex than we could have ever imagined. The Faculty of Arts has long been dedicated to discovering the different ways history has made itself known, and how history shapes our lived experiences today. The essays selected for this chapter are a testament to these discoveries.

The beginning of this chapter explores the different forms through which historical narratives can be conveyed. It opens with a piece by Ponsaran, who utilises prose to respond to the Homeric Hymn to Demeter. Ponsaran tells this narrative through the first-person perspective of a character named Eudora, navigating the journey of a Greek girl growing into womanhood. Although Eudora's tale of struggle, triumph, and liberation is reflective of Ancient Greek society, the themes within it are still very accessible to a contemporary audience.

Turning away from fiction, Skinner's essay navigates the relationships between history, art, and the archive. Comparing the practices of Susan Hiller and Christine Hellyar, Skinner explores how archival practices have been relocated from museum settings into contemporary art. The essay draws our attention to how archival practices have been subverted through art, and why this subversion is necessary for providing a new lens on historical narratives.

From here, the chapter looks into historical narratives told through absence. Such is the case in Macdonald's essay. Here, Macdonald unearths the horror beneath Ann Shelton's photographs of New Zealand greenery, which have been strongly associated with the New Zealand Gothic. This essay points to Shelton's use of cropping and mirrored images as a means of revealing how memory shapes our understanding of tragic histories, even when they aren't laid bare before us.

Continuing the theme of history and absence is Cheuk's essay, where she discusses the embodiment of absence in the Melbourne Station Gallery's collection, *The Museum of There, Not There* (2020). Collected and curated by Patrick Pound, the collection features an array of objects found on eBay. Though the objects that comprise this collection show no connection to one another, Cheuk notes that their placement within the gallery space urges us to think of these objects as anything beyond the ordinary. Rather, these objects are traces of history which the viewers are left to decipher on their own.

The chapter concludes with a beautifully written piece by Romero De Medeiros. It is a beautiful story where history and memory become living entities, whose tumultuous relationship finds its way into the hands of a soldier in Moscow. The soldier's tale reminds us that the act of remembering history is far from easy. Memory is equally deceptive as it is alluring, shrouding our clarity with emotion. Though the feelings that come with memory are difficult, they are also necessary. Memory is the bridge between our past and our present, a crucial tool for looking back on the life long left behind.

History is a pathway that leads us to the past, but it's also so much more. Sometimes history stands neatly before us, stretching its hand outwards to shake ours. Sometimes history forgets formalities, choosing to haunt us from the shadows instead. Sometimes history is the simple mannerism, the catchphrase, the endearing habit we've unknowingly picked up. This chapter is a reminder that each form that history takes is one that we're lucky to encounter.

Shania Pablo

Ancient History 110G

Classical Mythology

Alev Andrea Ponsaran

Praise be to Lady Demeter!

Obscenities fill the air as though the Muses are singing a song to impart our gods' greatness. Harmonising with choruses of boisterous laughter, this practice of *aischrologia* is like music to my ears. I join the chorus of these untamed women, echoing words that we're deprived of in our daily lives. Society paints us like wild animals that need marriage for taming, and here, in the festival of Thesmophoria, we are running free in the wilderness. Right now, we are embodying the queenly Deo's burst of joy, through the light-heartedness of Iambe—shining a ray of light amid the darkness our goddess felt from losing her daughter, Kore, to Aides. Like Demeter and Kore, we are grieving, dealing with the ache that continues to fill our hearts that only us women can understand. In the midst of our platitudinal lives as citizen wives in Greece, this practice invokes a surge of energy; an empowerment that I rarely feel when confined within the walls of my husband's house. With the repression of womanhood in my mind, I passionately declare, "Men can go off to the crows!" As the words leave my mouth, I feel a weight lifted off my shoulders. The sensation washes over me, reminding me what it's like to genuinely feel at peace.

Having been married for five years, I did not realise how much I needed even five days of peace, away from my restrictive household and societal responsibilities. I indulge in the space around me, surrounded by my fellow women who, more or less, share the same restrictions. Here, we aren't just the subordinates of our husbands. Here, we aren't merely tools for reproduction.

"You are a gift to this world, Eudora," my mother used to tell me. Eudora. My name literally means "good gift." My mother was too young when she had me and the fact that we both lived was a gift to her and my father's life. At least, that's what she made me believe. I eventually learnt that the days I spent accomplishing my obligations as an obedient daughter was actually a lead-up to my transition into wifehood. As a young, naïve girl, I didn't know better until I learned that my father was to gift me to a man of his choosing. I was, after all, my parents' only daughter. I wasn't a blessing, I was just another burden to be dealt with.

I accepted the fate of being a bride at thirteen years of age. I learnt that there was nothing more honourable for a young Greek girl to have done, than to be the bridge that extends her natal family's connections. I would be lying if I said I did not despise the idea of leaving my own family. Though they may have given my hand out for marriage, I still love them dearly, especially my beloved mother. She ensured that my life was filled with optimism, even though our time together was mostly spent learning essential skills to prepare me for the day I was to become a wife. One of my favourite memories of her was how she brightened my days of learning household chores, by re-telling me stories of the divinities. Her words painted vibrant images of the realms beyond as I fulfilled mundane tasks at home. Of all those stories, it was the story of Demeter and Kore that I held close to me. Like them, my mother and I had the same bond, strengthened by unconditional love. It was this bond that made our separation harder, after my matrimony. But I was not to let this pain overcome the duties I have to fulfil for my family. I was especially not to detest the wishes of my father to give my hand in marriage. Kore herself did not detest her Father's will; and if she cannot escape her fate to become the bride that she was destined to be, then who was I to think that I had the right to escape mine?

Some days, I still ponder the wistful epithalamia sung on my wedding day. What if I dared to bring those verses to life? Although I know, deep down, that I wouldn't have done so for this was my destiny. It was the gods' will that we live in a balanced society where the men serve the land through their strength and profundity, while us women ensure that our civilisation continues to prosper for generations to come. It was this idea, that despite the freedom that the

festival provides for us, we prayed for guidance to be able to conform to society's perception of womanity. But even in sporadic moments, in the midst of praying for agricultural and personal fertility to ensure the prosperity of our cultural resources, we embrace the freedom that the festival of Thesmophoria bequeaths upon us. To us women, freedom can only be consumed by the spoonful, through our participation in these rituals. It was festivals like this where we can feel as though we belong to the nation we serve, even for a brief moment. It was festivals like this where we feel that the gods are in our favour.

As a wedded woman, I found solace through the guidance of the earth goddess and her daughter, the goddess of the Underworld. My faith in them granted me security that not only will I have a satisfying mortal life, but her Majesty, the Queen of the Underworld, has also blessed us with peace in the inevitable afterlife. They have bestowed upon us blessings that a simple Greek woman may not have been privileged to attain. Praise Demeter, indeed, for it was through her motherly sacrifice that we are rewarded with bliss as we journey through life. The sacrifice she made by giving her daughter's hand in marriage to her brother assuaged our anxieties of the unknown. Through these rituals, we are now sanctified. In worshipping her name to ensure that she is gratified, our society, in turn, has been nurtured by her.

I stood among the crowd, reflecting on the past few days wherein I prayed, I sacrificed, and above all, I basked in the freedom of being able to express myself as an individual and a member of a community that shared the same desire for a coveted life. Before this, I dreaded the uncertainty of the future. But here, at the festival of Thesmophoria, I am nourished. I inhale the fresh breeze around me, caressing my stomach with one hand. I look up to the sky, filled with gratitude. I'm here not just to thank her for her blessings to our society, but also to thank her for this little gift of fecundity. No matter what happens from here, I am at peace knowing that I have been purified through Her grace, ready for what's to come.

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This article discusses the profanities used by the Greeks in antiquity, which I drew inspiration from to create a dialogue in the scene of *aischrologia*, creatively emphasising the conservativeness of their culture. This reading stated that the most common profanity used in antiquity was “To the crows!” which was their closest equivalent to “Go to Hell!”

Foley, H. (1994). Background: The Eleusinian Mysteries and Women’s Rites for Demeter. In H. Foley (Ed.), *The Homeric “Hymn to Demeter”: Translation, Commentary, and Interpretive Essays* (pp. 65–75). Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt3fgxdk.9>

A brief description of the rituals within the festival of Thesmophoria was described in this resource. I utilised this to establish the setting of the narration. It also helped me decide on my character’s background, giving her attributes relevant to the nature of Thesmophoria participants.

Foley, H. (1994) “Part 2. Interpretive Essay on the Homeric Hymn to Demeter.” In H. Foley (Ed.), *The Homeric “Hymn to Demeter”: Translation, Commentary, and Interpretive Essays* (pp. 79–178). Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt3fgxdk.9>

This in-depth analysis of the fundamental concepts of Demeter myths and how these were reflected in women’s experiences and values, assisted in broadening my understanding of the Hymn. I expressed this by incorporating Eudora’s negative perceptions of marriage, her personal relationships, and influences of her culture’s composition.

Johnston, S.I. (2013). Demeter, Myths, and the Polyvalence of Festivals. *History of Religions*, 52(4), 370–401. doi: 10.1086/669646

The versatility of Demeter’s rites provided different platforms to its participants, enriching the foundations of their ancient tradition, as well as ensuring the durability of their myths and rituals. Its rites exhibit the four key functions as demonstrated through Demeter’s gifts of agriculture, marriage and fertility, security in the afterlife, and women’s empowerment. I focused on the three latter functions. The exclusivity of Thesmophoria may imply the prioritisation of these functions because it provides a space where women could freely express themselves and receive gifts which they aren’t privileged with in their normal lives in ancient Greece.

Lewis, S. (2011). Women and Myth. In K. Dowden & N. Livingstone (Eds.), *A Companion to Greek Mythology* (pp. 443–456). Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. Retrieved from <https://doi-org.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/10.1002/9781444396942.ch23>

Myths can provide guidelines for how women were expected to act, and suggest consequences for the disobedience of these guidelines. I emphasised this idea through Eudora’s inner abhorrence of her misogynist society, using the festival of the Thesmophoria as a form of escapism. Conformity to myths’ perception of women was implied towards the end, where she circles back to her fulfilment of her societal duties. Her pregnancy revelation shows that despite her opposition, she still embraced her obligation to appease her natal family and to maintain the gender balance in her household, showing the limited power women held in ancient Greece.

Powell, B. (2012). Myths of Fertility: Demeter and Related Myths. In B. Powell (Ed.) *Classical Myth*. 7th int. ed. translations by H.M. Howe (pp. 236–254). Boston: Pearson.

Various concepts presented by the Hymn were used as an inspiration for the story of Eudora such as the significance of the mother-daughter relationship, emphasis on women's functions and duties to society, humanisation of divine experience to normalise certain practices, and the blessings bestowed by Demeter in their mortal lives and thereafter. With these ideas, I demonstrated my understanding of how myths can reflect the culture of ancient Greece, which complements the findings discussed within the previous resources.

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Ways of Seeing Contemporary Art

Isabella Skinner

Contemporary Artists, Their Artwork, and the Notion of the Archive

Archival practices within contemporary art have been adapted from many practices seen in museum settings. Archival artists question found objects or images and translate the meanings into their own unique presentation. This essay aims to compare two artists and their artworks, inspired by the archive, and put into question how they both adapt and oppose conventional uses of the archive system. The first artist, Susan Hiller, has been well-known for her curating of notable pieces inspired by the ideologies of Freud, which is seen in her work, *From the Freud Museum* (1991–96). New Zealand artist Christine Hellyar takes the museum exhibition concept and transforms it into an installation piece that celebrates the power of women, in her 1982 work, *Tool Trays*. The two artists have differing presentation styles and historical backgrounds, as seen in the collections of artifacts within their work. Several other factors are present that they have in common which should also be considered when exploring contemporary artists in relation to the archive.

In order to understand the influences of archival art, it is effective to look into just what makes up a typical archive. Merewether (2006) states that “the archive [...] constitutes a repository or ordered system of documents and records, both verbal and visual, that is the foundation from which history is written” (p. 10). The term ‘archive’ is bound tightly to the museum environment, as these are places where historical documents, monuments, and photographs are kept and displayed (Artspace, 2014). Historical knowledge and forms of remembrance are collected, stored, and recovered in archives. Event traces and testimonies have encouraged a reconsideration of the archive’s role; it is viewed as a contested subject and medium in itself. This links to Breakell’s (2008) view that while we may know the origin of a trace, future meanings aren’t fixed and up for interpretation in whatever way the viewer chooses. Hiller’s and Hellyar’s will be discussed in greater detail because they both relate to these ideologies present in archival presentation. *Tool Trays* are effective pieces of art allowing viewers to understand order and organisation. Yet it also is a sight of remembrance for working women; an exhibit-like display of activities that now, in the present time, ‘seem strange’ (Auckland Art Gallery, 2020). *From the Freud Museum* is about placing historical moments and artifacts in a story-book fashion, to present a strong narrative to the audience. The similarities between the two artists and artworks will be discussed first, followed by their differences.

A number of similarities are present when the viewers are first confronted by the artworks. Obviously, both display the artifacts in boxes. Many of these artifacts are everyday objects; things that viewers can identify with in one way or another. While narratives are interwoven throughout both artworks, there is encouragement in thinking between the lines and discovering the possible connections with the historical moments. Both feature things that have historical or anthropological significance (Anderson, 2013), particularly in the form of the objects, yet still retain contemporary relevance juxtaposed with the images of historical significance. Foster (2004) sees archival art as a genre that makes historical information often lost or displaced, physically present. Archival artists elaborate on the found image and object, and favour the installation format. This can happen in the form of projects dealing with real archival material (as seen in Hiller’s work) or artworks in which artists use the archive as a theme (sometimes even inventing material). The latter is clear in *Tool Trays*, where the box is placed in the middle of the floor and the audience can walk around it and gauge differing perspectives and angles.

Although both artworks are considered ‘archival’ because of the subject matter, the way in which each artist presents their work is different. Hiller’s work is displayed in a more traditional museum setting with each of the fifty boxes positioned behind glass windows. This ‘barrier’ puts space between the art and the viewer. There is some sort of distance at play, as it almost implies that the objects are too precious to be up close and personal. Hellyar’s work is more ‘interactive’ in the

sense that viewers can walk around the trays laid out on the floor of the gallery and see it from a variety of angles and perspectives. There are different stages of viewing depending on the viewer's level and their distance from the artwork, signifying Hellyar's desire to challenge the "customary eye level presentation" commonly seen in exhibits (Google Arts & Culture, n.d.). *From the Freud Museum* is placed in a way that makes audiences start from one end and go to the other whilst looking at each box; there is more control present over this type of display technique compared to *Tool Trays* in which audiences choose how they look at it. Hiller's work is considered to be a between-system archival work. The production involves transporting things from one place to another, as the artifacts are inspired by what appears in the Freud Museum.


Taking a focus on *From the Freud Museum*, we can ascertain the cultural meanings behind the various objects placed within the boxes in the display. Merewether (2006) says that archival objects gathered together, usually in a pattern, act as devices that have the effect of aiding the memory. Hiller's work undoubtedly does this as there are important associations made with both the text and object as well as the layout of each box in relation to each other. It also recalls Freud's comparison of his method of 'working through' the concealed layers of the unconscious mind with the task of the archaeologist (Merewether, 2006). An important concept of the archive is whether the art is within-system or between-system. In an art context, within-system is something that refers to itself whereas between-system is something that refers to another concept or setting. As mentioned previously, the work functions on the premise of the between-system concept. Her series of objects are placed inside the confines of the Freud Museum collection, so is essentially a collection within another. It creates a series of complicated relationships between images, words and objects creating an extended metaphor for the human mind (Minissale, 2013). This relation to each other is created by the existing perception of the mind's superordinate categories, which also create subcategories. Hence, meanings are formed by this in-depth web of various branches of categories and groups that people put things into. The viewers are asked to visualise systems of political, cultural, and economic influence as they help to produce art collections (Minissale, 2013). Automatically, the between-system style of Hiller's art refers to other means of production; in this case, the ideologies of Freud and the ways in which she challenges and interrogates his theories.

In contrast to *From the Freud Museum*, Christine Hellyar's pieces *Tool Trays*, encompasses more of a materiality aspect seen within archiving. The objects have a textural dimension to them, rather than just being placed behind a glass window for people to view. It takes the appearance of a sculptural piece of art but one that has historical significance, particularly in women's studies. Merewether's (2006) discussion on measuring relations between past and present comes into play when looking at *Tool Trays*. There is a strong connection made between the actual event (the women's labour) and evidence of it happening (the tools themselves). By using real things and making copies of them, Hellyar asks us to consider the way we use objects as 'evidence' or markers of history, memory, and knowledge (Te Papa, n.d.). Minissale (2013) elaborates on this by saying that some artworks, such as *Tool Trays*, emphasise relations between objects rather than the valuing of the formal properties of the objects themselves. The way the artifacts are 'contained' is unique to Hellyar's artwork. Rather than using the common form of displaying on shelves, she decided to utilise various containers to present the objects inside. She uses a mixture of deep wooden boxes, Perspex cylinders, food display cases, and China cabinets (Te Papa, n.d.). There is an interesting paradox when considering what these forms of containment may represent. They may at first, assume the feeling of security and nurturing but at a closer look might be seen as 'boxed-in.' This link to emotions ties into Hellyar's concern for the environment and how people have abused it in the past, relating to concepts of culture and human activity. This reminds viewers that museums have traditionally studied and presented indigenous societies as a series of archaeological artifacts, removed from any emotional or spiritual framework.

Both *From the Freud Museum* and *Tool Trays* present to the viewer a collection of carefully crafted objects and moments in history. Hiller's and Hellyar's work show a form of objectifying different kinds of people and demonstrating to art audiences why certain artifacts are imposed into certain spaces. They have both taken traditional archival components but turned them upside down in order to make a statement. In the case of Hiller, it is about creating a narrative based on the influences of Freud, while Hellyar wants to acknowledge and celebrate women's lives in the past. They have both taken a viewpoint on how historical narratives are interwoven into regular museum and archival spaces and the ways in which they can adapt them to better reflect what has actually taken place in human history. For Hiller, she recodes and criticises some of the Freudian theories, while Hellyar expresses how important it is to showcase the lives of women in historical contexts.

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Contemporary Art in Aotearoa NZ

Madi Macdonald

Embodying Notions of the Unease: A Study on Ann Shelton's Photography

CONTENT WARNING: This article contains mention of institutionalisation, lobotomy, and electroshock therapy.

Ann Shelton's photography practice embodies notions of 'unease' through examining the themes of memory, trauma, place, and history. In both *Cell (After An Angel at My Table)* and *Doublet (After Heavenly Creatures)*, Shelton explores ideas of this unease in relation to trauma, femininity, and the landscape. In *Landschaft The Bridge to Nowhere*, Shelton captures the unease in the impact that early settler had on the New Zealand landscape, a concept which also relates to the New Zealand Gothic. Often working in series, Shelton uses techniques of absence and doubling in her photographs to examine ideas of memory and collective consciousness as she asks the viewer to construct the meaning in some of New Zealand's forgotten histories. Shelton is interested in the way doubling, coupling and inversion can be used as formal devices "to disrupt a particular dominant visual system, and in how this visual stammering might change the cognition or reception of images conceptually—suggesting an uncertainty, violence or a kind of duplicity" (Shelton, 2010). Shelton is also interested in the way that this doubling challenges traditional histories of photographic practice as a break from the idea that photography acts as authentic representation.



Figure 1. Shelton, A. (2003). *Cell (After An Angel at My Table)* [Diptych, C type prints]. Retrieved from <https://www.annshelton.com/works/public-places>

Shelton's *Cell (After an Angel at My Table)* (2003) (Fig. 1) is a photograph of Seacliff Asylum in North Otago, New Zealand. The image is printed correctly on one side, then doubled and printed in mirror reverse on the other side. The building is derelict, emerging from the centre of the picture plane with groups of trees at either end and an unkept lawn stretched in front of the building towards the viewer. There is an immediate sense of unease from the abandoned building, drawing on regionalist tropes of an unpeopled landscape and calling attention to the forgotten state of the property. This work is part of Shelton's series *Public Places*, which documents different places across New Zealand with histories of violent trauma, especially in relation to femininity and the landscape. This series explores how seemingly ordinary places can suddenly hold different meaning when their histories are revealed.

The Seacliff Asylum was a well-known Victorian-era psychiatric hospital built in the late nineteenth century. In his film *Cinema of Unease*, Sam Neil (1995) states that the twentieth century was a paranoid time for New Zealand, with 'madness' being the greatest fear of all. Psychiatric hospitals were notorious in society, seen as an ever-present threat, and everyone seemed to know someone who had ended up in one (Neil, 1995). By using the 'after'

terminology in the title, Shelton is specifically referring to New Zealand author Janet Frame's autobiography *An Angel at my Table* (later turned into a film) in which Frame writes about her experience whilst being a patient at the Seacliff Asylum. Frame spent years at the hospital where she was misdiagnosed with schizophrenia and received electroshock therapy, with her planned lobotomy only cancelled when her first book was awarded a national literary prize.

The doubling of the image represents the violence in this work that is not immediately visible, whilst the diptych format with the gap in between the two images leaves room for the viewer to examine this abandoned building and wonder what has happened here. Shelton calls this the "gap between perception and cognition," and states that this technique asks the viewer to think about what they are really seeing (Shelton et al., 2003). David Craig (2004) states that images such as these of abandoned notorious New Zealand psychiatric hospitals 'function as haunted houses, full of "if these walls could speak" terrors of pathology and madness.' The mirroring of the two photos creates shapes out of the clouds, creating an effect like the Rorschach ink blot tests used in psychology. Beyond this, the inverting of the image represents the inversion of the hospital as a place of mistreatment and trauma rather than care, which is also reflected in the way the building has received no care, resulting in its derelict state in the photograph. This image also draws on themes of memory, with darker aspects of New Zealand's history often forgotten.



Figure 2. Shelton, A (2001). *Doublet (After Heavenly Creatures)* [C type prints]. Retrieved from <https://www.annshelton.com/works/public-places>

Doublet (After Heavenly Creatures) (2001) (Fig. 2) is another work in Shelton's *Public Places* series. Again, Shelton has printed one photograph correctly, then doubled and inverted the other. Pictured is a gravel path through a group of dense trees with bark and leaves strewn across the path. Put together, the paths create a kind of fork in the road, leaving the viewer with the choice of whether or not to dive deeper into the work and construct the meaning. However, the sky is not visible, which adds to the sense that the only choice is for the viewer to go deeper into the work. For this work, Shelton uses the 'after' terminology in the title to refer to another important film in New Zealand's cinematic history—Peter Jackson's *Heavenly Creatures*. This film tells the story of the Parker-Hulme murder in Christchurch, where two teenage girls brutally murdered one of their mothers. The title reveals that this photograph is of the Port Hills in Christchurch where the crime took place, creating a sense of unease by revealing this path as the site of trauma.

However, as Shelton explains in an interview about this work with the Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa (2011), she cannot be sure that this is the *exact* site of the murder. Charlotte Huddleston (2005) argues that Shelton's documentary style of photography often holds the authority of truth, but the true location of past actions often remains unconfirmed. Huddleston argues that this reflects a further layer of temporality to Shelton's works, that although this image speaks to the trauma of the crime, it is not a photo of the crime itself. It is a form of memorialising the event, and thus the photo acts as an object in itself, introducing an element of phenomenology into the work. As Shelton (2011) states, she does not put the urban myth in the image but alludes to it through the absence. Absence functions as a different way of looking—not based on looking at the actual event. "Her images depict places bearing the marks of habitation that contain the past, they are filled with invisible but somehow tangible information and, of course, they are filled with loss" (Huddleston, 2005). Obviously, there is a sense of unease in memorialising such dark histories. Robert Leonard (2008) argues that in actively remembering histories such as the Parker-Hulme murder, New Zealand is responding to a fear of being benign. This paints the New Zealand Gothic as a kind of dark self-identification, "an expression of who we are but also of who we don't [sic] want to be" (Leonard, 2008). In doubling the image, Shelton is doubling the importance of this murder in New Zealand's history.



Figure 3. Shelton, A. (2007). *Landschaft The Bridge to Nowhere* [Diptych, C type prints]. Retrieved from <https://www.annshelton.com/works/wastelands>

This idea of unease within New Zealand's self-identity is further explored in *Landschaft The Bridge to Nowhere* (2007) (Fig. 3). In it, a bridge stretches through a valley of abundant native New Zealand greenery. The bridge is obvious, immediately calling attention to the presence of man in this otherwise untouched landscape. This work is part of Shelton's *a ride in the darkness* series, which explores notions of early settler impact on New Zealand. There is an immediate sense of unease in this photograph, especially as the title calls attention to the bridge leading to nowhere, removing its fundamental function as a means to get from one place to another. This can be seen to embody a kind of Duchampian ready-made, taking an object out of its functional context in an uncomfortable and anxious way. The doubling calls attention to this anomaly, and as Stephen Turner (2010) states, "two bridges get you somewhere no better than one." Again, this photograph is site specific, as pointed out in the title. This bridge is situated in the Mangapurua Valley in Whanganui, which was 'opened' in 1917 to provide cheap land for soldiers returning from the First World War (Shelton & Turner, 2010). The settlement encountered problems of infertile soil, remoteness, and difficulty of access which meant that

the roads to and from the bridge did not materialise and people slowly migrated out of the area, deeming the settlement a failure (Shelton & Turner, 2010).

Failed settlements such as this became known as ‘wastelands,’ a source of controversy in New Zealand’s colonial history. Turner argues that these wastelands exist as a negative impact, a failure to create ‘somewhere,’ therefore creating a ‘nowhere’ instead (Shelton & Turner, 2010). However, “Māori names, sites and claims signify that somewhere was not ‘nowhere’ or ‘nothing’ before second settlement” (Shelton & Turner, 2010). This image therefore points to the vast amounts of Māori land confiscated through the Native Land Court for Pākehā settlement, and the way that settlement stories such as this one are remembered. This is something that is particularly important in current debates around decolonisation, and as Jo Smith (2011) states, is inherent to New Zealand identity. For Smith (2011), this is the New Zealand Gothic, that “somewhat akin to an obsessive-compulsive disorder, the settler nation is deeply vexed by its own precarious identity.” Shelton’s doubled photograph therefore functions as a ‘double-take’ at New Zealand history, an attempt to consider silent histories and the impact that the dominant Pākehā culture has had in establishing both place and people (Turner, 2015).

In conclusion, these three photographs by Ann Shelton embody notions of unease by representing uncomfortable New Zealand histories. By doubling the images, Shelton disturbs a standard reading of the images and uses the device of absence to involve the viewer in constructing the meaning of each work. Each work explores the themes of trauma, loss, and time, asking us to think about what is remembered and how memories are reported (Turner, 2015). By doubling the images, Shelton is also creating works that operate as mirrors between construction and truth, invoking the project of myth making and foregrounding the role of the camera in the construction of representation (Shelton et al., 2003). Each photo, although representing a specific time and place, is taken after the fact and therefore “paradoxically, there is nothing there; nothing but a banal and empty site” (Shelton et al., 2003).

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English 718

Opening the Archive

Jennifer Cheuk

The Museum of There, Not There: A Case Study on Absence

Situated in the Melbourne Station Gallery, *The Museum of There, Not There* (2020) is a found object collection that embodies the concept of absence: Each of the objects in this archive are linked by their physical expression of absence. The criteria for *The Museum of There, Not There* is: “The Object must refer to a thing, event, person or circumstance that is either there, or not there, with priority given to those that have managed both” (Parlane, 2020). Patrick Pound, more the archivist and curator than creator, sources the objects from eBay, an online archival market. Furthermore, because it is an art gallery piece, *The Museum of There, Not There* is there from the 24th of April and not there from the 23rd of May onwards, operating ironically under its own philosophy. The purpose of this archive is to chronicle gaps and absences, archiving objects that have become un-indexed traces.

The Museum of There, Not There is displayed as an array of objects on the floor of an art gallery. A space has been cleared in the middle of these objects for visitors to walk through. The intended access to this archive has been interrupted by COVID-19 restrictions, adding another layer of absence to Pound’s art piece. Parlance comments on this, referring to the cleared space as being for the “exhibition’s (non-existent) visitors” (Parlane, ibid.). Beyond functional access, there is also the matter of social access. Sarah Gory notes that accessing this archive during a pandemic “feels indulgent, luxurious even” (Gory, 2020). Gory is focussing on the opportunity to be doing something purely for enjoyment during a pandemic. However, her comment unknowingly highlights the deep-rooted privilege of these spaces. During a time where survival is of utmost importance to most, some people are able to take the time to go to museums or art galleries, perhaps even peruse artwork online. Likely unintended, Pound’s archive comments on this social absence. There is always a contrast of who is present and who is absent in galleries, museums, and archives. This is also reflected in the curatorial decisions to omit stories from women, people of colour, LGBTQI+ communities, and lower socio-economic classes. A pandemic, however, highlights the limited social access to these spaces of privilege. More people will be concerned with basic levels of survival, and it becomes more obvious who can and cannot access these spaces. Pound’s (unintentional) opening during COVID-19 adds another layer of absence to his archive. This absence of access does not only comment on functional access, but also social access.

The concept of authority and ownership also pervade archive and gallery spaces thickly. *The Museum of There, Not There* acknowledges these concepts. As the objects have been sourced from eBay, the original ‘owners’ of the objects willingly sold them. The question arises: Are they now owned by Patrick Pound? Perhaps yes, from the standpoint of a legal economic exchange. But, perhaps no, from the standpoint of context and history. These objects were acquired or passed down to the (anonymous) eBay sellers for a reason. This poses an interesting question about ownership: Do these objects change ownership with the exchange of money, or, like taonga, are they simply being borrowed and shared, never really owned by anyone?

The idea of ownership is further challenged in Pound’s choice to not have labels. Unlike a conventional archive or museum there is no indication of the place, person, or context behind these objects. In *The Museum of There, Not There*, the objects exist in pure liminality. Finigan (2020) compares archives and museums to graveyards, but even graveyards have tombstones and epitaphs. Pound’s archive is more similar, perhaps quite upsettingly, to a potter’s field, or a mass unmarked grave. However, the absence of epitaph or label is actually very necessary for Pound’s conceptual archive. It has been established that these objects all embody absence in different ways. But step back, the object as a whole is an absence. It is an absence of place or people. Where did these objects come from? Who made them, who found them, who sold them? The objects are liminal, they exist in a permanent state of contextual absence. Finigan

also comments that “objects in museums are often lost or divorced from their context” (Finigan, 2020). They are no longer indexically traced to any person or any place. The object as an object is already one of absence. The moment it was placed in this archive, without a gesture to its home and its people, the object became absent. But to contrast, are these objects gaining archival history by being placed in the archive? The people that walk by and feel drawn to a certain object, is that a new history being embedded into the layers of the object? The archive divorces an object from its identity, but it simultaneously produces an identity as well. Pound’s work considers how archival spaces disconnect from, rather than connect with, people and place. He confronts this idea by paying no homage to how he has ‘inherited’ these pieces. The artwork also raises questions of how monetary transactions change the status of ownership.

The Museum of There, Not There contains two objects of most interest to me: The Bay necktie and the tube of vanishing cream. I have chosen these two objects because they encode a fundamental philosophy of the archive: that there are different types of absence. It has been established that *The Museum of There, Not There* is an inventory of something that is conceptually absent. The objects there, tell a story that is not there. However, the feeling we get from the Guantanamo Bay necktie is not the same feeling when we look at the vanishing cream. The difference is actually to do with the indexical relationship between consequent and antecedent. An antecedent is an entity that originates or precedes another entity, this second entity being the consequent. The necktie from Guantanamo Bay is a consequent with an absent antecedent, whereas the vanishing cream is an antecedent with an absent consequent. There is an asymmetry between these two concepts because the consequent cannot exist without its referent antecedent. Conversely, the antecedent can exist wholly by itself.



Pound, P. (2020). *Guantanamo Bay Necktie* [Found object]. Melbourne Station Gallery: Melbourne.

The necktie is of importance in the archive because it is an inverse absence. We only know there is an absence because of the presence of the object. The object is indexing Guantanamo Bay, but Guantanamo Bay is something that is deliberately hidden, or kept absent from the public sphere. Therefore, the necktie indexes something that is ‘not there.’ The object is a consequent to an absent antecedent. This may evoke an inextricable feeling of discomfort. This is because an indexed object can never logically come into existence without its antecedent: The necktie disrupts our understanding of reference. The necktie is an empty reference point that can only reflect back on itself indefinitely; a sort of *mise-en-abyme*. This can be explained through linguistic anaphora: The Guantanamo necktie is like using an anaphoric pronoun

(himself, herself) without a referent e.g. “Himself looked at himself.” It feels unsettling and as though you are staring into a void (hence the *mise-en-abyme*). The necktie is also a logical contradiction, a case of $p \ \& \ \sim p$.¹ The necktie exists in front of us, but it’s history and context are non-existent. Its context has been erased or kept hidden from our collective memory. This makes us question whether the object should exist at all. The contradiction between an object that refers back to nothingness is what creates discomfort. To see this necktie is to see an absence. It is the contradiction of presence and absence existing all at once. Interestingly, the antecedent absence is what makes the surviving consequent particularly powerful. It emphasises that events or memories can be erased or deleted intentionally.

It is in this object we are reminded that “archives are less like mirrors than like chessboards” (Yale, 2015). The necktie is a physical remnant of the manipulation and power within our memory machinery. The memory machinery, as Turner (2011) explains, are the historians and archivists, or any form of constructed memory keeping, that seek to maintain a particular narrative. They are in charge of shaping a collective memory. Memory is a powerful threat; our individual memories need to be contained within a larger memory machinery in order to maintain a collective social narrative. For this to be maintained, some histories must be deleted. The human rights violations in Guantanamo Bay are a prime example of how history can be deleted for political reasons. So, when we see an object, like the Guantanamo Bay necktie, that has been erased by the machine, it is almost upsetting. It is an “algorithmic glitch” (Pound, 2020) that presents itself before us. It is the trace of a ghost; spectral and uncanny. The necktie represents a type of object that refers back to an event or people or thing that has been erased (or attempted to be erased). Regardless of if they have been successfully deleted from our mnemonic search history, we achieve erasure by deeming them ‘taboo,’ or we simply do not talk about these things comfortably. The Guantanamo bay necktie is a remnant of constructed absence. A ghostly glitch in the system.

However, objects such as the Guantanamo Bay necktie are necessary in archives and in museums *because* of the discomfort they evoke. The productive discomfort achieved by this Necktie forces us to confront the memory machinery we exist in. When we come across an object that seems to refer back to nothing, the discomfort we feel is not from the object itself. It is from the fact its antecedent has been actively erased. It is from the fact we realize our memories (both collective and individual) are shaped and moulded by the memory machinery. Museums and archives are not about curating objects, they are about curating memories and thoughts. It feels appropriate here to consider Derrida’s comment that archives “name at once the *commencement* and the *commandment*” (Derrida, 1996). In the creation of an archive, or any type of memory machinery, there is the commandment of social order and authority: What can remain, and what must be erased.

¹ A given proposition could be true (p), or false ($\sim p$). Hence, $p \& \sim p$ demonstrates the same proposition being both true and false simultaneously, representing a logical contradiction.



Pound, P. (2020). Tube of Vanishing Cream [Found object]. Melbourne Station Gallery: Melbourne.

Conversely, the tube of vanishing cream encodes a different kind of absence: one that exists without any further external information. As discussed before, this object is already an antecedent. It exists by itself fully without any discomfort. This object's concept of absence is not predicated on an event or person or any consequent for that matter. Nothing is missing. It embodies absence through the very nature of itself. If we use the linguistic anaphora explanation again, it would be similar to saying "John looked." John, as an entity, exists without any problem, just as the vanishing cream exists as its own entity. This object encodes absence without the need for anything more. The Guantanamo Bay necktie needs another entity to understand its absence. It can only encode absence in the context of its indexical trace (or lack thereof). The nature of the vanishing cream is one of absence already. Its essence as an acne "vanishing" cream already encodes a desire for something to go away; to be absent. Another object of this type are the "barely there" women's briefs. It is interesting that these objects seem to be related to the body and to appearance. Similar to the Guantanamo Bay tie, the vanishing cream raises the question again: What can remain and what must be erased? These objects place the body into a realm of politics.

I have chosen the necktie and the vanishing cream to show the stark contrast between the objects in Pound's archive. One is a political absence shaped by the memory machinery. The other is simply an ontological absence: the very nature of this object rides on making things disappear. But beyond the concept of absence these objects share, they are completely unrelated. Looking through Pound's archive, it becomes an obsessive game to be able to find absence in these objects. You want to see the thread of connection, otherwise it all feels arbitrary and strange. Without that thread, you are simply looking at a room full of nothingness: objects with an absence of meaning or purpose. You started to question why? Why am I here looking at these things if there is no meaning?

The archive, the museum and the art gallery are interesting because the space itself is *needed* to form meaning. These spaces are matrices that give birth to connection. A matrix is a place from which something originates or develops. Geologists understand a matrix to be the soil in which a fossil is found. Etymologically, the word "matrix" is connected to *mater* or mother. The archive is like a womb. It not only protects the elements inside, but it also connects them through the common space of the archive. All archives are simply made up of random things. It is the archivist or the *mater* who transforms them into a collection. Our brains work through

patterns—we even learn language through probability and statistics, a process named “statistical learning” (qtd. In Hoff, 2008). We look for connections everywhere we go, and we arrange the world around us into sets. Perhaps we are looking for the matrix that everything originates from, or takes form in, and archives are a way for us to reconcile with our endless search for *mater*—for the mother or the originator. Archives are also a way for us to *play* mother and to make sense of chaos. Pound’s archive is particularly relevant here because he is categorising objects through the topological thread of nothingness, of what is *not there*. It is almost a joke, a mockery of our natural search for connections and patterns. And yet, the most miraculous thing is that we still do find connections between the objects in Pound’s archive, even when the connecting thread is something as figurative and conceptual as “absence.” The archive envelops and embraces these disconnected objects. If you walk into a room full of arbitrarily chosen objects and are told it is archive, your perception of the objects shifts. As Derrida says, “[documents] are kept and classified under the title of the archive by virtue of a privileged topology” (Derrida, 1996). The humanmade space of the archive is a matrix. The objects within the archive’s embrace are related simply because they exist together in the archive. The archive is our feverish need for connection, for meaning and for purpose. But, as Derrida subtly conveys through the word “privileged,” it is also our feverish need for authority, order and power.

The Museum of There, Not There is an archival art piece by Patrick Pound, where each object is chosen for its embodiment of absence. The objects have been acquired through eBay, an online marketplace. This is interesting as it raises questions of ownership, particularly when an exchange of money has taken place. The two objects of inquiry were chosen for their contrasting representations of absence. The Guantanamo Bay necktie and vanishing cream showcase the difference in objects that have been chosen for the archive. These two objects force us to think about collections and archives in general, as places where random things have been connected through the matrix of the archive.

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Arts Scholars 100A/B

Arts Scholars 1

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The First Historian

I

There was a book.

It sat on a pedestal in the hallway of the passage of time. None preceded it. Now, none will follow. It chronicles all that was and what is. It is the story without precedent. Long ago, all could skim and explore the pages prior to theirs. The book was worn from the curious fingers of generations thirsty for the truth.

The stories read spread far and wide. As they passed down family trees, History became a mother. She had a beautiful and hideous baby. She was born prematurely, so she is never complete. She made up for this, however, in passion.

Memory was an emotional child. She cried for lost lives and wounded men on the bad days. She rejoiced the beauty of the Earth on good ones. One day, History was very brutal. The Earth ran red. Memory up above cried until she flooded the hallway. History and her daughter drowned.

History unbound and fell apart. Its ink smudged and became hard to read. Its pages descended like birds to every corner of the Earth. Some hid under the Earth, cosy among the monuments of times long gone. Others stayed on the surface. Some within you, if you look hard enough.

Now that History is everywhere, she is hard to find.

Her pages are seldom read. They are few and sparse. So, to all, the past is really unknown. So, people do not understand. They do not understand anything. They are confused, because they have picked the story up in its middle. Strange chapters. No History. No story. They cannot read the chapters that came before. It is sad.

They are all cursed, living in the illusion that the story started when they were born.

II

It is a cold night in Moscow and the Soldier is standing by the river. His feet are freezing. It is the dead of winter and he has no socks. He is praying for warmth. His toes will fall off.

Miraculously, warmth comes. The cobble beneath his feet is as gentle as grass. The pasture, the sunlight, of his childhood home curls around his toes. The river he stands by is the stream he swum in only some years ago. His blue feet calm.

The Soldier knows it is Memory emerging from the water. She is beautiful and warm. There is no more pain. Only sunlight.

He looks up at the stars, and then Memory in her eyes. Tonight, he will run.

They run together. He runs home, past the guards, unafraid. There is little left to lose here.

His mother's smile drives the feet beneath him. The bakery two streets down from school. They took it all away. Memory will not let him forget. The beauty of home. They took it all away. But he is on his way.

It is a treacherous escape. There are spies everywhere. But with him, in every river, every stream, every tear, every raindrop, is Memory. Sometimes she pains him with memories of Moscow. They are as terrifying as home is warm. It makes him angry. Terribly angry.

Memory blinds him with tears, she sets him alight with rain. Every other day, his heart gets heavier, with love, and equal hatred.

When the Soldier turns the street that leads to his beautiful home his heart is beating so fast. Here it is. He wants Mom. Home. Bread. Socks. He turns the corner. Mom. Home. Bread. Socks. Socks. Socks. Socks for summer. Spring. Autumn. Winter.

There it is.

Green pasture beneath his feet. Soft sunlight. And the wooden front door. He is almost blinded with love and relief and hatred.

And then, Memory sets his heart on fire.

He falls to the ground. The grass tickles his knees. It is no longer warm.

III

With Memory there is a lot of deception. It is the common cause of idealism. Memory is poetry, totems, and tales. She destructingly simplifies the work of time. She is as hideous as she is lovely.

The soldier looks at the hole in his chest. He does not understand. He also does not know he is at a crossroads in time.

When he is ready to look again, he realizes a page has fallen out from his chest. He sits and reads. He did not even know he was thirsty for the truth. It explains too much.

If there is one, there must be others.

Memory was warm, comforting, beautiful. But she was also untrue, and contradictory. All passion. He does not abandon Memory because he knows she is the way to her Mother.

Now, the Soldier has embarked on a lifelong journey. He looks for History wherever he goes. He is the one of few who tries. In fact, he is the first.

He is not only a truth-seeker but an understander. He unearths pages and reads. And reads. He tries to understand. He really tries. He knows he is confused because has not read the pages that have come before. He tries to find them.

Someday, he may break the curse. He understands that many pages that have come before his.

He will not read them all. But he will try.

He is the first Historian.

